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All political argument employs political concepts. They provide the building
blocks needed to construct a case for or against a given political position. Is
development aid too low, income tax too high, pornography violence against
women, or mass bombing unjust? Any response to topical questions such as
these involves developing a view of what individuals are entitled to, what they
owe to others, the role of individual choice and responsibility in these matters,
and so on. These views, in their turn, imply a certain understanding of concepts
like rights, equality and liberty, and their relationship to each other. People of
different political persuasions interpret these key concepts of politics in differ-
ent ways. This book introduces students to some of the main interpretations,
pointing out their various strengths and weaknesses.
Older texts on political concepts sought to offer neutral definitions that
should be accepted by everyone, regardless of their political commitments and
values.1 Unfortunately, this task proved harder than many had believed. For
example, a common argument of this school was that it was a misuse of the
term ‘freedom’ to suggest that people who lacked the resources to read books
were unfree to read them. What one ought to say was that such people were
unable to read them. Individuals were only unfree to read books if they were
legally prohibited or physically prevented from doing so. However, as Ian Carter
shows in his chapter, this is not an issue that can be settled by attending to
actual linguistic practice, no matter how carefully. Most theorists do distinguish
between freedom and ability, but many dispute the view that a lack of resources
is necessarily a matter of inability rather than unfreedom. For instance, some
people would argue that the uneven distribution of such resources typically
results from unjust social arrangements that could and should be rectified and
as such has implications for judgements about the extent of a person’s freedom.
States can provide free education and libraries, say, rather than leaving the
provision of schooling and books solely to the market. They contend that delib-
erately withholding such public provision would constitute a form of coercion,
similar in kind to state censorship. In this dispute, disagreement over the 
Introduction
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correct use and meaning of freedom is firmly related to differences in people’s
normative and social theories. It is these differences rather than straightfor-
wardly linguistic ones that lead them to diverge in their views of whether indi-
viduals acting in a free market could ever coerce others, and so on. Though all
parties in this debate might agree that being free is different to being able, some
may still detect a lack of freedom where others only see inability.
These sorts of disagreements about the meanings of terms have led many
commentators to argue that political concepts are ‘essentially contestable’.2
According to this view, it is part of the nature of these concepts to be open to
dispute,  and disagreements over their proper use reflect divergent normative,
theoretical and empirical assumptions. Even so, these theorists would still
maintain that competing views represent alternative ‘conceptions’ of the same
‘concept’. In other words, in spite of their disagreements about how the concept
might be defined, they are nonetheless debating the same idea. As a result, it
also makes sense to compare different views and to argue that some are more
coherent, empirically plausible and normatively attractive than others. With
differences of emphasis, all the contributors to this volume broadly adopt
this approach. Some, like Rex Martin, Richard Bellamy, David Owen and Catri-
ona McKinnon, contrast two or more different views in order to defend a
particular account. Others, like Andrew Vincent, Ciarán O’Kelly and Alan
Cromartie, explore difficulties in all accounts. Still others, like Andrew Mason
and Anthony Coates, explore a particularly important conception of a given
concept, indicating both its appeal and problems. In some cases, as in Bill
Jordan’s and Emilio Santoro’s chapters, the authors concentrate on the theo-
retical presuppositions of current policies that are guided by a particular under-
standing of a concept. In others, as in David Boucher’s and Jonathan Seglow’s
chapters, authors compare how different conceptual underpinnings might
generate different policy recommendations.
No book will cover all political concepts, and this one is no exception. While
aware of many regrettable, if inevitable, omissions, we have attempted to
include a broad range of the main concepts employed in contemporary debates
among both political theorists and ordinary citizens.3 Each concept tends to
relate to the others in various ways but not all the authors would agree how
they do so.4 Consequently, we have not grouped the chapters into sections.
However, the first three chapters tackle the principal concepts employed to jus-
tify any policy or institution, the next seven can be roughly related to the main
domestic purposes and functions of the state, the following four concern the
relationship between state and civil society, and the final three look beyond the
state to issues of global concern and relations between states. While not an
exhaustive survey therefore, we have tried to offer a wide selection of the con-
cepts used to discuss most dimensions of politics.
2 Introduction
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Notes
1 Two well-known examples of this genre are T.D. Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics
(Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1953), and F. Oppenheim, Political Concepts: A Recon-
struction (Oxford, Blackwell, 1981).
2 The classical account of this thesis is W.B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’,
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1956), pp. 167–98. A text that employed
this thesis to analyse various concepts, including freedom, is W.E. Connolly, The
Terms of Political Discourse (Oxford, Blackwell, 1974).
3 For a more historical approach, see R. Bellamy and A. Ross, A Textual Introduction to
Social and Political Theory (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996).
4 Students interested in looking at how the main contemporary political philosophers
have related these concepts to each other might care to consult W. Kymlicka’s
excellent Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001,
2nd edn).
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Introduction
Imagine a woman is driving a car through town, and she comes to a fork in the
road. She turns left, but no one was forcing her to go one way or the other. Next
she comes to a crossroads. She turns right, but no one was preventing her from
going left or straight on. There is no traffic to speak of and there are no diver-
sions or police roadblocks. So she seems, as a driver, to be completely free. But
this picture of her situation might change quite dramatically if we consider
that the reason she went left and then right is that she is addicted to cigarettes
and is desperate to get to the tobacconists before it closes. Rather than driving,
she feels she is being driven, as her urge to smoke leads her uncontrollably to
turn the wheel first to the left and then to the right. Moreover, she is perfectly
aware that turning right at the crossroads means she will probably miss a train
that was to take her to an appointment she cares about very much. The
woman longs to be free of this irrational desire that is not only threatening her
longevity but is also stopping her right now from doing what she thinks she
ought to be doing.
This story gives us two contrasting ways of thinking of freedom. On the one
hand, one can think of freedom as the absence of obstacles external to the
agent. You are free if no one is stopping you from doing whatever you might
want to do. In the above story the woman appears, in this sense, to be free. On
the other hand, one can think of freedom as the presence of control on the part
of the agent. To be free, you must be self-determined, which is to say that you
must be able to control your own destiny in your own interests. In the above
story the woman appears, in this sense, to be unfree: she is not in control of her
own destiny, as she is failing to control a passion that she herself would rather
be rid of and which is preventing her from realising what she recognises to be
her true interests. One might say that while on the first view freedom is simply
about how many doors are open to the agent, on the second view it is more
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Ian Carter 5
1 Negative and positive freedom
Isaiah Berlin, the English philosopher and historian of ideas, called these two
concepts of freedom ‘negative’ and ‘positive’. The reason for using these labels
is that in the first case freedom seems to be a mere absence of something (i.e., of
‘obstacles’, ‘barriers’, ‘constraints’ or ‘interference from others’), whereas in
the second case freedom seems to require the presence of something (i.e., of
‘control’, ‘self-mastery’, ‘self-determination’ or ‘self-realisation’). In Berlin’s
words, we use the negative concept of freedom in attempting to answer the
question ‘What is the area within which the subject – a person or group of per-
sons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without inter-
ference by other persons?’, whereas we use the positive concept in attempting
to answer the question ‘What, or who, is the source of control or interference
that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?’1
It is useful to think of the difference between the two concepts in terms of the
difference between factors that are ‘external’ and factors that are ‘internal’ to
the agent. While the prime interest of theorists of negative freedom is the degree
to which individuals or groups suffer interference from external bodies, theo-
rists of positive freedom are more attentive to the internal factors affecting the
degree to which individuals or groups act autonomously. Given this difference,
one might be tempted to think that a political theorist should concentrate exclu-
sively on negative freedom, a concern with positive freedom being more relevant
to psychology or individual morality than to political theory. This, however,
would be premature, for among the most hotly debated issues in political theory
are the following: is the positive concept of freedom a political concept? Can
individuals or groups achieve positive freedom through political action? Is it
possible for the state to promote the positive freedom of citizens on their behalf?
And, if so, is it desirable for the state to do so? The classic texts in the history of
western political thought are divided over how these questions should be
answered: theorists in the classical liberal tradition, like Constant, Humboldt,
Spencer and Mill, are typically classed as answering ‘no’ and, therefore, as
defending a negative concept of political freedom; theorists that are critical of
this tradition, like Rousseau, Hegel, Marx and T.H. Green, are typically classed
as answering ‘yes’ and as defending a positive concept of political freedom.
In its political form, positive freedom has often been thought of as necessarily
achieved through a collectivity. Perhaps the clearest case is that of Rousseau’s
theory of freedom, according to which individual freedom is achieved through
participation in the process whereby one’s community exercises collective con-
trol over its own affairs in accordance with the general will. Put in the simplest
terms, one might say that a democratic society is a free society because it is a self-
determined society, and that a member of that society is free to the extent that
he or she participates in its democratic process.
For liberals, on the other hand, Rousseau’s idea of freedom carries with it a
danger of authoritarianism. Consider the fate of a permanent and oppressed
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6 Liberty
minority. Because the members of this minority participate in a democratic
process characterised by majority rule, they might be said to be free on the
grounds that they are members of a society exercising self-control over its own
affairs. But they are oppressed, and so are surely unfree. Moreover, it is not nec-
essary to see a society as democratic in order to see it as ‘self-controlled’; one
might instead adopt an organic conception of society, according to which the
collectivity is to be thought of as a living organism, and one might believe that
this organism will only act rationally, will only be in control of itself, when its
various parts are brought into line with some rational plan devised by its wise
governors (who, to extend the metaphor, might be thought of as the organism’s
brain). In this case, even the majority might be oppressed in the name of liberty.
Such justifications of oppression in the name of liberty are no mere products
of the liberal imagination, for there are notorious historical examples of their
endorsement by authoritarian political leaders. Berlin, himself a liberal, and
writing during the cold war, was clearly moved by the way in which the appar-
ently noble ideal of freedom as self-mastery or self-realisation had been twisted
and distorted by the totalitarian dictators of the twentieth century – most
notably those of the Soviet Union – so as to claim that they, rather than the lib-
eral West, were the true champions of freedom. The slippery slope towards this
paradoxical conclusion begins, according to Berlin, with the idea of a ‘divided
self ’. To illustrate: the smoker in our story provides a clear example of a divided
self, as there is the self that wants to get to the appointment and there is the self
that wants to get to the tobacconists. We now add to this that one of the selves
– the respecter of appointments – is a ‘higher’ self, and the other – the smoker
– is a ‘lower’ self. The higher self is the rational, reflecting self, the self that is
capable of moral action and of taking responsibility for what she does. This is
the ‘true’ self, since it is what marks us off from other animals. The lower self,
on the other hand, is the self of the passions, of unreflecting desires and irra-
tional impulses. One is free, then, when one’s higher, rational self is in control
and one is not a slave to one’s passions or to one’s ‘merely empirical’ self. The
next step down the slippery slope consists in pointing out that some individuals
are more rational than others, and can therefore know best what is in their and
others’ rational interests. This allows them to say that by forcing people less
rational than themselves to do the rational thing and thus to realise their ‘true’
selves, they are in fact ‘liberating’ them from their merely empirical desires.
Occasionally, Berlin says, the defender of positive freedom will take an addi-
tional step that consists in conceiving of the self as wider than the individual
and as represented by an organic social ‘whole’ – ‘a tribe, a race, a church, a
state, the great society of the living and the dead and the yet unborn’. The ‘true’
interests of the individual are to be identified with the interests of this whole,
and individuals can and should be coerced into fulfilling these interests, for they
would not resist coercion if they were as rational and wise as their coercers.
‘Once I take this view’, Berlin says, ‘I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes
of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture in the name, and on behalf, of their
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“real” selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man ...
must be identical with his freedom.’2
Those in the negative camp try to cut off this line of reasoning at the first step,
by denying that there is any necessary relation between one’s freedom and
one’s desires. Since one is free to the extent that one is externally unprevented
from doing things, they say, one can be free to do what one does not desire to do.
If being free meant being unprevented from realising one’s desires, then one
could, again paradoxically, reduce one’s unfreedom by coming to desire fewer
of the things one is unfree to do. One could become free simply by contenting
oneself with one’s situation. A perfectly contented slave is perfectly free to
realise all of her desires. Nevertheless, we tend to think of slavery as the oppo-
site of freedom. More generally, freedom is not to be confused with happiness,
for in logical terms there is nothing to stop a free person from being unhappy or
an unfree person from being happy. The happy person might feel free, but
whether they are free is another matter. Negative theorists of freedom therefore
tend to say not that having freedom means being unprevented from doing as
one desires, but that it means being unprevented from doing whatever one
might desire to do.
Some positive theorists of freedom bite the bullet and say that the contented
slave is indeed free – that in order to be free the individual must learn, not so
much to dominate certain merely empirical desires, but to rid herself of them.
She must, in other words, remove as many of her desires as possible. As Berlin
puts it, if I have a wounded leg ‘there are two methods of freeing myself from
pain. One is to heal the wound. But if the cure is too difficult or uncertain, there
is another method. I can get rid of the wound by cutting off my leg’. This is the
strategy of liberation adopted by ascetics, stoics and Buddhist sages. It involves
a ‘retreat into an inner citadel’ – a soul or a purely ‘noumenal’ self – in which
the individual is immune to any outside forces.3 But this state, even if it can be
achieved, is not one that liberals would want to call one of freedom, for it again
risks masking important forms of oppression. It is, after all, often in coming to
terms with excessive external limitations in society that individuals retreat into
themselves, pretending to themselves that they do not really desire the worldly
goods or pleasures they have been denied. Moreover, the removal of desires may
also be an effect of outside forces, such as brainwashing, which we should
hardly want to call a realisation of freedom.
Because the concept of negative freedom concentrates on the external sphere
in which individuals interact, it seems to provide a better guarantee against the
dangers of paternalism and authoritarianism perceived by Berlin. To promote
negative freedom is to promote the existence of a sphere of action within which
the individual is sovereign, and within which she can pursue her own projects
subject only to the constraint that she respect the spheres of others. Humboldt
and Mill, both defenders of the negative concept of freedom, usefully compared
the development of an individual to that of a plant: individuals, like plants,
must be allowed to ‘grow’, in the sense of developing their own faculties to the
Ian Carter 7
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full and according to their own inner logic. Personal growth is something that
cannot be imposed from without, but must come from within the individual.
Critics, however, have objected that the ideal described by Humboldt and Mill
looks much more like a positive concept of freedom than a negative one. Posi-
tive freedom consists, they say, in exactly this ‘growth’ of the individual: the free
individual is one that develops, determines and changes her own desires and
interests autonomously and ‘from within’. This is not freedom as the mere
absence of obstacles, but freedom as self-realisation. Why should the mere
absence of state interference be thought to guarantee such growth? Is there not
some ‘third way’ between the extremes of totalitarianism and the minimal state
of the classical liberals – some non-paternalist, non-authoritarian means by
which positive freedom in the above sense can be actively promoted?
Much of the more recent work on positive liberty has been motivated by a dis-
satisfaction with the ideal of negative liberty combined with an awareness of
the possible abuses of the positive concept so forcefully exposed by Berlin. John
Christman, for example, has argued that positive freedom concerns the ways in
which desires are formed – whether as a result of rational reflection on all the
options available, or as a result of pressure, manipulation or ignorance. What
it does not regard, he says, is the content of an individual’s desires.4 The promo-
tion of positive freedom need not therefore involve the claim that there is only
one right answer to the question of how a person should live. Take the example
of a Muslim woman who claims to espouse the fundamentalist doctrines gen-
erally followed by her family and society. On Christman’s account, this person
is positively unfree if her desire to conform was somehow oppressively imposed
upon her through indoctrination, manipulation or deceit. She is positively free,
on the other hand, if she arrived at her desire to conform while aware of other
reasonable options and she weighed and assessed these other options rationally.
There is nothing necessarily freedom-enhancing or freedom-restricting about
her having the desires she has, since freedom regards not the content of these
desires but their mode of formation. On this view, forcing her to do certain
things rather than others can never make her more free, and Berlin’s paradox
of positive freedom would seem to have been avoided. It remains to be seen,
however, just what a state can do, in practice, to promote positive freedom in
Christman’s sense without encroaching on any individual’s sphere of negative
freedom. An education system that cultivates personal autonomy may prove an
important exception, but even here it might be objected that the right to nega-
tive liberty includes the right to decide how one’s children should be educated.
Another group of theorists has claimed that Berlin’s dichotomy leaves out a
third alternative, according to which freedom is not merely the enjoyment of a
sphere of non-interference – as it is on the negative concept – but the enjoyment
of certain conditions in which such non-interference is guaranteed.5 These
conditions may include the presence of a democratic constitution and a series
of safeguards against a government wielding power arbitrarily and against the
interests of the governed. As Berlin admits, on the negative view of freedom, I
8 Liberty
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am free even if I live in a dictatorship just as long as the dictator happens, on a
whim, not to interfer with me. There is no necessary connection between neg-
ative freedom and any particular form of government. On the alternative view
sketched here – often called the ‘republican’ concept of freedom – I am free only
if I live in a society with the kinds of political institutions that guarantee non-
interference resiliently and over time. The republican concept allows that the
state may encroach upon the negative freedom of individuals, enforcing and
promoting certain civic virtues as a means of strengthening democratic insti-
tutions. On the other hand, the concept cannot lead to the oppressive conse-
quences feared by Berlin, because it has a commitment to liberal-democratic
institutions already built into it. It remains to be seen, however, whether the
republican concept of freedom is ultimately distinguishable from the negative
concept, or whether republican writers on freedom have not simply provided
good arguments to the effect that negative freedom is best promoted, on balance
and over time, through certain kinds of political institutions rather than others.6
2 Freedom as a triadic relation
The two sides in Berlin’s debate disagree over which of two different concepts
best deserves the name of ‘freedom’. Does this fact not denote the presence of
some more basic agreement between the two sides? How, after all, could they see
their disagreement as one about the definition of ‘freedom’ if they did not think
of themselves as in some sense talking about the same thing? In an influential arti-
cle,7 the American legal philosopher Gerald MacCallum put forward the follow-
ing answer: there is in fact only one basic ‘concept of freedom’, on which both
sides in the debate converge. What the so-called ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ theorists
disagree about is how this single concept of freedom should be interpreted.
Indeed, in MacCallum’s view, there are a great many different possible inter-
pretations of ‘freedom’, and it is only Berlin’s artificial dichotomy that has led
us to think in terms of there being two.
MacCallum defines the basic concept of freedom – the concept on which
everyone agrees – as follows: a subject, or ‘agent’, is free from certain con-
straints, or ‘preventing conditions’, to do or be certain things. Freedom is there-
fore a ‘triadic relation’ – that is, a relation between three things: an agent, certain
preventing conditions, and certain doings or becomings of the agent. Any
statement about freedom or unfreedom can be translated into a statement of
the above form by specifying what is free or unfree, from what it is free or unfree,
and what it is free or unfree to do or be. Any claim about the presence or absence
of freedom in a given situation will therefore make certain assumptions about
what counts as an agent, what counts as a constraint or limitation on freedom,
and what counts as a purpose that the agent can be described as either free
or unfree to carry out. Let us return to the example of the driver on her way to
the tobacconists. In describing this person as either free or unfree, we shall be
making assumptions about each of MacCallum’s three variables. If we say that
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the driver is free, what we shall probably mean is that an agent, consisting in the
driver’s empirical self, is free from external (physical or legal) obstacles to do
whatever she might want to do. If, on the other hand, we say that the driver is
unfree, what we shall probably mean is that an agent, consisting in a ‘higher’ or
‘rational’ self, is made unfree by internal, psychological constraints to carry out
some rational, authentic or virtuous plan. Notice that in both claims there is a
negative element and a positive element: each claim about freedom assumes
both that freedom is the absence of something (i.e., preventing conditions) and
that it is the presence of something (the doings or beings that are unprevented).
The dichotomy between ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’ is therefore a false one,
and it is misleading say that those who see the driver as free employ a ‘negative’
concept and those who see her as unfree employ a ‘positive’ one. What these two
camps differ over is the way in which one should interpret each of the three
variables in the triadic freedom-relation. More precisely, we can see that what
they differ over is the extension to be assigned to each of the variables.
Thus, those whom Berlin places in the ‘negative’ camp typically conceive of
the agent as having the same extension as that which it is generally given in
ordinary discourse: they tend to think of the agent as an individual human
being and as including all of the empirical beliefs and desires of that individual.
Those in the so-called ‘positive’ camp, on the other hand, often depart from the
ordinary notion, in one sense imagining the agent as more extensive (or
‘larger’) than in the ordinary notion, and in another sense imagining it as less
extensive (or ‘smaller’): they think of the agent as having a greater extension
than in ordinary discourse in cases where they identify the agent’s ‘true’ desires
and aims with those of some collectivity of which she is a member; and they
think of the agent as having a lesser extension than in ordinary discourse in
cases where they identify the ‘true’ agent with only a subset of her empirical
beliefs and desires – i.e., with those that are rational, authentic or virtuous. Sec-
ond, those in Berlin’s ‘positive’ camp tend to take a wider view of what counts
as a constraint on freedom than those in his ‘negative’ camp: the set of relevant
obstacles is more extensive for the former than for the latter, since negative the-
orists tend to count only external obstacles as constraints on freedom, whereas
positive theorists also allow that one may be constrained by internal factors,
such as irrational desires, fears or ignorance. Third, those in Berlin’s ‘positive’
camp tend to take a narrower view of what counts as a purpose one can be free
to fulfil. The set of relevant purposes is less extensive for them than for the neg-
ative theorists, for we have seen that they tend to restrict the relevant set of
actions or states to those that are rational, authentic or virtuous, whereas those
in the ‘negative’ camp tend to extend this variable so as to cover any action or
state the agent might desire.
On MacCallum’s analysis, then, there is no simple dichotomy between ‘posi-
tive’ and ‘negative’ freedom; rather, we should recognise that there is a whole
range of possible interpretations or ‘conceptions’ of the single concept of free-
dom.8 Indeed, says MacCallum, a number of classic authors cannot be placed
10 Liberty
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unequivocally in one or the other of Berlin’s two camps. Locke, for example, is
normally thought of as a staunch defender of the negative concept of freedom,
and he indeed states explicitly that ‘[to be at] liberty is to be free from restraint
and violence from others’.9 But he also says that ‘liberty’ is not to be confused
with ‘licence’, and that ‘that ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges
us in only from bogs and precipices.10 While Locke gives a more ‘negative’
account of ‘constraints on freedom’, he seems to endorse a more ‘positive’
account of the third freedom-variable, restricting this to actions that are not
immoral and to those that are in the agent’s own interests. This suggests that it
is not only conceptually misleading, but also historically mistaken, to divide
theorists into two camps – a ‘negative’ one and a ‘positive’ one.
3 Constraints on freedom
To illustrate the range of interpretations of the concept of freedom made avail-
able by MacCallum’s analysis, let us now take a closer look at his second variable
– that of ‘constraints on freedom’.
We have seen that for those theorists Berlin places in the ‘negative’ camp,
only obstacles external to the agent tend to count as constraints on her free-
dom. We should now note that these theorists usually distinguish between dif-
ferent kinds of external obstacle, restricting the range of obstacles that count
as constraints on freedom to those that are brought about by other agents. For
theorists who conceive of ‘constraints on freedom’ in this way, I am only unfree
to the extent that other people prevent me from doing certain things. If I am inca-
pacited by natural causes – by a genetic handicap, say, or by a virus or by cer-
tain climatic conditions – I may be rendered unable to do certain things, but I
am not, for that reason, rendered unfree to do them. Thus, if you lock me in my
house, I shall be both unable and unfree to leave. But if I am unable to leave
because I suffer from a debilitating illness or because a snow drift has blocked
my exit, I am nevertheless free, or am at least not unfree,11 to leave. The reason
such theorists give, for restricting the set of relevant preventing conditions in
this way, is that they see freedom as a social relation – a relation between per-
sons.12 Freedom as a non-social relation is more the concern of engineers and
medics than of political and social theorists.
In attempting to distinguish between ‘natural’ and ‘social’ obstacles we shall
inevitably come across grey areas. An important example is that of obstacles
created by impersonal economic forces. Do economic constraints like recession,
poverty and unemployment merely incapacitate people, or do they also render
them unfree? One way of supplying a clear answer to this question is by taking
an even more restrictive view of what counts as a constraint on freedom, and
saying that only a subset of those obstacles brought about by other persons
counts as a restriction of freedom: those brought about intentionally. In this
case, impersonal economic forces, being brought about unintentionally, do not
restrict people’s freedom, even though they undoubtedly make many people
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unable to do many things. This last view has been taken by a number of market-
orientated libertarians, including, most famously, Friedrich von Hayek, accord-
ing to whom freedom is the absence of coercion, where to be coerced is to be
subject to the arbitrary will of another.13 Critics of libertarianism, on the other
hand, typically endorse a wider conception of ‘constraints on freedom’ that
includes not only intentionally imposed obstacles but also unintended obstacles
for which someone may nevertheless be held responsible,14 or indeed obstacles
of any kind whatsoever.15 Thus, socialists have tended to claim that the poor in
a capitalist society are unfree, or are ‘less free’, than the rich, in contrast to lib-
ertarians, who have tended to claim that the poor in a capitalist society are no
less free than the rich. Socialists typically assume a broader notion than liber-
tarians of what counts as a ‘constraint on freedom’, though without necessar-
ily embracing anything like Berlin’s ‘positive’ notion of freedom.16
If we take an even closer look at the different notions of ‘constraint on free-
dom’ employed, we can see that there are in fact two different dimensions along
which one’s notion of a constraint might be broader or narrower. A first dimen-
sion is that of the source of a constraint on freedom – in other words, what it is
that brings about a constraint on freedom. We have seen, for example, that some
include as ‘constraints on freedom’ only obstacles brought about by human
action, whereas others also include obstacles with a natural origin. A second
dimension is that of the type of constraint involved. We have seen, for example,
that some include only coercion or physical barriers as relevant types of pre-
venting factors, whereas others want to include as ‘constraints on freedom’
more subtle forms of influence, including not only external constraints but also
internal ones such as those brought about through ideological manipulation.
To see the difference between the two dimensions of source and type, consider
the case of ‘internal’ constraints. An internal constraint is a ‘type’ of con-
straint, defined by reference to its location ‘inside’ the agent. It is a category that
covers various psychological phenomena such as ignorance, irrational desires,
illusions and phobias. Such a constraint can be caused in various ways: for
example, it might have a genetic origin, or it might be brought about inten-
tionally by others, as in the case of brainwashing or manipulation. In the first
case we have an internal constraint brought about by natural causes; in the sec-
ond, an internal constraint intentionally imposed by another. Given the inde-
pendence of these two dimensions, one might want to combine a narrow view
of what counts as a source of a constraint with a broad view of what types of
obstacle count as constraints, or vice versa. The two dimensions are repre-
sented as in Table 1.1, where a narrower notion of constraints is one that
restricts freedom-limiting factors to those located towards the top left-hand cor-
ner of the table, whereas a broader notion is one that includes more factors
located towards the right or towards the bottom of the table.
To illustrate the independence of these two dimensions, consider the case of
the unorthodox libertarian Hillel Steiner.17 On the one hand, Steiner has a
much broader view than Hayek of the possible sources of constraints on free-
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dom, extending that notion as far as the third row in Table 1.1: he does not limit
the set of such sources to intentional human actions, but extends it to cover all
kinds of human cause, whether or not any humans intend such causes and
whether or not they can be held morally accountable for them, believing that
any restriction of such non-natural sources can only be an arbitrary stipula-
tion, usually arising from some more or less conscious ideological bias. On the
other hand, Steiner has an even narrower view than Hayek of what counts as a
type of constraint, restricting this to the left-most column in Table 1.1: for
Steiner, an agent only counts as unfree to do something if it is physically impos-
sible for her to do that thing. Any extension of the constraint variable to include
other types of obstacle, such as those brought about by coercive threats, would,
in his view, necessarily involve a reference to the agent’s desires, and we have
seen that for those liberals in the ‘negative’ camp there is no necessary relation
between an agent’s freedom and her desires. Consider the coercive threat ‘your
money or your life!’. This does not make it impossible for you to refuse to hand
over your money, only much less desirable for you to do so. If you decide not to
hand over the money, you will of course be killed. That will count as a restric-
tion of your freedom, because it will render physically impossible a great num-
ber of actions on your part. But it is not the issuing of the threat that creates
this unfreedom, and you are not unfree until the threat is carried out. For this
reason, Steiner excludes threats – and with them all other kinds of imposed
costs – from the set of obstacles that count as freedom-restricting.
Steiner’s account of the relation between freedom and coercive threats might
be thought to have counter-intuitive implications, even from the liberal point of
view. Many laws that are normally thought to restrict ‘negative’ freedom do not
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doing so by threatening punishment. Are we to say, then, that these laws do not
restrict the freedom of those who obey them? A solution to this problem may
consist in saying that although a law against doing some action, x, does not
remove the freedom to do x, it nevertheless renders physically impossible certain
combinations of actions that include doing x and doing what would be precluded
by the punishment. There is a restriction of the person’s overall freedom – i.e., a
reduction in the overall number of act-combinations available to her – even
though she does not lose the freedom to do any specific thing taken in isolation.18
Conclusion
We began with a simple distinction between two concepts of freedom, and have
progressed from this to the recognition that freedom might be defined in any
number of ways, depending on how one interprets the three variables of agent,
constraints, and purposes. Might Berlin’s concepts of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’
freedom nevertheless still be of some use? Perhaps, in the sense that the concept
of self-mastery or self-direction implies a presence of control that may not be ade-
quately captured by MacCallum’s explication of freedom as a triadic relation. If
one thinks of freedom as involving self-direction, one has in mind an ‘excercise
concept’ of freedom, as opposed to an ‘opportunity concept’.19 On an excercise
concept, freedom consists not merely in the possibility of doing certain things (i.e.,
in the lack of constraints on doing them), but in actually doing certain things in
certain ways – for example, in realising one’s true self or in acting on the basis of
rational and well-informed decisions. MacCallum’s triadic relation does not
really capture this ‘excercise’ element in the concept of freedom as self-direction.
The importance of this concept continues to be dicussed in contemporary politi-
cal philosophy, though normally under the rubric of ‘personal autonomy’. Mac-
Callum’s framework has nevertheless tended to dominate in contemporary
discussions about the nature of ‘constraints on freedom’, about the relation
between an agent’s options and her desires or values, and about whether and
how an agent’s specific freedoms can be aggregated so as to make sense of the lib-
eral political prescription that people enjoy ‘maximal’ freedom or ‘equal’ freedom.
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Introduction
Rights appear in every plausible theory of justice and dominate contemporary
political rhetoric. Critics, as a matter of course, raise two objections to this pro-
liferation of rights talk. First, they argue that no clear justification exists for
rights. As a result, every political issue can be turned into a demand for rights.
This inflation of rights claims has devalued the currency of rights to the point
of worthlessness. Second, they object that rights encourage individualistic and
anti-social behaviour. People stand on their rights to avoid obligations to oth-
ers. Such attitudes are justified when society makes unreasonable demands on
people. But they can also appear at odds with, or indifferent to, such necessary
social virtues as compassion, civility and charity. This chapter addresses these
two standard criticisms. Section 1 explores two approaches to rights – the inter-
est-based (IB) approach, and the obligation-based or Kantian view. Both are
shown to offer coherent justifications that can avoid turning all political con-
cerns into a matter of rights. Section 2 then compares the ways they relate to
other social duties. It shall be argued that only the Kantian approach fully
escapes the second criticism by positively requiring that we supplement rights
with other social virtues. As such, it is to be preferred over the IB approach.
1 Interest-based and Kantian approaches
Contemporary political theorising starts by accepting that a diversity of reli-
gious, moral and philosophical outlooks is a permanent fact about societies
which is not to be regretted. Given this pluralism, rights-theorists cannot invoke
theological premises in their justification of rights, and without these premises
the claim that rights are natural is mysterious and metaphysically suspect. The
most promising approaches to rights which eschew such thinking are the IB
and Kantian approaches.
The IB approach has it that a person has a right to x when his or her interest
in x is sufficiently important for other people to be held under a duty to provide
him or her with x, or not prevent his or her pursuit of x. Rights are systematised
2
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by principles of justice specifying the nature of these rights, and the priority
they have in relation to one another. Two prominent advocates of the IB
approach are Jeremy Waldron and Joseph Raz. Waldron claims that, ‘An indi-
vidual has a right to G when the importance of his interest in G, considered on
its own, is sufficient to justify holding others to be under a duty to promote G’.1
For Waldron, rights protect a person’s important interests not only in liberal
freedoms, but also in socio-economic goods.2 For Raz, rights protect persons’
interests in securing well-being.3
By contrast, on the Kantian view duties of justice constitute the basis of
rights, and these duties, rather than interests, are morally basic. Duties of jus-
tice are systematised by principles of justice which specify the content of
rights, and their relationship to other social values. The Kantian view is that
a person A has a right to x if and only if all other people have an obligation to
provide A with x, or not to prevent A from having x, and this obligation is
derived from the categorical imperative (CI). Kant argued that all moral obli-
gations are derived from one supreme moral principle, the CI, which asks each
of us to ‘Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will
a universal law of nature’ (a maxim is a subjective principle of action, or the
purpose of an action). Kant classified obligations deriving from the CI as per-
fect or imperfect. If a maxim cannot be conceived of as a universal law of
nature without contradiction then we have a perfect duty not to act accord-
ing to that maxim; Kant’s famous examples of perfect duties are the avoidance
of suicide and false promising.4 If a maxim cannot be willed as a universal law
of nature without contradiction then we have an imperfect duty not to act
according to that maxim; Kant’s examples are developing one’s talents and
charitable giving.5 The difference between perfect and imperfect duties is that
the latter contain a greater degree of latitude with respect to their perform-
ance than the former. For example, if I have a perfect duty not to make false
promises then I must never make a false promise at any time, but if I have an
imperfect duty of beneficence to give to charity this need not mean that I must
put money in every charity tin I come across, although the pattern of my giv-
ing behaviour, and possibly my character, must be of a certain type. Kant
thought that only certain perfect duties – duties of justice – should serve as
the input to a theory of justice. Kant’s fundamental principle of justice
ensures a right to equal freedom for every citizen.6
The desiderata of a theory of rights according to which these two approaches
will be considered are as follows:
1 An account of the basis of rights should allow for an interesting debate with
respect to the content of rights. Having established a basis for rights, it
should then be a further question whether people only have rights to non-
interference by others, or whether in addition they have substantial, ‘wel-
fare’ rights to things like food, shelter, medical care and education.7 Unless
questions about the basis and content of rights are kept separate, no debate
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about the content of rights is possible among those who agree on the 
basis of rights, let alone among those who disagree about the basis of
rights.
2 A theory of rights should generate concomitant duties in a way that is sen-
sitive to the context of the rights-holder. That is, a theory of rights should
allow that what is demanded of people in order that Alison’s right to X in cir-
cumstances C is met might differ from what is demanded of people in order
that Bob’s right to X in C is met. The duties which correlate with rights
should not be taken to demand uniform courses of action across time and
space.
3 A theory of rights should allow for a distinction between universal rights
and special rights. Universal rights are had by every person with the char-
acteristics providing a basis for rights; special rights are had by a person in
virtue of something that distinguishes him or her from other persons. The
most common example of a universal right is the right to non-interference:
in various ways it is argued that all persons share something according to
which they have this right. The most common example of a special right is a
right created by contract: for example, spouses have particular rights against
one another in virtue of the contract they make with one another in mar-
riage. The distinction between universal and special rights is fundamental to
law and jurisprudence, and should be accommodated and explained by a
theory of rights.
4 A theory of rights should make possible the construction of rights-
respecting institutions from scratch. That is, a theory of rights should guide
us to political action even in the absence of institutions that encode these
rights in law. Unless this is the case, rights are impotent as tools for political
change.
Let me compare the IB account and the Kantian account in terms of how they
satisfy these desiderata.
1 Basis/content distinction. The IB approach can, but need not, support a con-
ception of substantial ‘welfare’ rights beyond more traditional rights to
things like liberal freedoms, equality before the law, private property, and a
vote. The concept of an interest is flexible enough for it to be an open ques-
tion whether rights extend beyond non-interference. Interest-based theo-
rists such as Jeremy Waldron support a view of rights as extending to
welfare rights, but not all IB theorists insist on this point.8
Prima facie, the elasticity of the concept of an interest makes the IB account
more attractive than the Kantian account with respect to the basis/content
distinction. It might be thought that Kant’s classification of duties of giving
to others as imperfect – and thus not matters of justice – unacceptably nar-
rows the scope of rights so as to include only libertarian rights to freedom and
non-interference. However, there are interpretations of Kant’s theory of
rights which address this worry. For example, Onora O’Neill argues that the
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commitment of all practical reasoners to principles which could also serve as
principles of practical reason for other agents yields a substantive account of
justice whereby persons have both rights to non-interference and welfare
rights.9 On her interpretation, principles of justice must protect individuals
against systematic or gratuitous injury, either through direct attacks upon
them, or through damage to the social and natural fabric of the world. Thus,
principles of justice protect individuals from more than the interference by
others with their freedom; individuals are also injured when they are pre-
vented from obtaining food, deprived of shelter or denied an education. When
this form of injury is systematically inflicted – as might be the case in famine
situations, societies in which the homeless form a class, or in societies marked
by mass illiteracy – political institutions distributing rights to food, shelter,
and education are demanded by justice.
2 Context sensitivity. The IB approach is context sensitive: the demands placed
on person A by person B’s important interest in x will not be the same as the
demands placed on person C if A and C stand in different relations to B. In
Jeremy Waldron’s terms, each interest-based right will generate waves of
duties for people differentially placed with respect to rights-holders. For
example, the right not to be tortured imposes a duty on all people not to tor-
ture one another, but it imposes extra ‘duties of enforcement’ on govern-
ment officials to investigate and prosecute torturers, ‘duties of rescue’ on
those in a position to save torture victims and, perhaps, ‘duties of commu-
nication’ on journalists and educators.10 Once we have identified an impor-
tant interest, and established a person’s right to have that interest satisfied,
we can trace the waves of duty to their various holders and set up political
and legal institutions and procedures to ensure that these duties are per-
formed.11
Similarly, the Kantian approach makes the duties associated with rights
sensitive to the context in which both rights and duties appear.
Discharging a duty of justice which is politically manifested in the right of
hungry people to food may, in some contexts, demand simply that hungry
people are not interfered with in their planting and harvesting of crops. But
in other contexts, when planting and harvesting is not possible, it might
require the active provision of food for hungry people and, perhaps, action
to make planting and harvesting possible in the future. Duties the perform-
ance of which are sensitive to context in the sense of external circumstances
will also be sensitive to the ways in which people are differentially situated
with respect to rights-holders. The actions which qualify as the performance
of a duty to provide hungry people with food will be different for a genetically
modified (GM) foods executive than for a citizen of a state which has eradi-
cated hunger among its people. The GM foods executive will have duties to be
honest about the extent to which use of GM seeds may make a population
dependent on GM companies in the future; the citizen of an affluent state
will have duties to lobby his or her government to apply pressure to GM foods
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companies to make such matters clear to their customers; both have a duty
to pay taxes which contribute towards foreign aid programs.
3 Universal and special rights. It is clear how an IB approach can give an account
of universal rights: once an interest shared by all people has been identified
as being of sufficient importance to provide the basis for a right, we can
claim that all people have a duty to help/not hinder one another in the pur-
suit of this interest. For example, the important interest every person has in
not being assaulted straightforwardly means that each person has a duty not
to assault another person, in which case all people have the right not to be
assaulted.
It might seem that the IB account cannot so easily accommodate special
rights, because it is hard to see how an interest can be sufficiently important
to ground a right unless it is an interest that all people share, in which case
the interest grounds a universal right. The way in which an IB approach
might accommodate special rights can be seen in Joseph Raz’s account of the
rights created by promise-making. Raz claims that every person has an inter-
est ‘to be able to forge special bonds with other people’.12 This shared interest
(a) grounds the universal right to make promises from which the right to
make a particular promise is derived, and (b) grounds the universal right to
have promises made to us kept. Given that the second of these universal
rights can only be exercised when a person has had a promise made to him
or her, we can derive from it special rights to have this particular promise
kept, even if what it is that is promised is not itself in our interests. Interest-
based approaches can account for special rights by deriving them from
higher level universal rights, and linking the exercise of the universal 
right to a particular set of circumstances which are not common to all 
people.
Kantian accounts have an in-built distinction between universal and special
rights. Special rights, like those which correlate with promise-related and con-
tract-based duties are duties of justice because principles of false promising
and intentional contract breaking cannot be adopted by all practical reason-
ers. When a person has created a special relationship between himself or her-
self and another person through the making of a contract, then the other has
special rights against him or her that he or she perform his or her side of the
contract. In addition to special rights correlating with duties created by par-
ticular relationships, the CI procedure yields universal rights to reciprocal non-
interference with the freedom of others. When a person adopts a principle of
interfering with certain freedoms of others while denying that others ought 
to interfere with his or her own enjoyment of the same freedoms, he or she
makes himself or herself an exception to the principle of reciprocal non-inter-
ference, which shows that his or her principle is not adoptable by all practical
reasoners.13
4 Building rights-respecting institutions. Onora O’Neill argues that the Kantian
approach is superior to the IB approach with respect to this desiderata
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because the Kantian approach makes it easy to identify the counterpart-
obligation holders for universal rights to liberty, or special rights attaching
to particular relationships. If everyone has a right to liberty, then everyone
has an obligation not to interfere with the liberty of others. In the same 
way, those with an obligation to respect special rights can be identified by
considering the relationship characterised by the special right; for example,
those who have a duty to respect a person’s special rights arising out of a
contract can be determined by discovering who the parties to the contract
were. 
O’Neill claims that although universal and special rights require institu-
tional structures for their enforcement – courts, a penal system, a police
force – they can nevertheless be pressed in the absence of these structures,
which are not necessary for the identification of counterpart-obligation
holders. But she claims that the same is not true of universal welfare rights
to goods and services. Unless and until counterpart-obligations are distrib-
uted by institutions, it makes no sense to talk of welfare rights at all. It is
important to note that O’Neill is not making the relatively uncontroversial
point that institutional structures make the identification of counterpart-
obligation holders for welfare rights more easy. Rather, her point is the
stronger one that without the institutional identification of such obligation
holders, welfare rights do not exist.14 Thus, on O’Neill’s account, and in the
absence of institutional structures designed to ensure the satisfaction of
welfare rights, it will not do to say that a given person has ‘a right to relief
against the whole world’,15 or to answer the question ‘Who has the obliga-
tion to supply food to all those who need it?’, with, ‘All of us’.16 When the 
language of universal welfare rights is used in the absence of structures
which create counterpart-obligation holders – as is the case with United
Nations (UN) Declaration of Human Rights – the expectations of putative
rights-holders will be inflamed and disappointed: ‘The perspective of rights
provides a perilous way of formulating ethical requirements since it leaves
many possible obligations dangling in the air.’17 O’Neill claims that the pri-
ority given to obligations in Kantian approaches avoids this problem. The
obligations with which her Kantian approach starts include obligations not
to injure others by depriving them of important goods and services. Even if
people with these obligations do not know to whom exactly these obligations
are owed, they can nevertheless ‘make the construction of institutions that
allocate tasks and identify claimants the first step towards meeting their obli-
gations’.18
O’Neill’s argument does not succeed as a criticism of the IB approach.
This is because the identification of interests as important enough to 
warrant holding others to be under a duty to promote the interest does 
not require institutional structures. Jeremy Waldron claims that conceiving
of rights as generated by interests gives us enough grounds to start to 
think about how to distribute concomitant duties to promote or support that
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interest through political and legal institutions and processes. That is, the
interest-based account of rights allows us to detect the presence of rights in
the absence of legal or other structures which specify who has a duty to
ensure that the right is met.19
This means that, ‘I can say . . . that a child in Somalia has a right to be fed,
meaning not that some determinate individual or agency has a duty to feed
him, but simply that I recognize his interest in being fed as an appropriate
ground for the assignment and allocation of duties’.20
Recognising that another person has an important interest in food, shel-
ter or education does not require institutions of law or international politi-
cal conventions. The fact that we recognise that a person A has such an
interest in x is sufficient for us to attribute to A certain rights to x, which
means that we can begin to build institutions to distribute the counterpart-
obligations to provide A with x, which we acknowledge to exist when we
attribute a right to x to A. On the IB account, when we accept the rights-
claims people make we also accept an obligation to put in place structures
which ensure that that right is met by distributing its counterpart-obliga-
tions. But this seems on a par with the Kantian approach which moves from
obligations through institutions to political rights.
The IB approach and the Kantian approach are evenly matched according to
desiderata 1–4. In the remainder of this chapter I want to focus on the extent
to which commitment to each theory of rights gives us grounds for choosing
between different and competing conceptions of the good society, and for 
arguing that people ought to work to create this society. I shall argue that 
with respect to this question, the Kantian approach is superior to the IB
approach.
2 Beyond justice?
Let me start by considering the Kantian approach to the good society question.
O’Neill and other Kantians point out that there are many ‘social virtues’ – for
example, charity, civility, solidarity, compassion – which are not a part of jus-
tice, and to which people do not have rights, yet which we have an obligation to
develop and which have non-justice related value.21 The Kantian approach can
make sense of duties to work towards these valuable aspects of society with its
tripartite division of morally good actions.
1 Perfect duties of justice are required and are the basis upon which rights are
attributed to people.
2 Imperfect social duties do not have correlate rights but are nevertheless
required: for example, we have a duty to act charitably, but not everyone has
the right to charity from us.
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3 Finally, there are supererogatory acts which it is good to perform, but which
we do not have a duty to perform (for example, acts of heroism or great self-
sacrifice).
By creating conceptual space between perfect duties and supererogatory
actions the Kantian approach allows that we have some social obligations to
which no rights correlate. The Kantian approach thus has the resources
to explain why we ought to work towards a rights-respecting compassionate,
civil, fraternal society rather than a rights-respecting heartless, aggressive, self-
seeking society: we have imperfect, non-justice related, duties of compassion,
civility and fraternity.
O’Neill argues that, in general, pure rights-based approaches lack the
resources to address the good society question because they only address the
obligations people have to perform those actions necessary for the respect of
rights; the performance of all other actions, or the cultivation of certain dis-
positions, however laudable, is on these accounts non-obligatory.22 There are
two ways of taking this criticism. First, it might be claimed that rights-based
approaches lack an account of why a just and good society is better than a
just and bad society. Second, it might be claimed that rights-based
approaches cannot explain why people in a just society ought to work to
make that society good. With respect to the IB approach, this criticism bites
only in its second sense. The problem with the IB approach is not that it is nec-
essarily indifferent between visions of the good and bad just society. The good
just society can be endorsed over the bad just society in virtue of its
supererogatory value, assuming that IB theorists can give an account of
supererogatory value. Rather, the criticism is that on the IB approach people
only have obligations to perform actions necessary for the protection of cer-
tain important interests, but there are social virtues not related to the pro-
tection of such interests which characterise the good society and which, we
would want to say, people ought to cultivate. The problem is that supporting
judgements about the goodness of societies by reference to their supereroga-
tory values leaves it unclear why people ought to work to create this value in
their societies. If the value of a good society is supererogatory, then presum-
ably action fit to create this value is also supererogatory. But supererogatory
action is non-obligatory, in which case we cannot say of people who do not
work to create the good society that they ought to do so. The Kantian
approach avoids this problem because its account of the value of a good just
society is given in terms of the performance of actions which are obligatory,
albeit imperfectly so.
Let me assess the force of this criticism against Waldron’s version of the IB
approach. With respect to the social virtue of charity, Waldron claims that ‘the
welfare state functions . . . as a clearing house for . . . imperfect obligations [of
charity]’.23 Although Waldron makes room for the concept of imperfect duty,
this does not yield an answer to the good society question which resembles the
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Kantian answer. This is because, according to Waldron, some important inter-
ests generate imperfect duties which correlate with rights: an interest in, say, food
is sufficiently important to hold others to have imperfect duty of charity
towards the hungry and, therefore, for the hungry to have rights to have this
interest satisfied.24
Waldron’s incorporation of imperfect duty into the typology of value of the
IB approach might straightforwardly be taken to address the question of the
good society question by being extended to cover social other social virtues like
fraternity, civility and kindness. However, this extension dissolves the distinc-
tion between the just and the good society, and so should be avoided. If it is
claimed that persons’ important interests in being treated fraternally, civilly
and kindly generate imperfect duties to be fraternal, civil and kind, then what
Waldron claims about the imperfect duty of charity applies mutatis mutandis to
these other imperfect duties: people have rights that others treat them frater-
nally, civilly and kindly. But if people can claim the performance of imperfect
duty as a matter of right, then rights take up all the space of value-judgements
about the nature of a society. The claim implies that all societies are either just
or unjust, and that there is no possibility of a society which is just but not good
(as in, for example, Kant’s ‘nation of devils’).25
It is clear that Waldron does not hold this view. For him, people have rights
to perform actions that are ‘stupid, cowardly, tasteless, inconsiderate, destruc-
tive, wasteful, deceitful, and just plain wrong, as well as actions that are wise,
courageous, cultured, compassionate, creative, honest, and good’.26 Rights do
not take up all the space of value-judgements. But in that case, duties to cre-
ate a good society must be understood in terms of something other than the
promotion of/non-interference with persons’ important interests, otherwise
such duties would generate rights, and judgements about the goodness of a
society would be equivalent to judgements about its justice. The IB theorist has
two options for fleshing out this understanding of imperfect duties to create a
good society.
First, it might be claimed that imperfect duties characterising the good soci-
ety are not generated by interests at all, in which case the question of their cor-
relation with rights does not arise on the IB approach. The problem with this
approach is as follows. Any account of justice fit for conditions of pluralism will
explain why people who reject justice nevertheless have an obligation to be just:
it will have authority for such people. If the account of imperfect duties to cre-
ate the good society is derived from the same source as the account of justice
which it accompanies, then it will have the same authority as this account. This
is the case with the Kantian approach: obligations of justice and imperfect
social obligations are both derived from the CI, and have their authority in
virtue of this derivation. In contrast, if the authority of imperfect social obliga-
tions is divorced from the authority of duties of justice – as is the case in the
approach under consideration – then we are owed an independent account of
the grounds on which imperfect social obligations have their authority. Perhaps
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such an argument can be made. However, given the difficulty philosophers
have faced in coming up with accounts of justice which are plausibly authori-
tative in conditions of pluralism, we are entitled to some scepticism here.
A different approach for the IB theorist is to claim that imperfect social obli-
gations are derived from interests, but that these interests are not important
enough to hold others to be under duties to help/not hinder their pursuit, and
so do not correlate with rights. Here, duties of justice and imperfect social obli-
gations share their authority in virtue of being derived from the same source:
interests. If an argument can be made to show that, regardless of how they dif-
fer on moral, religious, or philosophical questions, all people ought to help/not
hinder one another in the pursuit of their interests, then both duties of justice
and imperfect social obligations have authority in pluralism. What distin-
guishes them is the importance of the interests from which they are generated,
which affects whether performance of the duties can be enforced in law
through the allocation of rights to people.
The key claim of this approach is that social obligations are generated by
interests which are of less importance than interests generating rights. The
problem is how to make an argument for this claim. Consider some standard
imperfect social obligations: toleration, kindness, charity. Is it the case that
persons’ interests in being treated with toleration, kindness or charity are less
important than their being assured freedom of speech, association or market
participation through the allocation of rights? Of course, freedom of speech,
association and market participation are very important goods necessary for
human flourishing. But the idea that these goods can be ranked above tolera-
tion, kindness and charity is unattractive, for two reasons. First, ranking
strategies require the employment of some overarching standard or master-
good according to which all goods can be compared, such as utility. But in con-
ditions of pluralism appeal to such a master-good in political justification is
problematical. Second, even if the problems associated with appeal to a mas-
ter-good can be avoided, the way in which particular goods are ranked will be
a matter of disagreement among people committed to a just and good society
in conditions of pluralism. These problems make it best to avoid such ranking
strategies.
The Kantian approach retains the distinction between duties of justice and
imperfect social obligations without ranking the goods to which these duties
relate. On the Kantian view, these obligations are distinguished according to
how maxims expressing purposes contrary to the realisation of these goods fare
when subjected to the CI procedure: a person has a duty of justice not to act on
any maxim which cannot be conceived without contradiction, and an imper-
fect duty not to act on any maxim which cannot be willed without contradic-
tion. But this does not mean that the goods protected by duties of justice are
more important than the goods, protected by imperfect duties. All it means is
that the way in which these goods are realised differs.
Catriona McKinnon 25
chap 2  23/1/03  7:43 am  Page 25
Conclusion
Given that the IB approach and the Kantian approach perform equally well
according to the four desiderata outlined earlier, should the fact that the Kant-
ian approach performs better with respect to the good society desideratum lead
us to prefer this approach? A hard-nosed response would be to deny that the
good society desideratum is appropriate as a touchstone for comparing the
approaches. A hard-nosed person might respond that a theory of justice is just
that; it is no criticism of such a theory that it does not provide answers to ques-
tions about the good society, and so there is no reason to prefer a Kantian
approach to rights over an IB approach. The problem with this response is that
it makes theories of justice rather mean and cold-blooded creatures. Concep-
tions of justice which have in the past inspired people have offered substantive
accounts of the content of justice, but have also suggested ways of thinking
about what a good society might be like once justice is achieved. They have
offered visions of transformed social relations, improved characters, more ful-
filling work and more exciting art and culture, and they have done this without
collapsing the distinction between the just society and the good society. With-
out pretending to argues this point, I think it would be a great loss if such
visions disappeared from the landscape of justice-talk. For anyone who agrees,
the Kantian approach to the basis of rights is preferable to the IB approach.
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Introduction
Most liberals believe that equality of opportunity requires sought after occupa-
tions to be allocated to the best-qualified candidates, and institutions to be
designed to ensure that everyone has fair access to qualifications. They suppose
that equality of opportunity so conceived has sufficient weight that it cannot
legitimately be sacrificed to promote overall welfare. Although liberals pay lip-
service to this ideal of equality of opportunity and seek to enshrine it in legis-
lation and public policy, it is hard for them to carve out the right role for it within
their theories. On the one hand, they want to show that a commitment to equal-
ity of opportunity is compatible with respecting personal liberty, especially in
the face of those who insist that enforcing it threatens individual rights, includ-
ing the right of parents to raise their children as they see fit so long as they do
not harm them. On the other hand, they want to show that equality of oppor-
tunity is an independent principle of justice, not simply an efficient way in most
circumstances of allocating jobs and educational places that is consistent with
what justice requires.
John Rawls’s account of fair equality of opportunity in A Theory of Justice
provides a good illustration of the difficulties involved here. It is a sophisticated
attempt to defend the idea that equality of opportunity is an independent prin-
ciple of justice, the enforcement of which takes second place to respect for indi-
vidual rights. I propose to explore Rawls’s account in some depth in order to
bring out both its strengths and its weaknesses. I shall begin by briefly present-
ing, for the uninitiated, the main elements of his theory. Those already familiar
with it should go straight to section 2. There I defend Rawls’s principle of fair
equality of opportunity against two objections, including the challenge that
implementing it in full would require abolishing the family. In section 3, how-
ever, I take the offensive, maintaining that it is unable to provide a secure justi-
fication for the idea that equality of opportunity is an independent principle of
justice. In the final section of the chapter I try to diagnose why contemporary
theories of justice, influenced as they are by Rawls’s work, have difficulty in
accommodating this idea.
3
Social justice: the place of equal
opportunity1
Andrew Mason
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1 The basic elements of Rawls’s theory
Let me introduce the basic elements of Rawls’s theory as they were presented
in A Theory of Justice, for it is here that Rawls gives the most sustained treatment
of equality of opportunity.2 He begins from the idea of society as a co-operative
venture for mutual advantage. He claims that, so understood, a society requires
principles of justice because it needs some way of determining how the various
benefits and burdens of social co-operation should be distributed. In the face of
widespread disagreement over which principles of justice should govern our
major institutions, Rawls draws upon the social contract tradition in order to
develop a method which he hopes can secure agreement on a particular con-
ception of justice.
Rawls’s guiding idea is that the principles which should be adopted are those
which rational persons, concerned to further their own interests, would agree
upon in an initial position of equality. In order to model this initial position, he
employs a device he calls the veil of ignorance, behind which people are pre-
sumed to be ignorant of various facts about themselves, such as their class or
status, race and wealth, and their conception of the good, i.e., their views about
what is of value and importance in life. This veil of ignorance is intended to
secure a kind of impartiality or neutrality: if people are in ignorance of these
facts, they cannot seek to benefit themselves by arguing for principles that are
congenial to, say, their class, race or conception of the good.
Although they are behind a veil of ignorance, the parties are to make certain
assumptions. First, each is to assume that they have some conception of the
good, even though they do not know its content. Second, each is assumed to be
rational, and because they are rational they are assumed to want the means to
realise their conception of the good, whatever its content. Since things like lib-
erty and opportunity, wealth and income, and self-respect are likely to make it
easier for a person to realise his own conception of the good, it is assumed that
persons in the original position will want as much of them as possible. Rawls
calls these the primary goods.
Rawls argues that persons in this initial or original position of equality,
behind the veil of ignorance, will choose two main principles. According to
the first principle, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for all. Basic liberties include
political liberty, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and
freedom of thought, freedom of the person along with the right to hold per-
sonal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure. The second
principle comes in two main parts. According to it, social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are open to all, which Rawls devel-
ops into the principle of fair equality of opportunity, and so that they are to
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, which he calls the difference
principle. He argues that when entertaining the possibility of conflict
between these principles, the parties in the original position will rank the first
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principle above the second, and the principle of fair equality of opportunity
above the difference principle.
Although the original position is the centrepiece of Rawls’s theory as it was
originally presented, he also gave a further argument for both the principle of
fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle that is sometimes
referred to as ‘the intuitive argument’. This starts from the premise that dis-
tributive shares should not be influenced (at least in any systematic way) by fac-
tors arbitrary from the moral point of view, and concludes that the difference
principle, constrained by the principle of fair equality of opportunity, is what is
needed to achieve this outcome.
This is the briefest possible sketch of Rawls’s theory of justice. The next two
sections will explore his account of fair equality of opportunity in more depth
and consider some difficulties it faces.
2 Fair equality of opportunity defended against two objections
Rawls begins his discussion of equality of opportunity by endorsing the idea
that careers should be open to talents in the sense that everyone should have
‘the same legal rights of access to all advantaged social positions’.3 Minimally
this must imply that there should be no legislation requiring discrimination and
no legislation requiring different treatment of different groups. Rawls does not
say anything more to clarify the notion of ‘careers open to talents’ and as a
result it is amenable to different interpretations. But I assume that careers
would not be genuinely open to talents if selectors chose to exclude certain
groups from consideration, for otherwise that would make the notion consis-
tent with an informal system of apartheid. Even if selectors are not legally
obliged to do so, they must by and large practice non-discrimination if there is
to be equality of opportunity. The idea that careers should be open to talents is
perhaps not equivalent to the idea that the best-qualified candidates should be
selected for advantaged social positions but it is a close relative of it.4
Rawls argues that the principle of careers open to talents is insufficient for fair
equality of opportunity by appealing to the major premise in what I referred to
earlier as the intuitive argument. In his view this principle is insufficient because
it permits ‘distributive shares to be improperly influenced by . . . factors . . . arbi-
trary from a moral point of view’.5 He argues that a principle of fair equality of
opportunity can correct for this by requiring that positions be open to all not only
formally, but also in such a way that each has a fair chance of attaining them.6
He treats this as equivalent to the idea that ‘those who are at the same level of
talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the
same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system,
that is, irrespective of the income class into which they are born’.7
In order to assess Rawls’s account of fair equality of opportunity, let me begin
by considering two influential objections. The first objection maintains that
what Rawls seeks to achieve from fair equality of opportunity – that is, equal life
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chances for those similarly endowed and motivated – could be secured simply by
randomly reassigning babies to different parents at birth.8 Indeed, as Brian Barry
points out, if equality of life chances at birth were a sufficient condition for fair
equality of opportunity, then a caste system which randomly reassigned babies
shortly afterwards would qualify.9 This is surely enough to refute the idea that
equality of life chances is a sufficient condition of fair equality of opportunity.
To suppose that Rawls is advocating that idea, however, is to ignore one of the
two elements of fair equality of opportunity. He is clear that careers must be open
to talents and that would immediately rule out a caste system. This does not
wholly defeat the objection, however. There are many possible social systems in
which the best-qualified candidates are appointed to advantaged social positions
but where economic class, say, still strongly influences one’s chances of success.
According to Rawls’s conception of fair equality of opportunity, it would appear
that in these systems equal opportunity could be achieved simply by randomly
reassigning babies at birth, and this is surely an unpalatable conclusion.
But I think Rawls can also respond to this point. His guiding idea is that peo-
ple should not be systematically disadvantaged by morally arbitrary factors;
that result could not be achieved simply by randomly reassigning babies at
birth. If one’s life chances were a function of the family to which one happened
to be reassigned, they would be deeply affected by morally arbitrary factors. Fair
equality of opportunity obtains only when similarly endowed and motivated
individuals have an equal chance of success because morally arbitrary disad-
vantage has been avoided or received compensation.
The second objection I shall consider maintains that fair equality of oppor-
tunity can be realised only by abolishing the family and that this is an unac-
ceptable price to pay.10 Similarly motivated and similarly endowed individuals
will have unequal prospects of success so long as they experience different fam-
ily environments. For example, some parents may value educational achieve-
ment, and encourage their children in this direction, while others do not. Rawls
recognises this difficulty but his response to it is weak.11 He moves from the
claim that ‘the principle of fair equality of opportunity can be only imperfectly
carried out, at least as long as the institution of the family exists’ to the claim
that ‘[i]t is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of achievement . . .
for those similarly endowed and motivated’,12 and from there to the conclusion
that all we can do is mitigate the morally arbitrary effects of ‘the natural lottery’
by implementing the difference principle. But if fair equality of opportunity
requires abolishing the family, Rawls needs to give us some reason for not doing
so. It is not enough for him to reply that fair equality of opportunity can never
be fully realised in practice, for the objection is that it could be more fully
realised by abolishing the family.13
Does Rawls have the resources to construct a better response to the argument
that fair equality of opportunity, as he understands it, would require abolishing
the family? He could point out that in his theory the basic liberties take priority
over fair equality of opportunity and then argue that these basic liberties entail
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that people be allowed to form families. This would require him to add to his list
of basic liberties, for they do not as they stand appear to justify a right to raise
one’s children. He could then concede that, strictly speaking, fair equality of
opportunity would require abolishing the family but maintain that this is ruled
out by the priority given to the (conditional) liberty to raise one’s children.
This line of argument is not without difficulty, however. In his later work
Rawls employs a conception of citizens as reasonable and rational, which
requires them to possess two moral powers, namely, the capacity for a sense of
justice, and the capacity to form and revise a conception of the good. The basic
liberties are then conceived as ‘essential social conditions for the adequate
development and full exercise of the two powers of moral personality over a
complete life’.14 Yet, as Véronique Munoz-Dardé points out, it is not obvious that
a right to raise one’s children, of the kind which would be required to justify
something akin to the traditional family, is an essential condition for the ade-
quate development and full exercise of the two moral powers that Rawls identi-
fies.15 The best case which can be made here is that even if the family is not
strictly an essential condition for the adequate development of these two pow-
ers, in practice over time other institutions, such as compulsory state provision
of childcare of various kinds, would be likely to fare worse in developing these
powers than some suitably constrained form of the family, given the dangers of
vesting the state with that amount of power in the upbringing of children.16
3 The independent role of equality of opportunity in Rawls’s theory 
of justice
In the process of answering objections to Rawls’s account of fair equality of
opportunity, I have argued that it needs to be understood in the context of his
overall theory, and I have emphasised that it consists of two elements – the idea
of careers being open to talents and the idea of equal chances of success for
those with the same level of endowments and motivation to use them. Both of
these points introduce difficulties of their own, however.
For a start, there are potential conflicts between the principle that careers
should be open to talents and the idea that similarly endowed and motivated
individuals should have equal chances of success.17 Suppose that employers
tend to devalue women. As a result of discrimination women’s life chances may
be less good than the life chances of men with similar talents and motivation.
Given the complexity of selection decisions, sexism may operate in subtle and
even unintentional ways, and as a result it may be hard to detect or prevent.18
For example, it may be hard to know when gender stereotypes, such as the idea
that women are less committed to their careers, are active in selection decisions.
So in some circumstances the most effective means of promoting equal chances
of success for similarly endowed and motivated men and women in the long
term may be to enforce a quota system by means of the law. As a result, pro-
moting equal life chances would entail abandoning the idea that equality of
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opportunity requires careers to be open to talents, at least when that is under-
stood (in the way that Rawls does) to require the same legal rights of access to
advantaged social positions.
If careers being open to talents and equal life chances for the similarly
endowed and motivated are each necessary conditions of fair equality of oppor-
tunity, it follows that in some circumstances equality of opportunity may be
impossible to achieve in practice. Given Rawls’s aspiration to provide us with a
theory in which conflicts within and between principles are resolved by prior-
ity rules, he at least owes us an account of which of these two necessary con-
ditions should take priority when they come into conflict. The point cuts deeper
than this, however. When we reflect upon the issue of which of these two ele-
ments should take priority in Rawls’s theory, it starts to become unclear why he
should give the idea of careers being open to talents any independent role at
all.19 What drives his account of fair equality of opportunity is the idea that the
distribution of advantaged social positions should not be affected by morally
arbitrary factors, and that idea is cashed out in terms of equal chances of suc-
cess for those with the same level of talents and abilities and willingness to use
them. But if equal chances of success for people thus situated is what really
matters for fair equality of opportunity, then the idea of careers being open to
talents appears to play at best a derivative role. In most circumstances holding
careers open to talents may be the best means of ensuring that those with the
same level of capabilities and willingness to use them have the same chances of
success. But when that goal could be better realised by giving individuals dif-
ferent rights of access to advantaged social positions, then fair equality of
opportunity would appear to require us to abandon our commitment to it.
Just as within Rawls’s account of fair equality of opportunity the independ-
ence of the principle of careers open to talents is problematic, so too in his the-
ory as a whole it is hard to justify the independent role of the account of fair
equality of opportunity. Let me explain.
Recall that the difference principle says that inequalities are permissible if
they are to the greatest benefit of the worst off group. The effect of giving the
principle of fair equality of opportunity priority over the difference principle is
to insist that equal opportunity, so understood, cannot legitimately be sacrificed
for greater material benefits for the worst off group.20 But why should we sup-
pose that the principle of fair equality of opportunity ought to be ranked above
the difference principle? Rawls does not explicitly present his reasoning but
hints that the same line of argument which justifies giving the principle of lib-
erty priority over the difference principle will also justify giving fair equality of
opportunity priority over the difference principle.21
The argument he gives for the priority of liberty appeals to the device of the
original position: when a person knows in the original position that society has
reached a point where everyone’s basic needs can be met, it is rational for him
to give priority to liberty.22 It is rational for someone in the original position to
assume that once his basic needs have been met, the basic liberties will be more
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beneficial for pursuing his own conception of the good, whatever that turns out
to be, than, say, greater wealth or income. Even if this is a good argument for
the priority of liberty,23 it is hard to see how the analogous argument in relation
to opportunity is supposed to work. The original question in effect resurfaces in
a new form: why is it supposed to be rationally required from the standpoint of
the original position to refuse to trade off access to advantaged social positions
in favour of greater wealth and income if the basic liberties are in place? Rawls
is implicitly treating access to advantaged social positions as more important
than other primary goods such as wealth and income, the distribution of which
is to be governed by the difference principle. But why should we suppose that
access to these positions is of such importance to justify ranking the principle
of fair equality of opportunity above the difference principle in a way that
disallows trade-offs?
Rawls develops his argument for the priority of liberty in a way that might
seem to promise an explanation of why he thinks the principle of fair equality
of opportunity should take priority over the difference principle. He argues that
in a just society the basis of self-respect for all is secured by the public affirma-
tion of equal citizenship, which requires enshrining the basic liberties in public
institutions.24 Might it be argued in a parallel way that the basis for self-respect
for all can be secured only if the principle of fair equality of opportunity is also
enshrined in society’s basic institutions? It is hard to see how this position could
be sustained. Rawls faces a dilemma. Either the social basis of self-respect can be
secured simply by institutionalising the principle of equal liberty or it cannot. If
it can, then the social basis of self-respect does not require institutionalising the
principle of fair equality of opportunity. On the other hand, if the social basis of
self-respect cannot be secured simply by institutionalising the principle of equal
liberty, the question immediately arises of why we should think it will be best
secured by enshrining the principle of fair equality of opportunity and giving it
lexical priority over the difference principle. For once we have moved away from
the assumption that the principle of equal liberty suffices, it is hard to see how
we could justifiably rule out the possibility that the basis for the self-respect of
the worst off group might sometimes be better secured by giving priority to the
difference principle rather than the principle of fair equality of opportunity in
matters of institutional design.25 Why is access to advantaged social positions,
understood in Rawls’s terms, supposed to be so much more important for secur-
ing self-respect than making the worst off as well off as it is possible for them to
be in terms of their share of wealth and income?
Rawls does present a further reason for thinking that access to advantaged
social positions is of particular importance. He points out that they may be
valuable not just as a means of securing material goods but also as a means of
securing rewarding jobs and hence self-realisation:
if some places were not open on a fair basis to all, those kept out would be right in
feeling unjustly treated even though they benefited from the greater efforts of those
who were allowed to hold them. They would be justified in their complaint not only
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because they were excluded from certain external rewards of office such as wealth
and privilege, but because they were debarred from experiencing the realization of
self which comes from a skilful and devoted exercise of social duties. They would
be deprived of one of the main forms of human good.26
The idea that access to advantaged social positions is important for this reason
is plausible but it is of limited help in justifying the priority of fair equality of
opportunity over the difference principle. At best it warrants the conclusion
that access to these positions should be given special weight. But that could be
done in two ways, neither of which requires there to be an independent princi-
ple of equality of opportunity, ranked above the difference principle. First, free-
dom of occupation could be treated as a basic liberty, to be protected by the first
principle of justice, the principle of liberty. Second, access to advantaged social
positions could be added to the list of primary goods that the difference princi-
ple is supposed to cover.27
Consider the first of these suggestions. Rawls himself seems to treat freedom
of occupation as a basic liberty in his more recent book Political Liberalism.28 But
he accepts that freedom of occupation can be secured without the principle of
fair equality of opportunity being satisfied.29 Freedom of occupation, when it is
conceived as a negative liberty in Rawls’s preferred way, in effect as the absence
of state-directed labour, does not seem to require equal chances of success for
the similarly endowed and motivated. (Nor does it seem to require careers to be
open to talents, as Rawls conceives it, for there are ways of regulating access to
jobs which fall short of a policy of state-directed labour but which nevertheless
mean that people do not have the same legal rights of access to them. An
enforced quota system of the kind described earlier would be an example.)
Consider the second proposal, that access to advantaged social positions
might be included in the list of primary goods that the difference principle cov-
ers. As Rawls deploys the difference principle, it is primarily concerned with the
distribution of wealth and income but there is no reason in principle why it
could not be extended to cover opportunity, if opportunity (conceived as having
a genuine chance of occupying advantaged social positions that enable self-
realisation) were regarded as a separate primary good. In practice, of course,
this would raise various difficult questions concerning the relative weight to
accord to wealth, income and opportunity. But these difficulties are not resolved
by insisting that opportunity is much more significant than wealth and income,
which in effect is the assumption behind ranking the principle of fair equality
of opportunity above the difference principle.
The difference principle, reformulated in this way, would still have implica-
tions for the distribution of advantaged social positions. If institutions are to
ensure that members of the worst off group are as well of as possible (in terms
of their shares of opportunity, wealth and income), these positions must be dis-
tributed in such a way that the talents and powers of individuals are utilised to
good effect. Although this does not in any straightforward way imply the prin-
ciple of fair equality of opportunity, it lends some limited support to it. For
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designing institutions in such a way that those with the same level of talents
and abilities, and willingness to use them, have the same chances of success is,
in most circumstances, likely to benefit the worst off group considerably in
terms of the opportunities and income and wealth they enjoy.
The suspicion that Rawls’s theory lacks the resources to explain why the
principle of fair equality of opportunity should be given an independent role is
reinforced by considering an incoherence from which that principle appears to
suffer. Rawls’s move from careers open to talents to fair equality of opportunity
is driven by the idea that the distribution of advantaged social positions should
not be affected by factors that are arbitrary from the moral point of view. Yet fair
equality of opportunity permits access to positions to be affected by natural
endowments (i.e., those talents and abilities, or parts of them, which are due to
one’s genetic inheritance) which Rawls also accepts are arbitrary from the
moral point of view. Therefore, if he is to be fully consistent it seems he must
concede that fair equality of opportunity, properly thought out, requires all per-
sons to have an equal chance of occupying advantaged social positions, irre-
spective of natural endowment.30 If Rawls’s theory were implicitly committed
to the idea that advantaged social positions should be distributed in such a way
that people’s natural abilities have no bearing on who gets them, it would be
hard to imagine a notion that is more fundamentally at odds with our intuitive
understanding of equality of opportunity.
Rawls is aware of this problem. In response he seems to argue that the best
solution in practice is to allow unequal natural endowments to affect access to
advantaged social positions in the way the principle of fair equality of opportu-
nity does, while adjusting the extrinsic rewards accruing to these positions so
that inequalities in the distribution of these rewards are limited in accordance
with the difference principle.31 In the context of Rawls’s theory, however, this
response appears flawed. It would seem that extrinsic rewards are being offered
to those with less natural talent as a way of compensating them for their rela-
tive lack of access to the goods intrinsic to advantaged social positions.32 Yet
surely it is precisely this kind of compensation that is supposed to be disallowed
by ranking the principle of fair equality of opportunity above the difference
principle. If compensation of this kind is permitted, again there seems to be no
reason to give the principle of fair equality of opportunity any independent role.
The opportunity to occupy advantaged social positions could be treated as a
primary good, which, along with wealth and income, is to be distributed by the
difference principle.
4 Can appointing the best-qualified candidates be defended 
as an independent principle of justice?
From within Rawls’s framework it is hard to see why equality of opportunity
should be given any independent role. This is a problematic conclusion which
must raise doubts about the framework itself. For once we embrace this
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conclusion, the justification of fair equality of opportunity, and indeed of a
practice of appointing the best-qualified candidates to advantaged social posi-
tions, becomes contingent upon its role in making the worst off group as well
off as possible (judged in terms of some appropriate metric which gives weight
to income, wealth and opportunity). The point here is not that this way of jus-
tifying equality of opportunity will allow exceptions to the idea that the best-
qualified candidates should be appointed to advantaged social positions.
Exceptions to this principle may be justified, as indeed defenders of affirmative
action programmes argue. The problem is rather that this principle seems to
have independent weight in our thinking about justice, even if does not express
a strict requirement of justice. Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity
held open the possibility of being faithful to this deeply rooted intuition but it
cannot be if we must regard it as derived using empirical premises from some
suitably expanded version of the difference principle.
The difficulty Rawls faces in giving the principle that selectors should appoint
the best-qualified candidates an independent role as a principle of justice arises,
at least in part, because the two most obvious ways of trying to justify this prin-
ciple are unavailable to Rawls, revealing the gulf between his theory and
ordinary intuitions.
It is sometimes held that the best-qualified candidate for an advantaged social
position deserves to be appointed to it, at least if there is fair access to qualifica-
tions.33 But this kind of defence is ruled out by Rawls, for he believes that it is
impracticable to reward desert. In his view people’s achievements are due not
only to their own efforts but also their fortunate circumstances, such as the
supportive family into which they were born or their inheritance of various tal-
ents. Rawls appears to assume that people deserve to be rewarded only for their
efforts; therefore tracking desert would require us to disentangle these different
components which he maintains is impossible in practice.34 Even if Rawls were
wrong and we could disentangle the different components, the idea that
the best-qualified candidates deserve to be appointed would be hard to justify if
we employ his conception of desert, for a person’s qualifications are due in part
to factors beyond her control such as her natural endowments and social
circumstances.
Other writers, such as George Sher, have tried to defend the idea that appoint-
ing the best-qualified candidates is an independent principle of justice by
appealing to the notion of respect for persons as agents. He writes:
When we hire by merit, we abstract from all facts about the applicants except their
ability to perform well at the relevant tasks. By thus concentrating on their ability
to perform, we treat them as agents whose purposeful acts are capable of making
a difference in the world . . . [S]electing by merit is a way of taking seriously the
potential agency of both the successful and the unsuccessful applicants.35
When someone is hired because they are the nephew of the director, or because
they are members of disadvantaged groups, or when hiring them will bring
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about better overall consequences for society, the potential agency of the
applicants – successful or not – is ignored and they are not accorded respect
as rational agents: candidates are treated ‘as mere bearers of needs or claims,
as passive links in causal chains, or as interchangeable specimens of larger
groups or classes’.36 Sher regards this argument as grounded in the idea of
desert but I think it is better conceived as appealing directly to the idea of respect
for persons.
A defence of this kind (though in my view much stronger than one which
appeals to the idea of desert) is unavailable to Rawls for it relies upon a con-
testable notion of respect for persons, which, even if it can be given more
defence, will remain contentious. The idea that a theory of justice should
appeal to premises which are widely shared and weak figured prominently in A
Theory of Justice, and was reformulated in Political Liberalism in terms of the
requirement that principles of justice should not be defended by appealing to
comprehensive moral doctrines. Now Rawls supposes that the fundamental
purpose of political philosophy in a democratic society is to devise a theory that
could become the object of an overlapping consensus between those who sub-
scribe to widely different comprehensive moral doctrines. Appealing abstractly
to ideas of respect for persons in the way that Sher does in order to defend the
appointment of the best-qualified candidates to advantaged social positions is
poorly adapted to this role.
The discrepancy between, on the one hand, Rawls’s account of equality of
opportunity and the role he gives it within his theory of justice and, on the other
hand, our intuitions about equality of opportunity does not show that we
should reject the former. But I hope that I have clarified the choice facing liberal
theorists. They must either reject key elements of Rawls’s theory (such as the
conception of desert he employs and his claim that it is impracticable to reward
desert) or acknowledge that the idea of appointing the best-qualified candidates
for advantaged social positions can be given no independent justification.
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Introduction
‘Political obligation’ is a broad notion and covers many things. Some have said,
for example, that the citizen has an obligation or duty to vote. Others have
claimed that citizens may have a duty to serve their country and possibly even
to fight in its defence. Most people who talk of political obligation, however,
have one thing in particular in mind: the citizens’ duty to obey the laws in their
own country.
The issue I want to discuss in this chapter is whether people do in fact have
good and justifiable reasons for complying with laws that go beyond mere fear
of punishment, and, if so, whether they are bound or obligated by those reasons
to comply.
1 One main argument for a duty to obey the law: consent
Socrates had to decide whether to disobey an unjust but legal decision; the
remarkable thing is that he decided to obey, for what he thought were sound
reasons, in circumstances that would cost him his life. Socrates believed people
had a moral duty to obey the law. It is a very strict duty based on an agreement
they have made.1
What is distinctive about the agreement argument Socrates assented to (in
the Crito) is that it puts the issue in terms of justice or morality. In our own polit-
ical tradition there is an argument somewhat like the Socratic one; it stresses
not the morality of keeping agreements but, rather, the connection between a
legitimately constituted government, on the one hand, and a citizen’s duty to
obey the valid laws issued by such a government, on the other. This obligation
is a strict one; it attaches to all laws and can be overridden, if at all, only in
exceptional cases.
In this theory, usually associated with Hobbes and Locke in particular, a 
contract (sometimes called ‘consent to government’) is said both to authorise a
government to make laws and to bind subjects to strict obedience. Actually the
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Locke argues that, at a certain point (that is, upon reaching the age of adult-
hood and then by staying on, more or less voluntarily, in the face of an unexer-
cised right of emigration), people become members or parts of a particular body
politic. The main function of any such body is to create a constitution or form
of government and, presumably, there is a consensus (what Locke calls a major-
ity) among the citizens as to where – that is, in what institutions – the main
powers of government (legislative, executive, etc.) have been lodged. Indeed,
Locke says, if there were not this consensus the body politic would come apart,
would simply disintegrate, and could only be held together by obvious and
clearly improper force. Now, from these two facts (that one is a member of a
body politic and that there is a consensually based constitutional government
for it) it follows for Locke, as a matter of logic, that each citizen (each member
of a political society so organised) is strictly bound to obey the laws duly issued
by such a constitutional government. Or it follows from these two facts plus one
other – if laws were not obeyed people would in effect have returned to the
unwanted state of nature – that each member has the strict obligation in ques-
tion. One has, in short, not consented (contracted, promised) in so many words
to obey the laws; rather, one has consented to be a member of a body politic and
from that fact, plus one or two others, it follows logically that the citizen has a
strict duty to obey laws duly issued. One is thus obliged as if one had in fact
expressly consented to obey.2
The doctrine of consent in Hobbes is, perhaps, simpler. Hobbes argues that
all subjects of all governments consent in one and the same fundamental way.
They simply ‘stand aside’ from their own exercise of natural rights (from the
right to do anything they are physically able to do); thus each subject has indi-
vidually consented (or, in effect, promised) permanently but conditionally to
waive that exercise in deference to the exercise of that same right (the right to
do anything) by the government. Hence, the subjects consent to be under the
sovereign’s will and are obliged to comply with it, whatever it is, in all or almost
all cases.3
For the ‘contract’ theorists, just as for Socrates’s idea of an agreement, the
relationship of citizens to the government and its laws is construed on an anal-
ogy with some non-political undertaking, like promising, agreeing, consenting
or signing a contract, which is obligation-creating in character. It is the fact of
agreement or the act of consent that grounds the obligation to obey the law in
all these theories.
I can see two main problems with this overall approach. First, there is the
problem of what counts as consent. Second, there is the problem of whether
consent so conceived can really bind people to obey all, or almost all, valid laws
simply because these laws were issued in the correct way by a legitimate or
effective government.
What counts as consent? All of the theorists count mere residence, permanent
residence, during adulthood. Hobbes adds the interesting twist that a resident
could even bow one’s head and go on living under a conqueror, on pain of death
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if such ‘consent’ were not given, and that would count fully as consent. Many
people are reluctant to think that mere continued residence should count, espe-
cially under the condition Hobbes envisioned, as having exactly the force of an
explicit and solemn promise.
Some have said that voting in a free election should so count. Well, so voting
might commit you to accepting the outcome of the election, we might grant.
But why should it commit you to accepting, being obliged to accept, all the laws
issued by those elected? Some of those laws might be foolish or unconstitu-
tional, or even wicked. Suppose you voted on the losing side. Your candidate did
not win. You voted that way because you did not want a certain bad law passed.
And now the candidate you voted against has, along with others, supported that
very law. Or suppose it was a really wicked law, like the US law in the 1850s
which required runaway slaves to be recaptured and returned to their owners,
and you were a voter in the state of Massachusetts who did not like the idea of
such a law and who had voted for a candidate who opposed it, a candidate who
was then elected but whose vote against this law was then defeated in the next
meeting of the national legislature. These examples suggest that it goes a bit far
to say that simply by voting in a general election you are committed to accept-
ing this law, and are obliged to obey it.
But what about an explicit and solemn promise, a full-bodied agreement to
accept all valid laws and to be bound by them? Would that work? Not too well.
Most citizens have never consented or contracted, in a way that can be
regarded as really counting, to obey the laws of the country in which they
reside. For example, not everyone (certainly not every citizen) has engaged in
a meaningful act of consent in Britain or America or Canada; in fact, relatively
few people there have done so. Therefore, if full-bodied actual consent is
required, the contract theory cannot account for an obligation to obey the law
in such countries.
One could always reply: well, if everyone had freely and explicitly promised
to obey the laws in their own country (in a solemn oath of some sort), that
would surely count. We could still ask, even if such a promise counted as con-
sent, whether such explicit consent would or could bind those who had taken
that oath, could oblige them, to obey all the valid laws of the land simply because
they were the country’s laws. Is the strict obligation to obey laws grounded
merely in the bare existence of consent to do so or is it grounded in whatever
good reasons (excluding fear of punishment, of course) one might have for so
consenting in the first place?
Clearly, if we simply cited the reasons (but without an act of explicit consent
by the people involved) then we no longer have actual consent as the ground
of obligation, contrary to what the contract theory requires.4 Suppose,
though, we cited both the fact of an explicit and widespread agreement in a
given country and good reasons for making such an agreement. One could still
question whether the fact of explicit consent really added anything to these
reasons.
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Consider. If we regard our obligation to obey our country’s laws as a moral
obligation (as did Socrates in the Crito), then we probably also believe that most
or very many of these laws have a good moral content (such as do the laws that
prohibit murder, kidnap, rape or physical assault). But would not the prohibi-
tions in such laws (given their good moral content) control our conduct,
morally speaking, even if they were not set down in law? By the same token,
they would also control our conduct, morally speaking, even if we had never
explicitly and solemnly promised to obey the laws of the land.
The matter becomes more complicated when we consider laws that are
morally indifferent. I would think a question of moral obligation could arise in
such cases only where what the law required (for example, the payment of
income taxes) could be shown to be necessary or substantially important to the
government’s continuing ability to encourage people’s compliance with those
laws that do have a morally good content.
When we come to wicked laws (laws with a bad moral content, like the
Fugitive Slave Law mentioned earlier, or Nazi laws against the Jews) I think the
matter changes considerably from what it was in the two earlier cases (the case
of laws with good moral content and the case of laws with morally neutral con-
tent). I do not think it possible to ground the moral precept of obedience to law
on a foundation of indifference with respect to whether the laws are, in most
cases and in the long run, of a morally good or at least a morally acceptable con-
tent. The moral presumption here is surely against evil laws, and this presump-
tion will tell against any morally based obligation to obey such laws. In the
analysis we have given, a promise to obey evil laws could not be morally justi-
fied and any such promise, even the promise to obey all laws (just and unjust),
would not have obliging weight.
2 Another main argument for a duty to obey the law: benefit
Dissatisfaction with consent theory has led political theorists to consider other
possible grounds of an obligation to obey law. What follows is perhaps the most
commonly cited alternative.
It is often alleged that the receipt of benefits obliges one, as based on a proper
sense of gratitude, to show appropriate responsive conduct. Some have said (as
it was said, for example, in Plato’s Crito) that when the benefit comes from the
government, the appropriate responsive conduct is to obey the laws.
Of course, some benefits are ‘open’; they come to everyone and one can hardly
help but receive them (like breathing clean air as the result of anti-pollution meas-
ures). Sometimes benefits come, even though one actively tries to avoid them.
(Many of my neighbours actively opposed the city building sidewalks, along our
street, but now they use those pavements like anyone else.) But some benefits are
positively sought (and accepted) or are at least voluntarily received, knowingly
and willingly. These it might be said are the ones for which one clearly owes a duty
of gratitude, and appropriate responsive conduct is owed to the benefactor.
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The question is, though, Where these benefits are positively sought or vol-
untarily received from government, does one owe obedience to law as one
feature (perhaps the main feature) of one’s appropriate responsive conduct?
Does one, indeed, have an obligation to obey all the laws on such a basis?
Consider the following example. A black student (age nineteen) in South
Africa during the period of apartheid requests and receives admission to a state-
run high school and some monetary aid (to cover costs and fees) from the local
education authority, support that is paid for out of tax revenues. Suppose it is
believed that the student might now owe a debt of gratitude, to be paid back in
some sort of appropriate responsive conduct. But what conduct is appropriate?
Contributing to state-supported education in the future (through donation of
one’s time or contributing financially to a scholarship fund) might well be. But
it can hardly be alleged that one now is obliged, morally obligated, to support
the government and obey all its laws (including the laws that maintain
apartheid). The same could be said of a white student in similar circumstances.
That student might be thought to be obliged to contribute to state-supported
education in the future, but there is no good reason to say that this student, who
has probably received more benefits overall than the black student, is morally
obligated, any more than is the black student, to support the government and
obey all its laws.
Indeed, we could vary the picture somewhat, to include important benefits
people receive (but without assuming their voluntary acceptance). For
instance, both our students (black and white) might have benefited greatly from
public health measures (clean water, sanitation, vaccination and other disease
control programmes). Would it follow from this that either is morally obligated
to support the government and obey all its laws?
The basic point I am making, that there is no obligation to obey all the laws
of the land in such cases, would probably hold even if the evil apartheid laws
were completely removed from the picture. The fundamental question here is
whether the appropriate responsive conduct, said to be owed in these two cases
of education and public health, can reasonably be thought to include support-
ing the government and obeying all its laws. More to the point, if you were to
run through a wide number of cases, of various benefits actively sought or vol-
untarily received from government or of important benefits merely received,
and reach the same conclusion in each case, then you do not think gratitude for
benefits received does ground an obligation for recipients to obey all the laws of
their country.
Some have pointed to a special version of benefit theory, called fair play, to
make the case for a duty to obey law. Here is the picture they present. People are
engaged in a joint activity, a practice or an enterprise, that is widely beneficial
(like conserving water in time of drought or reducing electricity use in the face
of a brownout [a partial blackout]). The benefits of this activity can only be
obtained if most people join in, but doing so carries certain costs for each of
them (for example, I cannot water my lawn, you cannot wash your car).
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Now let us say that I (a university student) am engaged in such a practice (in a
scheme of things) in which others are doing something to benefit me (like paying
their taxes) and I have voluntarily accepted these benefits; now it comes my turn,
after a few years have passed, to pay taxes (for I have now entered the workaday
world). Fair play theory alleges that I am obligated, by my participation in this
practice (in particular, through my voluntary receipt of benefits and the costs
to others of these benefits being provided), to do my share, to return in kind the
benefits I have received, by paying my taxes. And this means complying with the
tax laws. (To keep matters simple, let us suppose that these laws are not unfair.)
Technically, the obligation I owe, under fair play, is to the other participants
in the joint activity. It can become an obligation to obey the law only indirectly,
in so far as the activity itself is essentially or significantly involved with one’s
being law abiding.
This said, I cannot quarrel with the analysis just given. The question, though,
is whether you or I have an obligation to obey all the laws (including future
laws, some of which might be bad laws or even evil ones).
The same thought experiment I suggested earlier would work here as well, to
help answer this question. The issue we are raising here is whether the appro-
priate responsive conduct, said to be owed in this one case of receipt of benefits
from tax revenues raised and spent, can reasonably be thought to go beyond
conformity to the tax laws to include supporting the government and obeying
all its laws. Surely, it does not. And if we took each practice up in turn, one after
the other, we would reach the same conclusion in each case. Thus, a person
who had benefited from other people’s obedience to laws against theft should
obey those same laws, were the circumstance to arise. You owe it to these oth-
ers, in fair play, so to act. But there would be no generalised duty, a duty that
went beyond conformity to anti-theft laws, to obey all the government’s laws.
Indeed, if you ran through a wide number of cases, envisioning people’s par-
ticipation in a variety of practices or joint activities (where they voluntarily
received benefits in each of them) and lumped them all together, you might con-
clude that the persons involved should do their share, to pay back in kind the
benefits they have received. This may well involve a duty to obey several, even
many, laws. But none of this would mandate the conclusion that fair play (in
the case of benefits voluntarily received by participants in a wide variety of
practices) would ground an obligation for each of them to obey all the laws of
their country. Obedience to some laws may not benefit everyone (and obedience
to some laws might not benefit anyone).
The conclusions reached in our survey of fair play are, of course, strength-
ened when we consider that some laws may be evil (like the Nazi laws against
Jews or the apartheid laws in South Africa) and that such evil laws cannot ben-
efit literally everyone. And if any are benefited in such cases (as some would be
by wicked laws, as were slave-owners in a slave system, for instance) there is no
moral obligation, no obligation of fair play, even for them (let alone for the per-
sons victimised by such laws) to obey all the laws of the land.
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3 A preliminary conclusion and some materials for a new start
We have now canvassed some of the main arguments for a generalised duty, a
duty of everyone, to obey all laws. The arguments based on consent, on gratitude
for benefits, and on fair play have been looked at in turn and each has failed.
Some have concluded from this that there simply is no obligation, no moral
obligation, for everyone to obey all laws in their own country. In fact, there may
not be a standing obligation, for some at least, to obey any of the laws.5 Others,
looking at this same sample, have concluded that none of the standard argu-
ments will work but these theorists have left open that another, radically differ-
ent, approach might work. And some have even suggested the main lines of
such an approach.6 I tend to side with this second view, suitably qualified.
The theorists we have been criticising all treat the obligation to obey the law
as primarily a moral one and thus the grounds they emphasise are distinctively
moral grounds. These theorists are interested in general grounds for obeying law
– grounds operative in all or almost all societies, grounds that could cover all
laws or, conceivably, all persons – and they disdain reasons which are local or
distinctive only of a particular society (or specific kind of system). But their
analysis, by its very nature, creates a deep problem: they cannot show that the
duties so generated – by reference to these general, distinctively moral grounds
(such grounds as agreement or express consent or gratitude for benefits
received or fair play) – can ever be duties of all people in a given country to obey
all the laws there. Or so I have argued. The quest for such generality has proven
to be a hopeless and unrewarding one.
A second feature of the standard approach also needs bringing out. The
favoured grounds cited in this approach all have in common that they invoke
some voluntary act on an agent’s part. Typically, the agents are here said volun-
tarily to have consented or, alternatively, voluntarily to have received benefits or,
as yet another alternative, to have knowingly participated in a practice or joint
activity from which they have voluntarily received benefits of the very sort
they’re now being asked to provide in turn. The main point relied on in all these
cases is the same: having an obligation implies that one has voluntarily taken on
that obligation through some sort of (morally approvable) transaction.
This pronounced emphasis on voluntariness may be out of place. One can
have duties that are not based on voluntary acts at all. For example, children
(say teenagers) could have duties to their parents which are not based on vol-
untary transactions on the young persons’ part; among the benefits they have
received are many that were not voluntarily sought or voluntarily taken (for
example, the enormous number of such benefits they received when they were
infants or very young children). More to the point, it may be the relationship
they are in, with their parents, that counts entirely (or for the most part) for the
duties they have.
Consider now a parallel case. The requirements on people’s conduct that the
law imposes are often there because of the status these individuals have (as
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innkeeper or employer or, quite typically, as member and fellow citizen) in a
given political society. The normative directions for conduct laid down in the
law often come with the territory and are imposed simply by the rule-making
actions of government officials. These requirements are, thus, unlike standard
voluntary obligations in a number of important respects. They do not neces-
sarily involve undertakings or determinate transactions that serve to bring a
citizen specifically under a given requirement; they are not, in many typical
cases, owed to definite or named individuals (but, rather, to all citizens); they
are not imposed because the individual has been the actual beneficiary of the
very way of acting which that individual is now being normatively directed to
engage in, and so on. (This last point is in deliberate contrast with fair play.) We
need, in short, to be able to discuss the duty one might have, to conform to such
laws, without assuming that the duty is there on the basis of some voluntary
undertaking or determinate transaction that has served to bring the citizen
specifically under that requirement.
Another dimension to this important matter of voluntariness needs mention
as well. Most people are in fact citizens or lifelong members of only one coun-
try during their entire lifetimes. They are born in that one country and they will
spend their whole lives there. Many others have joined them, for reasons of
their own, and have in effect cast their lots there; this we must grant. But we
must be able to make a case for a duty to obey laws for this vast majority (those
who were born there), if we are going to have any serious case for the claim that
citizens have or may have a duty to conform to laws. We need, in short, to be
able to discuss the duty one might have, to conform to laws in the country of
their birth, without assuming that the duty is there and can only be there on
the basis of some voluntary undertaking or determinate transaction that has
served to bring the citizen specifically under that duty.7
One final point is worth making. People often talk about a duty to conform to
law which is system specific. Here one’s obligation to obey laws is not represented
as a moral one at all; rather, it is thought to be based on some feature of the polit-
ical system itself. Thus, someone might allege that in a democratic state the
norms of democracy require that one accept democratically established law as
law, as binding law, and be willing to comply with it so long as it remains in force.
The problem with taking a very general ‘moral reasons’ approach to political
obligation (where we consider only moral reasons that would bind all people at
all times and places to obey all the laws in their country) is not just that it would
not work, a point I have already made, but also that it deflects attention from the
notion of any sort of special obligation to laws as laws. It seems we should deter-
mine what it is about laws simply in so far as they are laws and about the specific
political system in which they occur that might initially engender and justify
such a duty. If we cannot do this, one might wonder if we are really talking about
political obligation at all. We should, then, if we want to take seriously the issue
of an obligation towards laws as such, make system-specific reasons our first line
of attack in determining the grounds of one’s obligation to obey the law.
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Let me summarise the main themes, now, of our suggested new approach to
assessing political obligation. First, we should emphasise the case of people who
are born in a given country and are lifelong residents there. And we should not
assume that any duty to obey laws, should there be one, is a duty voluntarily
taken on or one involved in a transaction of some sort. Second, we would do well,
at least as an initial step, to focus on specific features of the political system of the
country in which these people reside, to see if these features give rise to any sort
of duty to obey the laws there. And, finally, we should give up the quest for gen-
erality, of trying to find general reasons that would underwrite an obligation of
all people at all times and places to obey all the laws in their country.
To follow out the new approach just suggested does not preclude us from ask-
ing moral questions. We can still ask whether a given system of political con-
ceptions and institutions, in which the elements of political obligation have
been established as embedded, can be morally approved. Or we can ask whether
most laws generated by such a system can be morally approved. This is the same
as asking whether a system-specific political obligation can be morally justified.
But the questions we are asking here can only be asked and answered in the
order I have given. Without first showing that an obligation is owed to the laws
qua laws and that such obligation can be given a system-specific justification,
any programme for a moral justification of political obligation would seem to
be off target. It could not tell us whether (or why) we have a duty to comply with
laws simply in so far as they were laws. And this would be to miss the point of
raising the issue political obligation in the first place. Or so I would argue.8
What we would be looking for, in carrying through this analysis, are reasons
specific to a given political system that could bind people to conform with the
laws, simply as laws, in such a system. If such a system actually exists to an
appreciable degree in the country in which a group of people live, then we have
found reasons that will bind such people to the laws there, merely in so far as
these are duly enacted laws, or will bind them with respect to an important sub-
set of these laws. In following out the lines of the new approach we might be
able to come up with a definite and workable notion of political obligation.
We will not have time in the present study to carry through this analysis.
What is important to see here is the basic approach we would be taking to it. But
the analysis itself is something we must save for another day.9
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Introduction
This chapter is about national ties and how they are supposed to act as a glue
that holds the state together in the eyes of its citizens. A nation-state, so the
story goes, is one where all the people in the state are bound together by ties of
national solidarity. The solidarity legitimates the state – it tells the citizens why
they are members and why it is right for the state to exist. In theory the power
of the state is really in the hands of the nation because the state is nothing more
or less than the great national project.
National stories are told all over the world. Despite its sordid history,
the South African state is legitimated as the project of the ‘rainbow nation’. The
Scots have a new parliament (though not quite a state) that represents the
Scottish nation. The newly unified German state allows the nation to shape its
destiny as one. East Timor is free from Indonesian domination, and the nation
can now have its say. Of course, this is not the whole story. For example,
national solidarity appears in a less benign light in the former Yugoslavia,
where conflict has raged over national self-determination. When members of
one nation live in another state, things often get unpleasant. Very many people
have killed and died in the name of the nation, and states have disintegrated
into bitterness and conflict as a result.
Nationalism can be very exclusive. Much of the thinking described in this
chapter prizes a solidarity that is strong yet socially inclusive. In section 1 the
issue of solidarity will be explained. Nationalists argue that solidarity derived
from ‘thin’ concepts like ‘justice’ and ‘utility’ cannot bind people to their states.
The only solidarity that works is one that appeals to strong affections for com-
munities, in this case the nation. Conceptually, the sources of solidarity have
either derived from ideas of ethnicity or from ideas of civic unity (section 2). The
stories we tell are often either about common origins, or common social tradi-
tions. We may be members of the Volk or citizens of ‘the land of the free’.
In section 3, three attempts to give civic nationalism the upper hand are out-
lined. The questions provoked by attempts to redeem civic nationalism concern
the coherence and practicality of civic solidarity. Is it possible to have a strong
5
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solidarity that does not descend either into chaos or into ethnic cruelty? Can we
say ‘we’ without presupposing some sort of common character? Civic nation-
alists think we can, and they argue for a renewal of nationalist thought. How-
ever, perhaps they are swimming against currents that are just too strong.
1 On solidarity
Some contemporary political theorists regard nationalism as an anachronistic
vestige of less enlightened times, or as a distraction from the real issues of pol-
itics. For example, when asked the question ‘what reasons do we have to iden-
tify with the state to which we belong?’ they may answer that we have ties
because states have pragmatic and tangible benefits, both economically and
socially. Alternatively, they might say that we should not have primary ties to
states at all, but should have ties to justice.
For example, Robert Goodin sees the state as having two roles. First, it forces
people to ‘“internalise” externalities’.1 The state ensures that people pay the real
cost of their activities, including environmental and social costs. If citizens drive
cars, they pay for roads and for the costs of the pollution that they create. The
state co-ordinates the payment of these costs. Second, the state may be the
primary agent of welfarism where, through any one of a number of political
agendas, wealth is redistributed according to certain political criteria.2 So, when
we ask why we have ties to the state, the answer is that we are tying ourselves to
the usefulness of the state.
By contrast, John Rawls emphasises justice. His theory is related to Goodin’s
in that he sees the state as having a redistributive and regulatory role.3 The key
to Rawls’s understanding of the state is that it is not the starting point of his
thinking. Institutions will provoke allegiance if people find them acceptable,
and citizens will find them acceptable if they are just.4 The formations of states,
as manifested in the drawing of their boundaries, are thought by Rawls to be
arbitrary. As such, the place of states in the political run of things is just not all
that significant. The significant thing, again, is justice. What matters is the
development of an ‘overlapping consensus’ on the habits and institutions by
which people, who might otherwise diverge, can get along with each other.
Very many people have argued that the sorts of solidarity envisaged by
Goodin, Rawls and others is too ‘thin’ to be meaningful. This criticism has often
come from communitarians and multicultural theorists, who argue that polit-
ical understanding must take account of the fact that individuals are strongly
embedded in communities.5 These communities shape individuals in ways that
are politically significant. Community membership determines the ‘thick’ polit-
ical conceptions that real people, not the abstractions of liberal theory, carry
around with them.
As with communitarian and multicultural theory, nationalism emphasises the
importance of community membership. Nationalists argue that ties grounded in
the justice of institutions, or ties grounded in pragmatic calculation, are not
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strong enough to bind people to the state. Solidarity that is rooted in utility or jus-
tice as advocated by Goodin and Rawls, is not solidarity in any meaningful sense.
For nationalists, such a solidarity fails to do two things. It fails to describe the
reasons why people have experienced solidarity in the past, in situations when
their relationships with their states were neither hugely beneficial nor just in
the senses that Goodin and Rawls hold. Such a solidarity also fails to tell us why
people should regard a state as theirs. Justice, almost always universalist in
intention, and pragmatic calculation, always contingent on benefits, cannot
explain the feelings of ownership that French people have regarding the French
state, or that Spaniards feel regarding the Spanish state.
A theory of nationalism explains the affection people feel for their state. Nation-
alists argue that the mutual affections of co-nationals are a positive part of
political life. National affections help legitimate states, creating a sense of mem-
bership and ownership. National membership is the root of legitimate authority.
The state can tell us what to do because the state is our national project.
2 The nation and the nation-state
Historically, constitutional democracy is linked to the nation-state. When
absolute monarchs ruled states, states were regarded as legitimate in virtue of
the authority of the king, who was thought to receive his authority from God.
Solidarity had nothing to do with it. When kings were overthrown across
Europe and in America, the question of legitimacy arose. One answer to this
question was that authority should be defined, at least in part, by solidarity.
Boundaries were conceived as being dependent on something other than polit-
ical decisions. Boundaries of states reflected the territorial spread of nations.
In France, the link between nationalism and state power was enshrined in the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Individual, adopted in August 1789.
The declaration was to serve as the preamble to France’s Revolutionary consti-
tution of 1791 and was drawn from the constitutions of some American states,
and from the philosophies of Locke, Voltaire and Rousseau. Article III states
that ‘The principle of all sovereignty resides in the Nation. No body or individ-
ual may exercise any power other than that expressly emanating from the
Nation’. Article III was derived specifically from Rousseau’s writing.6
There are two ways of thinking about the nation. When the thinkers of the
French revolution thought of sovereignty as being vested in the nation, they
meant that it was vested in the people born in France. However, the second wave
of nationalism, beginning in the late nineteenth century, thought of the nation
as a Volk – as a group tied by their shared nationhood, not by their being born
in a certain state. In its first manifestation at the origins of the civic tradition,
the nation was decidedly subordinate to the bourgeois state and attendant
rights held by all the citizenry. The second wave was rooted in the romantic ori-
gins of pre-political groups. According to ethnic nationalists, the state was sub-
ordinate to the nation, because the nation was there first.7
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2(a) Civic nationalism
As I said, in the civic tradition the nation was assumed to be more or less every-
body in the state. Political structures were set up in line with the classical repub-
lican ideas of citizenship and discourse. However, a state like France was too big
to appeal to the sorts of strong solidarity that existed in medieval city-states,
where it was likely that everyone knew each other. The looser phenomenon of
national consciousness provided an appropriate story around which solidarity
could be built.
Quite literally, the state was deemed to be the national project. It belonged to
everyone, because everyone was involved in sustaining it. The appeal to nation
would present people with the interest and reference that overrode other, more
contingent concerns. Now, one could lose from the everyday rough and tumble
of the political world, and yet be given a reason to stay loyal. You might not have
your way in deciding the direction the ship of state was going to take, but you
were always part of the crew.
The civic national ideal also enshrined a concept of equality that had been
missing in the monarchical state. Not only were you part of the crew, but you
had as much right to be captain as everyone else. As such, the experience of
inequality was substantively different to the experience of inequality under
monarchism. Now inequality was thought of as a facet of merit, not of birth.
All members of the state were to be treated as equals without being equal in
merit. Success was linked to effort. The supposition that every member could,
through their own effort, climb to the top of the pile, was part of the basis for
people’s nationalist affections. And if you were a loser, you could console your-
self, so the story went, by the knowledge that you were still a member of the
crew. ‘Socially humiliated and discontented people find in the membership of
the nation a new sense of pride, a new dignity: “I am poor, but at least I am
American (or German or Italian)”.’8 You were still, so the story went, an author
of and participant in the great national project.
2(b) Ethnic nationalism
The second sort of nationalism chiefly developed across central and eastern
Europe. This nationalism was not based on the prior presence of a state or on the
need to legitimate a state. Instead it was based on groups that made claims to state-
hood. These groups appealed to the potent romantic brew of perceived cultural
and ethnic commonality to justify their uniqueness – the qualities that separated
them from their peers in whatever state they happened to find themselves in.
According to Hannah Arendt, the second wave of nationalism was sub-
stantially different from the first wave in that civic nationalism ‘even in its
most wildly fantastic manifestations, did not hold that men of French origin,
born and raised in another country, without any knowledge of French lan-
guage or culture, would be “born Frenchmen” thanks to some mysterious
qualities of body and soul’.9 The new form of nationalism, or ‘tribalism’ as
Arendt called it, was characterised by a concentration on the nation as a set of
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shared characteristics. The problem with this is that it was not confined to
national borders, as civic nationalism was. So, pan-Germanism was an aspi-
ration to unite the Germanic peoples of Europe, not a celebration of national
achievement. This nationalism justified, and justifies, what we now call Balka-
nisation – the attempted division of territory along supposedly ethnic lines.10
The rise of ethnic nationalism and of imperialist racialism led to the sidelin-
ing in the more established nation-states of the republican traditions associated
with civic nationalism. In France, where the republican tradition had been
strong, the tone of statehood started to tend towards the authoritarian. Now
the Dreyfusard appeal to ‘the stern Jacobin concept of the nation based upon
human rights – that republican view of communal life which asserts that (in
the words of Clemenceau) by infringing on the rights of one you infringe on the
rights of all’11 fell on deaf ears. In Germany, where there was little in the way of
a republican tradition, ‘antirepublicanism was even more pronounced’.12 The
automatic right of state members to citizenship disappeared, and those who
were deemed to be outside the nation were regarded as being beyond the pro-
tection of the state. Now, you were not of a place because you were born there.
You were of a place because it was your home, your birthright.
The Jacobin tradition was usurped by the ethnic drives of the new nations, by
people who drove their self-conceptions into increasingly narrow corridors and
away from the democratic embrace of republicanism. Now we associate nation-
alism with racism, intolerance and ethnic hatred. The nation is largely, though
not solely, the cause of the Balkan wars, of intolerance towards immigrants and
of innumerable breaches of human rights. If we are interested in a moral world
that reflects diversity, plurality and inclusion, we tend to fear nationalism’s rise.
The problem is that, without denying the dangers of nationalism, very many
people also recognise that the nation creates important social bonds. We can-
not and should not ignore the nation, despite the cruelties associated with its
ethnic manifestation. It is the root of solidarity in the nation-state that is still
the primary focus of our political lives.
The contemporary nation-state is being squeezed, both from above and from
below. The world we have inherited is made up of increasingly multi-ethnic
societies, with stronger global institutions and changes in the nature of com-
munications media, travel and education. As a matter of course, people make
claims to sovereignty within state borders. People also make moral and legal
appeals to institutions that exist beyond state borders. The nation-state is under
pressure from all sides. Nevertheless, the weakening of the nation-state should
not hide the fact that nationalism tapped, and still taps, directly into people’s
deepest affections. The nation is still a political issue. It has never gone away.
3 Transcending ethnic nationalism
Can we derive a notion of nationalism that does not hark back to the ethnic
nationalisms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? Is it possible
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to hold nationalist sentiments without betraying a liberal or pluralist outlook?
Some thinkers wish to preserve the legitimacy of states by restoring national-
ism to its civic roots. The legitimacy of states, they argue, is under threat both
from reactionary ethnic nationalists and from the dissolution of communities,
as traditionally conceived. In a globalised world, the nation can play an impor-
tant stabilising role. While ethnic nationalism is not desirable, neither is a situ-
ation where states cannot relate to their citizenries. Nationalists want to
develop an agenda that will help reorientate people back to a relationship with
their democratic states.
3(a) Postnationalism
Postmodernist thinkers ‘hold this belief in common: that the project of moder-
nity is now deeply problematic’.13 As anti-dogmatists, they try to show how sets
of concepts that had been accepted as similar or identical in the past are in fact
separate. Their political conceptions tend to be oppositional. This is because of
the inherently challenging nature of postmodern questions. Postmodernists
present a challenge to perceived unity, and to accepted power. They challenge
the supposed structures of the modern world.
In Postnationalist Ireland, Richard Kearney’s self-proclaimed agenda is to sepa-
rate into their constituent parts and varieties a series of nationalist concepts that
have been assumed to be identical, or to be related. He argues that the relation-
ship between citizens and the state, and indeed between each other, must be taken
apart. Once this is done, people might derive value from nationalist ties without
supposing that they should link national membership to ownership of the state.
This can only be done if people understand that the basis of their ties is not real
but ‘imagined,’ as Benedict Anderson put it – something that is not natural and
has no implications beyond itself.14 People must realise that their identities are not
unitary and complete, but are disparate, heterogeneous and complicated.
The idea that national freedom should be equated with state authority will
inevitably lead to instability. In the face of contrary feelings, the state cannot
maintain the unity of a diverse population. We should acknowledge the differ-
ent sources of legitimacy and identity. Authority can be based on these differ-
ent sources. The ethnic nation is not the sole source of identity and of
legitimation. If we want stability, authority must be dispersed above and below
the nation-state: ‘nations and states are of our own making and can be remade
according to other images’.15 If we understand the fact that our institutions are
invented, then we will be willing to think about them creatively, and will reject
the old dogmas.
Kearney replies to the question ‘can citizens live by law alone?’ in the nega-
tive. To try to ‘cure’ people of their communal ties would inevitably descend into
totalitarian oppression. Instead, our communal expressions should find ‘more
appropriate forms’.16 We should not hijack the state and turn it into a medium
for the ethnos. Instead, we should recognise the things that hold us together as
well as the things that keep us apart. The transcendence of ethnic nationalism
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lies in the recognition of the dubious grounds of ethnicity, both morally and
historically. The post-nation is the self-knowing nation.
Margaret Canovan argues that Kearney’s approach is problematic. The
way we think about ourselves is not so clear. Following Arendt, she writes
that ‘politics is not a matter of moulding passive material. Free politics means
action engaged in by plural actors, and no one can control or predict its
outcome’.17 The aspirations of postmodern nationalists may be too optimistic.
Holders of identity may be too stubborn to develop the realisations that
Kearney wants.
The arguments of postmodernists are far removed from the prevailing
feelings of people. When it comes to identity, appearances may deceive. Post-
modernism is, at best, ahead of its time. Indeed, as Canovan says, 
encouraging citizens to debate matters of common identity may generate more
enlightened and cosmopolitan views, but it could just as well provide opportunities
for populist mobilisation that might reinforce entrenched conceptions of ‘us’ and
‘them,’ or lead to re-imagined identities of an even less palatable kind. The increas-
ing success, in Western Europe and elsewhere, of political parties hostile to immi-
gration is a reminder of these possibilities.18
3(b) Liberal nationalism
In On Nationality, David Miller argues that liberalism and nationalism do not
have to conflict. He starts from the premise that nations can provide people with
a context for thick ethical outlooks – for concrete feelings of loyalty, bravery and
the like, as opposed to thin, ethereal notions of justice and virtue. People’s sense
of value, or right and wrong, can come from the more concrete conceptions
propagated by the nation. The nation also presents a rich foundation in our
globalised, homogenous world. We should value the cultural depth that can be
found amongst people who live their lives in rooted communities.19 Nationalism
provides us with a home. Nations exist to the extent that people believe they
exist. The truth or falsity of those nationalist beliefs is not an issue.
The specific nation is ‘strangely amorphous when we come to ask about the
rights and obligations that flow from it’:
Whereas in face-to-face communities, especially perhaps those with defined objec-
tives, there is a clear understanding of what each is expected to contribute towards
the welfare of other members, in the case of nationality we are in no position to
grasp the demands and expectations of other members directly, nor they ours.20
We may be able, Miller writes, to discern the national self-images of specific peo-
ple. For example, Americans think of the USA as the ‘land of the free.’ Such
images shape the way that people conceive of their national relationships. But
Miller points out that such concepts have to do with political culture and not
with national membership in the abstract. In the abstract sense, the nation has
no specific moral qualities.
Nevertheless, the idea that people should
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regard their nationality merely as historical accident, an identity to be sloughed off
in favour of humanity at large, carries little appeal. If national identities are dis-
tasteful, or have distasteful aspects, it seems more reasonable to work from within,
to get people to reassess what they have inherited, come to a new understanding of
what it means to be German or Canadian, than to dismiss such identities from an
external standpoint.21
In a way, Miller sees a potential for us to gain control over our national tradi-
tions, instead of regarding ourselves as passive products of our nations.
Miller argues that people within the state should be included even if they
regard themselves as different to the main current of national identity. ‘If a
state houses a minority who for one reason or another do not feel themselves to
be fully part of the national community, but who do not want or cannot realis-
tically hope to form a nation-state of their own, then national identity must be
transformed in such a way that they can be included.’22 A plural society
demands a pluralist nationalism. It is important to
free the public sphere of symbols, practices and unstated assumptions that prevent
the members of some groups from participating as equal citizens. I do not mean
that the public sphere should become culturally neutral: it expresses the shared
national identity of the citizens, and this must have some determinate content that
varies from place to place. But national identities have always been in a state of
flux, and the challenge now is to remake them in a way that is more hospitable to
women, ethnic minorities and other groups without emptying them of content
and destroying the underpinnings of democratic politics.23
Perhaps Miller, just like Kearney, is a bit optimistic. Can his argument propa-
gate change? Certainly when we think of, say, German identity, we think of a
transformation that is linked to the traumas of self-recognition in the wake of
Nazism and the Holocaust. However, other identities have not been forced into
such self-recognition or have refused such self-recognition. Changes in national
identity may happen, but there is no guarantee that the politics of members will
end up turning in one direction rather than the other. We may wish for nations
to be nicer, but we cannot make our wishes come true.
Even in states that are supposed to be nationalist in the civic sense, like the
USA, incidents of exclusion and repression are not uncommon. American
nationalism may focus on the rhetoric of freedom, but it can also turn towards
violence against foreigners or other outsiders. If we agree that identities are here
to stay as part of the political landscape, then we have to admit that nobody
knows how to control them. Nobody knows how to make nationalism nicer.
3(c) Patriotism
Miller and Kearney seek to renew nationalism. Patriots, on the other hand,
regard themselves as focusing on a solidarity that can be distinguished from
nationalism. They argue that nationalism cannot simultaneously guarantee
stability and an acceptable ethical outlook. We cannot rely on national affections
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to come up with a political outlook that respects citizenship and equal liberties.
Instead of directing our affections towards the nation we should direct them
towards the legitimate democratic structures of the state.
Maurizio Viroli writes that
the ideological victory of the language of nationalism has relegated the language
of patriotism to the margins of contemporary political thought. And yet, when
peoples become engaged in struggles for liberty, when they have to face the task of
rebuilding their nations after experiences of war and totalitarian regimes, theorists
are able to recover elements of the old language of patriotism under the predomi-
nant rhetoric of nationalism.24
Our civic tradition may be weak, but it is not dead.
Viroli argues that the ‘patriotism of liberty’ is neither nationalist nor univer-
salist. Just like liberal nationalists, patriots do not seek to create homogeneity in
cultural, ethnic and linguistic spheres. Neither do they expect us to engage solely
with abstract universal concepts. Instead, patriots argue for a ‘particularistic
love’ of ‘common liberty and the institutions that sustain it’. They argue for
love of the common liberty of a particular people, sustained by institutions that
have a particular history which has for that people a particular meaning, or mean-
ings, that inspire and are in turn sustained by a particular way of life and culture.
Because it is a love of the particular it is possible, but because it is a love of a par-
ticular liberty it is not exclusive: love of the common liberty of one’s people easily
extends beyond national boundaries and translates into solidarity.25
Viroli has little to say about how such a love can be created, but he does point
out that the patriotic tradition has been carried through centuries of political
writing. Patriotism is the inclusive love of ‘our’ liberty.
Similarly, Jürgen Habermas argues in favour of ‘constitutional patriotism’,
which is based on his sophisticated sociological theory, as presented in his two-
volume The Theory of Communicative Action.26 Habermas argues that, over time,
social discourses become progressively more rational through the ‘unforced force’
of the better argument. Societal action rationalises as a result of open discourse
concerning the reasons for action. Constitutional patriotism is a post-traditional
phenomenon. Habermas argues that, in a post-traditional society, people have
moved on from developing allegiance based on nationalist or other sentimental
and mystical outlooks. Instead, they place their allegiance in the just political
procedures of the state, based upon universalist and discursive principles.
Constitutional patriotism is a rational outlook because of the way that it has
been decided. This marks it out from nationalism. The only thing that guaran-
tees democratic rights is an explicit statement in a constitution. But that con-
stitutional statement is nothing unless it is accompanied by an attachment to
its moral standpoint. Habermas writes that
the universalist principles of constitutional democracy need to be somehow
anchored in the political culture of each country. Constitutional principles can nei-
ther take shape in social practices nor become the driving force for the dynamic
60 Nationalism and the state
chap 5  23/1/03  7:45 am  Page 60
project of creating an association of free and equal persons until they are situated
in the historical context of a nation of citizens in such a way that they link up with
those citizens’ motives and attitudes.27
As Attracta Ingram argues, it is part of the liberal state that it is unified by
certain shared values and the institutional structures that carry them over
time. The idea involves willingness to view people, for purposes of politics, as
generic individuals rather than as members of this or that clan, tribe or
nation’.28 Ingram’s point is that tight bonds can be created through ties to the
political structures of the liberal state. The constitutional patriot’s cause is obvi-
ously different to those of Kearney and Miller. Instead of looking to adjust
nationalism, or to promote a kinder, gentler nationalism, Habermas wants to
move away from nationalist feelings altogether. At least, that is, when it comes
to thinking about politics.
Viroli does not want us to detach ourselves from the ties that we have. He is
not asking us to remove ourselves from our deep communal structures.29
Habermas’s feelings about the benefits of such levels of commonality are some-
what open to question. It is difficult to know whether he wants us to forget
national ties altogether or to associate our national ties with pride in our con-
stitutional achievements.30 Either way, neither thinker is suggesting that we
completely rid ourselves of ties of birth. You do not become a citizen of your
state by sitting an examination – you do so by being born there. The important
thing is that we transcend the drive towards ethnic and cultural hegemony in
our society. The patriotic drive, according to both Viroli and Habermas, is suffi-
cient to tie us to our states. However, patriotism being sufficient for solidarity is
less important than the fact that it is moral and rational in a way that nation-
alism is not.
That said, there is some doubt as to whether constitutional patriotism would
create ties that are strong enough to bind people together in the way that a
nation is supposed to. For example, we may take some pride in the institutions
of the European Union, say the Convention on Human Rights, but that does not
necessarily make us feel European in the same way that we feel British or Irish
or French.31 If patriotism does transcend ethnic nationalism, there is a risk that
it will lead to the loss of solidarity in established states. That might mean greater
instability, as people turn their political attention to levels above or below the
nation-state.
Conclusion
In the introduction to this chapter, two questions were asked. First, is it possible
to have a strong solidarity that does not descend either into chaos or into ethnic
cruelty? Second, can we say ‘we’ without presupposing some sort of common
character? Civic nationalists believe both questions can be answered affirma-
tively. However, there are problems with the various attempts to transcend
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ethnic nationalism, as surveyed in the first section. We might believe, somewhat
optimistically, that nationalist ideas can be transformed. Kearney and Miller cer-
tainly believe this. Yet this strategy risks inadvertently legitimating old-style eth-
nic nationalism. If it is impossible to adjust nationalist ties in a way that rids us
of the ethnic fixation, it might be safer to reject nationalism as a whole. Possibly
any type of communal endeavour is exclusionary inasmuch as solidarity pre-
supposes exclusion. The only inclusive solidarity may be a loose global solidarity.
Instead of seeking a thicker solidarity, we could concentrate on the sort of con-
cerns that Goodin and Rawls appeal to, as discussed in section 2. If this leads to
the weakening and eventual dissolution of the nation-state, then so be it.
Of course, exclusion is not necessarily a problem in itself. The nation-state,
whether we like it or not, is still the primary focus of political life. What civic
nationalists and patriots want us to do is to realise that exclusion is an arbitrary
thing. We should include all those who live inside our territories and simultane-
ously admit that the territory and its boundaries have no moral relevance. We
may live in a nation-state, but that does not determine what our political actions
will be. The problem with this view is that civic nationalism or patriotism may
not be strong enough to create solidarity. Purely political solidarity may not be
enough. National stories invest too much in common origin and the like to be
open to adjustment in the direction of civic consciousness. Dangerous though it
is, the ethnic nation may be more compatible with what people really need.
Yet, something does seem to be happening, certainly across the rich part of
the world. To be sure, for some people the baby of social solidarity has been
thrown out with the bath water of nationalism. Nationalism is irrelevant to
them because they find all such bonds irrelevant. However, some others, with-
out necessarily dropping national bonds altogether, express a more cosmopoli-
tan sympathy with those who are not national members. Ideals of universal
human rights are spreading globally, and within states. Very many people
ignore nationalism when it comes to making decisions about the nature of sov-
ereignty. It just does not figure in their ideas of right and wrong. They may main-
tain their pride in national achievements, whether cultural or political, but they
do not think of the nation as the limit of their moral environment. Their moral
environment is characterised by a multiplicity of considerations. While they
want to get things right at home, they are also concerned that things are wrong
elsewhere. And the fact that things are wrong elsewhere is seen as their 
business. People are not just civic nationalists – they also exist beyond 
nationalism.
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Introduction
The prison populations of western countries have grown dramatically over the
past few years. All developed democracies are building new prisons and
increasing expenditure on law and order enforcement agencies, particularly
police and prison officers. This trend has been accompanied by a proliferation
of measures aimed at hindering or repressing any one who might disturb the
peace, such as prohibitions or restrictions on begging, curfews for teenagers
and the increased use of electronic controls, such as video surveillance in pub-
lic places and on transport services. David Garland2 has interpreted this situa-
tion as a ‘hysterical denial’ before the law enforcing agencies’ self-confessed
inability to control crime and their consequent resort to strategies that place
ever more responsibility for crime prevention on citizens and increasingly del-
egate the policing of public places to private security firms. However, this the-
sis is too crude. In western democracies, the number and categories of people
considered outlaws and suitable for imprisonment has risen at such a rate as to
constitute a qualitative transformation of criminal policies. Both governments
and public opinion appear to believe that current circumstances require a
much broader institutionalisation of citizens than was previously considered
acceptable.
Zygmunt Bauman3 and Loïc Wacquant4 have recently argued that the spread
of security related policies is closely related to the neo-liberal programme first
adopted by New Right governments in Britain and the USA, and which is now
presented throughout the western world as the necessary (or inevitable)
response to globalisation. They regard the criminalisation of poverty by west-
ern states as the paradoxical outcome of their weakened capacity for social
intervention due to the erosion of their political sovereignty by global pressures.
The marked expansion of social control and the barbarity of its methods ulti-
mately result from an ideology that champions the omnipotence of global mar-
kets. This chapter explores the link between the weakening of states and this
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66 Crime and punishment
1 Criminal policy in the era of globalisation
Drawing on Max Weber’s well-known thesis, Ernest Gellner5 argued that the
executive and legislative power of modern states rested upon three types of sov-
ereignty: military, economic and cultural. Historically, the sovereignty of states
cannot be separated from their capacity not only to defend their territories
against challenges from other sources of order, both internal and external, but
also to balance the accounts of the domestic economy and mobilise sufficient
cultural resources to defend their individuality by giving their subjects or citi-
zens a distinctive identity. Today the picture is quite different. The globalisation
of financial markets is increasingly presented as an irresistible force with which
states must comply, thereby relinquishing their hold on the regulation of the
economy. This analysis of markets as irresistible has gone hand in hand with the
ideology that the new world of mobile capital, where all state-created barriers
have been removed, is bound to make everyone’s life better.6 It has become a
commonplace that the control of the economic system by markets is of para-
mount importance for the well-being of humanity and the stability of the
world’s social arrangements. According to the ideology of globalisation, instead
of the economy needing to be made compatible with a given scheme of social
relations, society should be regulated to facilitate the operation of markets.
This approach drastically reduces the room for politics. Political activity,
defined by Claus Offe as ‘the capacity for making and implementing binding col-
lective decisions’,7 has become a problem: the public discourse created by the
ideology of global capitalism undermines the legitimacy of many choices that
for over half a century have been traditionally acknowledged as the prerogative
of states. In particular, the legitimacy of any state regulation of markets is
being increasingly questioned: there is no longer a domestic market to regulate,
the market is global and as such outside the state’s power. Moreover, trust in
spontaneous progress through the mechanism of the ‘invisible hand’ under-
mines any conception of the government’s role in economic life. Deregulation,
liberalisation, flexibility, the simplification of transactions in the labour and
real estate markets, reduced taxation: all these factors tend to reduce state sov-
ereignty to something merely nominal and to make its holder ‘anonymous’.
The trend is clear: the more the economy is taken out of political control, the
less resources states have at their command and the less they can afford to exer-
cise power – even when they are willing or supposed to do so.
As Bauman has emphasised,8 the emergence of new small, weak and power-
less sovereign states is consistent with economic and financial globalisation. Far
from hindering the new world society of the free circulation of capital, goods
and information, the birth of small politically independent territorial entities
with very few resources is indeed functional to its development. In a situation
where the border between what is ‘internal’ and what is ‘external’ to a state is
continuously shifting, the only function which seems bound to remain definitely
internal is that of policing the territory and its population. There seems to be a
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tendency to reduce state functions to their required minimum: namely, repres-
sive power. Indeed, the new world order needs weak states for its preservation
and reproduction: they ‘can be easily reduced to the (useful) role of local police
precincts, securing a modicum of order required for the conduct of business, but
need not be feared as effective brakes on the global companies’ freedom’.9
All the evidence indicates that the shift towards a judicial and prison man-
agement of poverty is more likely the more a government’s economic and social
policies are inspired by the neo-liberal ‘privatisation’ of social relations and the
weakening of state welfare. ‘Less state’ in the social field, less economic inter-
vention, apparently means ‘more state’ in the fields of law enforcement and
policing: repressive justice policies are the counterpart of libertarian economic
policies. Giving up the right to state welfare, let alone the right to employment
(a non-temporary full time job with social security and a decent salary), is
reflected in the obsession for reaffirming the ‘right to security’. The increase in
the resources devoted to maintaining public order compensates, above all sym-
bolically, for the lack of legitimacy resulting from governments giving up eco-
nomic regulation and the provision of social security.
2 From social contract to zero tolerance
From Cesare Beccaria in the eighteenth century to Hart and Rawls in the twen-
tieth,10 liberal theories of punishment have attempted to combine the general
deterrence of crime with due retribution against actual criminals. In eigh-
teenth-century theories, criminal law was regarded as an expression of the gen-
eral will. As such, it was believed not to discriminate unfairly against any
member of society or privilege any particular interest. According to social con-
tract theory, the liberal state’s monopoly of coercion was justified solely to pro-
tect those rights that reflected the rational interests of every individual. Its role
was to ensure every one respected the rights of every body else. The criminal
law was broken only by a small group of people who, unlike most citizens, were
incapable of following their own rational will and distinguishing right from
wrong. Those who committed crimes, especially re-offenders, thereby showed
they were not rational and did not deserve their rights. They had not developed
the required degree of self-control to deserve the benefits of the social contract.
Individuals were fully responsible for their own actions, for they were supposed
to be free to choose and directed by their own rational motives. Punishment was
the means whereby an individual, who went astray out of myopia, was
returned to the path of virtue. The law concentrated only on the crime, apply-
ing a strict code of retribution: the personal or social conditions leading an indi-
vidual to commit a crime had no bearing on the sentence.
These early liberal theories of punishment assumed a conception of individ-
uals as owning themselves and freely choosing and taking responsibility for
their own conduct on the basis of a calculus of its personal and social conse-
quences. This account of human agency came to provide both the underlying
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norm of the nineteenth-century liberal model of social order and the condition
for its operation. Its ‘actualisation’ was to be achieved above all by a criminal
policy that determined who and what to punish and how. As Foucault has
emphasised, from the late eighteenth century in the USA and then little by lit-
tle in Europe, it was realised that a stable liberal democracy required a set of
institutions – penitentiaries as well as asylums, hospitals, schools and the like –
capable of producing suitable citizens.11 In particular, social control and crimi-
nal policy were deliberately aimed at reinforcing, and creating if necessary, the
virtues of individual responsibility and self-discipline needed to cope with the
impersonal social relations of the new urban and industrial environment.
Deterrent criminal legislation, an efficient police force and a rigorous prison
system that both stigmatised convicts and subjected them to a uniform, consis-
tent and largely impersonal discipline, not only provided a practical means for
controlling crime, but also reinforced a certain value system.
The deprivation of liberty was a revolutionary and apparently progressive
approach to punishment, inspired by the values of the Enlightenment. It turned
the traditional strategy of social defence upside down: changing the offender
from an individual to be destroyed by death or torture to someone who
remained an integral part of society, in spite of having broken its rules. Thus,
punishment aimed at the criminal’s reintegration into society. The key function
of the ‘penitentiary’, it became the essence of the strategy of social control
adopted following the advent of the capitalist mode of production. The peni-
tentiary was viewed as the perfect instrument for turning the masses of former
peasants migrating into the towns into industrial manpower. It became a place
of forced socialisation and was structured according to the production model of
the manufactory and, later, of the factory.12 The penitentiary offered a theoret-
ical and physical locus that allowed the liberal theory of punishment to be fully
deployed. According to this theory, the best type of social defence required that
the offender – the breaker of the social contract – paid damages to society
through being deprived of a certain amount of liberty and subjected to disci-
pline while serving his or her term. Only in this way could offenders be reinte-
grated into the texture of legal relations as docile subjects who no longer
trespassed on property but were ready to earn a living by entering the market
and selling their labour power.13
At the end of the nineteenth century, the framework of liberal criminal
policy underwent a deep crisis. Liberal theories of order seemed unable to cope
with the negative consequences of industrialisation. There emerged a wide-
spread belief that the utilitarian account of agency, the unquestioned and vital
basis of classical jurisprudence, should be abandoned. The metaphysics of
interest, and hence of individual freedom and rationality, which was the prem-
ise of eighteenth-century economic and social theory, was replaced by the par-
adigm of the Positivist School. This model rejected the assumption that
individuals possessed creativity and the ability to choose. Instead, it was
premised on the idea that human beings had a given ‘personality’ or ‘character’
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that could be scientifically known and manipulated. Criminals simply possessed
deviant or pathological character traits.
In the twenty years following the Second World War, a new criminological
approach arose focusing on different modes of social control. Primary instru-
ments of social control (like the school, the family and the organisation of
leisure), often directly managed by the state, were privileged over the secondary
(notably prisons). The new strategy mostly addressed marginal non-criminalised
individuals, such as the elderly, children, the unemployed and underemployed,
immigrants and minority racial groups. Through financial and other forms of
assistance, especially social welfare, the state tried to gain their acceptance of the
existing social structure. An attempt was made to reduce imprisonment (both in
prisons and asylums) as much as possible and to develop alternative strategies for
controlling individuals, such as probation and parole for criminals and care in
the community for the mentally ill.
During the 1970s this paradigm also underwent a crisis. Not only was prison
perceived as an ineffective means of social control, but parole, community care,
fines and the like also no longer seemed able to achieve their primary goal of re-
educating offenders. In the concluding words of a well-known survey of the
early 1970s literature, it was felt that ‘nothing works’.14 Early analyses of
recidivism, which they regarded as the basic criteria for assessing the effective-
ness of re-socialising measures, seemed to show that every strategy had failed.
More generally, statistical evidence suggested that improving the living stan-
dards of the lower classes through state welfare did not in itself affect crime
rates. These results led to a questioning of the aetiology of deprivation, that is,
the theory associating deviance with subjective socio-economic disadvantage.
A widespread perception emerged that a generalised improvement of economic
conditions and a substantive enhancement of living standards had been unex-
pectedly followed by an increase in criminal activity. This view held true espe-
cially for that kind of criminality that had been thought to be closely related to
social deprivation: street crime and petty offences.
The belief that evidence disproved a link between criminality and marginality
ended up undermining the political legitimacy of both the pre-emptive and the
re-educational strategies. This left a theoretical gap that still seems unbridgeable.
For over two centuries every analysis of the failure and irrationality of the sys-
tem of punishment had been made with a view to a proposed reform that would
improve it. Such optimism has disappeared with the crisis of the notion of reha-
bilitation. Following the Second World War, this notion had provided the pun-
ishment of crime with both its goal and justification, legitimating it before public
opinion. Now it seems to neither have a future nor make much sense.
As Castel has observed,15 current criminal policies are radically different from
traditional ones. Today, coping with deviance no longer means singling out
deviant agents to be disciplined or otherwise ‘taken care of ’. The legitimacy of
punishing is again a self-evident given and is totally severed from the possible
‘positive’ impact on individuals it was thought to have when penitentiaries first
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appeared. The demand, that was once prioritised, of institutions capable of sus-
taining and re-socialising their populations, seems to have become irrelevant.
The policy of treatment or, more critically, disciplining, is now obsolete. Instead
of being disciplined, the new poor, such as immigrants and marginalised 
people, and above all drug addicts, are merely contained and detained.
Punishment is no longer focused on rehabilitation but is simply a repressive
measure designed to take the criminalised classes out of circulation. Its func-
tion is general prevention. It must act as a deterrent, with special prevention
being limited to temporary detention. It is not intended to re-socialise but sim-
ply to incapacitate offenders – at least for a while. Punishment is mostly con-
ceived of as a core set of physical material hindrances that make crime more
difficult. A theory of preventing criminality, based on a view of criminals as
socially, culturally, economically and biologically conditioned agents, has been
supplanted by a discourse focusing almost exclusively on deviant behaviour
and the environment within which it arises. The conception of agents as sup-
ple matter, developed by medical, psychiatric and criminological science as well
as sociology, is likewise vanishing. Since agents are no longer seen as treatable
transformable entities, their normalisation ceases to be the pivot of social con-
trol policies. The paradigm of these policies has changed: intervention in the
space for action has emerged as the main strategy for preventing crime. Social
control has been made independent of individuals and is associated with place,
especially urban areas.
The most popular strategy of crime control of recent years has been the Zero
Tolerance campaign promoted by the New York mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, and
managed by the police chief, William Bratton. The theoretical bases of this
criminal policy were laid by James Q. Wilson, perhaps the main authority of the
New Right in criminology,16 and George Kelling, a political scientist, in an arti-
cle which appeared in 1982. The article’s very title, ‘Broken Windows’17 sug-
gests the authors’ view that urban degradation, personal carelessness and
criminality are closely related. According to their ecological-behaviourist
account, when an urban environment is allowed to degrade, tolerating all sorts
of spoiling, that environment will soon host real criminal forms of behaviour.
The article’s title derives from the example used to illustrate the theory. If some-
one is allowed to break a window in an abandoned building, without it being
immediately replaced, all windows will soon be broken, thus triggering an esca-
lation of illegal behaviour. Ultimately someone will trespass into the building,
which in a short time will become a scene of vandalism. For Wilson and Kelling,
urban degradation suggests a lack of attention by the authorities, thus encour-
aging the belief that illegal action can easily be taken, getting the community
used to ever increasing levels of deviance and facilitating the emergence of
criminal cultures.
The recipe against crime that this thesis is meant to suggest is clear: instead
of the police simply trying to punish crimes after they have been committed,
they should prevent them ‘by protecting order’. Only by protecting order and
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shared values, providing a sense of membership of the community, can cities
be naturally defended against the emergence of criminality. The main task of
the police should be the repression of behaviour that, while being merely petty
offences, are annoying and make citizens feel they live in a degraded city. In
order to fight against criminality all ‘broken windows’ must be removed from
citizens’ sight, that is, rigorous repression must be used against those who draw
graffiti on shutters and subway walls or beg in an aggressive or annoying way,
street prostitutes, drunks and drug addicts staying in public places, tramps, etc.
It is worth remarking that the two theorists of zero tolerance seem uninterested
in either the ‘reasons’ for deviant behaviour (whether it expresses social distress
or points to problems to be dealt with or whatever) or whether these phenom-
ena can be really eradicated from society. In their view, it is only the prevention
in public places of ‘disruptive’ behaviour that matters.18
The thesis of Wilson and Kelling can be read as a behaviourist version of
what Hart,19 in his polemics against Lord Devlin, Parsons and Durkheim,
labelled the ‘disintegration theory’: namely, the theory that the task of criminal
law, more than repressing and punishing harmful behaviour, is to defend social
shared values. According to this theory, which rejects the separation of law and
morals lying at the heart of liberal doctrine, failing to protect shared values by
criminal punishment means that society – as Wilson and Kelling claim – runs
the risk of disintegrating, losing its bonds, in another words, of becoming
anomic. To the authors of ‘Broken Windows’, however, the values in need of
protection are not the basic values of the social structure, those grounding the
social contract in Locke’s and Beccaria’s theories: their protection is a by-prod-
uct. What is to be secured directly is the external value of a clean and orderly
environment for social interaction. Wilson and Kelling offer no criterion for dis-
tinguishing the permissible from the impermissible, orderly from disorderly
public behaviour. This task is entrusted to the police, who are granted the sta-
tus of the one legitimate interpreter of citizens’ shared feelings.20 Thus, the
police come to express the genuine voice of a community scared of crime. It is
up to them to repress behaviour that offends shared feelings. Whether this
actually means that they offend legal rules, moral judgements or aesthetic
beliefs is of no concern given the promise that this strategy guarantees security
and the restoration of order.
3 Actuarial criminal policy and risk distribution
In the field of practice, this new approach to criminal policy means that a sys-
tem focussed on individuals, the causes of their deviant behaviour and the pos-
sibility of their re-socialisation, is replaced with a system addressing whole
social groups selected on the basis of the risk they pose to public security. Con-
trol strategies target not ‘criminal’ or ‘deviant’ individuals but ‘categories of
individuals’ who ought to be the object of surveillance and deterrence. Individ-
uals are only relevant to the extent that they fall under a category denoted by a
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probabilistic assessment of the risk created by its members. Paradoxically, the
crisis of the welfare state and the success of libertarian policies have led to a
criminal policy governed by the same governmental and disciplinary logic that
had previously characterised the organisation of welfare.
The new criminal policies involve the state giving up its role as the agent of
security: the right to security is replaced by a policy of the socialisation of risk
designed to bring it within acceptable levels and mitigate its effects. Factors
jeopardising public security are managed in the same way the welfare state
approached social risks and unemployment, through a scheme of social insur-
ance. Hence the label ‘actuarial criminology’, that highlights how the new
types of social control are grounded on the sorts of calculations employed by
the insurance industry.21 This approach is based on a significant reconceptual-
isation of criminals: no longer are they either ‘individuals inherently at risk’ or
‘in need of rehabilitation’, they have become ‘risk creating agents’.22
The insurance strategy hinges upon economically effective techniques for
the rational management of risk. At its heart is the elaboration of a system for
pricing risk factors, so that the costs of possible accidents no longer fall on
affected individuals but are redistributed among all the insured. Like the wel-
fare state, actuarial criminology assumes that within each community there
are randomly distributed risk factors that cannot be linked to any single indi-
vidual but can be statistically related to certain groups of people.23 Thus, the
insurance strategy involves a probabilistic and statistical quantification of the
types and levels of risk for different social groups. Each type of risk can then be
priced according to its frequency and seriousness. However, whereas the wel-
fare state sought to share costs through universal schemes of social insurance,
actuarial criminology adopts the neo-libertarian logic of the insurance market
and effectively charges people according to the categories and degrees of risk to
which their group is prone. Though all citizens may pay in monetary terms for
crime prevention, members of the more risk creating categories of people also
have to pay in terms of freedom and opportunity regardless of their own actual
propensity to crime. The very logic of insurance rules out any inquiry into the
risk posed by an individual agent. The system operates on the basis of a classi-
fication of agents: while these classifications are unjust, they return a profit in
terms of security.
Actuarial criminology does not deal with individuals but with risk factors,
namely, statistical relations among heterogeneous factors that make it more or
less likely that a crime may be committed. It deconstructs agents, replacing
them with a list of circumstances that risk allegedly stems from. Dangerousness
appears as a mysterious and paradoxical notion, for it is an individual’s inher-
ent quality and can only be proved after she has committed a crime. The attri-
bution of dangerousness is always hypothetical, it is a more or less likely relation
between present symptoms and certain prospective harmful events. Repetition,
too, is something that cannot be predicted or can be predicted only with a
high degree of uncertainty. Since deviants are almost always unpredictable,
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preventative measures are highly risky and hard to justify. Operators are often
made to take action not in the light of objective data but out of the fear of being
blamed for their inactivity should a deviant individual commit another crime. A
conception of prevention confined to predicting a given occurrence appears
archaic and unscientific. The goal of the new criminal policies is not to tackle an
actual situation, dealing with and containing a given ‘dangerous’ individual,
but the prevention of any possible occurrence of undesired behaviour. Preven-
tion promotes suspicion to the scientific status of probability calculation. For an
individual to be suspected, special outer symptoms of dangerousness are no
longer required; it suffices to have those features security agencies count as risk
factors, on the basis of statistical induction.
Possible ‘injustices’ resulting from the actuarial method are mentioned in the
first document proposing a criminal policy of this kind in Europe: namely, the
Floud Report,24 drafted in England in 1981 during the Thatcher era. It acknowl-
edged that any predictive judgement can make two mistakes: it may be a ‘false
positive’ when it predicts an event that does not occur, or it may be a ‘false neg-
ative’ when it rules out in advance an event which does occur. The more ‘false
negatives’, the less efficient the actuarial system and the less security it provides.
‘False positives’ always result in an unjust bias against the rights of an individ-
ual, whose prospective behaviour is not correctly predicted. For if a harmless
person is imprisoned, a serious injustice is done with no benefit for public secu-
rity. Not only is this risk cynically calculated, but it is candidly justified: new
criminal policies are supposed to redistribute a burden of risk that the govern-
ment cannot reduce and the best way of doing this is by the actuarial method.
This policy also may lead to sentences against two authors of the same crime
being quite different in terms of the type and quantity of punishment inflicted.
For the measure of punishment is not the offence but the presumptive indica-
tors connected with the conduct, the circumstances of the crime, the groups
the offender used to frequent: simply put, the class the offender falls into. For
instance, according to the criteria of the new criminal policy, a ‘pusher’ of
heroin from the Maghrib, an unemployed and homeless illegal immigrant,
should be sentenced more severely, and be subjected to heavier cautionary
measures, than an English cocaine ‘seller’ with a house and a family, who gives
out cocaine at exclusive parties and takes it himself. For the former belongs to a
dangerous class and this is sufficient grounds for differentiated punishment.
Thus, the rhetoric of unavoidable risks that need to be distributed in a socially
acceptable way obscures that of equality which, following the Enlightenment,
used to be one of the major legitimating grounds of punitive power. For actu-
arial criminology, individuals should be treated differently depending on the
class they belong to. This approach is justified by the idea that the ‘burden of
risk’ currently threatening everyone’s life can only be dealt with at the level of
whole categories of individuals. This argument seems to have become accept-
able in nearly all western democracies: nobody seems to be asking whether
classes of dangerousness are a ruse to cover up the revival of a census based 
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system of justice, or whether it is right to sacrifice equality, a principle the lib-
eral tradition viewed for over two centuries as the main protection against
abuses of the power to punish. Instead of segregating undesirable people with
a view to their re-socialisation through more or less forcible correctional or
therapeutic treatment, the new forms of population management attach a
‘social fate’ to individuals by virtue of how far they meet the market standards
of competitiveness and profitability
A two-speed, dual society is appearing. There is the highway of people who
satisfy the harsh requirements of economic competition, and there is the mean
street of marginal people who are incapable of keeping pace. Such a dual soci-
ety may be said to have always existed, but the distribution of individuals
between the two sectors used to be theorised as the outcome of chance, depend-
ing on events. It was thought to result from markets and an individual’s capac-
ity for adapting and reacting to their logic, for staying in or re-entering if
expelled. On the classical liberal view, criminal policy was the junction point of
this system, segregating those unable to re-enter and trying, at least in princi-
ple, to enable them to do so after an intensive ‘treatment’. The classification of
people into classes defined by the statistical findings of epidemiological research
draws a different image of society as a homogeneous space with predefined cir-
cuits. Instead of an unknown wild land, marginality becomes itself an organ-
ised social zone for those people that, owing to their social characteristics,
appear to be unsuited to entering the circuit of economic competition.25
Conclusion
New criminal policies reflect what Peter Gloz26 has called ‘the two-thirds
society’, where a significant quota of citizens is excluded from well-being, or the
‘good life’ and the political means for claiming it. Within welfare systems, the
circuits of political and economic exchange systematically differentiate
between interests protected by organisations with strong bargaining power,
interests defended by associations without a strategic position and, finally,
‘widespread’ interests lacking any effective protection. Moreover, for over
twenty years in Europe, and much longer in the USA, there has been the phe-
nomenon of a mass migration of people from continental areas with high
demographic rates and scarce, if any, development, desperately seeking the
advantages of belonging to a ‘prized’ citizenship. This situation has led to a
mass of economically and politically very weak people who are de facto
excluded from the actual enjoyment of nearly every sort of right. As Galbraith27
has argued, the guarantee of rights for majorities, together with the need for
downsizing social security owing to the fiscal crisis of the state, has turned
affluent democracies into ‘dictatorships of a satisfied class’: the rich, the
wealthy, the affluent have always existed but, while in the past they were a
minority, they are now a majority. Therefore, they are no longer forced to defend
their privileges by promoting social mobility: they can afford immobility. Such
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historical-social conditions have led in all western countries to the emergence
of a what has been labelled an underclass,28 a more or less extended social sub-
class, often ethnically defined, deprived of legitimate access to available
economic and social resources. It is depicted as dangerous and felt as a threat to
urban security. There might be cynical joy in seeing how power finally drops the
mask of the rhetoric of equality, but what we call (legal) civilisation is but a col-
lection of masks everyone is supposed to wear, above all, the state leviathan.
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Introduction
Political theory has recently responded to the central questions about redist-
ributive welfare systems – their justification, and the institutional means for
implementing them – raised by the political economy of the past twenty-five
years. In the post-war period, the consensus around sustaining minimum stan-
dards of income, health, education and housing assumed an entitlement to
such guarantees (social rights) by members born into national communities of
fate (citizens). Rawls in turn built these assumptions into his theory of justice,
which provided a liberal endorsement for social democratic policies.1 His com-
munitarian critics of the 1980s,2 while lamenting the decline of family, associ-
ational and religious life, did not fundamentally question the nature of the
political community itself, or the duties its members owed each other.3
Meanwhile in the real world, the political agenda was being set by libertari-
ans,4 with welfare states as their primary targets. In their emphasis on individ-
ual freedom, and the capacity of (global) markets to maximise this (while
simultaneously optimising economic outcomes), they raised the possibility of
self-governing communities of choice – selected by their members for the bun-
dle of collective goods they offered and the tax rate this required. This challenge
has provoked what might be called a post-libertarian liberalism, and a post-lib-
ertarian communitarianism, both of which attempt to supply political princi-
ples under which redistributive welfare provision for citizens can be justified.
Yet as the work of Van Parijs and Etzioni respectively show, these analyses may
not in practice be as irreconcilable as they appear at first sight to be. This chap-
ter traces the transition from welfare to social exclusion sketched above, and the
various theoretical responses it has elicited.
1 Communities of choice
The idea that political justice should deal in issues about the distribution of
roles and resources, presupposes a political community which corresponds to
an economic system for production and exchange. Within a closed system of
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co-operation, conceived as a kind of organism with interdependent parts, with
each member’s life chances affected by the actions of all others, it makes sense
to ask questions about how burdens and benefits should distributed, and to
apply a single system of rules to all members of this clearly bounded commu-
nity. Both liberal political theory (from Mill to Rawls) and the neo-Hegelian,
Progressive Catholic and communitarian traditions (from T.H. Green to Walzer)
developed arguments for softening and embedding capitalism. The concept of
social justice emerged in both at the start of the twentieth century,5 and justi-
fied institutions for the democratic modification for market outcomes, on utili-
tarian, maximin or common good grounds.
Such ideas make less sense in a global economy, where citizens’ life chances
are strongly influenced by transnational forces, and where they often have
investments in other countries, or are employed by international corporations
or work abroad. In such a world, it is far harder to devise a coherent version of
politico-economic membership, or to justify a system of redistribution. For
example, if industrial capitalists are free to close factories in the UK or Germany,
and reinvest in new plants in China or Poland (for the sake of global productive
efficiency, from which all ultimately gain, and low-income Chinese and Polish
workers gain immediately), who – if anyone – should compensate redundant
British or German workers? Perhaps the Chinese or Polish governments might
owe the British or German part of their economic gain, but there is no institu-
tional mechanism for paying this. And, in any case, there are also British
and German citizens working in China and Poland, but paying taxes on their
earnings in the UK or Germany.
All these developments point towards a new version of social politics, very
different from the consensus around welfare collectivism that prevailed in the
post-war era all over the advanced capitalist world and in much of the develop-
ing one. In the ‘golden age of welfare states’,6 it was taken for granted that citi-
zens would look to nation-states for protection from the contingencies of the life
cycle and the arbitrary outcomes of the labour market. The bigger and stronger
the state, the more it was able to require capital and labour to submit to its redis-
tributive plans, the more reliable was this protection, and the better the welfare
dividend. But if states can no longer reliably offer this kind of protection, and if
citizen-consumers can get better welfare returns in the global marketplace, then
states must compete with each other to attract members and their resources,
must tax and redistribute and provide only by agreement, and must clarify the
terms of access and exit as well as those of voice.
Indeed, the institutional landscapes of almost all polities have been
redesigned, to a greater or lesser extent, in the past twenty years to take account
of this dynamic. The other side of the libertarian agenda, with its promotion of
market freedoms, was the public choice programme, which reformed the public
infrastructure as a space for rational economic action. Following the trail blazed
by Tiebout,7 whose model of governance postulated small cities competing for
mobile residents in order to ensure the efficient supply of local collective goods,
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the theory of ‘fiscal federalism’ has been deployed to break up national monop-
olies over welfare provision and to establish competing authorities (or con-
tracted commercial providers) for each of the social services.8 In this new
environment, voting with the feet – by moving to another jurisdiction – becomes
the public choice equivalent of market preference and consumer sovereignty.
The declared aim of these approaches has been to hold down taxation and
‘tame the Leviathan’ of central government,9 but their effects have been most
strongly felt by the poor. The theory of ‘clubs’10 assumes that individuals have
different incomes and tastes, and that the efficiency savings that come with
mobility are best achieved when groups who share the costs of collective goods
are homogeneous. ‘The rich tend to want to be away from the poor, but the poor
want to be in the same jurisdiction as the rich . . . There may be a tendency for
zoning on the part of high-income groups to exclude the poor.’11
Some theorists have gone as far as to postulate self-governing, consensual ter-
ritorial communities, with fully sovereign individual members (modelled on
Locke’s theory of moral autonomy, property, political authority and gover-
nance).12 In practical terms, there is some evidence of the emergence of such
‘private’ communities, for instance in Israeli settlements, in ‘gated communities’
of white South Africans, and all over the US.A.13 Although they still rely on cen-
tral and local authorities to provide certain goods and services (usually defence
and legal order), they offer applicants specific packages of collective amenities,
including schools, health clinics, residential care homes and other facilities,
provided they can pay the asking price for houses, and the service charges.
This raises important issues about the appropriateness of nation-states as
political units under evolving global economic conditions. After all, the present
system of nation-states finally came into being after intense competition
between these and empires, city-states and city-leagues,14 in the mid-seven-
teenth century. Nation-states adopted a concept of exclusive territorial sover-
eignty which was quite different from the versions prevailing in any of these
other units. They succeeded because they were better able to create unified
economies (with reduced transaction costs) to build legal systems, to mobilise
their subjects for war and to empower each other through international
treaties. None of these advantages may continue under present global condi-
tions, though it will take a long time for the power of national political systems
to break down.
Two aspects of national political authority are likely to be jealously guarded
– control over entry by foreigners, and control over the redistribution of income.
But even these might be adapted to be more consistent with the formation of
communities of choice. On the one hand, nation-states might enable such com-
munities to grant access to the workers they require, for efficient provision of the
services members choose. Selective immigration by foreign workers (not
granted welfare rights during their stay) could create a category of mobile
employee that such communities might recruit at low cost. On the other hand,
the state would retain responsibility for its increasingly totalitarian control
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over the lives of those citizens too poor (in terms of earning power) or too costly
(in terms of health and welfare needs) to find a place in any community of
choice. Hence the public sector could become, as it were, a ‘community of fate’15
for these outsiders, in which the regimes imposed by state officials would resem-
ble the pre-war Poor Law, or (ironically) the conditions under state socialism,
with compulsory labour as a condition for benefits, and little freedom for those
receiving services.
So, a possible vision of a re-feudalised mid-twenty-first-century society
emerges. Sovereignty has been divided between a number of authorities, all of
which exercise some jurisdiction over the same territory. For most purposes and
most citizens, the unit of membership and governance is the self-selecting and
self-ruling community, which sets its own tax rates and determines its own form
and level of public services. However, another authority (perhaps the nation-
state) deals with the population who lack access to such communities, maybe
through something like the Panopticon Villages foreseen by Jeremy Bentham.16
Finally, a supranational government deals with issues of migration, guaran-
teeing or supply of mobile workers between communities to staff essential serv-
ices, and meet labour shortages. Of course, individuals might come under the
jurisdiction of any of these at different periods of their lives. One pattern, for
instance, might be a period as a migrant worker, which (if successful) would
lead to entry into a self-governing community as a citizen, or (if unsuccessful)
into the Panopticon sector as a pauper.
Such developments are foreshadowed in emerging political economy and
social policy. The emphasis on conditionality and obligation for claimants and
beneficiaries, and the popular pressure for increasingly tough enforcement, all
point towards the Panopticon state. Meanwhile, European governments
increasingly pursue a dual policy on immigration, presenting a Fortress front
to asylum seekers (who are processed in camps, hulks or prisons), while actively
encouraging migrants with skills required by their domestic economies, by giv-
ing them various forms of time-limited work permits. For example, the Irish
government is currently running a television advertisement to recruit 50,000
workers in central Europe, and the UK minister for immigration has announced
a spectacular U-turn on ‘economic migration’ (formerly a synonym for ‘bogus
asylum-seeking’)17 by stating:
As with other aspects of globalisation, there are potentially huge economic bene-
fits for Britain if it is able to adapt to the new environment. We are in competition
for the brightest and best talents . . . Britain has always been a nation of migrants
. . . Many immigrants, from all over the world, have been very successful here,
bringing economic benefits to Britain as a whole . . . The evidence shows that eco-
nomically driven migration can bring substantial overall benefits both for growth
and economy.18
From an efficiency standpoint, such developments might have much to rec-
ommend them; but it is difficult to see how they can be justified from the
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perspective of equity. How do they stand up to scrutiny according to the
criteria of social justice?
2 Social exclusion
As a response to the ideas and real-world developments identified in the previ-
ous section there have been attempts to redefine social justice as the basis for
national welfare systems. Instead of a Rawlsian contract between all citizens
guaranteeing social entitlements, these postulate contracts between the state
and individual citizens, defining the responsibilities of each in welfare issues.19
On the one hand, those who receive assistance or services of any kind are
required to demonstrate either reciprocal efforts towards independence, or a
‘genuine’ incapacity. Such obligations rest ultimately on the duty not to burden
one’s fellow citizens unnecessarily,20 by passing on costs that morally should be
borne by the individual or family.21 On the other hand, citizens have the right to
expect the state to reach the quality standards and performance measures set
by the commercial sector in its provision of benefits and services. Instead of
shaping the market, by identifying the public goods undersupplied by commer-
cial interests, and redistributing resources for the sake of equity, the state is
required to submit itself to market disciplines, and to please ‘the demanding,
sceptical, citizen-consumer’.22
In many ways, these new approaches adapt to the opportunities for individ-
ual mobility and choice in a globalised environment. As a recent UK govern-
ment policy document acknowledged:
Society has become more demanding . . . First, confidence in the institutions of
government and politics has tumbled. Second, expectations of service quality and
convenience have risen – as with the growth of 24-hour banking – but public serv-
ices have failed to keep up with these developments; their duplication, inefficiency,
and unnecessary complexity should not be tolerated. Third, as incomes rise, peo-
ple prefer to own their homes and investments.23
Already, the UK government has been forced to look abroad for staff to meet
these demands. The largest occupational group recruited from overseas under
its new policies, noted above, has not been computer experts but nurses,24 while
teachers and social workers also figure prominently. The state itself, like the
communities of choice it contains, must attract temporary workers who are not
citizens in order to supply public services.
However, the most significant shift has been in policies for ‘activation’ of
working-age claimants, changing benefits systems ‘from safety nets to trampo-
lines’.25 Pioneered in the USA, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, these have
now been adopted in almost all European countries, including those with such
entrenched social protection systems as Denmark and the Netherlands.26 The-
orists in turn have used the idea of social exclusion to advocate an approach to
social justice that sees increased labour-market participation as the key to equal
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citizenship, in the face of mass long-term unemployment, and the emergence
of a significant ‘underclass’ of ‘welfare dependents’.27 As Anthony Giddens puts
it: ‘the new politics defines equality as inclusion and inequality as exclusion . . .
inclusion refers in its broadest sense to citizenship, to the civil and political
rights and obligations that all members of society should have . . . It also refers
to opportunities and to involvement in the public space’.28 He goes on to suggest
that ‘exclusion is not about gradations of inequality, but about the mechanisms
that act to detach groups from the social mainstream’.29 This implies that wel-
fare systems should focus on restoring them to employability and employment.
‘The cultivation of human potential should as far as possible replace “after the
event” redistribution’;30 hence the aim is, as the New Labour government puts
it, to ‘rebuild the [welfare] system around work and security. Work for those
who can, security for those who cannot’.31 Inclusion consists in equipping
claimants for a competitive labour market, and reforming the tax-benefit sys-
tem to ‘make work pay’.
This shift reflects the success of libertarian theories in changing the social
policy agenda of the 1980s and early 1990s, when the welfare state’s ‘rigidities’
and ‘barriers’ came to be seen as the problem to be addressed, and its version of
equality dismissed as a ‘mirage’ (now in Gordon Brown’s words ‘a socialist
nightmare’). In the Anglo-Saxon countries it implies that, redistributive systems
should focus on ‘hardworking families with children’ through tax credits,32 tar-
geted on the working poor, and leave them to work their own way out of poverty
and exclusion. However, this addresses only one part of the dynamic by which
citizens are relegated to the margins of society or the care of the state.
A fundamental tenet of the New Labour orthodoxy is that individuals and
households must be free to exercise choice over welfare goods, and to improve
their relative position through their own efforts. Equality of opportunity (a key
New Labour value) implies social and residential mobility for the sake of efficiency
and equity. But such mobility does not follow random patterns; citizens in pursuit
of ‘positional advantage’33 move to more favoured residential districts, with better
public facilities, and cluster around the best schools, health clinics, care homes
and hospitals. In this way, society organises itself (through citizens ‘voting with
their feet’) into homogeneous districts, where residents of like incomes congre-
gate. Through residential polarisation of this kind, communities of choice make
up the mainstream of society, while those unable to move, because they cannot
afford the housing costs, remain in impoverished communities of fate on the
margins (inner city ghettos or outer city social housing estates).
Furthermore, in the UK the Thatcher–Major reforms of the social services
facilitated these developments. Under such new arrangements as the devolution
of budgets to local units and the purchaser-provider split, schools, hospitals and
care homes have an interest in attracting high-yield, low-cost pupils, patients
and residents, and excluding low-yield, high-cost ones.34 Thus even public sector
health and welfare facilities reinforce the tendency for the highest income citi-
zens to gain exclusive membership of the best (private) social service amenities,
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while strategic action by middle-income groups produces a public sector hierar-
chy (or league table) closely corresponding to the income levels of service users.
In this way, state-funded services come to operate as ‘clubs’,35 with strong pro-
fessional interests in exclusionary practices; New Labour funding and regula-
tory systems tend to strengthen these pressures, and give even greater
opportunities and incentives for citizens (including government ministers) to
seek those schools or hospitals within the state sector that produce the best out-
comes, even when this involves high transport or other transaction costs. At the
other end of the scale, a fund-holding general practitioner practice in a deprived
area of Edinburgh was recently advised by a firm of consultants it employed to
devise the most efficient primary care strategy for its neighbourhood to get rid of
all its current patients, and attract some better-off ones.
Exclusions of this kind cannot be overcome by national policies focused on
increasing labour-market participation. The logic of collective action operates
in such a way that, in the absence of the restraints on such strategic action as
were exercised under post-war welfare states, citizens will group together in
narrower mutualities for the sake of the shared benefits they can produce.
These interdependencies are necessarily exclusive, because their benefits stem
from the sharing of costs among members, and rely on each member making
the necessary contribution to the association.36 And interdependencies are
formed because of members’ common interests in gaining positional advan-
tage over, or extracting ‘rents’ (monopolistic gains) from, those who remain
outside the charmed circle of their exclusive interactions. Policies which
promote low-skilled work do nothing to challenge these forms of exclusion;
rather, they subsidise members of communities of choice to employ outsiders
from communities of fate in service roles. This is recognised in the UK govern-
ment’s assessment of its measures to tackle unemployment in deprived neigh-
bourhoods (the Employment Zones and Action Teams). They are ‘identifying
suitable vacancies in neighbouring areas and bringing the two together’. Addi-
tionally, they are tackling barriers to employment, including funding for trans-
port to enable people to access nearby vacancies.37 In other words, residents of
poor districts will be required to work in more affluent ones, to serve the needs
of communities of which they are not, and probably never will be, members.
This is not inclusion.
Furthermore, the institutional and financial changes that have allowed (or
encouraged) public sector schools, hospitals and care homes to operate as
‘clubs’ further reinforce these disadvantages. The economic theory of clubs38
holds that members act together to internalise some of the costs of their asso-
ciation, and to externalise others by ensuring that they are borne by outsiders.
Poor people not only endure the highest risks and costs connected with such
social ills as pollution, the degeneration of urban infrastructure, housing
squalor and social disorganisation; they also receive the worst in education,
health care and social services, because higher-income groups act to attract
most funding and the best professional staff for their facilities.
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However, poor people have not been passive or acquiescent as these processes
unfolded; they have developed individual, group and community strategies of
resistance to offset their disadvantaged position. Research has shown how they
countered the insecurities of the labour market (casualisation, falling wages,
deteriorating conditions) and the means-tested benefits system (the delays and
disentitlements of an increasingly complex and conditional process) by com-
bining off-the-books work for cash with long-term claiming.39 By deploying the
covert ‘weapons of the weak’,40 male networks exchanged information, traded
in contraband or illicit drugs,41 or resorted to petty crime and hustling, while
female networks supplied informal order and mutual support.42 In these ways,
communities of fate evolved their own forms of collective action, at odds with
those of mainstream society, filling the vacuum in their districts left by the with-
drawal of the market and the state.
3 Theories of social justice
The libertarian challenge to liberal and communitarian political theorists over
welfare and social exclusion is to reconstruct a convincing version of social jus-
tice – one which retains the appealing aspects of individual autonomy, but deals
with its undesirable social consequences. Both schools of thought have started
from a critique of the part played by rights in libertarian accounts of justice,
where individuals are entitled to do what they want not only with themselves,
but with ‘whatever external objects they own by virtue of an uninterrupted
chain of voluntary transactions starting from some initial unrestricted private
appropriation of objects previously unowned’.43
In the communitarian response, this critique argues that rights must always
be balanced by responsibilities in any adequate account of a just society. The
analysis draws on interactions within families, informal groups and voluntary
associations, in which reciprocal exchanges are the stuff of co-operation for the
common good. This is, of course, to be expected, since communitarians recom-
mend that these should be the basic units of society, with the public authority
acting only when they prove insufficient. As Etzioni puts it: ‘First, people have
a moral responsibility to take care of themselves . . . the second line of respon-
sibility lies with those closest to the person, including kin, friends, neighbours
and other community members . . . As a rule any community ought to be
expected to do the best it can to take care of its own.’44
On the face of it, this corresponds to the emergence of communities of
choice, and justifies their exclusivity in terms of the voluntary nature of their
collective provision. Since active participation in the meeting of social needs is
a requirement of this version of social justice, such communities promote the
good society. Like other communitarians, Etzioni focuses on the advantages of
civil society organisations running schools and care facilities in each locality.
However, this implies that both welfare provision and social inclusion fall
within the province of moral obligation, binding individuals to particular
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groups through specific shared values, and moving them to contribute to the
good of all.
But in the real world of communities of choice, such needs as education,
health and social care are usually met by paid staff, and already in many cities
public service professionals are single, short-term immigrants, recruited
because indigenous staff with families cannot afford to live there on their pay.
And communitarians are also remarkably coy about the coercion involved in
welfare-to-work measures, which form the other part of recruitment to much
low-paid social care work. In spite of the fact that his language of ‘rights and
responsibilities’ was already being widely used in the USA and elsewhere to jus-
tify compulsion of claimants, Etzioni made no mention of this issue in The Spirit
of Community. Instead, he resistricted himself to comments like, ‘all people, no
matter how disadvantaged or handicapped, should take some responsibility for
themselves’,45 and ‘honourable work contributes to the commonwealth and to
the community’s ability to fulfil its tasks’.46
In later work, Etzioni has suggested that we all have a duty not to burden our
fellow citizens unnecessarily, and that this moral duty should be enforced by the
state – but that claimants should not be cut off from benefits altogether.47 Both
the coercion of claimants to take employment, and the recruitment through
these means of forced workers to meet social needs, seem to violate the princi-
ples of self-ownership and voluntary co-operation from which the benefits of
community are supposed to stem.
The liberal response attacks the libertarian account of justice by pointing out
that it is not only when rights are violated that freedom is restricted. Both inter-
nal and external endowments influence a person’s range of choices, as do eco-
nomic exploitation and political domination, even when these stem from
circumstances which libertarians would deem ‘rightful’. Hence Van Parijs con-
cludes that ‘any restriction of the opportunity set is relevant to the assessment
of freedom’.48 He goes on to argue that ‘real freedom is not only a matter of hav-
ing the right to do what one might want to do, but also of having the means for
doing it’,49 and that ‘real freedom-for-all . . . is all there is to social justice’.50
In order to fulfil the condition that each member of society should have the
greatest possible opportunity to do what he or she might want to do, Van Parijs
proposes an unconditional income for all (basic income), irrespective of their
willingness to work, and at the highest sustainable level, subject to everyone’s
formal freedom.51 Although most of this would be provided in cash, a ‘signifi-
cant fraction’ would be supplied in kind, where it was ‘unanimously wanted
and cheaper to deliver free of charge’.52 He justifies the substantial redistribu-
tion that all this would require by treating the ‘job assets’ of labour-market
insiders as ‘employment rents’, gained at the expense of outsiders, thus stand-
ing on its head the notion of a moral obligation to take paid work.53
Although the basic income proposal by no means commands general
support among liberals, it nonetheless has attracted considerable interest
among political theorists. Van Parijs’s analysis is post-libertarian, in the sense
Bill Jordan 85
chap 7  23/1/03  7:46 am  Page 85
that it does not postulate a society that is a system of social and economic co-
operation, nor is his concept of social justice based on reciprocal obligations
among members. However, the justification for redistribution does rest on the
notion of a society that is bounded. For instance, in rebutting the libertarian
version of justice, Van Parijs points out that, in a society consisting of an island
owned by one person, and where it was too expensive or difficult for other resi-
dents to leave, the former could exploit and dominate all the latter.54 Lack of exit
options define injustice in this case.
But one of the problems of social justice in a globalised environment is that
some of the inhabitants of any real-world society would be able to leave it at
relatively low cost, whereas others would not (either because they lacked the
resources, or because of strong interdependencies with other residents). This is
how the distinction between communities of choice and fate arises. Further-
more, the exit option open to owners of capital limits the scope for redistribu-
tion. Critics of the basic income proposal point out that, unless the level of
income paid is sufficient for subsistence, the scheme loses many of the advan-
tages for social justice claimed by Van Parijs. A small basic income would still
leave those with low earning power open to exploitation, and would not give
employers incentives to use their services efficiently. Without a strong state
(by implication, one whose legitimacy rests on either a system of co-operation
beneficial to all, or a moral consensus favouring the chosen principle for redis-
tribution) the necessary contributions could not be collected – and the case for
paying benefits to all without a requirement to work runs counter to popular
moral intuitions.
Conclusions
In practical social policy terms the choice between conditional welfare-to-work
approaches and the unconditional basic income principle is not as stark as the
above analysis might suggest. The new politics of welfare in the USA and the UK
is essentially concerned with an impasse that had developed during the
Thatcher–Reagan years.55 Poor people were unwilling to give up their strategies
of combining benefits claims with various kinds of informal economic activity,
and taxpayers were unwilling to contribute more to assist the poor until they
gave them up. Welfare-to-work schemes reassure the latter that their taxes are
focused on deserving claimants, while trying to give the former better incen-
tives to take formal work.
But in the longer term, there is still an unresolved problem of how to include
(that is, share the costs of sustaining) citizens whose labour power is not
required for the economic efficiency of the productive unit. This ‘surplus popu-
lation’ has constituted a thorny problem in political thought since Malthus;56 if
some citizens’ needs fall as costs upon the rest of the community, even during
their ‘working’ years, how then can their continuous maintenance be justified?
The traditional solution – that they should be the responsibility of their families
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– is scarcely viable when, as Malthus and others among his contemporaries57
recognised, such individuals tend to be members of larger-than-average family
units, all of whom made claims upon the public purse (the ‘workless’ house-
holds of New Labour hagiography).58
The new politics of welfare addresses this problem by investing in the human
capital of this sector of the population (increased spending on education and
training) and through the systematic subsidization, via tax credits, of its
employment. The fact that this policy has not been wholly successful (despite
consistent falls in unemployment) is advertised in the recruitment of overseas
labour for important economic tasks – not only in high-tech sectors, or even
just in health, education and social care, but also for such mundane tasks as
fruit and vegetable picking.59 The same trends can be seen all over the developed
world. For example, in Germany, which spends DM45 billion on retraining
unemployed people for labour market each year, there is increasing recruitment
of central European guest workers for a similar range of tasks; and in the Czech
and Polish republics, Ukrainians and Russians are imported to do manual work
that citizens are now unwilling to take at the wages presently on offer. In other
words, even in countries with extensive unemployment, neither compulsion
nor retraining provides the most efficient means of supplying the labour power
for performing society’s necessary tasks.
This in turn poses a question about the most efficient and equitable division
of labour in social reproduction work.60 How much of it should be done by
means of paid services and formal employment, and how much on an unpaid,
informal basis, in families, kinship groups and neighbourhoods? Feminist the-
ory (of citizenship and power relations)61 is understandably suspicious of any
tendencies to relegate such tasks to the private sphere, where women have tra-
ditionally been exploited and dominated by men.62 But it asserts the importance
of the politics of difference,63 the relevant difference here being a preference for
the informal and moral economy of care, or at least the right to choose how to
combine access to the public sphere with participation in society’s nurturing,
civilising and socialising activities, outside formal employment.
Two problems are likely to present themselves sooner rather than later to
governments of a New Labour stripe. The first is the problem of efficiency asso-
ciated with social reproduction work, which forms an ever-growing sector of
employment in advanced economies, but whose tasks (for instance, care of eld-
erly and disabled people) are not susceptible to productivity improvements.64
Although the success of Third Way programmes has been closely linked with
expanding (often part-time and female) employment,65 there must be limits to
the extent to which this growth is consistent with the efficient use of labour
power, especially when a large proportion of such work requires subsidisation
through tax credits.
The second is linked to the latter point; eventually, the inexorable rise in the
rates of credits paid (or tax-free earnings allowed) to individuals in low-paid
work will come to equal the value of the (price-linked) benefits paid to those
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outside the labour market, despite the latter being rigorously tested for being in
‘genuine need’. Can it be equitable to pay no more to those who demonstrate
unfitness for labour than to those quite capable of work, and actually earning?
And is it right to penalise the many (housewives, volunteers, activists, students)
who qualify for neither tax credits nor benefits? These questions point towards
a move in the direction of something like a ‘participation income’,66 for which
the relevant test is social engagement rather than employment – and the
administrative complexities and transaction costs of this point further, eventu-
ally to an unconditional basic income for all citizens.67 This is not the direction
in which New Labour policies have started, but it may be the one in which they
will eventually, by a circuitous route, reluctantly stumble. Only this principle
would allow low-earning workers the same choices about how to combine paid
and unpaid work as are enjoyed by mainstream citizens.
This raises another question: to what extent does the concept of community
provide an alternative approach to the problems of deprived districts, and a
more plausible model of social inclusion? Here again, the new politics of wel-
fare is ambiguous and ambivalent. Its emphasis on ‘social and economic regen-
eration’ (in the UK through such institutions as the Social Exclusion Unit, the
Single Regeneration Budget and the New Deal for Communities) has hitherto
been mainly top down and regulatory, focusing on the problems of areas such
as crime, truancy, drugs, homelessness, and improving the housing stock. It
has also (through programmes like the Employment Zones) up to now concen-
trated on creating formal employment, as much as possible in the private sec-
tor.68 In order to promote self-help and the mobilisation of residents, motivated
to act collectively to pursue a better quality of life in their districts, a different
approach would be required. Instead of enforcing training or employment, a
basic income, even at a modest level, would more readily facilitate community
and cultural activism in projects which were not economically self-sustaining.
And local social services, instead of being tied into the policing of standards for
child protection, or rationing resources according to categories of risk, would
be required to support and empower residents for participation in such projects.
There is some evidence for the viability of this approach,69 but it would be a
major shift from current orthodoxies. It would also allow communitarian and
basic income principles to be combined in novel ways.
These dilemmas are particular instances of the central political problem of
the new welfare regimes. So far, they have gained electoral support by pro-
grammes for ‘tough love’70 – harsh, conditional, enforcement-orientated poli-
cies, in the name of taxpayers’ requirements, but based on paternalistic
interpretations of the long-term best interests of the poor. However, what David
Blunkett (in an unconscious reference to Lenin) calls the ‘working state’ is not
sustainable in this form. The bifurcation into communities of choice and com-
munities of fate that results from the logic of exclusive strategic action will
require more and more toughness, and less and less love (as the growth in the
prison population already attests). Recruiting ‘club servants’71 from abroad to
88 Welfare and social exclusion
chap 7  23/1/03  7:46 am  Page 88
do the dirty work for the members of communities of choice smells strongly of
racism, especially when they are granted temporary work permits, and denied
all social rights. Panopticon surveillance and enforcement as members of a
pauperised underclass is the alternative destination for our most vulnerable cit-
izens, if the new politics of welfare cannot discover more creative and inclusive
solutions to these issues.
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Introduction
All governments rely, at least in part, on the co-operation of the governed. The
power of a simple despotism, exclusively dependent on the terror it evoked,
would be restricted to activities that it could supervise in every detail. Even in
rather primitive conditions, such a regime would be a feeble thing, so much so
one would hesitate to say that it was governing its people; in more advanced soci-
eties, with complex divisions of labour among experts, it would be certain to
collapse in days. Though hated alien conquerors have sometimes governed
such societies, they have invariably had to work through an existing cultural
apparatus, that is, through personnel and institutions which can secure obedi-
ence without the use of bribes or punishments. They have had to find ways of
presenting their instructions as being legitimate.
A given command has legitimacy to the extent that it secures willing
obedience even where it conflicts with the obvious interests of those com-
manded. The best known modern treatment of the concept is in the later writ-
ings of the great sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920). Weber approached
legitimacy as a subcategory of ‘domination’, by which he meant ‘the proba-
bility that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a
given group of persons’. He noted that ‘every genuine form of domination
implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an interest (based on
ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience’.1 The probability of obe-
dience thus rests upon the presence of motives to obey (including purely
altruistic ones). But no relationship of domination is likely to depend indefi-
nitely on a coincidence of interest:
An order [that is, system of domination] which is adhered to from motives of pure
expediency is generally much less stable than one upheld on a purely customary
basis through the fact that the corresponding behaviour has become habitual. The
latter is much the most common type of subjective attitude. But even this type of
order is in turn much less stable than an order which enjoys the prestige of being
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It is no doubt for this reason that ‘domination’ never limits itself to ‘the appeal
to affectual or material or ideal motives’. ‘Every such system’ also ‘endeavours
to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy.’3
Weber thus used the word ‘legitimate’ to characterise one type of domination:
the type in which obedience is based in part on the belief that the command is
binding. Weberian legitimacy is less an objective attribute of powers, entitling
some person or persons to be obeyed, than the defining quality of one particu-
lar power-situation: a relationship in which obedience is partly explained by the
attitude of the subordinate to the bare issuing of the instructions. The reason
that Weber addressed this situation was that he studied social practices ‘inso-
far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behaviour’;4
legitimacy is the subjective meaning attached to the conscious acceptance of a
relationship of domination.
Weber has long been famous for classifying legitimate domination into three
categories, depending on whether obedience was based on a regard for the qual-
ities of a leader (charismatic), for the sanctity of custom (traditional), or for the
legality of a system of rules (bureaucratic). The moral basis of all three is purely
arbitrary, but the eventual triumph of the last will be ensured by its efficiency.
Though Weber’s treatment of this rule-bound future has an oracular obscurity,
he clearly felt hostility towards it, in part, no doubt, because bureaucracy is of its
nature sterile. Bureaucracy can discipline the bureaucrat himself into accept-
ance of a professional ethos, but it cannot on its own supply the values by which
a rounded human being lives. The modern world, which witnesses the victory of
bureaucratic rule, will also see what Weber calls a modern ‘polytheism’, a moral
anarchy of clashing values.5
If Weber is broadly correct, legitimacy might be said to fall outside the scope
of political theory, if only because it seems to have no content that is suscepti-
ble of theorisation. Charismatic and traditional domination are fundamentally
non-rational, while it seems that bureaucratic domination is not in a strict
sense legitimate; it may persist by virtue of its sheer effectiveness in satisfying
our material wants, but it cannot induce a belief that its orders are binding.
There is, however, a history of trying to explain legitimacy. It is a history that
begins when the reflective individual imagines herself as devoid of political ties
and sets out to account for their existence. We speak about legitimacy because
we can imagine authority as non-legitimate. Capacity to do this derives from a
certain conception of our selves, one that excludes the possibility that selves are
constituted by their shared activities. Political legitimacy (the subject of this
chapter) only becomes a necessary concept when people can imagine human
beings as neither governing nor being governed, because their intellectual
starting-point is an image of completely separate selves; it consists, one might
say, in whatever beliefs may glue selves back to states.
The heart of a legitimating theory is thus the self-conception of the individ-
ual. The problem can only arise if there is something in that self-conception
detaching his identity from the idea of his obedience; it can only be solved if
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acceptance of subjection (in whatever form subjection locally takes) can be
shown to be consistent with the way that the self is imagined. This suggests
two important distinctions. A person who thinks of his state as a part of himself,
experiencing his rulers’ reverses as his own, has what might be called an ‘iden-
tity-theory’, as does a person who believes he is a natural slave, and therefore
incomplete without a master; but to the extent that they construe these common
situations as answering needs of pre-existent selves (in no sense constituted
by subjection), they have ‘legitimacy-theories’. These legitimacy-theories are
successful if they are logical and realised: logical in that whatever characteristics
the theories impute to the selves imply a belief that given commands are bind-
ing; realised in that the relevant self-conception attains sufficient plausibility to
be embraced by actual individuals (a theory might be ‘logical’ without achieving
plausibility to people of a given cultural background).
In fact, of course, the image of the self is likely to have features shaped by the
experience of social life; legitimacy becomes possible because a self is pictured
that has needs that present practices can satisfy. Our image of the self was
shaped by a variety of practices; if legitimate authority seems elusive, it may be
that those practices imparted inconsistent expectations.
1
Pre-modern Europeans still took government for granted. They devoted much
time to discussing the characteristics of the ideal ruler, but they showed much
less interest in justifying rulership in general; the very existence of people who
could secure willing obedience was not yet seen as being problematic. Though
Greek and Latin writers could imagine the coalescence of communities from
isolated individuals, the primary purpose of such narratives was not to explain
why governments enjoyed obedience, still less why they could be seen as deserv-
ing to do so. The most elaborate attempt to rationalise these assumptions is
found in Aristotle’s Politics. In this first recognisable work of political science,
Aristotle of Stagira (384–322 BC) described the behaviour patterns of the
inhabitants of city-states (poleis), the communities he saw as the natural end-
point of biological developments. He showed less interest in theorising the
supra-political power by which non-Greeks were generally governed; although
he was a Macedonian, who taught Alexander the Great (356–323 BC), he was
not interested in his pupil’s unnaturally distended polity. Because he was a the-
orist of small communities, he was able to take it for granted that citizens would
have enough in common to make it possible to speak about a ‘common good’,
including the good of mutual interaction by taking it in turns to rule and be
ruled. But in any case, this good of interaction was not a need of individuals so
much as a fulfilment of their natures; enjoyment of the practices that we call
politics was seen as constituting human beings.
Thus Aristotle presupposed that somebody should govern; the problem of
legitimacy simply did not arise, because co-ordination for a collective good was
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something that was part of being human. The ultimate source of legitimacy-
theories was probably the bias towards individualism that was introduced by
Christianity. Because the objective of Christians was salvation (in practice almost
invariably conceived of as the avoidance of the pains of hell), political activities
were inessential to their self-conception, and it was possible to hold that earthly
governments were something contingently willed by Providence. Some Chris-
tians, some of the time, especially under the influence of Augustine (354–430),
were thus enabled to see government as something extrinsic to humanity. But
their type of legitimacy-theory demands for its realisation a homogeneous theis-
tic culture of a kind that is no longer possible. The earliest legitimacy-theories with
elements that we could hope to borrow date from the post-Renaissance period.
The first articulation of the problem in something resembling the form it is
known today was in the political works of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). One
explanation of his novel project was that he was facing a novel situation, in
which legitimacy was required by the agent that he came to call ‘the state’. Dur-
ing the Middle Ages, religious and cultural authority had been to some extent
divorced from military and economic power, the former being located, in the
main, in the international church. But from the early sixteenth century
onwards, the rulers of many communities were forced to decide for themselves
if their dominions should accept or repress some version of Protestant doctrine
(almost all serious thinkers held that toleration was unthinkable). This meant
the early modern polity was exercising a new kind of power: the power to judge
the truth of moral teachings. Hobbes was the theorist of an institution that
needed to decide between beliefs in order to impose them, through schools and
the clergy, on every member of the population.
One reason that legitimacy was more of a problem for Hobbes than his pre-
cursors was thus his need to justify new types of government activity. But in any
case a dogma about method helped to propel him in the same direction. He
wanted to give an account of political life that would deserve the name of civil
science, a ‘science’ being knowledge by means of which ‘when we see how any
thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like
causes come into our power, we see how to make it produce the like effects’.6
This ‘knowledge of consequence’ was ‘not absolute, but conditional’, embodied
in statements of the form ‘that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has
been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally’.7 To grasp
the workings of a commonwealth was thus to grasp how its component parts,
its human population, could jointly cause the whole phenomenon. Hobbes did
not seriously maintain that human beings ever met as isolated equals, but his
conception of a civil science dictated ‘a need, not indeed to take the common-
wealth apart, but to view it as taken apart, i.e. to understand correctly what
human nature is like, and in what features it is suitable and in what unsuitable
to construct a commonwealth’.8
The unsuitable features were more obvious. When seen in isolation, the
members of a commonwealth were nothing but material mechanisms, whose
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‘life’ was constituted by an endless succession of appetites and aversions. Con-
trary to what Aristotle thought, they were not naturally political; indeed their
only shared and natural purpose was to continue to have appetites. In the
absence of a state’s authority, each of them would enjoy a liberty ‘to use his own
power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own . . . Life; and conse-
quently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, he shall
conceive to be the aptest means thereunto’.9 Under these circumstances, com-
petition for scarce resources, mutual distrust and a competitive instinct known
as ‘glory’ (the wish to do down others) were certain to drive these creatures into
conflict, a conflict in which ‘there is nothing he can make use of, that may not
be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth that
in such a condition, every man has a Right to everything’.10 The only known
means of escaping this condition was through a covenant (that is, a contrac-
tual arrangement in which one party has to trust the other). Only if human
beings covenanted to lay down this unfettered liberty could they attain security
and comfort, but nobody would act on such a contract unless they thought that
it would be enforced upon the other parties. The solution was a covenant erect-
ing a covenant-enforcer, the sovereign state, thus setting up conditions which
made it rational for them to trust.
One possible reading of Hobbes holds that a truly sovereign state would be so
terrifying that everyone would keep their covenants and follow its instructions.
Hobbes certainly often maintained or implied that ‘the Passion to be reckoned
upon is Fear’.11 He thought that it could override all other human motives and
he explicitly maintained that ‘excepting some generous natures, it is the only
thing (where there is apparence of profit, or pleasure by breaking the Laws) that
makes men keep them’.12 But he was also well aware that something must be
added to physical terror to make a commonwealth sustainable. The sovereign
may be frightening, but he cannot be an ever-present threat to somebody not
physically restrained. There was a clear distinction in Hobbesian thought
between the position of someone who was temporarily at the sovereign’s mercy
(like someone who is captured in a war) and someone who is permanently sub-
ject. Thus captives ‘kept in prison or bonds . . . have no obligation at all; but may
break their bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their Master,
justly’.13 Subjects, by contrast, are obliged to be obedient, ‘which natural obliga-
tion, if men know not, they cannot know the Right of any Law the Sovereign
maketh. And for the Punishment, they take it but for an act of Hostility, which,
when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour by acts of
Hostility to avoid’.14
Thus if a Hobbesian commonwealth is to be feasible, then subjects need to
know themselves to have an obligation: they need, in other words, to have legit-
imacy-beliefs. At times, Hobbes argues that to be obliged quite simply is to have
performed a special kind of action, ‘there being no Obligation on any man,
which ariseth not from some Act of his own’.15 On this view, only if one knows
that one has performed such an act can one be said to know one’s obligation.
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This doctrine is frequently cited by theorists who hold that legitimacy is based
upon consent, but it is worth remembering that Hobbes was easily convinced
that someone had consented. As his conception of consent was perfectly con-
sistent with overpowering fear, he presupposed a tacit consent to obey when-
ever a person with somebody else at his mercy allowed the latter corporal
liberty. Thus the authority enjoyed by mothers (unless a subsequent contract
intervened) derived from the fact that ‘every man is supposed to promise obedi-
ence, to him, in whose power it is to save, or to destroy him’.16
In practice, then, the act Hobbes called ‘consent’ was something he imputed
to anyone reduced to a state of obedience. A prudently constructed polity would
no doubt encourage ‘knowledge of obligation’ by an insistence on express con-
sent, but this type of completed historical act is not the theory’s ultimate foun-
dation. Consent is only binding because the institution of consenting has a
tendency to favour self-preservation. Though it is true that in a state of war (the
condition where we lack a common sovereign) we are inevitably driven to act
ferociously, we are nonetheless bound to an inner disposition that favours
sociable behaviour. This is evidently a type of obligation which cannot be
deemed to arise from an act of our own, unless, that is, we are deemed to have
consented to any type of action that we must consistently will, given we also
will self-preservation.
The reason Hobbes found it so hard to make himself clear was probably that
he could not explain how a self-interested automaton could make a binding
promise. Hobbes was no doubt quite right to believe that somebody who is dis-
posed to co-operate with others can be expected, other things being equal, to have
a safer, more agreeable life than someone who is not; but it is easy to construct
examples that would induce a rational calculator to see advantages in breach
of contract. A person with an hour to live, a person whose behaviour could not
be scrutinised, or somebody whose breach of faith would place him beyond reach
of retribution might all, in Hobbesian terms, have excellent reasons for failing to
fulfil their obligations.
Hobbes did show some awareness of objections of this type, and put a
vaguely specified example into the mouth of someone called ‘the Fool’, who
‘questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the fear of God. . .may not some-
times stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and
particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a
condition, to neglect not only the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of
other men’.17 Hobbes’s answer to the Fool’s very pertinent question presents
interpretative difficulties unlikely to be finally resolved, but the reading that
appears to make most sense is that the type of person who reasons like this is
likely, in due course, to be found out. The rational self thus chooses dispositions
(that is to say, habitual virtues or vices) that will in general aid self-preserva-
tion.18 But this involves the unappealing claim that the purely hypothetical deci-
sion of someone who can freely choose what type of individual to be ought to
affect the conduct of someone with determinate characteristics.
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2Hobbes was the first great thinker to face up to our political predicament. The
Hobbesian detachment of a reflective self from the activities that it engaged in
involved him in developing a picture of that self as holding beliefs supportive of
his state’s authority. Unless there is an answer to the Fool, Hobbesian legitima-
tion of the state is plainly unsuccessful. But even if there is a cogent answer,
Hobbesian legitimation could not be realised in the modern world unless a fully
Hobbesian self-conception could somehow attain plausibility. A moment’s
thought reveals this is unlikely, in part because our picture of the self has several
quite unHobbesian characteristics.
The question that Hobbes set himself was how the individuals that his ‘sci-
ence’ abstracted from observed activities could be combined so as to form a sta-
ble polity. The fundamental basis of his answer was the belief that everybody
shares a powerful motive: a common aversion to death that overrides our several
and conflicting appetites. Where Aristotle believed in a shared Supreme Good –
the good, among other things, of interaction – Hobbes believed in a shared
Supreme Evil: violent death. It followed that the main ideological threat to the
stability of Hobbesian states was the belief, promoted by the clergy, that there is
something worse than violent death: the everlasting torment of the damned.
Our situation is more difficult, because our picture of the self is much more
complicated. There are, of course, still social scientists attempting to answer the
Fool by pursuing the essentially Hobbesian programme of trying to see politi-
cal arrangements as products of individual greed and fear (they tend to forget
about ‘glory’), but most of them present themselves as merely exploring a
‘model’ of human nature. Their caution is quite understandable, because the
basic Hobbesian postulates were much more in tune with Stuart common sense
than with more modern assumptions. The Hobbesian conception of the indi-
vidual as hell- or death-avoiding was an adequate rationalisation of seven-
teenth-century practice; it was easy to construe the Christian religion as
primarily a rational strategy for maximising pleasure (the joys of heaven),
and/or avoiding pain (the fires of hell). But rationalisation of our accepted
moral practices promotes a quite different conception of the individual.
To begin with, we think of the self as a bearer of rights, and in particular of
the right to choose and to express its own beliefs. Hobbes thought that the state
was well advised to interfere as little as possible in the behaviour of individuals,
but his assertion of its right to judge precluded the more modern view that there
is an intrinsically private sphere, intrusion on which is a violation of individual
prerogatives. The origins of this attitude are usually and probably rightly traced
to the political theory of John Locke (1632–1704), who founded his ideas upon
a duty, given by God, of preserving one’s self (and secondarily others), and
therefore of protecting all the rights (revealingly known by Locke as ‘Property’)
by which that preservation was assured. There seem to have been two social
practices shaping the Lockean self. One was the rationalist Christianity of
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liberal Protestantism; the other was the experience of a proto-capitalist legal
order, assuring to the individual indefinitely transferable property rights. From
the perspective of this self, the only purpose that was served by states was the
enforcement of his private rights, using coercive powers that they borrowed
from pre-political individuals. It was consistent with this view that there was
still one sphere of life in which the individual’s rights could not be given away
or even lent. Where Hobbes allotted to the state the right to determine the
details of religion, Locke held that the right to free religious practice was too
important to be handed over to the political authorities. Given the risk of hell-
fire, this claim was eminently rational, especially when supported by the claim
that God rewards sincerity (as opposed to dogmatic correctness).
Though the decline of Christianity has taken away its original foundation,
responsibility to a Creator, the secularisation experienced by most societies has
actually entrenched the core assumption, for the tendency to abandon dog-
matic religion has been in the name of the value of working out one’s own
morality. Both Christianity’s decline and liberalism’s survival are no doubt
functional with respect to market practices, but both create some rather obvi-
ous problems. If Locke’s ideas were wholly dominant, it is extremely hard to see
how any government could be legitimate and stable, because legitimation based
on Lockean self-conceptions encounters two important difficulties. The first is
how to deal with the emergence of anti-Lockean moral theories. Locke sup-
ported coercive state action to discourage atheism, the theory that threatened
the logical basis of Lockean natural law,19 but secularised Lockeans, with their
attachment to sincerity, find it extremely hard to justify the suppression of sin-
cerely held ideas. The freedom Locke defended was freedom to follow one’s rea-
son; the freedom prized by many of his successors (including, incidentally, Max
Weber) is freedom to make an arbitrary commitment to some particular values.
There is, of course, no guarantee that those values will themselves be tolerant;
but, in any case, post-Lockean liberalism leads to diversity, and the steady
diminution in the stock of shared beliefs is bound to affect the shared belief that
state commands are binding.
The second is a problem shared with Hobbes. Like Hobbes, Locke was driven
by logic to the view that his abstracted individuals could only be subjected by
some action of their own, but the importance he attached to the free exercise of
moral judgement meant his criteria for ‘consent’ were more demanding than
his predecessor’s. In consequence, his doctrine of tacit consent was even less
convincing. Lockean legitimacy would be founded on the memory of an unco-
erced decision to put oneself into subjection, but such events are virtually
unknown. No major modern state attempts to elicit even the fiction of express
consent from native members of its population; at most such states rely on the
tacit consent allegedly involved in casting votes.
The self that seems to be implied by modern practices in fact owes more to
Rousseau (1712–78); it is a self whose leading characteristic is horror at the
notion of being subjected to another’s will. Rousseau escaped from the insoluble
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problems created by resort to historic consent by tracing the legitimacy of polit-
ical institutions to the present will of individuals. The crucial move that made
this possible was abandonment of the Hobbesian postulate that natural man
desires to excel. The passion to out-do that Hobbes called glory (and Rousseau
amour-propre) was said to be characteristic of human beings denatured and
corrupted by their society, for natural man is indifferent to his fellows except in
wanting to avoid any dependence on another’s will. Rousseau believed that he
could find such selves both in contemporary savages and in the citizens of past
republics, but the ready acceptance of his self-conception suggests that it was
somehow already implicit in eighteenth-century culture; religious introspection
(both sides of the confessional divide), respect for private ‘sentiment’, and
bourgeois self-assertion were all of them certainly likely to encourage an ideal of
non-dependence. At all events, in Rousseau’s theory, love of autonomy replaces
glory in precluding the view that man is innately social and setting the problem
legitimacy must solve.
The essence of Rousseau’s solution is quite simple. As Rousseau’s selves prize
self-determination above convenience and even safety, legitimacy can never be
realised among people with a healthy self-conception unless a government’s
laws can be construed as an expression of a General Will directed to achieving
the shared good of the whole. But there can only be a common good if people
are shaped in such a way that they have goods in common: ‘if there were not
some point on which all interests agree, society could not exist’.20 This was prob-
ably why Rousseau attached significance to the institution of the Censorship, a
moral watchdog that enforced correct behaviour in private life, and to the exis-
tence of a civil religion whose few and simple doctrines were consistent with,
and reinforced, the values of the state.21 He went out of his way to acknowledge
an implication: the anti-political nature of Christianity, a religion whose adher-
ents cared too little about conditions in the present life.22 The same objection
would apply to any way of life that made peremptory demands distracting a per-
son’s attention from the collective good. Rousseau’s society cannot afford the
presence of values that undermine commitment to the common interest.
3
Most of us have of course imbibed both Locke’s and Rousseau’s self-conceptions.
We see ourselves both as the bearers of Lockean rights and as averse to govern-
ment by others. The shared priorities Rousseau guaranteed through civil religion
and pressure upon manners have been assured, in modern times, by the power of
national feeling. Though it is very difficult to say any more about nations than
that they are groups with something important in common that leads them to
aspire to govern themselves, the wish to be a part of such a unit appears to be a
very powerful motive. The urge to create and defend a nation-state has brought
about the kind of sacrifices, up to and including the laying down of life, no Hobbe-
sian self could possibly envisage. Though this phenomenon can appear to rest
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upon identity-beliefs (the loyal subject feels his country’s triumphs as his own), it
can also be construed in a more individualistic spirit. Rulers who come from the
same national background find it easier to create within their subjects the
impression that they share a common good, in part because they are presumed
to share an interest in cultural survival; the rational explanation of the ferocity
of nationalism in places like the former Yugoslavia is the entirely plausible
assumption that only one culture is likely to survive in a given political unit.
The self that seems to underly much modern political practice is thus a per-
son who attaches value to the persistence of some characteristics she feels that
she shares with her neighbours. She may believe this way of being human is
better than all others, but she is motivated by the accident that it happens to be
hers. Though it is threatened in its turn by the emergence of sub-nationalisms
(few nations are so homogeneous that they lack proto-national subdivisions)
legitimacy based on this conception has plainly been quite widely realised. The
obvious danger with this situation is that promotion of the nation’s values is
likely to lead to subversion of Lockean ones, whether to do away with compet-
ing loyalties or to forestall such loyalties from emerging.
But even if the nation-state had ways of containing this threat without
unduly transgressing the rights of its members, it would still be bound to clash,
sooner or later, with the international economic order. Modern nations are in
practice interdependent in ways that demand the enforcement of quite intan-
gible entitlements. In the foreseeable future, a high proportion of the wealth of
the most powerful will take the form of claims on foreign assets and so-called
‘intellectual property’, that is, of bonds, shares, licences and patents, and other
entities whose very existence is constituted by a legal system. Even if we sup-
pose, implausibly, that everybody has an interest in the existence of this legal
system, it is bound to be experienced by some people (and some peoples), some
of the time, as standing between them and self-determination.
This chapter has been arguing that a legitimating theory has to be based
upon a self-conception that people actually find acceptable. Precisely this
thought can be found in the most celebrated work of later twentieth-century
liberal theory. John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) maintained that just
arrangements were those that would be chosen by rational selves behind a ‘veil
of ignorance’ concealing, amongst other things, their talents, social status and
‘conception of the good’.23 This remarkably ignorant self would still, however,
be a ‘moral person’, that is, someone ‘with a fundamental preference for condi-
tions that enable him to frame a mode of life that expresses his nature as a free
and rational being as fully as circumstances permit’.24 Rawls thought this self-
conception has actually been realised in our culture: ‘The hypothetical nature
of the original position invites the question: why should we take any interest in
it, moral or otherwise? Recall the answer: the conditions embodied in the
description of this situation are ones that we do in fact accept.’25
The question is obviously right, but it invites a gloomier response. The postu-
lated Rawlsian self, abstracted from its actual characteristics, seems as irrelevant
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to us as the virtue-choosing self to Hobbes’s Fool. Rawls’s more recent work has
explained that ‘free and rational’ ought to be understood as ‘reasonable’, as
‘ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of co-operation and to
abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so’.26
Borrowing from T.M. Scanlon, Rawls claims that we are given by our culture ‘a
basic desire to be able to justify our actions to others on grounds they could not
reasonably reject’.27 This Rawlsian self-justifying self can no doubt be abstracted
from some current practices (on a somewhat idealised view of the character of
university life, it might be found, for instance, in the activities of academics). It
is a cousin of the self implicitly imagined by Jürgen Habermas, with his principle
that ‘just those action norms are valid which all possibly affected persons could
agree as participants in rational discourses’.28 But nobody spends all their time
as a rationally discursive individual, and there is no obvious reason why rational
discourse should be seen as more essential to the self than, say, sex, sport, jokes,
poetry or religion.
Even a sketchy survey of the history of legitimacy-beliefs raises a troubling
possibility. Our present intuitions about a separate self owe something to
Hobbesian ‘science’, something to secularised Lockeanism, and something to
Rousseau’s hatred of dependence. Because there is no answer to the Fool, no
Hobbesian self-conception can really support legitimate arrangements. But the
more elaborate selves we can imagine are also fundamentally unsuited to the
legitimation of our actual practices. The privileges attributed to the post-Lock-
ean self will offer it the space to make non-Lockean commitments, while
Rousseau’s self-governing selves will be affronted by dependence on an inter-
national order. What actually sustains our present arrangements may be no
more than habit, combined with faith in their effectiveness, effectiveness being
narrowly defined in terms of the delivery of economic growth. We find our-
selves, in fact, in Weber’s world. If and when our economic growth should
falter, the outlook will be bleak.
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Introduction
The concept of democracy is central to our contemporary political vocabu-
laries, yet agreement on how to conceptualise democracy is far from wide-
spread.1 As Adam Przeworski has recently remarked: ‘Perusing innumerable
definitions, one discovers that democracy has become an altar on which
everyone hangs his or her favorite ex voto.’2 Certainly we can say that democ-
racy is a form of government that appeals to an idea of popular sovereignty
and, hence, an answer to the question ‘who rules?’ – but to flesh out this
answer will very quickly mire us in controversy. This point is of more than
merely academic interest for two reasons. First, how we understand the con-
cept of democracy guides our practical reflections on how to design or reform
democratic institutions, it generates criteria governing what we can reason-
ably expect from democratic government and it animates our debates con-
cerning political legitimacy. Second, in so far as reasonable disagreement is
an abiding circumstance of politics and democratic rule is a condition of
political legitimacy, it follows that disagreement concerning the nature of
democratic rule, and hence of the criteria of political legitimacy, is itself liable
to be a persistent feature of democratic politics. For this reason, this chapter
will begin by considering a recent minimalist view of democracy, before going
on to consider two important contemporary models of democracy: the inter-
est-aggregating model and the deliberative model. It will then briefly consider
a supplement to each of these models in the form of ‘contestatory’ demo-
cratic mechanisms. The chapter will conclude by indicating what is arguably
the main contemporary challenge to democratic theory and practice in the
era of globalisation.
1 A minimal view of democracy
Perhaps the best known minimal view of democracy is that advanced by Schum-
peter as ‘a system in which rulers are selected by competitive elections’,3 where
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suffrage. The main question that arises here is this: why should we value democ-
racy understood in this minimalist way?
Przeworski has argued that we do have good reasons to value democracy on
a minimal understanding of it; even if it is the case, as he also argues, ‘that
choosing rulers by election does not assure either rationality [of decision-mak-
ing], or representation [of the interests or will of the people], or equality [of cit-
izens]’.4 He advances this argument on two main grounds: first, ‘the mere
possibility of being able to change governments can avoid violence’ and, sec-
ond, ‘being able to do it by voting has consequences of its own’.5
With respect to the first point, Przeworski puts his argument thus:
assume that governments are selected by a toss of a, not necessarily fair, coin . . .
the very prospect that governments would alternate may induce the conflicting
political forces to comply with the rules rather than engage in violence, for the fol-
lowing reason. Although the losers would be better off in the short run rebelling
rather than accepting the outcome of the current round, if they have a sufficient
chance to win and a sufficiently large payoff in the future rounds they are better
off continuing to comply with the verdict for the coin toss rather than fighting for
power. Similarly, while the winners would be better off in the short run not tossing
the coin again, they may be better off in the long run peaceably leaving office
rather than provoking violence to their usurpation of power.6
Notice that this argument suggests that the chances of maintaining democratic
rule are increased in having at least two relatively matched political parties and
where political loyalty is primarily to political parties rather than individuals.
In the absence of these conditions, as the current state of affairs in Zimbabwe
illustrates, democratic rule may become very fragile.
Przeworski’s second point turns on the fact that we do not actually toss coins
but vote:
Voting is an imposition of a will over a will. When a decision is reached by voting,
some people must submit to a decision different from theirs or to a decision con-
trary to their interests . . . Voting generates winners and losers, and it authorises
the winners to impose their will, even if within constraints, on the losers. This is
what ‘ruling’ is.7
This fact has consequences not because voting imposes an obligation to respect
the results of voting (although it may, Przeworski is more sceptical of this claim
that I am) but because ‘voting does reveal information about passions, values
and interests’:
If elections are a peaceful substitute for rebellion, it is because they inform every-
one who would mutiny and against what. They inform the losers – ‘Here is the dis-
tribution of force: if you disobey the instructions conveyed by the results of the
election, I will be more likely to beat you than you will be able to beat me in a vio-
lent confrontation’ – and the winners – ‘If you do not hold elections again or if you
grab too much, I will be able to put up a forbidding resistance.’8
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In other words, voting not only provides a mechanism, like coin-tossing, that
avoids violence but also provides current rulers and possible future rulers with
information concerning the political constitution of those subject to their rule,
information which (given their interest in re-election and election, respectively)
is likely to inform the character of their rule.
These are, I think, compelling arguments for the value of democracy even on
a minimal view. But that we should value democracy on these grounds does not
imply that we cannot reasonably and plausibly expect more – at least from rel-
atively mature and relatively wealthy democracies – than simply the avoidance
of internal violence and the provision of informational constraints on rational
rulers. What more can and should we expect? The reflections offered in this
chapter will begin from the delineation of a formal concept of democracy as: a
mode of government in which the members of the unit of rule are equal consociates
and have collectively an effective capacity to govern, either directly or via intermedi-
aries, matters of common interest (or concerning the common good) qua member-
ship of this unit of rule.
This formal concept highlights two features which are typically taken to be
basic to any substantive account of democracy: the political equality of citizens
and the idea of collective self-rule. Hence on any more than minimal view of
democracy, it is suggested, we can and should expect that democratic institu-
tions will, at least to a significant extent, be shaped by commitments to ensur-
ing the political equality of citizens (in terms of, for example, public and private
rights) and to facilitating ‘collective self-rule’, where this phrase implies not
simply a right to the periodic selection of one’s rulers by way of competitive
elections but also that ‘important decisions on questions of law and policy
depend . . . upon public opinion formally expressed by citizens’.9 How we under-
stand these commitments (and the obligations that they impose), however, will
hang to a large extent on the way in which we conceptualise democracy. For
this reason, the next two sections of this chapter examine two different models
– or, more strictly, regulative ideals – of democracy, tracing the distinct ways in
which these commitments are cashed out.
2 The interest-aggregating model
This first model begins with the intuitively simple and appealing thought that the
basic substance of political reflection and action is interests, where these inter-
ests are expressed by political actors as preferences. This basic thought orients
the justification and conceptualisation of democracy as a mode of political gov-
ernment. The argument for democracy on this understanding runs as follows:
If the good or interests of everyone should be weighed equally, and if each adult
person is in general the best judge of his or her good or interests, then every adult
member of an association is sufficiently well qualified, taken all around, to partici-
pate in making collectively binding decisions that affect his or her good or interests,
that is, to be a full citizen of the demos. More specifically, when binding decisions
chap 9  23/1/03  7:47 am  Page 107
are made, the claims of each citizen as to the laws, rules, policies, etc. to be adopted
must be counted as equal and equally valid. Moreover, no adult members are so
definitively better qualified than the others that they should be entrusted with
making binding collective decisions. More specifically, when binding decisions are
made, no citizen’s claims as to the laws, rules, and policies to be adopted are to be
counted as superior to the claims of any other citizen.10
To argue against democracy on this view requires that one reject either or
both of the conditional statements at the beginning of Dahl’s remarks. Hence,
the anti-democrat must argue that the interests of everyone should not be
weighed equally and/or that each adult person is not in general the best judge
of his or her interests. Although historically both of these anti-democratic
arguments have been made, it is not clear that they can easily be sustained.
Given this interest-oriented argument for democracy, what ideal standards
are appropriate to a democracy? Dahl suggests the following five ideal standards
as the core normative commitments of democracy:
1 Effective participation
2 Equality in voting
3 Gaining enlightened understanding
4 Exercising final control over the agenda
5 Inclusion of adults.11
Why these criteria? Dahl’s response is that, given the assumption that democ-
racy is to be understood in terms of interests, ‘each is necessary if the members
. . . are to be politically equal in determining the policies of the association’.12
This establishes (1), since to deny any citizen the opportunity to express their
preferences, place questions on the agenda or give reasons for endorsing or
rejecting a given proposal is to mute their political voice; it justifies (2), since to
weigh votes unequally is to weigh interests unequally; it implies (4), since oth-
erwise the agenda may not represent the full range of interests of the citizens;
and it establishes (5), since otherwise the interests of some competent persons
are not counted. But what of (3)? Dahl’s point here is that citizens must have an
adequate and equal opportunity ‘for discovering and validating (within the time
permitted by the need for a decision) the choice on the matter to be decided that would
best serve the citizen’s interests’,13 since otherwise some citizens may be disad-
vantaged relative to others in terms of being able to accurately determine the
choice which best expresses their fundamental interests with respect to a given
decision. Essentially the democratic idea expressed here involves two elements.
First, that what count as matters of collective interest (that is, matters on which
political decisions may be appropriate) should be determined by equal citizens
as a collectivity within the constraints imposed by the conditions of democratic
rule. Second, that what is held to be in the collective interest (that is, what is the
best course of action for the polity to adopt) in relation to a given issue should
be decided by equal citizens collectively in accordance with the principles of
democratic rule. This is why Dahl stresses the importance of both the collective
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ability of citizens as political equals to set the agenda and to decide what to
do. Any form of government that fails to meet both of these conditions subjects
citizens, in one way or another, to the rule of guardians.
But how are decisions concerning what is in the collective interest to be deter-
mined? The aim of democracy, as David Miller noted, ‘is to aggregate individual
preferences into a collective choice in as fair and efficient a way as possible’.14
Now in so far as these collective choices take the form of a single-issue choice
between option A and option B, such aggregation is straightforward and, for
issues which are not constitutionally basic, it seems reasonable to adopt the
principle of majority rule, that is, that the option with the majority of votes
wins.15 But what of collective choices where there are more than two options
and no option receives an absolute majority of the votes cast? Here determin-
ing the collective interest may be harder than it immediately appears to be.
Consider that there are numerous ways in which an aggregation of these
votes might be accomplished. On the one hand, there are majoritarian decision-
making rules such as the plurality rule (whichever option gets the most votes
wins) and the Condorcet rule (the winning outcome is the option which defeats
each of the others in a vote on every pair of alternatives). The problem here is
that the plurality rule implies that a choice is simply that of the largest minor-
ity, while the Condorcet rule is incomplete in that for a given distribution of
votes there may not be a Condorcet winner. On the other hand, there are posi-
tional decision-making rules such as the Borda count (the winning outcome is
determined by scoring each option according to its place in a voter’s ranking,
thus the top option gets n points, the second n–1 points, etc., and then aggre-
gating the point for each option across all votes cast). The problem here is that
‘it may make the decision among quite popular options depend on the way that
some voters rank way-out or eccentric options if these are on the ballot paper’16
and, for just the same reasons, this decision rule is highly vulnerable to strate-
gic voting. Things get worse! As Arrow has demonstrated in his famous Impos-
sibility Theorem, given certain reasonable conditions which we might wish a
decision rule to satisfy,17 ‘if there are more than two alternatives, any method
for making social decisions that ensures transitivity in the decisions must be
necessarily either dictated by one person or imposed against the preferences of
every individual’.18 The implication drawn from this and related social choice
theorems is that no rule for collective decisions can be discovered that does not
produce arbitrary or meaningless outcomes and hence both (a) there is no deci-
sion rule for aggregating preferences which is clearly fair and rational and
hence superior to other possible rules and (b) different rules may produce
different outcomes. In this context, Riker has argued that it makes no sense to
speak of discovering the ‘popular will’ at all.19
This is clearly in principle a very serious challenge to this model of democracy
and it is one that might encourage us to give up trying to make sense of the
notion of majority rule. We might, then, instead adopt a principle of unanim-
ity in which each citizen has a right of veto over laws, policies, etc.20 The main
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objection to this proposal by Buchanan and Tullock is that it is unfeasible, mak-
ing government (to all intents and purposes) impossible.21 This conclusion is a
little quick since, under conditions in which each of us knows that any of us
can veto a given proposal, it seems likely that we will rapidly develop a political
culture of bargaining, compromise and trade-offs such as characterises exist-
ing political contexts in which decisions are subject to this rule (for example,
treaty negotiations). Still although the conclusion drawn by Dahl is hasty, it is
the right one – under contemporary conditions, it makes little sense to propose
that a community’s capacity to govern itself be subject to the dogmatic convic-
tions of every member. However, since unanimity is the only way of avoiding
the problems concerning majority rule raised by social choice theory, we are
thrown once more back on to the task of making sense of this notion. One way
to avoid this problem would be to adapt the unanimity principle so that what
requires unanimity is not a proposal but a choice between two proposals – and
then decide between these proposals on the basis of a majority vote. This would
avoid the most obvious difficulty with the unanimity principle while ensuring
that all decisions can be unproblematic expressions of majority rule. However,
although such an adapted unanimity principle would avoid the problems raised
by social choice theory, it is difficult to see how such a demanding principle
would be practicable.
But does the arbitrariness of decision rules really matter that much? Recall
that the problem is this:
The problem of arbitrariness arises because it is not clear which of the many pos-
sible rules best matches our intuitive sense of ‘finding the option which the voters
most prefer’, or to put the point another way, for any given rule it is possible to give
examples where using the rule produces an outcome that seems repugnant to our
sense of what a democratic decision should be.22
It was for this reason that Riker insisted that the notion of ‘popular will’ is
just an empty phrase. But to reach this conclusion Riker would need to assume
that the fact that different decision rules produce different results or expressions
of the ‘popular will’ vitiates the notion of the ‘popular will’ and this does not
follow: the popular will (or collective interest) is just whatever is the result of the
decision rule that we take to be authoritative for a given decision, that other rules
may produce other results is neither here nor there. The real question is how,
knowing that different rules may produce different results, we decide which
rule to employ for a given decision. Now it might seem that this simply pushes
the whole problem back one stage but it does not. From a democratic point of
view, what matters is not that a given decision rule may produce results which
conflict with our intuitions concerning what a democratic decision would be
but that the democratic community has determined what the authoritative rule
is for a given class of decisions – and this is the point at which the principle of
unanimity has a role to play. In other words, what matters democratically is not
that the rule may produce counter-intuitive outcomes but that the choice of the
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rule is not arbitrary – and the only way to secure this is to adopt the principle of
unanimity. It is, in other words, to treat the choice of decision rule (or rules,
where different rules may be used for different decisions) as if it were analogous
to a treaty – or contract! – in which all parties are required to agree. Indeed, this
is, I think, why Rousseau insisted that the contract to form a political commu-
nity must be unanimous. (Moreover, if the members of a community are par-
ticularly troubled by the thought of strategic voting, they might choose to
introduce a meta-rule to the effect that the decision rule will be chosen ran-
domly once the votes are cast. This would have the advantage of blocking
attempts at the strategic manipulation of the outcome.) But does not this pro-
posal suffer from the same disadvantage as the proposal of unanimity as a deci-
sion rule? No. The problem there was that where unanimity is used as a decision
rule for specific issues, any member who had particularly strong or dogmatic
convictions on that issue could veto any proposal that did not conform with
their convictions. But in this case unanimity is being used as a decision rule for
deciding between decision rules and not for deciding between proposals on con-
crete topics – and this means that no member of the community will be in a
position to know (in more than very general terms) whether or not the choice
of decision rule x for treating decisions of type y is likely to work out in ways
that tend to favour them and hence members will have no interest-based motive
to veto the proposal of particular decision-rules. (Note that if this turned out to
be false, it would provide a general incentive for adopting the randomising
meta-rule suggested above.) In this respect, it seems to me that we can talk intel-
ligibly of the popular will or collective interest, and hence that the apparent
threat posed by social choice theory to this model of democracy is dissolved.
To conclude this section, let us return to the question of what more we might
expect from democracy in terms of cashing out the principles of political equal-
ity and ensuring an effective capacity for collective self-rule. In terms of this
interest-aggregation model, it is clear that what we can and should expect is a
commitment to realizing as fully as practicable the five ideal standards which
Dahl sketches and thus, most importantly, to measures which seek to ensure
our equal freedom to form and identify our own interests, our equal freedom to
express these interests at all stages of the democratic process from agenda-set-
ting to final decision-making and the equal weighting of our interests in deter-
mining our collective decision. Our democratic institutions are to be evaluated
in terms of their design and performance against their satisfaction of, and com-
mitment to, such measures.
3 The deliberative model
Whereas the first model takes interests as the basic currency of politics, the sec-
ond model takes public reasons as occupying this position. Joshua Cohen has
helpfully summarized the distinction thus:
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According to an aggregative conception of democracy . . . decisions are collective
just in case they arise from arrangements of binding collective choice that give equal
consideration to . . . the interests of each person bound by the decisions. According to
a deliberative conception, a decision is collective just in case it emerges from arrange-
ments of binding collective choice that establish conditions of free public reasoning
among equals who are governed by the decisions. In the deliberative conception, then,
citizens treat one another not by giving equal consideration to interests . . . but by
offering them justifications for the exercise of collective power framed in terms of
considerations that can, roughly speaking, be acknowledged by all as reasons.23
The deliberative argument for democracy, thus, emerges from a claim about the
political equality of citizens as grounded on their equal moral status as
autonomous individuals capable of giving and exchanging reasons – and,
hence, on what Rainer Forst has called their basic moral right of justification,
that is, the basic right to have exercises of collective power over their free activ-
ity as citizens justified by reasons that are acceptable to them as citizens.24
Given this argument for democracy, what ideal standards does it invoke? On
Cohen’s account, these standards can be given by presenting ‘an idealized pro-
cedure of political deliberation, constructed to capture the notions of free,
equal and reason that figure in the deliberative ideal’.25 We can summarise this
ideal procedure thus:
1 All citizens acknowledge the freedom of each citizen to participate.
2 Citizens are formally equal in that each has the same rights to propose issues
and solutions, to offer reasons for or against proposals, and to have an equal
voice in deciding the outcome.
3 Citizens are substantively equal in that each has an equal opportunity to
exercise their rights of participation.
4 Citizens are reasonable ‘in that they aim to defend and criticize institutions and
programs in terms of considerations that others, as free and equal, have rea-
son to accept, given the fact of reasonable pluralism and on the assumption
that those others are themselves concerned to provide suitable justifications’.26
The standards invoked by this idealised procedure are interestingly analogous
to those proposed by Dahl in that this procedure ensures the opportunity for
effective participation (proposing issues, solutions and offering reasons), equal-
ity of voting (each has an equal say and each counts as one in a vote), gaining
enlightened understanding (where this now implies the opportunity to con-
sider and determine, within the time available, the reasons that one considers
best concerning the issue at hand), exercising final control over the agenda
(equal rights to propose issues) and inclusion of adults (all persons with the
deliberative capacities). In addition, this model also invokes the standard of
reasonableness, namely, that citizens acknowledge the fact of reasonable
pluralism and seek to offer reasons that other reasonable citizens could not rea-
sonably reject.27 In this respect, the deliberative model is more demanding than
the interest-aggregation model since it requires that citizens exercise a form of
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democratic self-restraint, namely that they reflect as citizens and not in terms
of their private interests.
At this stage, we can turn to the issue of what it means to talk of ‘collective
self-rule’ in this context. Ideally, of course, collective self-rule here refers to the
generation of a consensus such that for any given law or policy, it can be justi-
fied to all citizens in terms that they could not reasonably reject. (This does not
require that the justification is the same for all citizens; an overlapping consen-
sus will do as well as a common consensus.) However, since it is unlikely that
such a consensus will emerge on most, if not all, issues, it is clear that most deci-
sion-making will require the use of some decision-rule in this same way as
required for the interest-aggregration model.28 The deliberative model is, how-
ever, arguably better placed with respect to the issues raised by the need to select
a decision-rule. Thus David Miller has argued that the interest-aggregation
model is exposed to social choice dilemmas in part because it posits choosing a
decision rule independently of consideration of the content of the citizens views,
whereas because the deliberative model sees the content of citizens’ judgements
concerning the collective interest as emerging in the course of reasonable delib-
eration, it is less vulnerable to these problems in three ways.29 First, we may plau-
sibly expect that the deliberative process may produce voters’ rank orderings that
are ‘single-peaked’, that is, ‘the alternatives can be arranged on a continuum
such that if, say, a voter ranks the alternative on the left highest, he does not rank
the alternative on the left above that in the centre’.30 This matters because in
cases where such single-peaking occurs, there is always a Condorcet winner. We
can expect this because in many cases the policy options represent a choice
between two values and voters’ ranking reflect their weighing of these values.
Second, where such single-peaking does not occur, it is likely to be the result of
more than one dimension of disagreement emerging in the deliberative process
– but precisely because the dimensions of disagreement become apparent
through deliberation, it may be possible to disaggregate the original choice sce-
nario into components such that for each component there is single-peaking.
Third, if we consider majoritarian (for example, Condorcet) and positional (e.g.,
Borda count) types of decision-rule, we can note that whereas the former aim to
satisfy as many people as possible, the latter aims to satisfy everyone collectively
as much as possible and, consequently, which of these aims is best may hang on
the nature of the issue over which we are seeking to come to a decision. Miller’s
point is that deliberative democracy will be well placed to choose decision-rules
that are appropriate to the issue at hand since the nature of this issue will be
revealed in deliberation, whereas the interest-aggregating model of democracy
will not be so well placed. Whether or not it is actually the case that the deliber-
ative model is better placed, however, depends on whether or not citizens do in
fact exhibit the commitment to reasonableness that this model calls for, and that,
in turn, hangs to a significant extent on whether the claim that involvement in
deliberation with free and equal others has transformative effects on individual
citizens, that is, cultivates a disposition to reasonableness.
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In considering the question of what more we might expect from democracy
in terms of cashing out the principles of political equality and ensuring an
effective capacity for collective self-rule, we can note that the deliberative model
involves a commitment to realising as fully as practicable a framework of social
and institutional arrangements that ‘facilitate free reasoning among equal
citizens . . . while ensuring that citizens are treated as free and equal in that
discussion; and tie the authorization to exercise public power – and the exercise
itself – to such public reasoning’.31 It is against such criteria that our democratic
polity is to be judged.
4 Contestatory democracy
Given the above account of the two models of democracy, we might still rea-
sonably be concerned by the potential problem posed by the tyranny of the
majority. While both models provide effective arguments for liberal freedoms
such as freedom of speech and freedom of association as intrinsic to democratic
rule, it remains plausible that, under non-ideal conditions, the interests or rea-
sons expressed by minority groups may be ignored or, at least, not granted
equal status within the decision-making process. In the practical context of
democratic rule by way of representative government, addressing this problem
‘would require not just that the majority are heard in determining what com-
mon, perceived interests ought to be pursued by government, but also that the
relevant minorities get a hearing, ‘So the question is whether there is any way
of subjecting government to a mode of distributive or minority control in order
to balance the electorally established mode of collective or majority control.’32
Pettit’s suggestion is to introduce contestatory mechanisms. These are mech-
anisms through which a minority group who hold that the decision reached
has not adequately acknowledged their political voice can contest the decision
through ‘a procedure that would enable people, not to veto public decisions on
the basis of their avowable, perceived interests, but to call them into question
on such a basis and trigger a review; in particular, to trigger a review in a forum
that they and others can all endorse as an impartial court of appeal’.33
This supplement to both the major models is important not least because it
contributes to maintaining an effective sense of political belonging among
minority groups. After all, as Pettit notes:
There is an enormous gulf between being subject to a will that may interfere in
your affairs without taking your perceived interests into account and being subject
to a process such that, while it takes your interests and those of others equally into
account, it may deliver a result – for reasons you can understand – that favours
others more than you.34
Consequently, under non-ideal conditions, a concern with promoting demo-
cratic stability in the sense of a strong identification of citizens with their dem-
ocratic institutions entails that we have good reasons to adopt a contestatory
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supplement to our basic democratic fora and that this is the case whether our
democratic understanding is primarily informed by either of the two main
models considered.
5 Globalisation and democracy
In this final section, I want to mention a significant contemporary issue for
democratic theory, namely, the problem of the embeddedness of democratic
polities within networks of transnational governance.
It is increasingly becoming a commonplace that democratic polities in the
form of the sovereign nation-state are situated within, and subject to, forms of
regional and/or global governance by way either of regional organisations such
as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA)
(which may or may not be polities themselves: the EU is a polity but NAFTA is
not) or the multilateral institutions of global governance such as the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank. In this context, recall our basic formal definition of democracy as
a mode of government in which the members of the unit of rule are equal consociates
and have collectively an effective capacity to govern, either directly or via intermedi-
aries, matters of common interest (or concerning the common good) qua membership
of this unit of rule. Up to this point we have been considering the issue of citizens
possessing ‘an effective capacity to govern’ in terms of the internal arrangements
and conditions of a polity, but it is equally clear that such an effective capacity
can be undermined by virtue of being subject to external forms of governance
such that, for example, policies concerning the subsidisation of manufacturing
industry within the polity are politically disconnected from public opinion on
this topic and subject to the authority of the WTO. The dilemma, therefore, is
that a polity which has the form of a democratic polity may only exhibit the
appearance of democratic rule rather than the reality of such rule – or, more
strictly, may only exhibit the reality of such rule in externally limited and con-
strained contexts. In this real world contemporary context, maintaining the
claim that a polity is democratic requires either a highly implausible and imprac-
ticable reassertion of its autonomy or a democratisation of the forms of transna-
tional governance to which it is subject. In this respect, as David Held has
powerfully argued, a concern with democratic rule cannot be restricted to the
level of the sovereign state but must track the levels of governance to which we,
as peoples, are subject.35 This raises a plethora of theoretical and practical issues
for democracy but the challenges posed by these difficulties need to be met if we
are to maintain our practical identities as democratic citizens.
Conclusion
This chapter began with reference to a minimalist view of democracy and it did
so because reflecting on this view should remind us of a point which needs to
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be borne in mind when considering the concept of democracy. This is that the
more we demand from democracy, the more we are likely to be disappointed by
our democratic institutions and, in our disappointment, to lose sight of the very
real benefits which democracy delivers even on a minimalist view. With this
warning in mind, however, it has been argued that we can, at least in some
circumstances, expect more from democracy than the minimalist view admits
and I have tried to sketch what more we might reasonably expect by reference
to the two major contemporary models – or regulative ideals – of democracy as
well as suggesting that contestatory mechanisms can play an important sup-
plementary role with respect to these models. Finally, the chapter has indicated
the central issue for the future of democratic theory and practice, namely, our
subjection to forms of transnational governance over which, at present, we can
exercise little or no effective democratic control.
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Introduction
Many political theorists view the rule of law with suspicion. On the one hand, it
can appear mere political rhetoric. For example, politicians habitually invoke the
doctrine to suggest that any failure to comply with decisions made within the
current political system leads to anarchy and the end of law. Opponents must
play by the rules of the game and, when they lose, obey the winners. So
employed, it operates as a self-serving ideological device whereby governments
assert the legitimacy of all their actions. As Judith Shklar has remarked, it seems
unnecessary to waste intellectual effort ‘on this bit of ruling-class chatter’.1 On
the other hand, certain critics of this rhetorical position identify the rule of law
with some notion of good or just law. In this case, however, the doctrine risks
becoming indistinguishable from a comprehensive political philosophy and
better designated as such. No distinctive role appears to be allotted to law or
legality per se.
To escape vacuity, therefore, a theory of the rule of law must avoid collaps-
ing into either of these two interpretations. A standard approach associates the
rule of law with those properties of legality and due process that allow people
who disagree about the just society to peacefully coexist and, where necessary,
to work through their differences. However, this thesis immediately confronts
the original dilemma. If the rule of law merely requires that formal procedures
exist and are followed, it will amount to little more than an endorsement of the
prevailing formalities. All regimes may need a degree of procedural and legal
formality to hold together, thereby setting certain limits to what even the worst
tyrant can do if he wants his state to function with any efficiency and avoid col-
lapse, but these limitations need not be terribly demanding. Yet strengthening
them could lead to the doctrine incorporating contentious substantive notions
and thereby losing its distinctiveness vis-à-vis comprehensive theories of the
just and good polity.
Section 1 argues that some of these problems can be avoided if we see the main
task of the rule of law as the prevention of arbitrary rule. Two broad approaches
are identified. The first centres on the very nature of rules and the constraints
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that arise from following them. The second focuses on political checks and
balances for constraining power. Though related, both historically and substan-
tively, I shall argue the second offers the chief defence. Sections 2 and 3 defend
this argument by analysing respectively an example of each approach.
1 The idea and value of the rule of law
The core idea of the rule of law can be grasped via the classic contrast with the
‘rule of persons’. The objection to the latter resides in the fear that unfettered
personal rule, be it by a single individual, such as a monarch, a group, such as
a democratic majority, or a corporate agent, such as a bureaucratic body, places
the ruled under the arbitrary sway of their rulers. In other words, such rulers
have the capacity to intentionally coerce, obstruct, manipulate or otherwise
interfere with the ruled, without consulting the views or interests of those
affected. By forcing rulers to follow certain forms and procedures, law con-
strains such arbitrary power – though theorists differ as to the effectiveness and
normative implications of different sorts of constraint. Naturally, the capacity
for arbitrary interference is never absolute. No agent can always choose when,
where, how and with whom to interfere, or to what degree. Nor can arbitrary
interference ever be eliminated entirely. Paradoxically, the rule of law always
depends on the rule of persons to make and uphold it. Even if their rule is care-
fully controlled, no political system can avoid giving either executives or minor
officials a degree of personal discretion which could be abused. The aim must
be to limit such opportunities as far as possible without producing inflexibilities
in decision-making that lead to inefficiencies and a lack of responsiveness that
are themselves sources of injustice.
Three related concerns are involved in the fear of arbitrariness. First, there is
the danger that rulers will simply govern wilfully and capriciously. As a result,
there will be no consistency or coherence to policy, so that people will not know
where they stand. An act that appeared unexceptional before could suddenly and
for no apparent reason attract a severe penalty simply because the ruler has taken
a dislike to it or become unusually attentive. Second, people will feel dominated by
their rulers. They will be permanently in awe of their power, attempting to second
guess their next move either to escape their wrath or win their favour. Finally, arbi-
trariness can produce oppression when people’s legitimate expectations and
needs are overridden or ignored for the sake of another’s self-interested ends.
Though linked, one kind of arbitrariness can exist without necessarily involving
the others. For example, an enlightened despot may not act capriciously or
oppress people’s interests, but by virtue of his comparatively unchecked power
will still exert domination over them. All three kinds reduce the ruled to slaves of
their ruler by removing their capacity to act autonomously. In each case, individ-
uals lose the capacity to plan ahead on their own account, without the anxiety of
being subject to unpredictable and possibly malicious interferences by either the
public authorities and their supporters or the inadvertent actions of others.
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This feature of arbitrary rule provides the key to the purpose and value of the
rule of law. If domination is the condition to be avoided, then the task of the rule
of law must be to guarantee people’s status as free and equal citizens. All non-
trivial accounts of the rule of law conceive equality and freedom as intimately
related. It is because there is no ascribed status justifying seeing some as the nat-
ural servants of others, that individuals should be treated as moral equals, able
to act as responsible and autonomous agents free from the domination of oth-
ers. However, different versions of the rule of law cash out this linkage between
equality and autonomy in different ways. One version, surveyed in section 2,
argues that the key lies in the law having a certain form: namely in being gen-
eral, public, clear, prospective, stable and applying equally to all. As a result,
none are above the law and it is hard to manipulate for self-serving and partial
purposes. Another version, examined in section 3, suggests the crucial factor
is the process of law-making: equality in the making of the law must be such
that legislators show equal concern and respect to different points of view by
‘hearing the other side’.
Despite their differences, these two versions of the rule of law do not neces-
sarily pull in opposite directions . First, both try to tread the line between offer-
ing a purely formal or procedural and an overly substantive account of law. The
first version tries to pack these substantive features into the form taken by the
law, the second into the process of legislation. The aim in each case is to ensure
not only a reduction of uncertainty by limiting the ability of rulers or others to
act totally wilfully, but also to ensure the law embodies non-arbitrary or domi-
nating ends by virtue of treating those subject to it as moral equals.
Second, the two versions are not logically incompatible. Certain theorists
have argued that only laws having the form advocated in the first version could
be agreed to by the law-making process recommended by the second. Whether
such a process actually has to be employed then becomes a largely prudential
matter. Thus, some analysts have argued that it offers the most realistic safe-
guard for ensuring rules have the desired form, whereas others believe it is too
difficult to institutionalise in practice, so that laws must simply be drafted ‘as if ’
they had emerged from it. However, I shall argue that this fit is not quite so neat,
and that departures from rule formality are often necessary in ways that are
only likely to be satisfactory if checked by a particular process. That process,
though, does have certain formal rule of law features.
Third, both versions engage with different aspects of what could be termed
‘the Hobbesian challenge’. Stated crudely, Hobbes argued that in circumstances
of conflicting interests and deep disagreements about values and judgements,
laws would only be equitably and coherently drafted and applied by all individ-
uals being equally in awe of a sovereign who was outside the law and whose
power was indivisible. All law has to be interpreted and these interpretations
are necessarily controversial. As a result, political stability cannot result from
the rule of laws per se but only from having an unquestioned authority vested
with the power to formulate, interpret and apply the laws. To suggest that any
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agent or agency is subject to the law is simply to place another interpreter of the
law above them, while to divide sovereign power is to create a divisive conflict
between interpreters.2 By contrast, both versions of the rule of law seek to place
all persons within the law and to divide law-making power, although the ways
they do so differ.
Fourth, the theories of the rule of law discussed here differ from certain
notions of the Rechtsstaat with which the doctrine is sometimes conflated.
These last centre on upholding a certain list of rights reflecting a particular
conception of justice, rather than simply preventing the arbitrary use of polit-
ical power by virtue of law or law-making having a given form. Joseph Raz
cites as an instance of this approach the International Congress of Jurist’s
equation of the rule of law with the creation and maintenance of ‘the condi-
tions which will uphold the dignity of man as an individual’ – a requirement
that includes ‘not only recognition of his civil and political rights but also the
establishment of the social, economic, educational and cultural traditions
which are essential to the full development of his personality’.3 This view sim-
ply takes on too much. Its not just that people may hold differing visions of the
good life. Even within a particular vision, a distinctive role exists for law and
the legal and political system as mechanisms for facilitating social interaction
and protecting against abuses of power: for example, by managing discus-
sions over how best to achieve agreed goals and ensuring the appropriate
administration of the distribution of goods on which ‘human dignity’
allegedly depends. As Catriona McKinnon argues in her chapter, contempo-
rary rights theorists seek to avoid turning them into a wish list of all good
things. Thus, more sophisticated versions of this approach to the rule of law
aim simply at delineating a narrowly ‘political’ conception of justice.4 As
we shall see, the two accounts discussed here differ also from these versions.
Naturally, both accept that legal rules and political arrangements give rise
to rights, but neither takes them as their starting point. Limits of space pre-
vent giving chapter and verse of their critique of rights-based theories.
Instead, I shall focus on the coherence of their positive claims to offer an alter-
native to theories centred on a set of constitutional rights that define and limit
the political sphere.
2 Hayek and the rule-like nature of law
Among contemporary political theorists, the rule of law has been closely asso-
ciated with the work of F. von Hayek, who gave it a pivotal role in his constitu-
tional theory. Hayek’s account developed out of a critique of economic
planning.5 He believed interventionist economic policies and totalitarian poli-
tics were intimately connected: the one entailed an incremental increase in
arbitrary interferences with individual liberty that ultimately led to the other.
To understand Hayek’s view of the rule of law, therefore, we must turn to his
contrast between planned and market economies and see why he identified the
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former with a legal-positivist view of law as ‘command’ and the latter with a
formal conception of law as the ‘rules of the game’.
Briefly, Hayek maintained that economic planning required God-like powers.
Planners would have to be omniscient, knowing on the one hand what con-
sumers actually wanted and what they might want if it was available, and on
the other how producers might best utilise existing resources not just to meet
existing demand but to create demand. They would then have to use this infor-
mation to fix prices. The problem in each case is that producers and consumers
not only engage in conceptual innovations but also respond to unpredictable
events of various kinds, such as changes in the supply of natural resources
resulting from unexpected disasters such as droughts. These innovations,
events and the responses they elicit are impossible to second-guess yet are con-
stantly altering the character of supply and demand. Since attempts to predict
the future are futile, planners end up arbitrarily imposing their views on others
and vainly trying to prevent any unplanned innovations or choices that might
upset their calculations. Even so, they lack the omnipotence required to pre-
cisely coordinate everyone’s activities to the plan. The result is a hopelessly
inefficient economy and an increasingly authoritarian state.
Hayek contended this foolhardy enterprise was encouraged by the misguided
belief in social justice and the doctrine of popular sovereignty. He interpreted
social justice as the conviction that an ideal distribution of goods existed,
whereby each individual’s needs and deserts could be determined by certain
rational criteria and the economy so planned that they were precisely met. As
we saw, he thought this state of affairs was impossible to achieve and entailed
severe restrictions on individual freedom. Democracy fostered and legitimated
the pursuit of this ideal. First, politicians would always be tempted to woo vot-
ers by offering to promote their sectional interests, while these demands could
be rendered generally acceptable by being presented as claims for social justice.
Second, popular sovereignty transferred the despotic authority of monarchs to
legislatures, with law whatever the duly elected government decreed. It thereby
became legitimate for governments to issue legally binding directives aimed at
pursuing certain policy goals.
Hayek maintained the democratic pursuit of social justice was gradually
moving western states along ‘the road to serfdom’. To question the legitimacy as
well as the economic advisability of such actions, he had to attack the concep-
tion of law on which they rested. In sum, he wished to claim that planning and
the pursuit of social justice infringed the ‘rule of law’. Hayek accepted that most
bureaucratic organisations, including the state apparatus, often operated on the
basis of commands issued by an executive. That was because they had clear
organisational goals. But the wider society had no common purposes of this
kind, just the very diverse and evolving ends of the individuals who composed
it. To make laws that could realise the ends of each individual would require the
same sort of God-like powers needed to plan the economy and involve similar
restrictions on individual liberty. The true role of law was to provide stable
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conditions in which individuals could choose for themselves which ends to pur-
sue without being arbitrarily interfered with by governments and other individ-
uals or arbitrarily interfering with others themselves. As he put it, the law
should operate like a Highway Code: it provides those rules of the road needed
for people to drive about with a reduced risk of accidents, not a set of orders
directing people where to go, when and how.6
Thus, Hayek thought the ‘rule of law’ involved precisely those features I iden-
tified at the start of this chapter: namely, it must offer a framework for human
interaction which neither regards law as whatever legislation has been duly
enacted nor attempts to promote a particular vision of the good society. It was
impossible to construct an ideal legal code aimed at achieving certain ends.
Rather, rules arose spontaneously through individuals trying to adapt to each
other and their environment. Rational appraisal involved weeding out poor
conventions through trial and error, not assessing their fit within a supposed
rational system of law. To continue the Highway Code analogy, it is custom
rather than a priori reasoning that determines whether one drives on the right
or left, and experiment that tends to fix the most appropriate speed limits. How-
ever, laws had to have certain formal features to avoid becoming instruments of
arbitrary power. They had to be universalisable, expressed in general terms and
apply equally to all (while taking into account relevant differences), be prospec-
tive (only invoking retroactivity as a curative measure), public (albeit often
through publicly funded experts), clear (avoiding vague terminology open to
wide discretionary interpretation) and relatively stable (but not so as to ossify).
Taken together, he believed these criteria would prevent ad hoc, discretionary
decision-making that was aimed at either benefiting or harming certain indi-
viduals or groups of persons. His claim was that their very generality and
abstractness meant that it was impossible to know how they might effect par-
ticular people. As a result, law-makers had an incentive to ensure legal rules
and procedures were as fair as possible and enacted solely for purposes requir-
ing collective agreements that were in the public interest. Hayek thought only
laws that protected the individual’s negative liberty were compatible with these
constraints because laws serving any other purpose would need to refer to par-
ticular persons, places or objects and treat some differently to others.
Although these rules give rise to rights, some of which – notably the standard
civil rights – he thought so important as to possibly warrant being given special
protection within a constitution, his argument was not right based. Conse-
quently, though Hayek saw judicial independence and review as vital for ensur-
ing the integrity of the law and preventing its arbitrary use or abuse by the
authorities, he was against the idea of an activist judiciary promoting certain
policies and obliging new laws to be passed through the creative interpretation
of constitutional rights. In other words, he favoured formal over substantive
judicial review. Otherwise, he feared the courts would lapse into acting like
a Hobbesian sovereign, issuing commands rather than merely ensuring con-
formity to the law. All the same, Hayek maintained constitutional checks on the
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legislature were necessary, since the chief cause of the expansion of command-
like law had been popular sovereignty. He suggested that as well as separating
the judicial, legislative and executive functions, as in the American system, one
should also separate the legislation needed to run the public administration
from law-making for the wider society and proposed the latter be assigned to a
representative body that was free from some of the perverse electoral pressures
that afflicted modern parliaments. The details of this ingenious scheme cannot
be gone into here.7 Instead, I shall concentrate on the coherence of his attempt
to distinguish formal, general rules from particular commands, and the contri-
bution this distinction makes to controlling arbitrary power.
Rules can reduce certain kinds of ad hoc and discretionary decision-mak-
ing in ways that remove some sources of uncertainty, insecurity and ineffi-
ciency. For example, the rule that one cannot be imprisoned for a crime that
has not been previously declared an offence in law and before the proper pro-
cedures for conviction have been followed, constrain the arbitrary power of a
government to gaol people it dislikes or finds troublesome. However, properly
passed and applied laws may still be harsh and unjust, even if they are not
completely capricious. True, the consistent application of unjust laws means
that one can often learn how to get around or avoid them. But consistency
also prevents sympathetic judges and officials quietly bending the rules to
avoid injustices. Similarly, rules can economise on the time and effort needed
for case-by-case decision-making, and will often guard against carelessness, a
lack of thoroughness or prejudice on the part of officials. Likewise, rules
increase visibility and accountability. If citizens know the rules, they can
ensure officials play by them. Rules can also embolden officials to make hard
decisions because they are simply applying the rule rather than making a per-
sonal judgement. Indeed, agreement on a fair procedural rule, such as major-
ity vote or first come first served, can often help us reach a decision in areas
where there is considerable substantive disagreement. In part, that’s because
the impersonality of rules involves a rough and ready form of equality and
fairness. Like the traditional image of justice, rules are ‘blind’ with regard to
their effects. Still, these same qualities also create difficulties. Rule-bound
decisions can become mechanical and unsuitable. Officials who stick to the
letter of the law rather than its spirit often appear obtusely or maliciously
oppressive, with an inflated view of their own importance. The very blindness
of rules to difference can render them inappropriate and inefficient or even
discriminatory. For example, small businesses often complain about being
subjected to the same regulations as large ones, and feminists have criticised
equal opportunities law for including a covert ‘male comparator test’ that
overlooks relevant differences such as pregnancy or the structural factors
that have relegated women to low-paid, casual employment. In such circum-
stances, transparency may be lost either by people surreptitiously evading or
bending certain rules, or by their devoting considerable effort to playing them
in ways that exchange form for substance.
124 The rule of law
chap 10  23/1/03  7:48 am  Page 124
In sum, rules guard against certain kinds of arbitrariness but embody other
kinds. Clearly, one could not imagine a legal system existing without some gen-
eral rules setting up judicial institutions and authorising particular agents and
agencies to adjudicate on certain matters according to a given set of proce-
dures. To be followable, laws will also need to possess various formal qualities
without which people would be unable to modify their behaviour so as to con-
form to them in consistent ways that others could reasonably rely on. In other
words, law to be law in any meaningful sense must have certain characteristics
to a given degree, much as a ball would not be a ball without a measure of
roundness and volume. But just as notions of ‘ballness’ do not tell you per se
whether it is a cricket or a rugby ball, so notions of ‘lawness’ or ‘legality’ do not
say anything about the purpose or content particular laws might have.
Law as such does eliminate many forms of arbitrary rule in ways that entail
equity and promote autonomy. Clarity, prospectiveness and regularity in the
law and the rules governing the processes that regulate it reduces the dangers
of social relationships and interactions being disrupted by unpredictable
changes in people’s behaviour. Formal rules provide a degree of stability and
certainty essential for fixing goals and working to achieve them. For example,
traffic laws give me a certain security when navigating the roads in my car, giv-
ing me a reasonable expectation that people will stop at red lights and so on.
And these laws would not work unless they applied equally to all and could not
be changed except by procedures designed to ensure everyone knew and could
abide by the reformed code. However, law can meet these formal criteria and
still embody dominating ends, including the institution of slavery.
Meanwhile, eliminating all discretion in applying the law or denying it any
purposeful content, as Hayek proposed, appear neither possible nor desirable.
Thus, traffic regulations have elements of generality to secure fairness and the
benefits of co-operation but are also determined in part by notions of expedi-
ency and various substantive purposes (for example, decisions about speed lim-
its and their enforcement, which usually allow for a number of exceptions for
emergency services, say). Hayek is no doubt right to observe that legislators
rarely set out to frame laws in formal terms per se. But that is because it would
be nonsensical to do so. They devise laws with certain ends in mind and then
give them a certain form in order to obtain the law-like characteristics which
enable these purposes to be achieved. Yet these purposes need not be that
benign and Hayek’s formal criteria fail to ensure that they will be.
These difficulties become apparent if we turn to Hayek’s two main claims
with regard to the ‘rule of law’ – that they will operate against redistribution
and economic planning while protecting liberty. Hayek’s problem is that there
are no particular purposes that cannot be framed within some general descrip-
tion that applies to them alone or be derived from some suitably designed gen-
eral rule. ‘All persons earning above £100,000 pay supertax’ is a general, equal
rule. Likewise, stable prices and plans announced well in advance may also be
consistent with a purely formal view of the rule of law. The point in such cases
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is whether these policies are socially or economically sound. Far from being
incompatible with the pursuit of social purposes, rules help promote them by
moving officials and citizens consistently towards that objective without the
need for continuous commands. If, as Hayek rightly insists, it would be impos-
sible to direct centrally all the activities of a complex society, it appears equally
problematic to employ solely abstract procedural norms possessing no refer-
ence to particular persons or sensitivity to local conditions. For example, Hayek
suggests that ‘measures designed to control the access to different trades and
occupations, the terms of sale, and the amounts to be produced and sold’ all
‘involve arbitrary discrimination against persons’ and so offend the rule of law
as he conceives it.8 Yet he immediately backtracks, admitting it is sensible to
ensure doctors are suitably qualified before being allowed to practise, pilots pass
eye tests, and even that sellers of firearms and poisons should be ‘persons satis-
fying certain intellectual and moral qualities’. In fact, most government regu-
lations – including much social legislation – arise not as part of a rational plan
but as responses to particular problems, being progressively modified through
the trial and error mechanism Hayek approves.
These problems prove even more acute in the case of liberty. Hayek’s central
contention is that ‘when we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules laid
down irrespective of their application to us, we are not subject to another’s will
and are therefore free’.9 At times, he appears to suggest that so long as everyone
is similarly affected by a rule, it is not aimed at anyone personally, and infrac-
tion is avoidable, then no coercion is involved. Law-givers do not know the par-
ticular cases where their rules will be applied and the judge is simply applying
that law. Consequently, law is like a natural obstacle. But this too leads to
absurdities. As Hamowy has observed,10 by these criteria a gangster-ridden
neighbourhood – being like a plague-infested swamp, neither aimed at me per-
sonally nor unavoidable – represents no limit on my freedom. This is a serious
problem given that his purely formal criteria not only offer no guidance as to
which rules should apply to what sorts of activity, but also are consistent with
all kinds of hidden or overt biases that can discriminate against particular
groups. Hayek partially acknowledged this difficulty in accepting that it can be
misguided to apply the same rules to everyone in all circumstances. Law fre-
quently discriminates on grounds of age or sex, for example. The key is to dis-
cover when such discrimination is reasonable or not. His response to this
problem is extremely suggestive: ‘Such distinctions will not be arbitrary’, he
wrote, ‘will not subject one group to the will of others, if they are equally recog-
nised as justified by those inside and those outside the group’.11 However, the appeal
here is to the test of the rule of law being less its formal qualities than its capac-
ity to evince reciprocity and, hence, obtain mutual assent from citizens. Equal-
ity before the law involves the content of legal rules taking everyone into
account and giving equal weight to different points of view. Put another way,
Hayek appears to be suggesting that law must reflect the general rather than
any particular will. The republican tradition, explored next, agrees, but argues
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achieving this result depends on the form of the legislative process more than
of the law.
3 Republicanism and the process of legislation
That a political system should constitute ‘an empire of laws and not of men’12
was a key tenet of the republican tradition, at least in the neo-Roman variant
of Cicero, Machiavelli and Harrington recently identified by Quentin Skinner
and Philip Pettit.13 However, republicans grasped the nettle posed by the para-
dox that only ‘men’ could bring about this condition and linked the rule of law
to democratic self-rule. Freedom from arbitrary rulers, who need not consult
the concerns of the ruled, only arises when the people make their collective
rules for themselves. To quote Harrington again, it is only when all are equal in
the making of the laws that they will be ‘framed by every private man unto no
other end (or they may thank themselves) than to protect the liberty of every
man’.14 Thus, the political system must allow the people, usually through their
representatives, to ensure the laws show them equal concern and respect. Leg-
islators must be obliged ‘to hear the other side’, displaying reciprocity and an
effort at mutual understanding to reach agreement on their collective interests
and the various respects in which people merit equal or unequal treatment.
Republicans trace arbitrariness and domination to asymmetries of power.
Given that any polity contains groups with conflicting interests and values,
power must be so divided that groups may check others – thereby forcing all
laws to be collectively negotiated and rendered mutually acceptable. The polit-
ical constitution must reflect the social complexion of the polity, balancing the
various groups in ways that prevent any one dominating another. Standard
devices have included bicameral legislatures operating different systems of rep-
resentation and various forms of federalism. It is the ‘mixed’ form of popular
government and the processes of negotiation it fosters rather than the form of
law itself that guards against the arbitrary use of power.
As we saw, Hayek voiced the standard liberal fear that popular sovereignty
merely transfers the potentially tyrannous powers of the Hobbesian sovereign
to electoral majorities. The equitable dispersal of power is designed to guard
against this possibility. On the republican view, all individuals must be free to
contest both the rules regulating social interaction and those governing how
these rules are determined. The purpose of such contestation is to ensure the
law serves only the public good – the res publica – rather than the factional inter-
ests of particular persons. The public good does not comprise only those goods
that de facto would be in every individual’s rational interest to have provided
publicly. In this case, those well provided for could always object to contributing
towards a similar provision for others. Even standard public goods might not
pass such a lowest common denominator test. In fact, such objections involve
a factionally motivated block on the pursuit of the public good. Rather, the
test is whether the law and the purposes it promotes are publicly justifiable. In
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accordance with the injunction that legislators should ‘hear the other side’,
such public justification entails the giving of reasons that are shareable by oth-
ers. Thus, common rules should not only treat all individuals as moral equals
capable of autonomous action, but also be attentive to the variety of circum-
stances in which they find themselves and the diverse forms of practical rea-
soning they adopt. To meet these criteria, legislators will have to drop purely
self-interested and self-referential reasoning and look for forms of argument
that other individuals constrained by a similar requirement for public justifica-
tion could accept.15 In other words, there will be an assumption that in evaluat-
ing laws we start by taking into account the effects of their general performance
for securing the various generic goods that one could expect individuals to value
in the different situations they find themselves. This assumption implies neither
that all are similarly situated nor that they value the same goods. On the con-
trary, it would exclude any such arguments that failed to heed the plight or con-
cerns of others and could not be plausibly shared. For example, self-serving
arguments by the prosperous that there could never be grounds for mutual
aid would be unlikely to pass this test. But it does require that arguments be
made in terms all could relate to. That requirement is consistent with groups
or individuals pointing out either how their peculiar circumstances create spe-
cial demands which would be felt by others in their place, or asking for special
recognition for their particular ideals by relating them to the views or claims of
others and justifications based on equal concern and respect.
As a result of these constraints, arguments will tend to have many of the for-
mal features of abstractness, generality and equality that Hayek associates with
the rule of law. However, they will operate in a less mechanical manner, allow-
ing the substance of the law to develop as people grow more appreciative of each
other’s diverse and evolving experiences and concerns. Arguably this logic has
operated to produce a number of the policies Hayek finds objectionable as well
as those he does not. Thus, much welfare legislation has arisen from acceptance
of equality of opportunity as a fair general principle, on the one hand, and an
enhanced sensitivity to the disadvantages encountered by people finding them-
selves in certain social circumstances, on the other. Likewise, if more con-
tentiously, multicultural arguments for group rights have often been based on
the claim that members of minority cultures are disadvantaged in parallel ways.
In these and similar cases, criticism of the existing law has frequently been tied
to a critique of the prevailing process for deciding it, with the demand for equal-
ity in the latter preceding improved equal recognition in the former. Indeed, it
may often be harder to get agreement on a fair resolution of a substantive issue
than a fair procedure for resolving it. However, proposed modifications to the
process must also be publicly justifiable. Standardly, such proposals are for
the extension of democratic decision-making to spheres where arbitrary rule
still prevails because it is not subject to public contestation, such as private cor-
porations, or for new styles of decision-making that allow significant differences
of experience to be taken into account, as in demands for various forms of
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devolution or the enfranchisement of excluded groups. But these proposals need
not turn on specific cases per se. Usually they appeal to reasons that similarly
situated others could share and, so, might be applied generally.
Obviously, all rules and political systems give rise to rights. But this argument
is not rights based. For rights and their application to particular cases must
themselves be specified through the process of public justification. Moreover,
rights, like the rules or procedures from which they flow, must be open to con-
testation. Nevertheless, it might be thought advisable to give certain rights spe-
cial constitutional protection as a prudential measure. However, this would be
consistent with having democratic procedures for reviewing them – albeit ones
that require a higher than usual threshold of agreement from various con-
stituencies for any change to pass. Meanwhile, in protecting such entrenched
rights, constitutional courts will also be obliged to base their interpretations of
their scope and bearing in particular cases on publicly justifiable reasons. Indeed,
a standard rationale for handing rights over to the courts is that the absence of
electoral pressures renders them more immune to self-interested bargaining
than legislatures. Yet the typically limited social range and experience of their
membership can also make them unaware or unresponsive to certain demands,
while a focus on particular cases can lead them to overlook knock on effects in
other areas of policy-making. My aim is not to settle this debate over the advisa-
bility of judicially protected bills of rights here, merely to indicate that arguments
for them have a procedural and democratic foundation in terms of their respon-
siveness to public justification and hence are amenable to criticism on those
grounds. In any case, we saw that all laws will need to have certain formal char-
acteristics to be followable and that having independent courts that ensure they
are consistently and equitably applied provides an important break on arbitrary
rule. As such, the judiciary plays a crucial role within a republican system.
Conclusion
The rule of law offers an indispensable defence against arbitrary rule. Formali-
ties with regard to legal processes and the law itself both secure certain benefits
in this regard, but are not decisive. The crucial elements are that law is not only
public in the sense of being followable, which Hayek’s formal criteria help
ensure, but also publicly justifiable, which republicans insist is the task of a
properly designed democratic system. Within this framework it then becomes
possible for people to debate the nature of the good society while devising both
the general laws required to further their collective interests and those particu-
lar ones needed to respect their differences.
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Introduction1
The public–private distinction is one of the ‘grand dichotomies’ of western
thought.2 The dichotomy has a complex history, which has generated numerous
formulations of the opposition between public and private, most of which still
inform contemporary understandings of the terms. In this context, subjecting
the public–private dichotomy to critique, as many feminists have done, will
inevitably also be a complex project. In this chapter I shall survey contemporary
understandings of the public–private distinction and feminist critiques of these.
I shall then consider recent feminist moves to go beyond critique, which entail
attempts to de-gender the dichotomy, to reconceive the public and the private
spheres, and to deconstruct the dichotomy itself. Together these attempts to
reconceive the public and the private indicate that it is helpful to retain and
rework the concepts, but that they are better understood as different modes of
interaction rather than as separate spheres.
1 Differing definitions of public and private
There is no single public–private distinction. Political theorists tend to acknowl-
edge two broad traditions for distinguishing between the public and the private
– the classical and the liberal. While both the classical and the liberal traditions
share a common emphasis on the importance of a public–private distinction,
the nature of the distinction is profoundly different in each.
The public–private distinction is usually cast within liberal discourses as a
distinction between market and state. It is standardly interpreted as a govern-
mental, non-governmental distinction among neo-classical economists, whose
primary concern is to demarcate the sphere of the ‘public’ authority of the state
from the sphere of voluntary relations between ‘private’ individuals in the mar-
ket. By contrast, the distinction is cast within the classical traditions as an oppo-
sition between oikos – the domestic sphere of production and reproduction
inhabited by women and slaves, and polis – where the public is also equated with
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distinction), but the politics of discussions, deliberation, collective decision-
making and action in concert.3 Although liberal discourses have frequently
claimed to supplant the classical distinction, they have in practice incorporated
many of its elements. As a result, much of the ambiguity surrounding the pub-
lic–private distinction derives from the fact that two different traditions of polit-
ical thought are at work in the public–private distinction.
The complexity does not stop there, however, for liberal discourses also fre-
quently invoke a romantic tradition as well. Will Kymlicka suggests that there
are two different conceptions of the public–private distinction at work within
liberalism: the state–civil society distinction and the social–personal distinc-
tion. In the first, civil society is private in the sense that it is not governed by the
public power of the state. In the second, which arises later than the first and in
some ways may be viewed as a response to it, the personal is private in that it
represents a sphere of intimacy to which one might retreat in face of the pres-
sures to conform within society. These two combined create a tripartite, rather
than a dual, division of social relations: the state, civil society and the personal.4
It is clear that the state is always cast as public. It is equally clear that the per-
sonal (when considered within political theory) is cast as private. Confusingly,
civil society is cast as private when opposed to the state, and public when
opposed to the personal.
In an attempt to highlight the ambiguity concerning the place of the domes-
tic in relation to contemporary understandings of the private, feminist theorists
have demanded the explicit recognition of yet another public–private distinc-
tion. Neither of the liberal distinctions explicitly invokes the family (which can-
not be assumed to be synonymous with the personal sphere of intimacy). By
contrast, a third form of the public–private distinction opposes the public, com-
prising both the state and civil society, with the private, defined institutionally
as the relations and activities of domestic life. The intriguing and politically sig-
nificant issue, which feminist theory draws attention to, is the fact that con-
temporary liberal theory nowhere explicitly theorises the relation between this
third articulation of the public–private dichotomy and either of the other two.
For some feminist theorists this neglect renders the entire liberal project sus-
pect. Had the family been viewed as a part of civil society, liberal theorists would
surely have been compelled to oppose its hierarchical form and argue for its
organisation on the basis of equality and consent as they did with all other
forms of civil co-operation.
In response, feminists have tended to label the domestic as private and all else
– civil society, government, political deliberation, sociability – as public. The
public becomes simply a residual category.5 This is not quite a return to the pub-
lic–private dichotomy of the classical tradition. For while the private did equate,
in the work of Aristotle for example, with the household (or oikos), the public
was equated specifically with the polis – a sphere for the practice of citizenship.
In the feminist articulation of the divide the account of the private is similar,
and fundamentally at odds with accounts of the private within the liberal
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tradition, but the account of the public is much less theorised and much more
eclectic. It frequently entails not only the notion of the polis, but also civil soci-
ety, and the state. Dichotomous thinking is reproduced within many feminist
critiques of the public–private dichotomy, which offer yet another articulation
of the nature of the oppositional identities under consideration when we speak
of public and private. In this way, some feminist critiques of the public–private
dichotomy appear to have gelled into simply another articulation of the
dichotomy, to add to the others already in play.
Critiques of the public–private distinction must be unravelled then to disag-
gregate the various strands within these dichotomous discourses. In many
respects feminist theorists have been particularly attuned to the operation of
this ambiguity: they have focused attention on the incompatibility of the two
notions of the private commonly adopted. The liberal tradition depicts a private
sphere of voluntary relations between free and equal individuals. The classical
tradition offers a private sphere of natural inequality between master and slave,
parent and child, husband and wife. Numerous feminist texts have shown how
the application of a liberal conception of the private to the domestic sphere has
worked to shield the abuse and domination that occurs within it, while the
classical conception has worked to justify and perpetuate it. In practice, the
ambiguity between these two conceptions of the private has worked to the ben-
efit of patriarchal norms, not women. It is for this reason that many feminists
have taken the operation of the public–private dichotomy to be essential to
understanding women’s oppression.
2 Feminist critiques of the public–private distinction
The feminist literature on the public–private distinction has focused primarily
on critiquing the liberal formulation of the public–private distinction. These
critiques fall into three broad strands, of which the first criticises the premises
of liberalism as being androcentric, the second criticises the extent to which
elements of the classical tradition are imported into the liberal model of social
contract theory and the third criticises the actual patriarchal practices of ‘lib-
eral’ regimes. While the first of these feminist critiques directly rejects the
liberal conception of the public–private distinction, the second suggests that
liberalism has been compromised in its theoretical formulation by the importa-
tion of classical or patriarchal norms, and the third suggests that, although
the public–private distinction proposed by liberalism may in theory be gender-
neutral, liberal regimes have in practice worked against the interests of women.
The first critique focuses on the question of subjectivity, claiming the liberal
discourse of individual autonomy to be prescriptive rather than descriptive;
structuring, rather than simply reflecting, social relations. The liberal theory of
the self, as a rational individual engaged in abstract moral reasoning with
strong ego boundaries, is not a neutral description of human nature; rather it
is part of a discourse that constructs individuals in this image.6 Recognition of
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this fact leads to two further insights. The first is that very particular social
structures and institutions are needed to shape individuals into this mould; the
second is that this conception of subjectivity may not apply equally to everyone.
The first insight leads to a concern with the processes of reproduction, nurtu-
rance and socialisation – those material processes which construct people as
autonomous individuals.7 These are processes which have conventionally been
located within the family and so hidden by the liberal construction of the pub-
lic–private distinction as a state–civil society distinction. The second insight
leads to an exploration of the extent to which women have been understood
as subordinate, dependent and emotional, and so excluded from the category
of ‘individuals’ within liberal theorising.8 The discourse that privileges
autonomous reasoning as distinctly human has generally assumed women to
be incapable of such rationality, and so not properly deserving of the rights
granted to individuals by the liberal state. These two issues are linked in
women’s status as primary carers. Neither the process of caring and nurturing
nor the status of carers and nurturers are theorised in liberal theory. The con-
cern of feminist theorists is that, as a result of this omission, not only have
women been denied the rights and privileges granted to the ‘rational individu-
als’ of liberal societies, but also that a crucial aspect of life, associated with the
caring performed by women, has been glossed over. This insight has implica-
tions not only for the role of caring as a practice, but also for its role as a per-
spective. The significance of caring, as both practice and perspective has
generated a large feminist literature on the ‘ethic of care’.9
This critique of the public–private distinction is complemented by a second,
which focuses on contract. Here the object of concern is not the rational liberal
individual, but liberalism’s origins in social contract theory. This contract-based
critique places the subjectivity-based critique in historical context. The focus here
is the particular social and political forces that created the situation in which
women were confined to a private, domestic, care-taking role while men were pre-
sumed to be able to move freely between the private (domestic) and the public (civil
society and state) spheres. The most influential theorist here is Carole Pateman.
She claims that the social contract that generates liberal politics and establishes
the political freedom of individuals simultaneously entails the sexual subordina-
tion of women in marriage.10 The social contract that is required to create both
civil society and the state requires a sexual contract to accommodate the patriar-
chalism that pre-dates liberalism. The liberal social contact therefore represents
the reorganisation, but not the abolition, of patriarchy. Patriarchy was relocated
into the private domain and reformulated as complementary to civil society.
Moreover, gender is given a highly specific and structuring role within liberal
theory at the same time as liberal theory presents itself as gender-neutral. As
Pateman influentially suggested: ‘Precisely because liberalism conceptualises
civil society in abstraction from ascriptive domestic life, the latter remains “for-
gotten” in theoretical terms. The separation between private and public is thus re-
established as a division within civil society itself, within the world of men.’11
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These first two critiques suggest that a holistic rejection of the liberal model
of the public–private distinction is needed. It is not just contingent bias in the
application of the liberal model that is at fault; the very model is constituted by
its exclusion of the dependent, emotional and caring relations that are taken to
characterise family relations, and those who are primarily defined by their rela-
tion to these – women. By contrast, the third critique of the public–private
distinction that emerges within feminist theory is basically supportive of liber-
alism, seeking only to rid it of patriarchal distortions.
This third critique of the public–private dichotomy, articulated most clearly
by Susan Moller Okin, focuses on the historical practice of liberal regimes. It
might best be characterised as a weak or limited form of the second, rather than
an alternative to it. The charge here is that, notwithstanding the abstract com-
mitment to the importance of a prohibition on state intervention in the private
sphere, liberal states have in practice regulated and controlled the family.12 Not
only has this practice been contrary to the fundamental principle of liberalism,
it has been adopted in pursuit of a profoundly illiberal end: the perpetuation of
patriarchy. While the state adopted this directly non-neutral relation to per-
sonal and domestic life, it also upheld practices within the marketplace, which
presumed that those engaged in waged-work could rely on the support and care
of someone at home. To add to the insult, from the perspective of women, the
principle of non-intervention in the private sphere has been used by the state to
justify inaction regarding cases of child abuse, marital rape and domestic vio-
lence. As Zillah Eisenstein has pointed out: ‘The state is said to be public (by def-
inition) and therefore divorced from the private realm, which is the area of
women’s lives. The state can appear through its own ideology, to be unrelated
to the family as the private sphere, when in actuality this sphere is both defined
and regulated in relation to the state realm.’13 In short, liberal states have actu-
ally enforced patriarchal power relations within the family, while formally
denying their responsibility to intervene in familial disputes on the grounds
that it is essential to limit state intervention in civil society and personal rela-
tions. This tension, arising from the very formulation of liberalism itself, is the
inevitable conclusion of the ambivalent role of the family in relation to the pri-
vate sphere. It emerges as a result of the way in which liberal discourses con-
cerning the public–private distinction inconsistently incorporate classical and
patriarchal discourses into their own.14
All three critiques have effectively highlighted the tension running through
contemporary conceptions of the public–private distinction, a tension that
grows out of the simultaneous appeal to the classic notion of the private as a
sphere of repetitive, domestic drudgery, and the liberal notion of the private as a
sphere of unconstrained individual liberty. The critical contribution of the fem-
inist engagement with this dichotomy is to focus on the extent to which women
have been made to carry the burden of this tension. While men were encouraged
to view the domestic as a sphere of personal privacy (a particular combination
of the two liberal distinctions – state–civil society and social–personal), women
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have frequently experienced it as a sphere of constraint and oppression (a man-
ifestation of a classical, or patriarchal, distinction). The two sexes were appar-
ently living different manifestations of the dichotomy simultaneously. Yet,
importantly, both were subsumed within a liberalism that played with the ambi-
guity to its own benefit. Liberalism, Diana Coole notes ‘tends to hold a schizoid
attitude toward the private realm as civil society and domestic sphere, modern
and traditional, masculine and feminine, individualist and familial, contractual
and natural ... Although its inconsistencies are theoretically unsatisfying, in the
economy of gender power, they permit an entirely functional flexibility’.15
Taken together, these three feminist critiques of the public–private distinc-
tion draw attention to the way in which the liberal notion still incorporates an
earlier classic notion of the public–private distinction as a division between the
political sphere and a pre-political natural sphere of the home. They differ in
that the second feminist critique (advocated by Pateman) views this incorpora-
tion as defining of liberalism itself, while the third feminist critique (advocated
by Okin) views the incorporation as inconsistent with liberalism. They concur
though in the assessment that, to the extent that women are part of this home
world they become, like slaves, the unacknowledged preconditions of the male
public world of autonomous individuals.
Notwithstanding their differences, feminist approaches to the public–private
dichotomy have collectively made three related points. First, most mainstream
political theorists have ignored the domestic sphere; second, the public–private
distinction is deeply gendered, operating as a discourse that legitimates the
assignment of men and women to different spheres of life (which has been par-
ticularly oppressive for women, who have conventionally been assigned to a
domestic sphere that – as the first point suggests – has been marginalised within
political discourses); third, by classifying the family as private, the public–private
distinction has frequently worked to shield abuse and domination within familial
relations, placing them beyond political scrutiny or legal intervention.16
Given these critiques, the challenge is to understand how some views of the
public–private distinction have oppressed women and to reconstruct, if possi-
ble, another understanding of the distinction which does not.
3 Re-theorising public and private
In this context, feminist theorists have turned towards the project of reconcep-
tualising the public and private in new, less gendered ways. There is evidence
that the feminist literature on the public–private distinction takes one beyond
critique to prescription. Indeed some have suggested that a single alternative
feminist model of the public–private distinction has emerged. A recent typology
of public–private distinctions proposes four major ways in which the
public–private distinction is currently used: the liberal-economistic approach,
which focuses on a distinction between state administration and the market
economy; the republican-virtue approach, which sees the public realm in terms
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of political community, distinct from both the market and the administrative
state; the anthropological approach, which focuses on the public realm as a
sphere of fluid and polymorphous sociability; and the feminist approach, which
conceives of the distinction as one between the family and the larger economic
and political order.17 Within this typology feminist critiques become a feminist
approach, offering its own normative endorsement of the distinction between
public and private.
Yet one need not endorse this ‘feminist approach’ in order to find one or all of
the critiques valuable. One can point out the extent to which the public–private
distinction has been drawn upon to justify inaction in ‘private’ affairs such as
marital rape and domestic violence, without suggesting that this discourse has
any significance in theorising what constitutes a just distribution of benefits
and burdens in the social world today. Indeed, a closer inspection of the femi-
nist attempts to re-theorise the public–private distinction reveals three distinct
strategies rather than a single model. These are first, the de-gendering of the
values associated with the public and the private; second, the reconceptualisa-
tion of either the public or the private, or both; and third, the deconstruction of
the dichotomy itself.18
In contrast to the early feminist slogan that ‘the personal is political’, theo-
rists advocating both the first and second strategies surveyed here are unified in
their endorsement of the importance of maintaining some form of distinction
between the public and the private. Okin, for instance suggests that ‘there are
some reasonable distinctions to be made between the public and domestic
spheres’ and Pateman acknowledges that ‘the personal is the political’ is merely
a slogan, which should not obscure the fact that different criteria ought to order
our interactions as citizens and as ‘friends and lovers’.19 These strategies
attempt ‘to break down the rigid demarcation between public and private with-
out obliterating the distinction between these two domains’.20 Accepting the
normative desirability of a public–private distinction, theorists worked to first
disentangle gender discourses from the dichotomy, then to reconsider the
nature of the two entities, public and private, that might best constitute the de-
gendered dichotomy. Much of this thinking is implicitly informed by a desire to
reclaim the second liberal-romantic conception of the private as a sphere of
intimacy, in the face of the dominance of an ambiguous alliance between the
conceptions of the private sphere as a sphere of domestic oppression (and with
the classical conception) or of civil contract (as with the first liberal concep-
tion). By contrast, the third attempt to rethink the public and private would
deconstruct the continued pertinence of the distinction itself.
The first attempt to rethink the public and private focuses on the importance
of de-gendering the separate spheres. This approach focuses on the second of
the general claims made within the feminist critiques of the distinction, namely,
that the public–private distinction is deeply gendered, operating as a discourse
that legitimates the assignment of men and women to different spheres of life.
An important strategy for undermining the gendered nature of the distinction
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has involved challenging the idea that women have actually always been con-
fined to the ‘private’ realm. To accept this claim (even if only to criticise the neg-
ative effect that it has had on women), is to perpetuate a patriarchal discourse
rather than destabilise it. The reality has always been more complex than this.
Working-class women, for example, have rarely been afforded the luxury of
remaining entirely within the home.21
In addition to producing alternative historical narratives which explore the
complexity of male and female relations to the public and private spheres
(thereby destabilising the binary narratives that help perpetuate women’s con-
finement to the private), many feminists have urged reforms that would facili-
tate women’s actual increased participation in the public sphere. The ambition
here is to allow women access to the participatory political sphere of positive
freedom and public recognition along with men. Betty Friedan, for example,
saw women’s confinement to the private sphere as the source of ‘the problem’
and encouraged their entry into the public sphere of professional employment
and political engagement as the source of their liberation. In so doing, she
accepted and reinforced prevailing understandings of the private as natural
drudgery and the public as the site of human achievement. Friedan accepted
the notion of the private sphere as oppressive, and suggested that women
escape its confines as men have done rather than advocating men participate
in it more.22
By contrast, the second attempt to rethink the public and private focuses on
the construction of the spheres themselves, not just the gender of their occu-
pants. As part of this broad project feminist theorists have proposed revised
conceptualisations of both the private and the public spheres. Susan Moller
Okin focuses on the failure of liberal states to extend the principles of justice
to the private sphere as the problem, and locates the resolution in an extension
of liberal rights to domestic and familial relations. She advocates granting
women the rights of negative liberty within the private sphere already claimed
by men. Her suggestion is that the liberal notion proper of privacy, as repre-
sented by John Stuart Mill’s view of the sphere where you can think freely and
not be interfered with, has value if agents are in a position to be able to use that
privacy constructively. Nonetheless, she accepts a threefold definition of the
private sphere as a place for intimate relations with others, a space where one
can temporarily shed one’s public roles and as a means of securing the time
alone to develop one’s creativity.23 In order to realise this ideal she proposes an
extension of the principles of liberal justice, already applied to the realm of
civil society, to the domestic realm. One could then reclaim and de-gender the
liberal conception of privacy, ridding it of its contingent incorporation of non-
liberal traditions.24
Similarly Jean Bethke Elshtain depicts the private sphere as a potential sphere
of intimate human relations protected from the influence of the political25 and
Iris Marion Young proposes a definition of the private as, ‘that aspect of his or
her life and activity that any person has the right to exclude from others’.26
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There is, in these texts, a shared commitment to maintaining a private sphere
which is equally realisable for both men and women and a clear acknowledge-
ment that any such sphere will be socially constituted and historically contin-
gent. These writings attempt to reclaim the concept of privacy, endorsing its
normative value while distancing it from a geographical location within the
domestic sphere. However, various issues remain unresolved in these revision-
ings. For example, it is unclear whether one can maintain an idea of private
affairs which is socially and politically decided without that idea also being
‘institutional’ in some sense. Moreover, this recovered notion of privacy may be
dissociated from the family and the domestic and may not be overtly spatial, but
it could well continue to be restrictive in the sense that what one has a ‘right to
exclude from others’ will be decided by the community, or the powerful group-
ings within it.
In addition to these attempts to map out new, de-gendered conceptions of the
private, various new articulations of the public have also recently emerged.
Whereas the reconceived models of the private sphere tend to appeal to a liberal
tradition, many of the reconceived models of the public sphere have been influ-
enced by Jürgen Habermas’s work. His major contribution was to isolate the
public sphere as a structure within civil society in which he locates ‘the politi-
cal’, which is distinguished from both the narrow conception of politics as the
state and a wider notion of the political as power relations.27 This conception of
a public sphere is characterised by the institutionalisation of the ideal of equal-
ity, the existence of rational communication and deliberation on issues of gen-
eral significance. Many feminist theorists have criticised this model for being
overly universalistic and so suppressing concrete difference, which has the
effect of marginalising women from the public.28 Yet several aim to revise and
‘feminise’ this vision of the public sphere rather than reject it.29 Iris Young, for
example, proposes a more heterogeneous public, open to ‘bodily and affective
particularity’.30 Her suggestion is that the public should be open and accessible,
which will require the rejection of the tradition of Enlightenment republican-
ism that, in aspiring to the ‘common good’, inevitably submerges particularity.
If public spaces are to be inclusive, Young maintains, they must promote the
positive recognition of differences of perspective, experience and affiliation. The
distinction between public and private is maintained, but its association with
distinct institutions or human attributes is firmly rejected.31
This second type of attempt to rethink the public–private distinction covers a
wide range of theoretical perspectives (liberal, republican and postmodern).
What binds these together as a group is the determination to retain a distinction
between, newly reworked, conceptions of public and private. This commitment
stands in contrast to an earlier feminist tendency to adopt an over-inclusive
notion of the public as all that is non-domestic, including civil society, the mar-
ket economy and the political realm. It also contrasts with a more recent ten-
dency to reject the public–private distinction altogether – which characterises
the third perspective to be considered.
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The third strategy draws on a general deconstructive challenge to dichoto-
mous thinking. Such thinking entails an accepted opposition between two iden-
tities, which are hierarchically ordered, where this pair is held to define the
whole.32 In other words, it generates two polarised terms, one of which is
defined by its not being the other, such that the secondary status of the subor-
dinate term is a condition for the possibility of the dominant one. These two
terms are assumed to constitute a whole, not simply parts of an open-ended
plurality. The deconstruction of dichotomies, revealing the ways in which each
side of a binary division implies and reflects the other, is one of the central
methodological devices of an increasingly prevalent theoretical approach, now
highly influential within feminist theory.33
Those who adopt this third approach to the public–private distinction high-
light the extent to which previous critiques have reinforced the notion that
there actually is a dichotomy at work. When Pateman famously asserted that
the public–private dichotomy is ‘ultimately, what the feminist movement is
about’,34 she may have actually entrenched the apparent dichotomy between
public and private by accepting its status as a binary divide. More recently, the-
orists have begun to question this assumption.
Joan Scott, for example, suggests that: ‘It makes no sense for the feminist
movement to let its arguments be forced into pre-existing categories and its
political disputes to be characterised by a dichotomy we did not invent.’35 And
Coole argues that ‘a dichotomous cartography looks both anachronistic and
complicit’.36 Public and private are consistently presented through a series of
spatial metaphors, each space defined by not being its other. Moreover, ‘such
spaces are normatively interpreted ... on the basis of certain metaphysical
judgements about what it means to excel as a human subject’.37 Although the
metaphor is a spatial one, there is a disciplinary project embedded within it: ‘the
location and permeability of this boundary, as well as the association of the
spaces it divides with particular groups or qualities, is not about geography, but
power’.38 Both activities and populations are spatially distributed, disciplined by
the normative hierarchy of spaces.
Following the achievement of women’s right to vote and stand for election,
the rise of ‘girl power’ and the feminisation of the workforce, Coole suggests, it
is simply not clear that women are any longer primarily confined to, or associ-
ated with, the private sphere. Moreover, in the context of diversity politics it is
increasingly problematic to assume that ‘women’ as a coherent category have
any single and stable relation to spheres of life: ‘Not only are women themselves
seen to be differentially distributed across a series of spaces, due to their com-
plex identities, but it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain that gender is
the privileged index of spatial politics.’39 In the context of the increasing mobil-
ity and visibility of populations following new technological developments, it is
perhaps no longer remotely realistic to maintain a commitment to privacy as a
spatially guaranteed phenomenon. As Peter Steinberger recognises, feminist
writers ‘have demonstrated, beyond any doubt, that the idea of a separate and
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distinct sphere of privacy is indeed an ideological distortion, incompatible with
our moral institutions and inconsistent with the realities of a complex, highly
differentiated society’.40
This third approach is committed, like the first, to deconstructing the appar-
ently natural correlation between women and the private sphere, men and the
public sphere. It is also committed, like the second, to deconstructing the cur-
rent dominant binary dualism between public and private. But, unlike the other
two, this third approach would deconstruct the pertinence of the dichotomy
itself, suggesting that not only patriarchal, but also feminist articulations of the
dichotomy are both anachronistic and disciplinary.
Despite the diversity among the proposals to reconstruct the meaning and
significance of the public and private, the second group of theorists nonethe-
less maintain a dichotomous framework and a language of binary spheres. The
danger, as Coole points out, is that, ‘because feminism is so closely identified
with the language of public and private ... we might carry on using it in a situ-
ation where it is no longer empirically relevant or politically useful’.41
Conclusion
Feminist engagement with the public–private dichotomy has resulted in innu-
merable positive contributions to political theory and practice. On the theoret-
ical level, the most significant contribution has been the uncovering of the
place of the domestic within mainstream political theory. Inverting the stand-
point of the observer, feminist theorists looked out from the domestic sphere
and asserted that the liberal insistence on labelling civil society as private had
the effect of hiding the very existence of the domestic.
Most of the feminist writing on public and private has worked to undermine
the stability of the dichotomy in that it has uncovered the historical contin-
gency of any distinction between the public and the private, and has drawn
attention to the ambiguities arising from the co-existence of several distinct
articulations of the distinction within contemporary discourses. However, it is
possible that this writing has become complicit in the perpetuation of the
dichotomous thinking that surrounds debates about public and private.
Phillips suggests that the public–private dichotomy ‘was early identified as
the crucial underpinning to patriarchal political thought’.42 This has been the
received wisdom about the public–private dichotomy within feminist theory for
a number of years. But this new orthodoxy stands in need of disturbance. We
should question ‘whether it still makes sense ... for feminists to privilege this
particular spatial division’ if ‘this particular map of gendered space is becom-
ing anachronistic due to changing topography’.43 Were more attention to be
paid to the differences between individual autonomy and small-group intimacy,
between state administration, market economy, political community and urban
sociability, the pertinence of a binary image of spheres would lessen and new
explorations in plural spheres might emerge.44 Dispensing with the language of
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dichotomous spheres would allow for either a fuller exploration of the notion of
multiple separate spheres, or the rejection of spatial metaphors altogether
allowing for a greater focus on the meaning of privacy and publicness, disen-
tangled from the prejudices of geographic tradition.
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Introduction
The background (though most emphatically not the topic) of this discussion is
the liberal/communitarian debate. Many believe that debate has now run its
course, but it has left an indelible mark on the way that perennial questions
about the relations between individual and community are framed. In this
chapter I attempt to articulate the idea of one kind of community, pertinent to
social and political questions, which is present in many areas of actual human
life. In section 1 I discuss the general idea of community, then offer and explore
a specific conception of community as collective agency. In section 2 I suggest
that membership of a collective agency raises, but does not of itself settle,
important questions about loyalty, allegiance and dissociation. In section 3 I
suggest that the existence of collective agencies casts doubt on the adequacy of
the doctrine of the distinctness of persons.
1 Community and collective agency
The concept of community is a protean one. At its broadest it applies simply to
a number of individuals who share something in common. But what they
share in common, and indeed how the idea of sharing is to be understood, are
matters for further elaboration. For example, they may constitute a commu-
nity by virtue of sharing the same physical location: in that sense, the squire and
the peasant may belong to the same community though in other important
respects they stand in relations of separation and even opposition. By contrast,
people talk of the gay community or a linguistic community, where the indi-
viduals who compose that community may be spatially separated and
unknown to one another. Presumably, what underlies the idea of community
in the non-spatial sense is some notion of common or shared interests. That in
its turn would have to be distinguished from a community involving not merely
shared interests but, as it is often put, shared meanings and understandings.
Charles Taylor suggests:
12
Community: individuals acting together
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Common meanings are the basis of community. Inter-subjective meaning gives
people a common language to talk about social reality and a common understand-
ing of certain norms, but only with common meanings does this common reference
world contain significant common actions, celebrations and feelings. These are
objects in the world that everybody shares. This is what makes community.1
The idea of community can also vary depending on whether we think of the
individual as belonging to one overarching community or to a series of commu-
nities. It has been a matter of contention whether communitarianism insinu-
ates the idea that there is just one relevant community in which an individual
is located.2 I do not attempt to settle that question. Some communitarians cer-
tainly acknowledge the fact of multiple and conflicting communities (as they
must). Sandel, for example, says ‘There is no such thing as “the society as a
whole” . . . Each of us moves in an indefinite number of communities’.3 But it
is another matter whether that explicit acknowledgement is accompanied,
either in Sandel’s or in others’ case, by the acknowledged fact’s playing an
appropriately prominent role in subsequent thinking.4
Once the existence of multiple communities is acknowledged, questions arise
about the priority among them. Amitai Etzioni has argued for layered loyalties
‘divided between commitment to one’s immediate community and to the more
encompassing community, and according priority to the overarching one on
key select matters’.5 But it may be less than clear which community counts as
the overarching one. Neera Badhwar says that she ‘will follow communitarian
practice in using “society”, “nation”, “state”, and “political community” inter-
changeably’.6 In a discussion of state authority which is pertinent for considera-
tions of community, Joseph Raz says ‘Throughout the discussion I refer
interchangeably to the state, which is the political organization of a society, its
government, the agent through which it acts, and the law, the vehicle through
which much of its power is exercised’.7 But since these different terms refer to dis-
tinct institutions, that raises problems about priority. What if a government has
acted illegally, for example? What if the actions of the state are inimical to the
interests of the nation? What if the state represents some sectional interest rather
than the interests of the whole society? In these circumstances it will be a matter
of deep contention what is required for according priority to the overarching com-
munity, because it will be contentious which community is the overarching one.
‘Community’, then, can be used for a variety of different purposes, to pick out
different phenomena in our life as social creatures: shared location, shared
interests, shared meanings and understandings, and so on.8 In the midst of
these varying conceptions of community, there is no point in being essentialist
or prescriptive: in what follows I attempt to isolate and characterise one form of
community which is highly salient in the social and political lives of individuals,
and to indicate what follows from its existence for some of the issues which were
at stake in the liberal/communitarian debate. The form of community in ques-
tion is a collective agency: what its members share in common is participation in
collective action.
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Sometimes the actions of individual human beings are best seen as part of
some collective action. For example, I may join a number of other people in col-
lectively pushing a broken-down car. The most appropriate and informative
description of what I am doing will make reference to the fact that I am acting
with others in this way. In this kind of case, there is little conceptual distance
between individual and collective action. Each of us individually is attempting
to do that very same thing which all of us collectively succeed in doing. Often,
moreover, the collection of people involved will be an ad hoc one which dis-
solves after the task in hand has been achieved. But it is a significant contingent
fact about the world we inhabit that there are collective agencies of a more per-
sistent and distinctive character.
Consider two examples of more persistent and distinctive collective agencies
(rather special examples, as it will turn out). I may be not merely kicking a ball
around a field but playing in a football team. Or I may be not just playing a clar-
inet but participating in an orchestral performance. Collective agencies like
football teams and orchestras typically exist over a period of time and engage in
a whole series of related actions – in other words, they persist in a way that, typ-
ically, a collection of car-pushers does not. Connected to that persistence is the
further fact that the collective agency can survive a change in its constituent
membership. Particular individuals come and go but the team or the orchestra
goes on. Moreover, these collective agencies are distinctive in that what they do
is distinct from what their individual constituents do: it is only the collective
agent, the team, which wins a match and is awarded points for doing so; it is
only the orchestra which produces an orchestral performance. (Indeed, one
reason why these examples are special is that these collective agencies do things
which it would be conceptually impossible for individuals to do.)
I shall refer to collective agencies which exhibit these properties of persist-
ence and distinctiveness as CAs.9 They have an ineliminable presence in our
social world, in that we cannot say all that we need to say about that world with-
out referring to them. We may insist that a team’s or an orchestra’s playing is
just a matter of a number of individuals acting in various ways, and in a sense
this is true. But it is a matter of their doing things as members of that entity, and
something important is left out of any description of their activities which does
not make that clear. There is, then, a certain kind of irreducibility and priority
here: our best descriptions of the social world will contain irreducibly collective
terms, and there will be a portion of individuals’ behaviour where an adequate
description will require prior reference to the collective agency in which they
are acting. Whether any kind of ontological or moral priority attach to CAs are
further questions.10 Our social world contains many instances of CAs as
described here. Committees, neighbour associations, trade unions, churches,
electorates, governments, classes, business corporations, for example, all
exhibit the characteristics of persistence and distinctiveness of action. They do
things which individuals do not, they possess resources which individuals do
not, and their existence is recognised in law.
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Collective agencies, communities of individuals sharing collective action,
will often be co-extensive with communities of individuals sharing some of the
different characteristics mentioned earlier, such as shared location, shared
interests, shared meanings and understandings. But for any given CA it will be
an open question whether it possesses all or any of these other characteristics.
Thus, a CA may consist of individuals located in the same place or it may not:
a team does, but a trade union does not. Similarly, a CA may consist of individ-
uals sharing a common interest or it may not: The National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People does, but a court does not.11 Most importantly,
and least easily seen, a CA may consist of shared meanings and understandings
in the way described earlier or it may not.
The point is not easily seen because shared meanings and understandings are
certainly necessary for the collective actions of some CAs, such as teams and
orchestras, to take place at all. A team’s winning is an ‘institutional fact’. There
are rules which specify what counts as winning, and without those rules winning
is not possible at all. The fact that Team X won, unlike the fact that the sun is 93
million miles from the earth, depends on a complicated set of attitudes taken up
by the agents involved.12 (That is a further respect in which the cases of teams and
orchestras are special.) But not all collective agency will have this character:
there is also a phenomenon which might be called hidden collective agency.
This may also be introduced by example. A number of individuals may form
a clique. (Perhaps they all went to the same school or belong to the same leisure
interest club.) They interact in ways which have an excluding effect on others:
they make allusions which they, but not others, immediately recognise; they
anticipate each other’s reactions as others cannot; they share a history and a
set of attitudes which others do not. The consequence is that non-members of
the clique cannot engage in social exchange in the same way, and feel a general
sense of exclusion. Now this phenomenon exhibits the following features of the
original examples of collective agency: the entity is a continuing one rather
than an ad hoc one lasting only briefly; we may assume that it can persist while
some (or over a period perhaps even all) of its constituents change; and it does
something distinctive which its individual members do not. (Indeed, perhaps
the individuals even cannot do the same, since no individual could have a gen-
eral excluding effect in this way.) But the phenomenon precisely does not exhibit
the feature that its activities come into being as a result of the attitude which its
constituents have towards what they are doing. On the contrary, they may sim-
ply be unaware of what they are doing collectively, though each is perfectly
aware of what they are doing individually.13 Even here the point may easily be
missed, since shared understandings abound in cliques. However, what is not
necessarily present is a shared understanding among its members that they con-
stitute a clique! The example itself may be of no great moment, but its structural
features are reproduced in more important contexts. For example, an indige-
nous population may unwittingly act towards strangers in its midst as members
of a clique do, but with results which are politically much more serious.
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The notion of a hidden CA actually covers several different possibilities. We
may be unaware that a CA exists at all, or unaware of its exact nature; we may be
unaware that it has acted on some particular occasion or unaware of the actual
significance of what it has done. And ‘we’ here may be either the constituents of
the collective agency or observers. In any event, a CA does not necessarily involve
shared meanings and understandings in the way intended in some conceptions
of community. Though it is necessary for a number of individuals to act together
for a CA to be in operation, they may or may not have any shared conception
of what they are collectively doing (because individually they may not have any
conception at all of what they are collectively doing).
Notice that a CA is not necessarily an overall community. True, a whole vil-
lage or a whole culture may act in some way significantly different from its con-
stituents taken severally, so that we wish to characterise it as a CA; but at the
same time there will many CAs which are very local and partial communities.
This has consequences for the issues discussed in section 2.
2 Community, identification and dissociation
One of the central matters of contention in the liberal/communitarian debate
was whether ‘the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it’.14 The nega-
tive communitarian answer held that the self is an embedded self: it approaches
the selection of ends with a particular social identity which predetermines its
mode of selecting them, so that, for example, a shared communal end is ‘not a
relationship [people] choose (as in a voluntary association) but an attachment
they discover’15 and ‘agency consists less in summoning the will than in seek-
ing self-understanding’.16
Now any tolerably adequate description of me as an individual will include
reference to various social roles which I inhabit – teacher, parent, voter, and so
on – and these descriptions will therefore constitute part of my identity. It is
then tempting to infer that ‘what is good for me has to be the good for one who
inhabits these roles’.17 Or, as Ross Poole has recently expressed it: ‘An identity
defines a perspective on the world and our place in it . . . It calls upon us – or
those who have the appropriate identity – to act in one way rather than
another.’18 But the inference is too hasty. There is an important distinction to
be observed between identity and identification. As a creature capable of self-
consciousness, deliberation and action, it is always open to me to reflect on my
identity, to consider whether I wish to continue in the roles I occupy, and (some-
times) to act to divest myself of one or more of them. I can, in other words,
choose to identify with or dissociate from a given role. So, for example, if I am a
victim of racial or domestic violence, what is good for me is to cease having
those descriptions applicable to me. Arguably, something similar is true if I am
a member of the Ku Klux Klan. In that way, what is good for me may not be what
is good for the inhabitant of a given role. On the contrary, what is good for me
is to divest myself of the role. Of course, divesting oneself of a role is not always
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an option. I cannot cease being someone’s parent or offspring (though even
there I may choose not to act in ways associated with the role) and perhaps in
practice I cannot cease being a citizen of the state I live in, for example.
Similarly, dissociation specifically from a CA19 is not always an option. Here,
as in the case of individual action, there are the possibilities of compulsive or
coerced action, where some of the normal features of control and decision are
lacking. (I may act in an army as a conscript, for example). But membership of
a CA is peculiarly susceptible to the possibility of dissociation, for reflection on
such membership is, precisely, reflection on what one is participating in doing;
and, anxieties about determinism aside, what one does is a matter where
choices and decision are in principle involved. Moreover, even in cases of coer-
cion a shadow of the options of identification and dissociation persists, in the
form of the attitude with which someone participates. If I have been coerced,
for example, into taking part in some collective practices which humiliate
others, I can still do so reluctantly, affirming to myself that this is something I
do not wish to be doing, rather than willingly and with relish.
The need for choice and decision and the possibility of dissociation, rather
than solely discovery, are all the more apparent given that CAs are typically
partial rather than overall communities. Collective agencies engage in
courses of action which sometimes conflict. There may be deep-rooted con-
flicts between classes or nations or ethnic groups, there may be more tractable
conflicts between neighbourhood associations and residents of a particular
street. And then sometimes an individual finds that they belong to a number
of different CAs which are locked in conflict. You are, say, a parent, an
employee, a manager, a member of the board of school governors; and the
CAs associated with these descriptions are pulling in different directions. The
conflicts between CAs are then reproduced within an individual, who will expe-
rience the pull of acting in different directions and will have to make decisions
about priorities.
It is not clear to me how wise it is to take a stand on the blanket question
whether or not the self is prior to its ends. What can be said with more confi-
dence, however, is that the self is importantly distinct from its ends in the con-
text of particular CAs. Where an individual is participating in collective action
with others, a space must always be left for critical reflection, options of identi-
fication with or dissociation from the CA and (where this is a live possibility)
even actual detachment from a CA. None of this will be settled by mere mem-
bership of a CA. But then since CAs are sometimes co-extensive with commu-
nities defined in other ways, exactly the same options must remain open in
those contexts. To that extent, an individual’s embeddedness fails to settle ques-
tions of ends without the addition of critical reflection. (Whether the critical
reflection proceeds by reference to abstract principles or to the values of some
other community to which someone belongs will be a further question.)
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3 Community and the distinctness of persons
A perennial concern in relations between individual and community is the
question whether the one type of entity has priority over the other (though it is
an important philosophical error to suppose that there is only one kind of pri-
ority and that therefore priority must always attach entirely either to the one or
to the other). Here, too, current thinking has been influenced by the
liberal/communitarian debate, in particular by the appeal to the distinctness of
persons frequently made by liberals. Rawls, for example, has argued that ‘the
plurality of distinct persons with separate systems of ends is an essential fea-
ture of human societies.’20 What we cannot then do, according to Rawls, is use
the same kind of reasoning when arriving at social decisions as that used by one
individual with one set of ends: the ‘reasoning which balances the gains and
losses of different persons as if they were one person is excluded’.21
Nozick makes a similar point. Individually, we sometimes choose to undergo
some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid a greater harm: in other
words, we accept some cost for the sake of the greater overall good. Why should
we not also argue that some people must bear some costs so that others may
gain, for the sake of the greater overall social good? Nozick’s reply is that
there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good.
There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individ-
ual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the
others. Nothing more. What happens is that something is done to him for the sake of
others. Talk of an overall social good covers this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person
in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a
separate person, that his is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing
good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him.22
According to the doctrine, it is particularly important to bundle together the
desires of a single individual. By contrast, no special importance attaches to a
bundle which represents the desires of different individuals for the same end.
That explains why the doctrine is invoked to criticise classical utilitarianism,
which is taken to allot special importance to the latter kind of bundle, in the
interest of maximising overall desire-satisfaction, regardless of whose desires
they happen to be.
There is both an implausibility and an incompleteness in the doctrine of the
distinctness of persons.23 The implausibility arises from neglecting the com-
plexity of individuals’ desires. They can reflect on them, accord some higher
priority than others, and also acquire meta-desires (as when I desire to smoke
but desire not to desire to smoke, or desire that people’s desires should be less
conventional). Consequently, individuals themselves may attach importance
to the fact that a given end is desired by a number of other people, and they may
themselves attach more importance to some desire jointly held by a number of
people than to the bundle of their own individual desires. Thus, I might desire
a cessation of some incidence of racial oppression, regard this desire as having
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much higher priority than any other desires I have, recognise that it is a desire
held by others, and believe that it is important that there is a high level of desire
for this cessation. This combination of beliefs and desires among a number of
individuals can itself generate a sense of community – in terms of shared
desires – across individuals: we identify with one another as desirers of the
same end. Where individuals themselves sum desires across individuals in this
way, rather than only seeing them as desires which each of them has individ-
ually, it is not clear that we can be so confident that no importance should be
attached to such a process of summation across individuals.
Consider an objection. It might be said that in the case in hand the desire is
for a state of the world, cessation of racial oppression, rather than for a state of
an individual. But, it might be objected, it is only the latter kind of desire which
the doctrine is meant to cover. This objection is weak, because all the essentials
of the claim could be re-run with individuals’ desire for states of themselves.
The earlier example of the National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People would illustrate the point. It may matter to me what happens to me
as a coloured person, and it may therefore matter to me what happens to peo-
ple who are like me in that respect. And that may matter more to me than any
other questions about my own well-being. Moreover, since many desires are for
general states of the world rather than for the individual, it would be a consid-
erable restriction on the scope of the doctrine if it were thought not to be appli-
cable to such general desires. For example, suppose I desire to own a watch. The
realisation of the desired state of affairs would involve others (those who make,
sell and transport watches). Although the desiring is a state of an individual,
the realisation of what is desired would involve other individuals, and it is not
clear why the latter fact should be thought any less important than the place of
residence of the desire, as it were.24
The incompleteness of the doctrine of the distinctness of persons lies in its fail-
ure to allow for the existence of necessarily collective ends, such as winning a
team game, performing a symphony or electing a government. It is not at all sur-
prising that we encounter collective desires for such ends, since it is only collec-
tivities of individuals which can actually bring them about. And where CAs have
their own characteristic good, such as winning a game, performing a symphony,
furthering the interests of the nation or the culture, they or their constituents
can indeed undergo sacrifices for the good of that entity: the team sells some of
its collective assets, or a member foregoes their wages, in order to buy a player
whose presence will enhance the team’s results. Hence, pace Nozick, it is not true
that there is no social entity which can undergo a sacrifice for its own good.25
At this point a kind of premature moral panic may occur. It may be felt that,
once we reject the distinctness of persons and allow a place for the possibility of
a collectivity or an individual being sacrificed for the collective good, we are on
the slippery slope to allowing the eclipse of individuals and the incursion of
totalitarian collectivism. Such a thought clearly exercises Nozick. The panic is
premature for two reasons. First, we are at this stage exploring the appropriate
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characterisation of the world we live in which will allow us then to draw defen-
sible moral conclusions. To say that the local football team and the Ku Klux
Klan each has a characteristic good is not to say that either good should be pro-
moted: that is a further question. If the distinctness of persons erroneously
characterises that world, it has to be rejected, and a more suitable characteri-
sation found which will support any set of moral convictions we wish to retain.
Second, even if all the claims in section 1 about the irreducibility of CAs are cor-
rect, we need to bear in mind that CAs are themselves composed of individuals
and nothing else. In the context of a CA individuals have not been eclipsed, but
we have to take seriously the idea that in this context they are indissolubly
linked. There are, that is, circumstances where we collectively desire something,
and that fact is not further dissolvable into circumstances where I do and you
do and she and he do. We want to win and we can only want that as a team.
The existence of CAs, therefore, can be invoked in challenging liberal claims
that there are only distinct individuals and that desires cannot be summed in any
way except as belonging to individuals, just as, in the previous section, it provided
the context for challenging the claim implicit in some communitarian thinking
that socially embedded people discover rather than selecting their ends.26
Conclusion
In one way the nature of the contemporary world is congenial to a stress on
the idea of community, and in another way not. On the one hand, globalisation
is a cliché and the interconnections between large numbers of people on a
worldwide scale are ever more apparent. The idea of human beings as isolated
units seems in that respect less defensible than ever and the expression ‘global
village’ more appropriate than ever. On the other hand, the contemporary
world signally lacks a feature possessed by at least some literal villages at some
times and places, namely that of providing an all-embracing community in
which an individual’s life gained its significance from their place in a closed
social network. In that connection, it has been a familiar criticism of commu-
nitarian theory that it might have been appropriate for well integrated societies,
where there was a workable notion of an all-embracing community, but that
this presupposes a world which no longer exists (or perhaps never was). As I
have indicated in this chapter, there are many conceptions of community more
circumscribed than this all-embracing one. The conception I have concentrated
on, where what people share in common is participation in collective action,
has many instances in actual life, including some (such as multinational
corporations) which are peculiar to modern conditions.
We need a fuller account of individuals’ relations to communities of this kind
than I have been able to provide here, an account of the forms which identifica-
tion with them can take and the circumstances in which dissociation is justified,
as well as an account of how the actions of collectivities are to be compared and
contrasted with the actions of individuals. One aspect of these further matters,
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alluded to earlier, seems to me particularly important. Just as an individual is not
necessarily in the best position to understand the existence or the nature of all of
their own actions without further reflection, so collectivities of individuals may
be unaware of the existence or the nature of their collective actions. People can
co-ordinate their actions in subtle and complex ways and collectively produce
results of which they are quite unaware. In that respect, there may be more
communities around than are dreamt of in our political philosophy.
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Introduction1
Multiculturalism can be acknowledged, championed, challenged or rejected, but
it cannot be ignored because it describes a central feature of the world in which
we live. Oddly, however, for many years it was ignored, despite decades of strug-
gle by black Americans for full political inclusion, the confederalism adopted by
several European states to accommodate linguistic and religious diversity and
the multicultural policies adopted by Australia and Canada in the 1970s, to
name just three examples. In the 1980s communitarian writers embraced the
culture-friendly virtues of solidarity, togetherness and belonging, but ironically,
while community was prized as homely and familiar, it was never spelt out which
communities – cultural or otherwise – were being invoked. Only in the early
1990s did the liberal-communitarian controversy begin to transform itself into
a more particular debate about how to accommodate cultural and ethnic claims
within a broadly liberal political theory. Here Will Kymlicka’s Liberalism, Com-
munity and Culture led the way.2 By now, it is increasingly recognised that liberal
constitutions are shot through with partisan ethnocultural norms.3
This is the first claim I want to make then. Multiculturalism cannot be
avoided. Whether endorsed as a policy (cultural diversity is good), it cannot 
be circumvented as a social fact, not so long as we are thinking about theories
for the world in which we live and not a cultureless planet far away. Theories
of justice, democracy and human rights are necessarily abstract since they
have a more or less extensive reach and describe a reality not yet arrived.
Abstraction is no bad thing. But when you argue that democracy fosters com-
munity, that social justice includes equal opportunity, or that there is a right
to free speech but not against hate speech you move from the abstract to the
ideal since, as a matter of fact, a community will need to take some stand on
immigration, on ethnic patterning in work and education, and on offence to
marginalised groups. Saying nothing has no less import than saying some-
thing when, like encountering a difficult aunt at Christmas, social circum-
stances demand a response. It is not necessarily wrong to suppose that
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that that position will need to be argued for no less than its opposite: there is
no culturally neutral baseline.
In sum, then, we must recognise that our multicultural reality is pertinent for
politics as soon as we start theorising about it. It is not something which, as
some writers imply, we can accommodate in larger theories of democracy, free-
dom and social justice that are first formulated in a culture-blind way. Multi-
culturalism is a problem for these theories only because of assumptions and
premises that made it so. Approaching multiculturalism with honesty and
integrity means accepting that it is not a decorative but a permanent feature of
our public social world.
In this chapter I want to explore what it means to move multiculturalism from
the outskirts to the centre of our political thinking. Section 1 surveys the range
of multicultural rights, while section 2 examines an important recent attempt
to theorise them, Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship.4 Section 3 explores
attempts to go beyong Kymlicka’s largely liberal approach with a more radical
‘politics of recognition’, which says that we recognise cultures on their own
terms. Here I make a number of positive claims about what recognising multi-
culturalism should involve; with the conclusion drawing these points together.
1 Multicultural rights
The first stage in this exploration is a careful consideration of the kinds of
demands made by minority cultures. Here I shall mention three kinds. First,
there are rights to do with government. They include the special representation
rights such as the guaranteed seats for Maori representatives in the New
Zealand Parliament, and the race-conscious drawing of district lines to boost
black representation in the USA. It also includes devolved power of the kind
fought for by Aboriginal peoples in Canada and Australia, the Scots, Welsh and
Irish national minorities in the UK or the two million Hungarians spread across
Romania, Slovakia and Serbia. At the limit, self-government means the right to
national self-determination, whether secession from one state aims at unity
with another (as republicans in Northern Ireland want) or a wholly new entity
(as happened when Norway split from Sweden).
The second family of multicultural rights seeks to accommodate a variety of
distinct cultural practices within larger states. Sometimes these seek to release
ethno-cultural groups from a burden that state laws would otherwise impose,
such as the efforts made by some Amish parents to withdraw their children
from state education at fourteen, the exemption from wearing hard hats on
building sites sought by Sikh men, or exemptions on animal slaughter legisla-
tion sought by Muslims and Jews. In other cases cultural rights seek to give spe-
cial assistance to a disadvantaged minority such as affirmative action
programmes to increase minority representation in colleges in the USA, or its
Bi-Lingual Education Act (1978) designed to help enable parallel instruction in
non-English languages for children who spoke them at home. In some cases
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rights of exemption or assistance overlap with the first category of government
rights, such as Aboriginal people’s demand that an indigenous legal tradition
take precedence over a state’s legal code.
The third family is most difficult to define. It does not involve rules or rights
but the more amorphous issue of collective esteem, a group’s attitude towards
itself. This becomes a matter for public policy when the symbolism of flags, cur-
rencies, names, public holidays, national anthems, public funds for cultural
activities and the content of school curricula bear on a minority’s fragile pres-
ence in the public political culture. Inevitably affecting how the mainstream
regards it, the gaze of recognition affects how members perceive themselves,
and in turn their attitude towards the wider society of which they are a part.
Prince Charles’s recent declaration that as king he would be called defender of
faith, not the Christian faith, acknowledged the importance of symbolic recog-
nition for minority religions which many in the mainstream would be hard
pressed to conceive. Romania’s large Hungarian minority demanded an explicit
acknowledgment of their existence in the light of the clause in the Romanian
constitution that declared it to be ‘a unitary state of the Roumanian people’.5
Defending the controversial decision to ban Muslim girls from wearing head-
scarves in French schools, the former Education minister later declared that it
was ‘impossible to accept’ signs whose very purpose was to ‘separate certain
pupils from the communal life of the school’.6 Some multicultural rights such
as the exemptions from common laws and limited self-government cause very
little pain to the majority. Political issues of recognition are not like this. They
are hard to resolve because they call into question not just a minority identity
but the majority’s too, and a problem caused by others is always a resented gift.
The rights and issues I have identified – self-government, exemptions and
privileges, and recognition – overlap in various and complex ways. Bilingual
schooling, for example, is both a collective right and a policy of recognition.
Indeed all the second family of multicultural rights involve recognition of some
sort where a minority wants to participate in the culture, rather than (as with
the Amish) take their leave of it.7 Demands and challenges are made with the
overriding need for cultural survival; multiculturalism is a battle fought on
several fronts.
2 Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship
As an example of how these multicultural claims are theorised, let us consider
Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship. Kymlicka wants to defend cultural
protection along liberal lines. He is exercised, therefore, by whether groups can
bear rights, by the need for toleration, and by the problem of sustaining a com-
mon civic identity. The result is that he comes to view cultures in a very partic-
ular way. Influenced by Inuit communities in the Canadian Northwest
Territories, Kymlicka regards a culture as a civilisation, self-sufficient and with
its own social institutions.8
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Three further moves assist the conscription of cultures to the liberal side. The
first move consists in saying that cultures are (a) valuable and (b) distinct, but
that (c) they do not consist of shared values.9 (a) Since cultures are valuable, at
least for their members, there is a loss involved if they begin to erode. This gives
the basic rationale for a theory of cultural justice. (b) Since each culture is dif-
ferent from its neighbours, this loss is not just a general complaint about
increasing cultural homogeneity, but a particular worry about the loss of a par-
ticular culture. Finally (c) cultures are not tightly knit clusters of shared values,
and hence do (despite liberal worries) allow for freedom and autonomy. These
three claims can each be questioned. Questioning (a), we can say that lots of
valuable cultures have degraded or died, not just cultures of ethnic descent
which are Kymlicka’s prime interest. Mining communities in South Wales also
provided their members with strong identities and a sense of belonging, and
have also declined.10 Do they too merit cultural rights? Examining (b), many eth-
nic groups need not have distinct cultural attributes. As Appiah has commented
on the situation of blacks in the USA, ‘[c]ulture is not the problem and it is not
the solution’.11 The problem is racism. Claim (c) is correct: cultures do not con-
sist of shared values. They consist of people. If people in the same group share
some values, they need not share them all. By implication, not every value is val-
ued by each person in the group. The truth is more interesting and complicated
than that. Moreover, while (a) combines easily with (b), the picture they conjure
up together, of self-contained cultures each unique, sits a little oddly with (c) the
non-shared values claim. In addition (a) and (b) together open the way for a
fruitless search for cultural thingness that I shall later take issue with.
Kymlicka’s second move is to distinguish between culture contexts, as media
that provide meaning, orientation, identity and belonging, and cultural
options, particular elements within that context.12 This distinction allows Kym-
licka to advance two divergent arguments. Conceiving cultures as contexts
means they can fulfil their purpose of over-arching individual choices. Cultures
are a necessary frame to human action; hence there is a loss if one’s cultural
context begins to erode. This is the justice argument, and it says that each per-
son has the right to a secure cultural context, not just any context but her own.
The freedom argument says that people are autonomous choosers, and what
they choose between are different cultural options. Unitary optionless contexts,
like seamless webs of shared values, would leave cultural members without lib-
eral choices. But contextless constellations of free-floating options, would sug-
gest there is no special loss if a culture declines – contrary to (a) and (b) above.13
One always loses something, not nothing; contexts provide that thing. Once
again, this encourages the search for the identity of the context. Not language
(because languages are not unique to cultures), not history (what has had the
history?), not, as Kymlicka insists, shared values, it is never finally spelt out
what a culture actually is, and hence not clear what is lost.
Finally, Kymlicka’s third move distinguishes between national minorities
and ethnic groups.14 The former are incipient nations who found themselves
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incorporated into a larger multinational state. Examples include the Aboriginal
peoples in Canada and Australia, Maori in New Zealand and the various
national groups that make up multinational states like Switzerland and Bel-
gium. Ethnic groups, by contrast, are largely the result of immigration. This
includes all the very different groups of migrants found in Canada, Australia
and the USA (the three countries with the very highest rates of immigration),
as well as Turks in Germany and Commonwealth immigrants in the UK, for
example. The point of this distinction is to justify his hierarchy of cultural
rights: while national minorities merit rights to special representation and
devolved self-government, ethnic groups deserve only rights to help them
assimilate on terms that are fair. Supporting this division are Rawls’s and
Dworkin’s theories of social justice which say that we should compensate peo-
ple for the circumstances they involuntarily find themselves in, while respect-
ing their voluntarily made choices. National minorities merit more rights than
ethnic groups because they generally find themselves in a situation not of their
own choosing. However, some ethnic groups did not choose to migrate – black
Americans are the best example. Even where they did, the choice was only made
by the first generation not subsequent ones. The latter often find they have most
in common with the country of their birth, however strange it was to their par-
ents who first arrived. Reversing matters, some national minorities do not want
self-government, but instead choose to assimilate into the larger culture. Even
where self-government is demanded, its purpose need not be to maintain and
transmit a unique cultural identity.
To be fair to Kymlicka, he does appreciate the difficulties involved in bringing
cultures into the ambit of normative analysis and he explicitly says that cul-
tural claims must be assessed on a case by case basis. He further distinguishes
between justifying a theory of minority rights and imposing it in practice.15 (As
J.L. Austin once said, ‘There’s the bit where you say it and the bit where you take
it back’.)16
3 The politics of recognition
The difficulty of legislating when a culture qualifies for minority rights is not
unique to Kymlicka. Charles Taylor wants to recognise cultures that have fairly
large numbers of members, have survived for some time and articulate a lan-
guage of moral evaluations. Influenced by his native Quebec, he seems to see the
essence of culture as possession of a shared language.17 Parekh maintains that a
culture has a claim to rights if it is vital to the fundamental interests of its mem-
bers and contributes to the wider society.18 David Miller claims a national com-
munity is constituted by shared beliefs, a historical narrative and territorial
home, is active in character and has its own public culture. National communi-
ties that pass these five tests have a prima facie right to self-determination.19
Parekh, Miller and Taylor, and beyond them Young, Tully and Tamir, together
go a little further than Kymlicka in their defence of cultural rights.20 For
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Kymlicka, the main value of cultural membership and cultural diversity is to
sustain those options within which autonomous persons can exercise choice.
Independent of autonomy, there are limits as to how far cultural diversity is
morally or aesthetically valuable.21 For these other writers, the value of cul-
tures, nations and ethnic groups is not primarily routed through their contri-
bution to autonomy. The perspective begins to shift towards their collective
value as such. In Taylor’s hands, this value supports what has come to be called
a ‘politics of recognition’.
Charles Taylor’s elegant essay ‘The Politics of Recognition’ has given the
politics of recognition a rich philosophical background.22 Arguing for a model
of liberalism that can include important collective goals, Taylor distinguishes
between the crucial liberties central to any liberal society and the less critical
rights and opportunities that may on occasion be over-ridden. The pro-French
policies of Quebec are such a collective good. The goal here is not just to sustain
but actively to create a community of French speakers into the indefinite future.
Two strands make up this argument. In the early sections of the essay, Taylor
defends the notion that individuals require, not just respect, but others’ recog-
nition: they need to be the object of others’ positive attitudes. Through a matrix
where affirmation is given and received, individuals acquire a positive relation
to themselves.23 Recognition, therefore, is not an optional extra, but a vital
human need.24 Second, Taylor distinguishes between two modes of being in late
modernity, autonomy and authenticity. While autonomy is the seed bed in
which the modern rational, disengaged self has grown, authenticity invokes
the alternative Romantic tradition of spontaneity, uniqueness and difference.
‘There is a certain way of life that is my way; I am called upon to live my life in
this way and not in imitation of anyone else’s life’.25 These two traditions are not
opposite, but divergent: both free the individual from obligation to a larger
order, but only authenticity invests the self with a unique life-project which she
has a duty to fulfil. Taylor, however, interprets authenticity not just in an indi-
vidual but a collective sense: cultures too have their own unique authentic
essences.26 When this is added to the first strand we arrive at the view that cul-
tures need recognition in their authentic particularity. Quebec is one case, but
there are others besides.
We have already encountered one key assumption underlying the politics of
recognition. In commenting on Kymlicka, I recorded claim (b), that each cul-
ture has its own cultural attributes. Individuals are unique – Taylor’s individ-
ual authenticity – but not cultures, or at least not every culture, not American
blacks for example. Still, as we shall see, whether a group does or does not have
a distinct identity is a political and not an empirical question. In any case, let
us turn to the main demand of this kind of politics, the public affirmation of
cultural difference.
Barry believes that public recognition is impossibly demanding and logically
incoherent. The equal treatment that liberalism demands of us is relatively easy
to fulfil. Whatever our real views on the merits of others’ ways of life, we can
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treat them with civility, courtesy and respect. Recognition, however, politicises
those private judgements that could otherwise remain concealed behind the
formal practice of equal treatment. Hence ‘[t]he notion that everybody should
be entitled to an equal ration of “recognition” cannot be accepted by those who
attach any value to individual liberty’.27 In any case, recognition is incoherent.
It is not just that an across the board affirmation of each culture’s value is a
meaningless activity. (It devalues the idea of value). The problem is also that to
believe in the worth of one’s own culture must include a belief in the values and
virtues it embodies. Faced with the demand to affirm the value of a culture that
espouses contrary values to our own, we are put in an impossible situation. The
Southern Baptist who believes homosexuality is a sin (this is Barry’s example)
cannot, consistent with retaining her Baptist beliefs, also affirm the value of a
homosexual lifestyle.28 You cannot believe in something while sincerely advo-
cating its opposite.
These criticisms are somewhat overstated. Taylor’s account of recognition
seems to hover between endorsing the values a culture subscribes to, and
affirming a culture’s specific identity, which need not require endorsing all its
values. The latter interpretation has less of a problem with Barry’s argument.
It is also the view of the other main proponent of a politics of recognition, Iris
Marion Young, for whom justice towards groups, before anything else, involves
acknowledging what is different about each group.29 Still, besides this speci-
ficity-claim, there remains a good deal of plausibility to Barry’s strictures
against recognition.
Against Barry’s first point, however, the public expression of private attitudes
is not unusual but routine. The shopkeeper whose veil of politeness to his Asian
customers hides a deeper racism will let the mask slip with his friends in the pub.
Since the communities we inhabit are diverse and several, a member of a liberal
society might encounter those who value and affirm the culture which his
other acquaintances ridicule and despise. This at least brings the possibility for
a re-evaluation of attitudes, if not engineered by the state, then encouraged and
fostered by it. Second, while the demand to affirm the worth of a culture repre-
sents an invasion of freedom, Barry implies that the burden of belonging to a
disparaged one does not. This, however, rests on a particular notion of what
freedom involves. It rests on the notion that freedom consists solely in doing
what one wants, with no attention to the social relations – including those of
servility, submission and domination – within which our wants are formed and
acted on. Recent work on freedom has viewed the absence of these social cir-
cumstances as central to an elaboration of the concept.30 For republicans, free-
dom is non-domination. Even if this view is rejected, we could still maintain
that a subject, disparaged and degraded by her peers, is hardly likely to make
use of whatever legal freedom she enjoys. This is the point of insisting that
recognition is a vital human need.
In order to reply to Barry’s second argument, and hence clear the way for a par-
tial vindication of a politics of recognition, we shall need to tackle some difficult
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issues of culture and value. I earlier took issue with Kymlicka for encouraging
us to think of culture as a thing, a tendency encouraged by his assumptions that
cultures were valuable and unique. An alternative liberal view sees culture as
secondary quality, apt to fade away under the Enlightenment torch. Both these
perspectives depart from the dominant view of cultural anthropology, which
regards culture as a process, a manifestation, in diverse material and symbolic
circumstances, of the universal human capacity to manufacture frames of social
action.31 Men and women make culture, but they do not do so just as they please,
but in circumstances directly encountered and transmitted from the past.
Baumann’s analysis theorises culture as ‘dual discursive construction’.32 Cultural
agents, in their day-to-day interactions, shape and change their culture as they
act to reproduce it. At the same time, cultural elites, outsiders and the media tend
to reify culture, they accentuate its thingness for a particular purpose: if you want
to attack or defend something, it must be, just that, a thing. Better still, it should
be a unique thing. During the Rushdie affair, for example, both Muslim leaders
and their opponents had powerful reasons for maintaining that there was a fixed
and characteristic Muslim community in the UK.33 ‘Yet in the end, all the comforts
of having a culture rely upon remaking that culture, and the dominant discourse
of culture as an unchangeable heritage is only a conservative-sounding subcom-
ponent of the processual truth.’34
If this view of cultures is correct then they cannot include, among other
components, subscription to a relatively static core of principles and values, as
Barry maintains. For as cultural agents remake their worlds and endow them
with cultural meaning, they revise the contexts within which apparently
immutable values are defended and maintained. Abstract principles receive
their meaning from a particular context. Hence ‘[t]o repeat the same statement
in new circumstances is to make a new statement’.35 Cultures are not clubs
whose members must affirm a set charter of principles. Values, like rules,
receive their meaning in the everyday production of social life. (Both theorists
and practitioners have a motive for absolutising normative principles, theorists
for intellectual robustness, practitioners for practical power.) There is, there-
fore, no simple conflict between cultural values. Recognised in one context,
they can be criticised in another. In fact this is almost inevitable, given the dif-
ferent communities liberal citizens usually inhabit. It also means that a culture
does not lose its identity when members revise their attitude towards the values
of others. Such revising is only a more self-conscious version of the cultural cre-
ation that is ongoing anyway, and this should give us grounds for hope.
The first claim I made in the introduction to this chapter was that multicul-
turalism was unavoidable and that the circumstances of a liberal politics cannot
but be culturally charged. A second claim, emerging from the discussion above,
is that we understand culture in processual not reified terms. This implies,
among other things, that theory is accompanied by a fine-grained empirical
analysis of cultural identity and cultural change. I now want to make two
further claims – a third concerning recognition and a fourth to do with freedom.
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Returning to the politics of recognition, we find a vision that has become
somewhat complicated. Cultural communities and legal norms exist in
dynamic relation to each other. Contrary to what Charles Taylor assumes, there
are no authentic cultural essences awaiting legal recognition. If there is money
for members of a culture we can be sure that its membership will increase, a
phenomenon familiar with Native Americans in the USA.. On what grounds,
then, should the liberal state recognise cultures?
It is indeed impossible to demand that we go around valuing other cultures,
and illiberal to ask that we act as though we did. There is, however, an impor-
tant asymmetry between how Barry treats recognition and how he theorises
respect. In his other work, he argues that we show others respect by seeking to
justify to them the norms we wish our common polity to adopt.36 But when he
turns to recognition, Barry assumes it can be claimed by disparaged cultures
as a right. He seems to imagine there would be an organ of the state charged
with the task of bolstering attitudes towards marginalised cultures. But recog-
nition, too, can be assimilated to the notion of public justification he elsewhere
defends. On this view, when and whether we recognise a culture is itself a mat-
ter for democratic decision. This has two aspects. First, the majority needs to
recognise that the public culture they share with minorities is not a neutral
arena for settling claims but is inevitably culturally punctuated. There is no
culture-free baseline that will secure the autonomy of equal respect. Moreover,
the cultural perspectives which minorities inhabit are relevant to determining
what the substantive values of our shared public culture should be. Not beyond
culture, our shared public life is the collective cultural creation of us all. Build-
ing on this first point, the second argument says that each group should have
a fair opportunity to participate in public deliberation on what our public cul-
ture should be. Fair opportunity involves measures promoting the inclusivity
of political institutions, fighting institutional racism and removing segrega-
tion in residence and employment. These measures are delivered, not just for
their own sake, but in order that the perspective on the world that minority cul-
tures occupy can more easily be entered into democratic debate about what
values our public culture should promote. Such promotion does involve recog-
nition, but it cannot be claimed by any group as a right. Take the recent debate
in the UK about faith schools. One solution (and one interpretation of equal
respect) is to have no religious segregation in education at all – and hence no
faith schools. Another solution is to allow faith schools on the grounds that it
publicly affirms and acknowledges the distinctive value and contribution of
Muslim, Jewish and other communities.37 The view of recognition I have been
arguing for takes a third perspective. Faith schools affect the self-perceptions
not just of the groups that have them, but those who do not, and they call into
question the values of the common public culture that all of us share. Whether
there are faith schools or not is for us as citizens to decide. We should not grant
them as part of an automatic right to recognition because we do not take a
minority culture’s claims about itself at face value (no more than we should
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take our own). But neither should we reject them out of hand as part of a
culture-free notion of equal respect.
Recognition, if it is to have any value, can only ever be voluntarily conferred.
Once we appreciate that some set of values are always and inevitably publicly
sponsored, we can better enter a debate about which ones they should be. By
trying to give all groups a fair opportunity to participate in democratic debate,
the state can help create the conditions where recognition is granted by citizens
on grounds they agree. Positive recognition is not a right, but a creation of mul-
ticulturalism’s everyday practitioners. That is my third claim.
My final claim concerns freedom. As we have seen, recognition already sug-
gests a conceptual connection between freedom and the social circumstances
in which some are disparaged and demeaned, but there is a bit more we can say.
Kymlicka’s theory, I believe, contains the resources for a reconceptualisation of
freedom more attuned to cultural membership. For Kymlicka, freedom exists in
the medium of a cultural context. It consists in exploring the possibilities pro-
vided by that context. On this view, then, freedom requires not just an agent
who is uncoerced and whose will is his or her own, but also a viable cultural
structure which provides the options in and through which freedom is exer-
cised. Raz similarly writes that ‘[f]reedom depends on options’ which invoke a
culture of ‘shared meanings and common practices’.38 Imagine a situation in
which nothing prevents a person from acting as he or she wishes but in which
there are no options, cultural or otherwise, for him or her to take advantage of.
A supermarket liberalism of shopping malls, cosmetic surgery and the Internet
delivers freedom of a kind, but it does not deliver meaningful opportunities.
Where these are present we have ‘opportunity-freedom’. The core of the idea is
that freedom takes place in a social context constituted by rules which make our
actions intelligible and meaningful.
Opportunity-freedom has no specifically ethnic colouring but it can be use-
fully linked to the idea of culture as process that I raised earlier. Raz appreciates
that cultures change, thereby changing the options available, but Kymlicka’s
theory is more problematic. Although he accepts the fact of cultural change,
his promotion of a cultural context (necessary for cultures to have a case in jus-
tice) pushes him towards the view that cultures are a thing. In any case, neither
writer explores how cultural options, ethnic or otherwise, are created by us.
Social not just cultural life is a process. Social action can be directed in ways that
make the public culture richer and more meaningful, or that degrade and
destroy the opportunities for freedom it provides. The best polity is not one
where each person is free from the will of others. It is one where democratic
communities assume responsibility for the social opportunities available to all,
and no person is demeaned in that process. It is one where we actively try to cre-
ate the conditions where what is culturally valuable can be publicly affirmed
and esteemed. Multiculturalism involves an acknowledgement of the full par-
ticularity of what at first appears alien and strange. No person is in command
of the particulars that go to build his or her own identity, but together we can
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collectively take some control of them. Decoupled from an obsession with
ethnic descent, multiculturalism supports a politics in which men and women
come together to take control of the production of their public social world.
Conclusion: a republican multiculturalism
I have argued in this chapter that (1) multiculturalism must be central not
peripheral to any adequate theory of principles to inform the liberal polity; (2)
that culture is a process not a thing, and that a culture’s favoured values must be
understood in terms of those processes; (3) that recognition involves democratic
deliberation not automatic affirmation; and finally (4) that freedom as opportu-
nity helps resolve the tension between freedom and cultural membership. Let me
end with a sketch that ties these claims together.
I referred earlier to republican writers for whom freedom is the absence of
domination. On this view, freedom and democracy are tightly linked because
the free agent is one who plays his or her part in determining his or her com-
munity’s laws and norms.39 Interference as such does not limit freedom; only
arbitrary interference that assails you from without. Thus whether a person is
free or unfree can only be discovered by examining whether he or she had a say
in deciding what he or she can do. The free community is one where citizens of
equal standing deliberate on the possibilities open to them all. In my view, this
is a fruitful paradigm for theorising multiculturalism. Liberal writers, however
sympathetic to multiculturalism, will always view multicultural rights and
measures with some suspicion since they so often reduce the freedom of indi-
viduals to live as they wish, neither interfered with by others, nor interfering
with them in turn. But, by transcending the thought that others’ interference
must reduce our freedom, there is less objection to the democratic view where
citizens of different cultures come together to deliberate on the rights and
recognitions that different groups should enjoy. The public culture they create,
open, plural and always subject to revision, is both a space for freedom and a
medium of value. An important lesson for liberalism (and for life) is that what
a person finds valuable need not hinge on what he or she chooses to pursue.40
There are other sources of value that, not chosen, we later come to appreciate.
If this is true, then multiculturalism might even increase our freedom, not
reduce it.
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Introduction
Like all concepts in political theory, gender has a history. Unlike most of these
concepts, though, the history of gender is comparatively short. The term itself
originated in the nineteenth century, arising in the context of descriptive and
diagnostic social sciences of human behaviour. It was only adopted into political
theory, as a result of a political process of struggle, about 100 years later in the
1970s. When it arrived, gender was itself a highly political concept, signalling a
rearrangement of the scope, terms and politics of political theory itself. Gender
theorists at that point conceived of their work within political theory as a further
engagement of feminism with ‘malestream’ thought, that is, theorisations of
politics written by men and reflecting their assumptions and interests. The fem-
inist stance towards the discipline, and towards its traditionalist practitioners,
was critical and transformative.1
To understand this important development in political theory, however, we
will need to examine the concepts of sex and sexuality as well. Moreover, it will
also be necessary to bear in mind that gender, woman and women’s lives are all
feminist concepts, but that within feminism itself they are not all the same thing.
Finally, to make matters even more interesting, political theory is now engaged
with theorisations of gender drawn from very recent developments, such as
cultural studies, media studies, multiculturalism, post-structuralism and post-
modernisms. These ideas and interests are not necessarily aligned with all, or
indeed any, of contemporary feminisms in terms of subject matter or inspiration.
On the whole, though, there is a tremendous debt in this area to feminist thought.
While strong claims can be made for understanding gender in feminist frame,
this is to some extent a matter of acknowledging a conceptual development in his-
tory, rather than stating a necessary truth about the concept. Political theory itself
records any number of historical encounters in which specific movements have
defined and deployed philosophical concepts, which have then been dropped or
redefined as political circumstances changed. ‘Monarch’, ‘republic’, ‘citizen’,
‘equality’, ‘right’ and ‘obligation’ are obvious examples. Gender is another con-
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of feminism with malestream thought, but its own conceptual genesis predates
contemporary feminisms, and its future is open to other interpretative moves and
political movements.
1 Sex and the single political theorist
Political theorists in the malestream canon have certainly noticed sex, taking
sex as the two ‘opposite’ sexes – male and female – and considering them repro-
ductively. Or rather, when the subject of reproducing the community arises,
women appear as wives and mothers (in that order), and men appear in rela-
tion to them as husbands and fathers within ‘the family’. This is not necessar-
ily just any family, as it could be a royal family (in theorists of patriarchal,
hereditary monarchy). At the other end of the class spectrum the family
arrangements of slaves, household servants, unpropertied workers (on or off
the land) are rarely explicitly theorised. Rather traditional political theory most
usually characterises a subject or citizen of a certain class and status, whose
sex only emerges as explicitly male when reproductive issues eventually arise.
Otherwise the subject or citizen has an abstract quality in relation to sex, and
specifically to femaleness, in that this supposedly generic ‘man’ is always
singular (that is, never pregnant) and occupies a public status that presumes
certain background institutions, typically but not exclusively the family.2
Background institutions are not wholly forgotten or excluded, of course. Sex-
ual, reproductive and ‘family’ circumstances are generally theorised as natural
and therefore inevitable and unchanging. Nonetheless, they are, somewhat par-
adoxically, also theorised as subject to the protection and supervision of the
‘properly’ political processes that constitute the foreground of political theory.
Theories that naturalise relationships and institutions always provoke a certain
tension, because they also necessarily invoke a concept of unnaturalness and a
need for regularisation. If heterosexual marriage and patriarchal families are so
completely natural, why then theorise them at all? In political theory they are
theorised not only in relation to ‘public man’ the subject or citizen as back-
ground, but also as a potential political problem within foreground concerns.
One of the political responsibilities of ‘public man’ is the orderly maintenance of
‘natural’ reproductive arrangements in the ‘family’ and heterosexual relation-
ships in patriarchal marriages, even when these are (rather disingenuously)
claimed to be ‘private’ and somehow protected from state ‘interference’.
Political theorists have in general been complicit with the backgrounding
and naturalising of sexual, reproductive and ‘family’ arrangements. There are,
of course, exceptions, and it is worth exploring one in particular in order to
raise the issue of bodily differences and the question of the validity of general-
isations in relation to sex. Plato’s dramatic dialogue The Republic (c. 380–370
bc) is the sole malestream work that raises female sexual difference as an issue
in relation to citizenship roles that were almost universally limited to men. In
this work, leadership (or ‘guardianship’) is conceived as membership of a class
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of warriors and rulers constrained to serve the best interests of the community.
They are explicitly divorced from the more usual self- and family-centred con-
cerns which all too often tempt those who exercise public power into material
corruption at community expense. The ‘dialogue’ actually recounts dramatic
yet conversational interchanges between Socrates (as a character) and other
named male individuals, and the build-up given by Socrates to the introduction
of such a controversial topic is considerable. He assumes that his audience will
find the idea of female warriors and rulers ridiculous and absurd, which indeed
they do (449a–457b).
This episode in political theory has been notorious, rather than influential,
and in particular it has not been much revived by feminist commentators. In
The Republic Socrates does not involve himself in any detailed discussion of the
bodily characteristics that are generally taken to constitute the femaleness and
maleness that the notion of two ‘opposite’ sexes is generally taken to reflect. The
male audience is happy in their idea that men are physically and intellectually
more suited to martial valour and wise rulership through their bodily capaci-
ties than women, whereas women are more suited to domestic concerns and
child-bearing through their bodily capacities than men. The argument put for-
ward by Socrates, in contrast, is based on exceptions to that generalisation,
which the male audience is forced to admit. These include an admission that
some men are better than some women at supposedly female-only pursuits, and
an acknowledgement that the barriers to martial training for females are cul-
turally rather than physically determined, and therefore malleable. Quite why
Plato the author wants to make Socrates the character propound this line of
argument is never explained. Feminists have been understandably unhappy
with the presumed validity of the generalisations about woman, however
embedded in dialogical concerns, and with the overall absence of interest in the
history of female oppression and of vision with respect to women’s lives.3
What Socrates does not do in The Republic is to explore the supposed basis
of the sexual distinction between males and females in the first place to any
significant degree. He deals with bodily difference by noting that women bear
children and men mount women. This rather brutal account of sexual differ-
ence enables him to argue that it really does not bear on any other activities in
society such that all women or all men are suitable or unsuitable for any task or
tasks. He thus theorises a panoply of individual differences in relation to social
activities that must be sorted out in every single case. This has the advantage of
respecting any particular individual’s personal qualities, without first estab-
lishing what must necessarily be true of them as a man or as a woman, or what
is likely to be true of them (to which generalisations there could, with argu-
ment, be exceptions). Whether Socrates has produced a defensible theorisation
of the human subject in relation to life cycle and occupational issues, or
whether he is merely another reflection of malestream inattention to the body,
and in particular to the female body (for example, wombs/parturition,
breasts/lactation), are interesting points of current debate.
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2 Sexual behaviour and the panopticon of science4
Gender was coined as a term, not in political theory, but in nineteenth-century
social science. The context then was the incorporation of the ‘study of man’
into the current framework of science, involving factual observation of regu-
larities, careful recording of data, inductive procedures of theory-formation,
deductive formulation of predictions and a search for causal factors of expla-
nation. As with the industrial technologies that developed in conjunction with
the progress of the natural sciences, so there were policy-orientated and thera-
peutic practices that developed from the social sciences. These ranged from
bureaucratised teacher training and mass education to social work and psy-
choanalysis, as new ‘knowledges’ were conceptualised and operationalised.
Sexual behaviour became a subject of study (in fields that came to be known as
psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology and anthropology) and a concept was
needed to indicate that biological sex itself did not produce uniform patterns of
behaviour in individuals. Rather, individuals progressed through a process of
development that originated in maleness or femaleness, but either arrived at
corresponding masculine and feminine forms of behaviour, or did not.
Forms of behaviour that were thought to correspond correctly to maleness
were, unsurprisingly, those that tended towards physical and intellectual aggres-
sion, unemotional individualism and competitive achievement, sexual promis-
cuity and risk-taking (among other similar human attributes). Those behaviours
that were thought to correspond to femaleness were, of course, presumed to
reflect an opposite: physical weakness and dependency, emotional excess and co-
operative social strategies, sexual constancy and security-consciousness (again,
among other similar characteristics). Moreover correctly corresponding behav-
iours in early gender theory were not limited to individualised expressions of
masculinity and femininity, as just described, but also to the presumed biological
relationship of the two sexes to the reproductive process. Desire and behaviour
between the sexes (and in a negative way, within each of the two sexes) was also
theorised in terms of gender, that is, masculine men and feminine women were
theorised as desiring each other sexually within a reproductive relationship, or
within courtship rituals and choices reflecting this supposed imperative.
Thus gender as a concept presumed that biological sex issued forth in corre-
sponding behaviours related both to rather generalised strategies in social
behaviour (for example, independence and aggression versus dependence and
co-operation) and to specifically sexual activity (for example. heterosexual
courtship and reproductive marriage). For the policy-orientated and therapeu-
tic practices that flowed from this laboriously observed (if not newly discovered)
scientific knowledge, the concept of unsuccessful, incomplete or abnormal
behaviours was crucially important by definition, because policies and therapies
must conceptualise the problems they aim to solve. It follows that these problems
must be intensely observed in order to discover their causes, and strategies must
be developed to deal with their consequences, both individually and socially.
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Within the social science of human sexology, masculine women and femi-
nine men were defined conceptually, located, observed, recorded and studied.
Homosexual behaviour was similarly studied and made individually and
socially problematic. Linkages between ‘inverted’ gender (masculine women
and feminine men) were theorised, but rather unsatisfactorily: homosexual
men did not always seem to exhibit any uniformity of pairing behaviour
between feminine men (unless such ‘inverts’ were defined tautologously as
‘feminine’ in virtue of same-sex attraction). In so far as masculine women and
lesbians were investigated, which was considerably less, much the same kind of
incongruity arose. Attempts to map same-sex relationships back on to assump-
tions that sexual relationships require the attraction of ‘opposites’ generally
tended to fail. In sum, gender came to stand for the behavioural aspects of sex
and sexuality, whether in correct correspondence with ‘reproductive biology’
or in deviance from it in diverse but problematic ways.
Between societies these behaviours could be similarly tracked and classified,
subject to cultural and historical differences that social scientists were trained
to factor out. A naturalised conception of opposite sexes and reproductive het-
erosexuality was clearly the basis from which the concept of gender emerged,
and it did so precisely because it enabled social scientists to project the presumed
truths of biological science forward into hitherto unsystematic studies of
human behaviour, given that humans were in their bodily construction, and
deepest identities, necessarily of two ‘opposite’ kinds.
3 Sexual politics and political theory
Political theory has reflected methodological assumptions in common intellec-
tual currency. These, of course, have been different, at different times. Plato’s
dialogues reflect a particular way of doing philosophy, and a number of
assumptions about how truth is produced, and what it is for. Other theorists
have employed rather different assumptions, reflecting other views about truth,
and what political difference its circulation could make (for example, Hobbes’s
‘science of politics’). Moreover political theorists have often had more or less
overt political agendas themselves, and have been in touch with political move-
ments that they hoped to influence, and which influenced them. These move-
ments may have been highly elitist or radically egalitarian, or anything
moderate and moderating in between.
Political theorists thus typically endeavour to link the most abstract questions
of method applicable to human affairs with truths that are communicable to
their contemporaries and even translatable, at times, into actions and institu-
tions. The attempted incorporation and ultimate acceptance (at least in some cir-
cles) of gender as an important, perhaps even fundamental concept in political
theory, has involved similar considerations. That is, a link between feminism as
a political movement, and feminist political theorists, has been fundamental in
this process. Moreover feminists in political theory have arguably contributed
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independently to a reconceptualisation of gender, sexuality and sex itself, with
far-reaching consequences for the social sciences and, indeed, for the way that
biological science conceptualises the human life form, and others.
Feminism, as a theory of women’s oppression, and a practice of resistance to
male domination, brought women’s lives, woman and gender to political the-
ory. This was not an easy process, as the canon of authors, the register of con-
cepts and the discursive presumptions – about ‘man’ and ‘his’ social
relationships, and about who is writing for whom about what kind of things –
were regarded as, if not fixed, at least very stable. Indeed, by the 1950s and
1960s it was suggested that perhaps this stability in political theory reflected a
decline because the world had less need for political theory itself. Ideological
battles were said by some to be over, and liberal consensus declared to be ascen-
dant. Feminists were not the only ones to disturb this latter-day tranquillity, but
disturb it they did. Battling to get women’s concerns recognised as theoretically
significant, and woman validated as an object of theoretical interest, feminists
launched the gendering of political theory.
This involved more than introducing woman as an idea and empirical refer-
ent, precisely because this introduction challenged the former universality of
‘man’ as the human individual. This was a double challenge: ‘man’ was
revealed to incorporate masculine presumptions concerning social behaviour
and bodily configurations; woman introduced whole new areas to political the-
ory that had formerly been treated as pre-political, non-political or anti-politi-
cal. These included reproductive roles, family structures, sexual relationships,
domestic spaces and numerous moral or religious or cultural issues as they bore
on women’s lives. These had generally been unnoticed, discounted or natu-
ralised by male political theorists. Whether there is any way of salvaging an
unsexed conception of the human individual as a foundational concept in polit-
ical theory, or any point in doing so, is currently an area of debate within, as
well as outside, contemporary feminisms. Similarly, whether there are any
aspects of women’s lives (or anyone’s life) that are, or should be, excluded or
protected from politics, is again a debatable question.
It is clear, however, that feminist work has considerably developed and
enhanced the concept of gender in interesting and complex ways within polit-
ical theory, and in the disciplines on which it draws. Working through this
development requires rigorous attention to what gender adds to conceptions
of sex and sexuality. In so far as gender slips back towards the supposed sim-
plicities of males and females as ‘opposite’ sexes, it fails to add value to those
notions, and detracts from the work that the concept should be doing. Gender
as a synonym for sex is clearly redundant, and reductive strategies to push it
that way produce confusion. Rather than reinscribe conventional understand-
ings of sex and sexuality in political theory, theories of gender must locate
sex and sexuality in relevant ways. Or, in other words, beware of the current
tendency to substitute gender for sex just to the side of the boxes where you are
supposed to tick M or F.5
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4 Three theories of gender
While there is a case to be made that three theories of gender have emerged
chronologically, it is certainly true that all three exist at present, are utilised,
and are useful. It is probably better to view them that way than as evolutionary
steps in a literature towards something superior, with possible reverse extinc-
tions. I shall try to indicate something of the strengths of each theory as I go,
by suggesting the kinds of problems that each could address, and the charac-
teristic kinds of conceptualisations that a theorist would employ. Perhaps
rather against the grain of canonical conceptions of political theory, I have cho-
sen this somewhat authorless way of presenting ideas. However, I hope in this
way to keep a clear analytical focus, and to provide a framework through which
to follow what particular authors are saying. I would not claim that any set of
authors exemplifies any one of my theories, the way that I have set them out,
nor that anyone’s work would be better if this happened. Most authors provide
discussions that employ at least one of my three theories at some stage.
Nonetheless I have given some reading for each theory that is particularly rel-
evant to the area, either as background or as analysis. My hope is that readers
(and authors) will get a clearer picture of what they mean by gender at differ-
ent points in any discussion, and not fall into the trap of letting this useful term
slip to mean just ‘biological sex’.
4(a) Behavioural theories of gender6
In these theories gender stands for behavioural aspects of sex and sexuality,
understood at first in a biological context of presumed reproductive instincts
located in individuals, who are of two profoundly different types, namely, male
and female. Individuals of these two types then exhibit a range of ‘normally’
corresponding individualised behaviours, as masculine men and feminine
women, or other-directed behaviours, as heterosexuals (of two types, males
and females), desiring biological opposites and reproductive mates. This further
entails exhibiting non-sexual behaviours in relations with other individuals of
the same sex, given the impossibility of biological mating. Where individual
behaviours deviate from this ‘normality’, whether individually as personality-
types or in interpersonal relations, this is then deemed scientifically and thera-
peutically problematic, and causes are hypothesised, mechanisms described,
and tests conducted.
The strength of these theories is precisely that they are behavioural, and
that observations can be accumulated and regularities postulated. This would
not have been possible if the relationship between biological sex and behaviour
(both as sexed individual, and within interpersonal sexuality) was presumed to
be fixed. If that were the case, then certain processes could never be observed,
because they could never exist. Here the theories become more complex and
developmental as they move out of the biological and into the sociological
and psychoanalytic realms. Theorisations include individual processes of
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psychosexual development and socialised forms of education, such that boys
become boys, girls become girls, men men and women women. Political theory
became gendered, that is, concerned with individual sexed behaviour and with
sexual relationships of all kinds, as central both to the very notions of the
human individual and political society.
Unsurprisingly there have been a number of protests, and protest move-
ments, reacting to the claims of deviancy and abnormality that were openly
stated or covertly implied in the study of gender. Feminisms and gay movements
struggled against the stigmatising and demeaning classificatory schemes
within gender studies, while simultaneously enriching and realigning the scope
and content of the research conducted. While these critiques revealed that clas-
sification schemes and research results were in general very close reflections of
the assumptions and prejudices of the researchers and of dominant groups in
their respective societies, the approach still has a certain conceptual and
descriptive validity.
4(b) Power theories of gender7
As a theory of women’s oppression, feminism is by definition concerned with
power. The framework sketched above was already, if not always explicitly,
imbued with a further dimension, that of power-relations. This included both
structural power in terms of institutions and micro-power in terms of interper-
sonal relations. In this theoretical framework gender works not merely to reveal
the role of institutions and agency in individual behaviours and relationships,
but to analyse and evaluate the power-relations that are characteristically in
place as sexed individuals and sexual relationships are produced in societies
according to certain regularities. Feminist analysis and commentary revealed
the extent to which individuals that (‘successfully’) became conventionally
masculine/heterosexual then accumulated advantages at the expense of those
who were produced as female/homosexual. Theories of patriarchy reflect this
linkage between the characteristic ways that masculine/heterosexual men are
produced as power-wielding individuals, and as intimidatory ideals, in relation
to women’s lives and any usual concept of woman.
While patriarchy is literally ‘rule of the fathers’, the term has been succes-
sively refined and rechristened as fratriarchy and viriarchy to denote the
homosocial relationships among masculine/heterosexual men through which
economic and emotional resources are monopolised, against the participation
and influence of women. Theorisations of this kind have been criticised for
over-generalisation about power-relations, neglecting the competitive power-
relations within masculine/heterosexual power structures, and for devaluing,
dismissing or denying the extent to which women can, to their advantage, gain
entry to power-relations as they currently exist. The former point has been
addressed by work that theorises dominant and non-dominant masculinities,
particularly non-heterosexual ones. The latter point has been aired by feminists
keen to promote equality of opportunity and individual achievement for
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women in contemporary conditions, even at the possible expense of an all-
encompassing female solidarity.
These debates within feminism have raised very traditional issues in political
theory: what is the good society? What are the appropriate strategies for realis-
ing it? How are individual rights and present entitlements balanced against the
possibilities for collective change? How can change benefit excluded and
oppressed groups? Without a theory of gender, the relevance of sex and sexu-
ality to these questions would not be visible, and without a power-theory of
gender, the link between contemporary political debates and movements, and
the literature of political theory, would not be available.
Much of conventional political theory has been descriptive and naturalising,
telling us what must be the case about ‘man and society’, such that we can
understand why relations of political power in society are necessary, and then
see which principles and institutions are most advisable within realistic bounds
of possible change. Power theories of gender imply a new agenda for political
change, driven by political theory. This is one that bears on very basic questions
of individual identity, fulfilment and protection. Theorisations suggesting that
politics is about ‘who gets what’ or about ‘individuals choosing life-plans’ now
seem rather bland and simplistic.
Once the individual that political theory conceptualises becomes much
more complicated and differentiated, and more thoroughly embedded in
complex and constitutive relationships and bodily configurations, then power
relationships become much more varied and problematic. This opens the way
to radical revisions of political theory, rather than just critique, however
thorough, of existing frameworks. Once sexed behaviour and sexual relation-
ships are released from biological or psychoanalytic reductionism, it follows
that gender describes and empowers ‘differences’ that far exceed the limited
and limiting vocabulary of conventional wisdom: male/female, straight/gay,
masculine/feminine.
Gender politics liberated ‘difference’ in a way that affects everyone (as
opposed to race/ethnicity, multiculturalism, and any number of other rather
more sociological categories that might not seem to affect every human indi-
vidual). However, gender, because of its origins in sex and sexuality, also seems
to license a constant reduction of ‘difference’ back to the supposed basics of sex
and sexuality. Is there a hierarchy within ‘differences’? Are sex and sexuality
more central to human political identities than, for example, race/ethnicity or
religion? If not, what concerns then allow or circumscribe an intelligible and
predictable politics of identity? Political theory currently reflects this tension in
its theorisations, much as practical politics reflects the ways that people battle
it out. Feminism faced up to these questions when confronted with ‘women of
colour’, who famously refused the generalisations about woman that white
women had offered. Any identity politics faces these issues, and political theory
is one area in which such debates take place.
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4(c) Performative theories of gender8
The ‘linguistic turn’ in post-structuralist philosophy has been extremely influ-
ential across the social sciences and humanities, and particularly so in gender
studies. Feminists had already addressed categorial questions about the relation
between women’s lives and the category woman, both in terms of the way that
social institutions produce women and in terms of the ways that female- or fem-
inine-identified categories are defined in relation to, or as the ‘other’ of, male-
and masculine-identified ones. Feminists had charted the way that these cate-
gories are represented visually and in other non-textual ways, particularly in
popular culture. It was a small but revolutionary step from these studies to a
dramatic reversal of the sex-gender story.
Rather than presuming, however variably and malleably, the supposed bio-
logical baseline of male/female difference, and seeing behavioural gender and
gendered power-relations as in some sense following on from sex differences
embedded in the body, a performative theory of gender reversed direction. Very
simply, gender was no longer viewed as an aspect of sex, but rather our very idea
of sex was said to be an aspect of gender. Gender was said to be a categorial
structure of binaries, arranged hierarchically, such that concepts of sexual
difference and sexualities were produced, including the apparently natural
biology of reproductive sex. That is, conceptual binaries male/female, man/
woman, masculine/feminine, rational/irrational, strong/weak, active/passive,
physical/emotional, and so on, exist within language. From that language we
construct and create realities of all kinds, including supposed ‘natural’ or ‘bio-
logical’ facts as sexual difference. The hierarchical binaries through which core
identities are constructed are then mapped back on to bodies, enforcing their
identification as male or female, irrespective of inter-chromosomal and other
deviations from a norm that biological and psychological sciences themselves
create. On this view ‘nature’ does not create anything; rather, humans have
concepts of nature that explain, often with political import, what is fixed and
inevitable about the world.
Gender is thus a ‘performative’, that is, a category that seems to name as a
reality that which it constructs itself in and through the performances that are
its only existence. Or in other words, there is nothing natural or biological that
gives us men and women. Men and women are constructed conceptually
through hierarchical conceptual binaries that make such social and physical
identifications as possible as they are. These performances are so thoroughly
learned through processes of citation and repetition that they generally seem
natural to the subjects who perform them. Human subjects are thus stylised and
scripted, naturalised and inscribed, such that concepts of voluntary action and
agency exist always and already within this apparent core of personal identity.
While this kind of theorisation is counter-intuitive, there are clues to its valid-
ity that we can recognise. One is the extent to which supposedly naturalised
realities have to be regularised, enforced and produced through social processes
involving education, medicine and commercialisation. This includes all
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manner of goods and services that seem to be directed at men and women, but
actually as performances constitute human subjects in these guises. Personal
consumption of men’s and women’s items, on this view, does not reflect identi-
ties and differences that have the universal and natural importance that they
are said to have. Rather these patterns of consumption cite a socially con-
structed and culturally malleable pattern of hierarchical binaries, as subjects
are ‘educated’ and ‘disciplined’ into gendered groups to consume them.9
Conceiving of gender as a constantly changing, yet relentlessly naturalising,
system of hierarchical binaries, allows for an almost infinite differentiation
between ways of being men and women, and ways of being sexual. In this way
niche markets create new kinds of consuming subjects, who come to feel their
‘inner’ identities as natural. The work in gay studies on the origin and develop-
ment of the homosexual subject, as well as feminist work on ‘drag’ and other
subversions of femininity, have been influential in revealing the extent to which
gender as a performative allows for ‘playful and erotic games’ that we all come
to understand.10 These occur within the performances through which gender,
as an open-ended and inherently diversifying system, pervades an increasingly
sexualised and concomitantly commercialised society.
5 Gender and political theory
Gender is arguably the biggest thing to hit political theory since democracy.
Equally arguably, gender is a conceptualisation that has arisen within the
globalised thrust of democratic political change. This movement has not only
expanded the categories of persons deemed worthy to share in ruling and being
ruled, it has also expanded the scope of state power to determine rights and
obligations, to protect and regulate all kinds of activities, and to promote and
distribute material welfare. As mentioned above, the emancipation of women
from restricted civil liberties and reduced material welfare is proceeding, and
this has brought considerations of sex (specifically as femaleness) into political
theory from a new perspective. It has also raised corresponding issues con-
cerning men, along with matters related to children and ‘family’ roles, includ-
ing reproductive heterosexuality. This has effectively and irrevocably politicised
an apparently natural order of things. Something of the same considerations
apply to sexualities alternative to reproductive heterosexuality, further loosen-
ing the grip of naturalising accounts that validate behaviours for some, and
criminalise or demean the behaviours of others.
Concepts of sex and sexuality are linked to behaviour via theories of gender,
of which I have outlined three. These do the additional work of raising a
description or categorisation into an issue. Behavioural theories of gender map
the distance between behaviours (both sexed and sexual) and the presumed fix-
ities of reproductive biology or psychoanalytical development. Power theories
of gender track the disparities of power and resources between behavioural
groups (from masculine/heterosexual men on down) as society reproduces
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them through educational and disciplinary processes. Performative theories of
gender present the binary and hierarchical character of the concepts through
which the lived experience of sex and sexuality is constructed, including the
supposed ‘natural’ truths of reproductive biology.11
Performative theories of gender are most effective in linking gendered theory
to further theories of ‘difference’, typically involving race/ethnicity, cultural
markers and multiculturalism, religious and linguistic identities, and so on.
They have the effect of removing the claims of any one characteristic, even the
bodily characteristics we demarcate as sex, from any clear prioritisation over
any other characteristic. This defuses debates as to which identity, or which
form of oppression or discrimination, is more significant or hurtful or pressing,
because that form of identity is more intrinsic, natural, unchangeable,
inevitable or foundational to the human person. Prioritisation must come
through a clearly political process, and cannot, on this view, be factored into
‘natural’ hierarchies and binaries.
This move could facilitate an interesting rainbow of coalition politics, and a
clearer alignment of political theory with all sections of any given community
than canonical texts have allowed. On the other hand, the extent to which more
traditional and foundational conceptualisations of ‘difference’ have a more
immediate appeal, and thus a long-term future, is undeniable, given the way
that political organisation and conceptual discussion tend to proceed along
familiar, well-trodden paths, perhaps for very good reasons. Ultimately gender
could dissolve into one aspect of the ‘politics of difference’, among others.12
Alternatively, the universality of sex and sexuality, and their persistent con-
nection to power relations in society, suggest that the concept of gender will
attain a permanent and salient position in the political theory of the future.
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Introduction
One of the deep attractions of green political theory is its claim to be focused
on the very survival of the whole natural ecosystem of the planet. In conse-
quence, it also addresses the conditions for our biological continuance as a
species. From our own species’ perspective, green theory could thus be said to
be articulating the conditions whereby further meaningful human life is pos-
sible. Exactly how we address these conditions is not just a question of choice
in a plural framework of values. Environmental conditions are far too impor-
tant for such a response. Thus, green political theory often claims, with some
justification, to be markedly different to most political theory to date. It carries
a health warning. This whole perspective gives green political theory a unique
signature. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse this unique signature with
particular reference to political theory. The key element of this signature is
‘nature’. Green political theory conceives of itself as ‘green’, ‘environmental’
or ‘ecological’ because of its key focus on nature. Nature is seen as a crucial
entity in its own right – of which we are just a very minor part. Thus, green
theory is not a conventional theory, disinterestedly examining the value status
of the non-human world. If this more conventional philosophical path were its
sole brief, there would be no purpose in overtly labelling itself green, ecological
or environmental. Nature, qua green, is the key theme. The underlying issue of
this essay therefore concerns the relation between nature and political theory.
If green theory does articulate the conditions of ecological and biological sur-
vival and flourishing, then politics must be imbricated, in the sense that how
humans act politically has a crucial impact on nature and, thus, indirectly
upon our survival as a species. It follows that the character of politics itself
would need to be adapted to the imperatives of green political theory. Green
theory articulates a politics which is responsive to nature and therefore
the conditions for human continuance. The same point would hold for green
political economy.
The first section of the chapter, briefly and non-controversially, identifies the
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perspectives on green political theory and locates common green preoccupa-
tions. Second, the argument then turns to the history of the concept of nature.
Third, having analysed the conceptual and historical dimensions of the con-
cept of nature, the discussion shifts to a critical appraisal of the claims of green
political theory. The chapter concludes on a sceptical argument which suggests
that green political theory suffers from a deep internal tension arising from its
focus on nature.
1 Green political theory
First, a dominant perspective on political theory, in the Anglo-American con-
text, over the last thirty years, has been the normative view. John Plamenatz
defined this as ‘systematic thinking about the purposes of government’.1 This is
not conceived as a descriptive exercise, qua political science. It seeks to evaluate
rather than explain. However, this conception of theory embodies a number of
sub-approaches. The main normative foundational contenders are utilitarian-
ism, consequentialism, Aristotelianism and deontology – with many subtle
overlappings and variations.2 It is within this general normative perspective
that green theorists tend to utilise the term ‘political theory’. Yet, green politi-
cal theory works in an idiosyncratic manner. Unlike the bulk of normative the-
ory to date, which has been largely focused on the very human purposes of
government, justice, equality or rights, the green agenda characteristically tries
to extend beyond human concerns.
Turning to the second issue of this first section: prima facie there are broadly
two green normative political theory positions. The first identifies a wholly
unique conception of political theory. This is the radical ecocentric perspective
of writers such as Arne Naess, Bill Devall, Warwick Fox and Robyn Eckersely.3
The central philosophical axiom of this perspective is ‘that there is no firm onto-
logical divide in the field of existence’.4 An inclusive monistic conception of
nature is adopted. The most well-known example of this is the Gaia hypothesis
which reads the whole earth as a single organism.5 The ecocentric value per-
spective has developed on two lines. The first is intrinsic value theory, which
sees nature as an end in itself.6 Crucially, intrinsic value does not require human
recognition for it to exist. Nature has objective ‘value-imparting characteris-
tics’. The second ecocentric perspective bypasses value theory. It argues that
what is required is not so much ethics as a psychological change in ‘ecological
sensibility’. The real issue is therefore psychology and ontology, not ethics. Eco-
logical ethics derives from a mature and developed psychology.7 Overall, for
radicals, political theory can never be the same discipline again.8
The second dimension of green theory is underpinned by variants of anthro-
pocentric argument. It is important to be sensitive here to gradations within
anthropocentrism. Anthropocentric arguments stress that human beings are
the sole criterion of value. The value of nature is instrumental in character.
However there are many subtle variations within this approach.9 It is important
chap 15  23/1/03  7:50 am  Page 183
to draw an initial distinction between a deep and pliant anthropocentrism.10
Deep anthropocentrism is indifferent to nature and is largely outside the domain
of green theory. Pliant anthropocentrism stresses co-dependency with nature,
although still filtered through human interests. The ‘pliant’ perspective leaves
traditional normative theory largely unchanged. However new issues and ques-
tions are mapped onto the older normative concerns. Green political theory thus
takes conventional issues of justice, freedom, equality, citizenship or rights and
then adds a green dimension, emphasising co-dependency with nature. This
perspective is embodied in the reformist ideas of writers such as R.E. Goodin,
John Dryzek and John Barry. In reformism there is a belief that green aims can
be achieved through coalitions within existing institutional structures.11
The third issue of this section focuses on ‘linking themes’ in all green theo-
ries. Despite the above variance of views, there are four formal themes affirmed
by green theories of most shades – although the reformists and radicals tend to
configure these themes differently. First, all assert the interdependence or inter-
meshing of the human species with nature. This is the signature of green polit-
ical theory. One broad implication of this is that human beings are linked with
nature.12 In consequence, there is a tendency to be sceptical about the supreme
moral position of human beings. Minimally, value extends beyond human
beings. Second, green theories usually think in terms of greater wholes, such
as nature, of which we are, in some manner, a part or co-dependent. Third,
there is a more sensitised awareness of nature than found in all other concep-
tions of political theory. Fourth, there is an anxiety about what industrial civil-
isation is actually doing to nature.
If we focus on the above themes, then the above two green perspectives can
be restated with more precision. First, for ecocentric theory we are wholly inter-
meshed with nature, however, the bulk of contemporary political theory is seen
to be premised on a separation between humanity and nature. The supposition
often underpinning the separation is that human persons are morally funda-
mental. Human persons are regarded as morally (not physically) distinct from
their natural environment.13 Kantian understanding of human agency and
autonomy provides a classical rendering of this point. Kantian freedom, ration-
ality and morality are wholly distinct from ‘natural causation’. The rational
agent exists autonomously as an end in herself and stands morally apart from
the natural world. Natural objects, or nature in general, can always be treated
as a means to an end. The human person is the only entity which can be con-
sidered morally as an end in itself.14
In reformist theory there is still an underlying unease about the position of
human persons, but it is held less stringently. Reformists adhere to the view that
one must accept a more realistic anthropocentrism. This is neatly summarised
in Robert Goodin’s point that one can be human centred without being human
instrumental.15 Further, naturalness, itself, can be a source of value. Goodin
suggests, for example, that nature’s independence is crucial to its meaning.16 He
remains, though, agnostic over the metaphysical load which might be attached
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to this ‘independence’. John Dryzek also suggests that the notion of ecological
rationality is embedded in an anthropocentric life-support system. He notes
that ‘the human life-support capacity of natural systems is the generalisable
interest par excellence, standing as it does in logical antecedence to competing
normative principles such as utility maximisation or rights protection’.17 Eco-
logical rationality is essentially ‘the capability of ecosystems consistently and
effectively to provide the good of human life support’.18 It is important to
emphasise here that it is only humans who are involved in the rational ecolog-
ical dialogue. This is a pliant anthropocentrism mediated through an ecologi-
cal rationality.19 In sum, despite the anthropocentric focus of reformists, it is still
a modified focus, which stresses the need to maintain a stable relation between
humanity and nature.
The second issue concerns ‘inclusive wholes’. There are greater wholes
which provide value in more traditional political theory, for example, the com-
munity, nation, culture, state or race, but all these ‘wholes’ still focus exclusively
on human beings (individually or collectively). The crucial aspect of green the-
ory is that it focuses systematically on even broader wholes – the biosphere,
ecosphere or nature. For ecocentric theories, this demands a wholly different
ontological perspective. As Arne Naess argues, individual human agents
should be considered as mere ‘knots in the biospherical net’ and not as ‘sepa-
rate actors’.20 The self is viewed as a developing process within a more inclusive
whole; it is, in effect, a locus of identification and the more comprehensive the
identification, the broader the self.21 In consequence, the diminishment of the
river, forest, mountain or ecosystem becomes my diminishment. In this context,
the widest self would be the whole of nature. In the reformist view, a via media
is again sought. Reformists see their theory as a ‘halfway house’ between the
ecocentric and deep anthropocentric positions. As indicated, humans are still
intermeshed with the greater whole of nature, but not completely. It is only
humans who can become conscious of this interdependence. It is therefore
important, for Goodin, that ‘just as you cannot reduce the value of nature
wholly to natural values (as the deep ecologists might attempt), neither can you
reduce the value of nature wholly to human values (as the shallowest ecologists
wish)’. Value is always ‘in relation to us’, but this is not same as only having
value ‘for us’. Consequently, ‘saying that things can have value only in relation
to us is very different from saying that the value of nature reduces to purely
human interests’.22 Some features of nature exist independently from us, and,
for reformists such as Goodin, nature as a whole can have value-imparting
characteristics. Thus, green theory ‘links the value of things to some naturally
occurring properties of the objects themselves’.23
Third, it would be a truism to say that the majority of political theories to date
have not been preoccupied with nature. However, nature, particularly human-
ity qua nature, is the central focus of all green theories. This is not to say that
traditional political theories are not adaptable to green problems, but to date
this has not been their overriding concern. This is a relatively uncontroversial
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point, shared by both radicals and reformists, with the one proviso that
reformists see adequate moral resources within traditional moral and political
theories – in Goodin’s case in consequentialist utilitarianism, in Dryzek in
Habermasian communicative ethics and in Barry in a form of neo-naturalistic
ethics – whereas radicals see the need for a new ontology.
Fourth, most contemporary political theories assume that some form of
industrial growth is unproblematic. However, the problem of industrialism has
figured prominently in green debates. As Jonathan Porritt noted ‘by industrial-
ism, I mean adherence to the belief that human needs can only be met through
permanent expansion of the process of production and consumption – regard-
less of the damage done to the planet, to the rights of future generations . . . The
often unspoken values of industrialism are premised on the notion that mate-
rial gain is quite simply more important to more people than anything else’.24
In fact, industrial development is often considered desirable. This is the com-
plete opposite to green theory. There are admittedly long-standing debates
within green theory about sustainable and unsustainable industrialism, how-
ever, this is still premised on the point that something is amiss in the modus
operandi of industrial culture. Ecocentric theories have been particularly con-
cerned to either modify industrialism or to find a radical economic alternative
to it. Reformists have been more concerned to use traditional or more orthodox
tools of law and state policy to control industrialism.
However, do green ideas fundamentally change the character of political the-
orising? The radical response to this question is that mainstream political theory
is rooted in certain beliefs which are totally antithetical to environmental con-
cerns. As Robyn Eckersley comments, ‘environmental philosophers have
exposed a number of significant blind spots in modern political theory’. For Eck-
ersely, these are not just trifling issues which can be rectified by minor adjust-
ments. These blind spots concern, for example, our whole relation with the
‘non-human world’. They are, in other words, fundamental issues which address
our very survival as a species, in relation to nature. We require therefore a radi-
cally new perspective, which moves away from the myopia of traditional the-
ory.25 For Eckersley, these fundamental issues have rarely been given the time of
day in contemporary political theory. Inter-human relations take absolute prior-
ity in mainstream political theory. The state, sovereignty, justice, equality, rights
and freedom are seen to be focused unremittingly on humanity, as indifferent to
nature. Humans decide on whether or not to allot values to the non-human. The
crucial issue here is that it is human decisions and human interests which are cru-
cial to mainstream political theory. The non-human is merely a backdrop to the
drama of human affairs. For Eckersley, the ecocentric root and branch ques-
tioning of this whole perspective should give rise to ‘a genuinely new constella-
tion of ideas’, as opposed to a mild adjustment.26 The reformist response is,
however, more nuanced than the ecocentric, partly because it tries to find a via
media between the radical perspective and an indifferent deep anthropocentrism.
Ecocentric theory is seen to be rooted in unacceptable metaphysical beliefs. Deep
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anthropocentrism is also unacceptable, due to its potential indifference to
nature. Reformists therefore present a case for a green theory supplementing a
more traditional conception of theory. John Barry’s notion of ‘critical anthro-
pocentrism’ catches the drift of this reformist position. It focuses on ‘the place
nature has within some particular human good or interest’.27 It is ecologically
based, but not ecologically centred.
In conclusion, despite sharing concerns, ecocentric political theory does
imply a wholly new ‘constellation of ideas’ which transforms the whole of polit-
ical theory. The new focus would be on the absolute priority of nature. For
reformists, however, green political theory needs conversely to work with con-
temporary political theory, arguing for a green supplementation of traditional
questions of justice, the state, citizenship or rights.
2 Nature
Rather than tackle the minutiae of the above reformist/radical debate, I want to
refocus the discussion on a point which is distinctive in both green positions. Both
perspectives, despite their manifest differences, are premised on the significance
of nature. This is a controversial point, since radicals and reformist read nature
differently. My contention would still be that nature remains central to both. This
is what I referred to earlier as the unique ‘signature’ of green theory. The concept
of nature enables us to identify something as green political theory. Nature is a
fundamental datum on which the edifice of green political theory rests, whether
in a co-dependent or monistic form. This is not a concept which has to necessar-
ily bear any heavy metaphysical load. Minimally one expects every green theory
to be concerned about nature. Yet, what is precisely meant by the term ‘nature’?
This question can be approached conceptually and historically.
First, the concept of nature implies a source or principle of action that makes
something behave in a certain way. Any discussion of the nature of human
beings would usually have this denotation. This is, in fact, the older sense of the
term. It is an idea familiar from Greek philosophers to the present. However,
there is a second conceptual sense of nature that refers to the sum total of things
and events. This sense of the ‘sum total’ can also imply two different ideas: first,
it can signify those things which are distinct from human action, intention or
artifice. Another way of putting this is – nature refers to things which are
driven by patterns of causation distinct from human action. The bulk of our
own organic life is in fact driven by this kind of causation – the facts of death or
indigestion, for example, are not under our control, only their timing or occa-
sion. Nature is the sum of what is not the result of human action. Ironically, this
idea has been attractive for ecocentric theories. For example, when deep ecolo-
gists speak of wilderness, it is usually nature untouched by human action. It is
the wild mountain or river system without any ‘unnatural’ human presence.
The aesthetic of wilderness experience is premised upon this ‘pristine’
untouched quality. The irony here is that most ecocentric theories appear to
Andrew Vincent 187
chap 15  23/1/03  7:50 am  Page 187
work with a monistic metaphysics which consistently denies ‘dualisms’, partic-
ularly dualisms which prioritise humans. Humans are envisaged as mere tem-
porary ‘knots’ in the ‘biospherical net’, rapidly unravelling and slipping back
into the organic soup. Yet, paradoxically, the insistence on wilderness implies
that humans are in someway distinct from nature. Thus, ecocentric theories,
from the opposite end to deep anthropocentric theories, make a subtle contri-
bution to a new dualism between humans and nature. In this case, humans are
villains, qua ecocentrism, rather then heroes, qua deep anthropocentrism.28
The second broad sense of ‘sum total’ addresses the issue that humans are as
much part of nature as any river system. Thus, the sum total includes humans
and all their actions. In one sense, an aspect of this argument is grasped by some
ecocentric theories, which accept that humans are omnivorous, and thus hunt-
ing animals for personal consumption is ‘natural’. This view is premised on the
point that human action is natural. Humans are part of the natural order. How-
ever, it is also important to note that this latter argument has unpredictable
extensions. To follow out its logic more rigorously would include all human
activity in industry, economics, culture and politics within the ambit of ‘nature’.
This, in turn, raises a further issue, namely, that environmental degradation, as
a result of human actions, could also be considered natural. If humans are
an evolutionary species, then all human activities are natural, even if some
are extremely risky for species survival. It may be natural for us to overreach
ourselves as a species and perish. It has happened to countless other species. In
summary, the concept of nature is deceptive. This point is reinforced if we turn
to a brief history of the concept of nature.
The historical argument sees nature as a contingent concept. In ancient
Greek thought nature was intimately related to intelligence or soul. Greek
thinkers would have been genuinely puzzled by later dualistic conceptions of
mind and nature. Another dimension of this intelligence in nature is teleology.
A design or purpose is implicit in nature. This idea precedes Aristotle and Plato
in the ancient world. Cities, temples, gardens and the like are designed and will
decay without an artisan, craftsman or designer. Analogously, for the ancient
world, nature in general implies a purposeful intelligent ordering.29 This idea of
nature as a designed and purposeful order was influential in medieval Christ-
ian thought. Two views derived from this Christian perspective: the first advo-
cated stewardship and care for God’s created order, the second arose within the
ambit of the fall. In the latter, a contemptus mundi and fear of a corruption
implicit in nature affected the whole argument. In sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century European thought the concept of nature changed again. It came to
be viewed as largely devoid of intelligence, rationality or purpose. It was, in
effect, analogous to a machine. In thinkers such as Descartes, Galileo, Bacon
and Kepler dualisms arose with a vengeance – body and mind or nature and
mind. For Galileo, for example, what was true in nature was measurable
and quantitative. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the most decisive
idea to affect the conception of nature was evolutionary theory. Evolutionary
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theory emphasised that nature had an immensely complex and mutable history
(of which we are part), and that nature was a process and not a mechanism
(mechanisms being finished and completed things). Evolution also emphasised
the point that nature was not necessarily benign. Humans were essentially a
primate species who had, for a contingent brief moment, successfully adapted.
There was nothing very special about us, except that our organic brains had
evolved in a quite unique way and we possessed some limited grasp of our situ-
ation. The upshot of this brief conceptual and historical excursus is that the
concept of nature is both mutable and contested. It cannot be simply deployed
as a source of value or as a way of differentiating green theory from other
perspectives, without further explanation.30
This conclusion has a bearing on another question: in what sense can poli-
tics ever be considered natural? Green discussions of this question usually dif-
ferentiate green politics as something uniquely natural. Either green politics is
conducive to a harmonious relation with nature, or, the communal arrange-
ments are, quite literally, natural. These can be called the intrinsic and instru-
mental uses of ‘natural’ qua politics. The intrinsic view suggests that certain
types of politics or morality are natural in themselves.31 Thus, there can be a
natural morality or politics, in an ecological sense. This argument relies on the
idea that there is a non-contested objective natural order to which we can refer.
This view is characteristic of radical approaches. The instrumental view argues
that certain conceptions of politics are more conducive to a natural order, in so
far as they facilitate a more symbiotic and sensitive way of living with nature.
This position is more characteristic of the reformist perspective. However, the
upshot of both these views is that there are certain forms of social and political
arrangements which are either harmonious with or functional for the natural
environment. Consequently, it is possible to identify a natural sense of ration-
ality, democracy, citizenship or justice. However, given that nature is contested,
what effect does this have on green argument?
3 Critique of green values
The problem with green argument is the ambiguity concerning nature. Deep
anthropocentrism ignores any co-dependence with nature. The opposite problem
is encountered in radical ecocentrism. It prioritises a monistic conception of
nature. For ecocentric theory everything has the equal right to subsist. The ethical
community includes landscapes and river systems. Ecocentrism consequently
advocates biospherical egalitarianism. However, what reformists try to do is recog-
nise that value extends beyond humans, but not so far as to ignore humans as val-
uers. The language of interests, qua nature’s interests, is still a human language.
In speaking of nature’s interests we inevitably anthropomorphise nature, how-
ever it still remains independent, to a degree. Yet, what does nature mean here?
In my own reading, the ‘problem of nature’ is truly sensed by reformist
writers, far more so than radicals. Reformists link an awareness that human
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interests are crucial with the point that we are relational co-dependent beings.
We filter nature through our interests, but, we are still intimately related to an
independent nature. Yet, this position has its own problems, namely, how does
one account for both the link between humans and nature, in tandem with
their separateness?
The strategy for dealing with this issue was originally canvassed by the social
ecologist Murray Bookchin. It involves a subtle blending between nature as dis-
tinct and nature as integral to us. To achieve this blending, Bookchin distin-
guishes between ‘First Nature’ (as the product of biological evolution) and
‘Second Nature’ (society and culture as human artefact).32 First Nature, for
Bookchin, embodies a dim sense of purpose. Yet, it is only in humanity that
nature is rendered self-conscious.33 This is ‘Second Nature’. Green theory, for
Bookchin, is nature in human consciousness (qua Second Nature) addressing
itself. As Bookchin put it, somewhat fancifully, in green theory, nature appears
to be ‘writing its own natural philosophy and ethics’.34 Second Nature, qua
green theory, reveals how a society ought be organised. Second Nature has ‘built
in’ imperatives. Humanity is self-conscious nature; we therefore have responsi-
bilities to direct evolutionary processes. This involves fostering a diverse and
complex biosphere, it also implies new concepts of urbanism, decentralised
authority, liberating technology and new types of community. Bookchin refers
to this Second Nature as the ‘new animism’. As we evolve, we see ourselves as
‘nature rendered self-conscious and intelligent’. In social ecology we co-operate
with the implicit teleology of nature.35
A more restrained and less teleological argument can be found in other
thinkers. Barry, for example, articulates the point that we are biological as well
as cultural products. As he comments, ‘“we” are adapted to “our” culture,
which in turn is, at least temporarily adapted to its environment’. Directly echo-
ing Bookchin, he speaks of the ‘first level of our nature’ which is premised upon
our biological constitution. He distinguishes this from our ‘second nature’
which is focused on ‘the centrality of culture in the determination of human
nature’. For Barry, as for Bookchin, ‘culture is our species-specific mode of
expressing our nature . . . As it is continuous with our nature as social beings,
human culture does not represent a radical separation from nature, but can be
viewed as our “second nature”’. In this context, Barry defines morality and pol-
itics in ‘relational terms’ – relational meaning rooted in a community of
humans, the community being co-dependent with nature.36 Ethics is therefore
viewed in the context of a form of communitarian naturalism.37 It accepts our
favouritism for our own species as quite rational, yet, as evolutionary creatures
we can also criticise our own conduct, adapt and modify our activities (thus
Barry’s ‘critical anthropocentrism’). Inevitably, in this reading, our interests
move outside our own immediate species. The ethical standing of nature is itself
natural. Culture ‘can thus be seen as a collective capacity of humans to adapt
to the particular and contingent conditions of their collective existence, includ-
ing, most importantly, the environments with which they interact and upon’.38
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The same distinction, between first and second nature, can be found in other
thinkers who favour a reformist agenda. Thus, Andrew Brennan’s distinction
between relative and absolute notions of the natural, or Mary Midgely’s dis-
tinction between open and closed instincts (closed are biologically fixed,
whereas open instincts indicate tendencies to certain types of behaviour which
are consciously modifiable), express a parallel thesis.39
There are, however, problems with this naturalistic argument. The first con-
cerns the roots of natural morality in local communities. John Barry is adamant
that naturally based ecological democracy, justice and the like, have universal
significance.40 Yet, if it is in our (second) nature to live in local communities, how
do we get from this communitarian ‘natural difference’ to a global naturalistic
ethic? The term ‘natural’ seems to be working extremely hard here and in con-
tradictory ways. Second, it is not at all clear why authoritarian, tribal or many
other types of political community cannot be natural. Third, it is not apparent
why the conception of ‘first nature’ cannot explain culture or second nature.
Another reformist approach to the question of value is taken by Goodin. He
draws a firm distinction between agency and value. Value ‘provides the unified
moral vision running through all the central substantive planks in the green
political programme’.41 For Goodin, the core green values are all ‘consequen-
tialist at root’.42 Agency, however, only advises on how to bring values into prac-
tice. Thus, the ‘green theory of agency is a theory about how best to pursue the
Good’. Thus, importantly for Goodin, one can agree on values, without agree-
ing on the agency. There is no necessity whatsoever to adopt a particular
lifestyle to be green.43
There are major problems with Goodin’s distinction. First, can means
(agency) and ends (values) be so firmly separated? Green’s characteristically are
concerned with how people live. Goodin is clearly out of step here with the
movement. Second, values do usually give rise to policies and agency. The con-
nection between agency and value is culturally prevalent – whether correct or
not. Third, many individuals do respond to ecological issues by adopting
lifestyle changes – which they perceive to be in their own long-term interest.
Fourth, Goodin’s value theory has no particular agency implications. Nothing
that Goodin says rules out authoritarian agency. Goodin’s value theory could
just as well be linked with fascist ecology. Fifth, a related point, is that Goodin’s
consequentialist utilitarianism is potentially fickle. As Brian Barry remarks
succinctly, many greens are ‘quite right to reject Goodin’s proposed substitute
for the quite straightforward reason that it makes the case for the preservation
of the natural environment depend upon what people actually want’.44 If some-
one says that there is a utility in chopping down trees (as many logging groups
across the world do argue), then nothing significant can be said against it from
Goodin’s perspective. If the consequence is massive profits and employment,
then it could be regarded as a consequential good. Utilitarian calculus, because
of its second order nature, is notoriously capricious. Sixth, Goodin’s agnosti-
cism over the ‘value-imparting quality’ of nature is problematic. For Goodin,
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the value is not there at the behest of human consciousness and the ‘value-
imparting quality’ (whatever it is) reacts with the cogniser. To admit this takes
the edge off his dismissal of ecocentrism. Despite separating humans and
nature, Goodin also suggests that humans are part of nature and that his argu-
ment is not so much a defence of nature, as of human modesty in dealing with
nature. As if this was not puzzling enough, he then raises the question whether
the separation between humans and nature is morally significant at all.45 This
admission takes his whole value argument full circle. This is not an uncommon
dilemma for reformists.
Nature, in all the above green accounts, appears to be a contingent resource,
lacking coherence. It might be argued, in response to this, why should not green
theory be motivated by the question: what status should be given to the non-
human environment in terms of policy? Why should there be a problem with
nature at all? There is no decisive answer to this question, yet the following
points should be noted. First, the critic would not deny here that many green
theorists – for example, the whole ecocentric dimension – have been fixated on
nature. Second, all dimensions of the green political theory do focus on the
importance of nature, in one shape or another. There is no reason to call one-
self green, if nature is insignificant. It would, however, be a truism that distinct
dimensions of green theory work with differing understandings of nature.
Third, there is nothing to stop any theorist pondering the value of the non-
human world – even those utterly indifferent to nature. However, one might
hesitate, with good reason, to say that this was green theory, as commonly
understood. Thus, I would still contend therefore that nature is the crucial cat-
egory of a political theory that claims to be green as opposed to one that merely
addresses green issues.
Conclusion
The crucial question is, who or what defines nature? If culture in general is
reduced to nature, then there appears to be nothing, logically, that could tell us
definitively what nature is. If, on the other hand, nature is a cultural and his-
torically mutable concept, then our economic, religious, scientific and philo-
sophic discourses continuously anthropomorphise the ‘natural’. We filter this
‘something’ through our interests. The ‘something’ remains noumenal. Even
calling something ‘first’ or ‘second’ nature performs this filtering task. We can-
not know outside of the ‘webs of significance’ that we weave. Speaking of
‘nature’s interests’ brings this ‘something’ into our cognitive domain. As such,
either there is no way categorically to know what is outside human production
and human culture, or, if we claim that we are wholly natural, then we still
could not know the natural because everything becomes natural. The status of
nature per se thus becomes baffling. Intermediate positions, like pliant anthro-
pocentrism, try to resolve the conundrum by relabelling, which, in substance,
simply restates the paradox in new terminology. Therefore, we do not really
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know, in green terms, what is being damaged or degraded. We do not know
what nature is. Nature is clearly integral (definitionally) to green theory, but
nature remains incoherent and contested. If green political theory is premised
on nature and we have no coherent or uncontested understanding of nature,
then it follows that green political theory is teetering on incoherence.
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Introduction
Is justice intra-national or international, localised or globalised, communi-
tarian or cosmopolitan, universal or particular, in its scope? Do richer coun-
tries have a duty to help poorer countries and, if so, is this duty a matter of
charity or justice, or both? Answers to these questions are often dependent
upon an answer to a prior question: are state boundaries morally arbitrary
and, if so, do we have a responsibility to help the less well off beyond these
borders? A whole range of positions are taken which often cut across the
cosmopolitan–communitarian divide favoured by such theorists who work
within the field of international relations as Chris Brown, Janna Thompson,
Charles Jones and Peter Sutch.1
Cosmopolitanism points to the justification of our moral principles as having
a universal basis. For the cosmopolitan the existing social arrangements have
no special status as the source of our value. The type of universal principles
required is generated by three different sources of cosmopolitanism: Kantian-
ism, utilitarianism and Marxism. Although utilitarianism is an entirely differ-
ent moral theory from that of Kant, it is nevertheless cosmopolitan. Jeremy
Bentham is, of course, the classic utilitarian. His theory is clearly cosmopolitan
in that values are universal, and not the product of various particularistic com-
munities. Each individual feels pleasure and pain and this is the basis of human
values. Individuals have a basic duty to increase the happiness of humankind in
general. The institutions of the family and state, for example, have claims on our
duty because they promote the maximisation of the general happiness and not
because they have priority over utility. Similarly, governments have a duty to
promote the happiness of humankind even if this somehow damages the inter-
ests of its own citizens. The principle of the greatest happiness has to be the
guide to what is right and wrong. In so far as international law is conducive to
the general happiness it should be encouraged, and in so far as war is detrimen-
tal to the general happiness it should be discouraged. Nothing in Bentham’s
view has intrinsic value, except pleasure: everything, including the existence of
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The central feature of communitarianism is that the source of value
derives from the community, and that communities themselves are ethically
significant. Individuals derive their meaning in life from, and are constituted
by, the political communities they inhabit. Such theorists as Frost and Brown
call themselves constitutive theorists in order to get away from the connota-
tion that communitarianism has of giving priority to the nation or state, but
also in order to jettison the metaphysics associated with Hegelianism. Brown,
like Frost, relies on Hegel for his account of the development of individuality.
Brown quite explicitly rejects Hegelian metaphysics and presents us with
what he calls a ‘demythologised’ version.3 Through the family, the individual
develops a personality and sense of belonging in the world based on uncon-
ditional love. Taking responsibility for one’s projects in the context of civil
society, and participating in the world of private property, the market and the
institutions which sustain them, constitutes a further stage in the develop-
ment of consciousness. This stage, however, places individuals in competi-
tion, and in civil society they experience the law as an external imposition
and constraint. More consciously developed individuals come to internalise
the law and appreciate others as fellow citizens and not competitors. The
rationale of the modern ethical state, based on the principles of the rule
of law and the separation of the powers, is to bring about this transformation
in consciousness.
Rather than as polar opposites the various versions of cosmopolitanism and
communitarianism in international relations are best conceived as occupying
places on a scale, the ends of which are not absolute zero and infinity, but a
universalism or cosmopolitanism which is not completely devoid of communi-
tarianism or particularism, and a particularism which accommodates univer-
salism. Neither is insensitive to the concerns of the other. One of the best
syntheses is that of Onora O’Neill whose concerns are cosmopolitan-based duty
rather than rights. This enables her better to incorporate the particularist
special obligation virtue ethics which motivate communitarians. This chapter,
therefore, surveys the cosmopolitan and communitarian positions before
turning to her synthesis of the two.
1 Cosmopolitanism/universalism
The seminal starting point in discussions of distributive international justice
which transcends state borders, and denies the nation as an ethically relevant
factor in such considerations, is the position of Peter Singer.4 Singer’s argument
implicitly covers both humanitarian aid, typically generated by a sense of soli-
darity when natural disasters dramatically threaten lives, and what is called
development aid, which contributes towards programmes of self-sustainment
such as establishing irrigation systems, sinking wells, transforming farming
practices and so on. The programmes are less visible than emergency aid, but
of more importance in the long run.
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As a utilitarian, the alleviation of harm and suffering is crucial to his line of
reasoning, although he denies that his argument relies upon utilitarianism. He
starts with the assumption that suffering and death caused by a lack of food,
shelter and medical care are bad, and that if it is in our power to prevent it from
happening without sacrificing something of comparable moral significance
then we ought to do it. The principle requires us only to prevent what is bad, not
to promote that which is good. Even in a modified form, which requires us only
to prevent very bad things from happening without having to sacrifice any-
thing of moral significance, the consequences are deceptively far reaching.
There are two momentous implications. First, distance and proximity are not
morally relevant factors: ‘If we accept any principle of impartiality, universal-
izability, equality, or whatever, we cannot discriminate against someone merely
because he is far away from us’.5 Second, it makes no significant moral differ-
ence whether I alone, or millions of other people, are in the same position to
prevent the harm, which in Singer’s examples are saving a drowning child or
helping Bengali famine victims. Put starkly, neither geography nor numbers
lessen our obligation to prevent the harm. This means that giving money to,
say, the Bengali relief fund is a matter of duty rather than charity, and that the
act is not supererogatory, that is something that is good to do, but not morally
reprehensible if I fail to do it.
How much are we obliged to give, and is it a matter of duty rather than char-
ity? On the strong version, we should help others up to the level of marginal
utility, that is the point at which by giving more we would cause a comparable
amount of harm to ourselves or our dependants. On the moderate version,
where we are required to prevent bad things happening without sacrificing
anything of moral significance, we would still witness a considerable transfor-
mation in society because expenditure upon trivia, which the consumer society
encourages, would be morally indefensible.
Both the strong and the moderate versions require us when saving lives is at
issue to invoke a standard of absolute poverty, where the lack of food and
resources lead to malnutrition and death, or when life is threatened by the com-
paratively rare occurrence of extreme famine and natural disaster. If, however,
we are to take a more relaxed standard than absolute poverty, where not only life
itself, but the quality of life should be a concern, then we invoke some notion of
relative poverty, where, for example, eastern Europeans are well-off in compar-
ison with Africans, but poor in comparison with western Europeans. It is a stan-
dard that does not signify any particular level of suffering or death.6 The strong
version of Singer’s case, the one that he prefers, would in fact commit us to
relieving relative poverty to the point where we are almost as poor as the recip-
ients. Even the weaker version, in his opinion, would lead to a significant shift
of resources.
The argument, however, lacks a time dimension, and suffers from an inabil-
ity to assess comparative benefits and costs. The cost of the QE2 was indeed
immense when compared with the suffering that may have been relieved at the
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same cost. The jobs provided, the additional allied businesses that relied upon
the venture, and the multiplier effect in the European economy may well mean
that in the long run more has been given to charity through governments and
individual contributions by prolonging the life of the ship building industry
than if it had been allowed to sink into decline.
More fundamentally, Hare’s objections to intuitive morality apply to Singer’s
type of argument. Singer is not offering a moral theory as such, but presenting
us with something that it is said everyone would agree to, and if we agree to it,
then we must agree to something else because the principle is the same. Singer
gives the example of saving a drowning child at the expense of getting one’s
trousers muddy, and extends the obligation felt in this situation to saving a
starving Bengali 10,000 miles away.7 What is presupposed is, first, that some-
thing that it is said everyone would agree to, ought to be agreed to, and second,
that the principles really are the same. This would entail a scrupulous exami-
nation of what the principle is, but it gives us no reason why we should accept
it, and not reject both judgements.8
Garret Hardin raises a different kind of objection. Can it be morally right to
redistribute resources if the benefits are far from evident? Redistributing bene-
fits may have an affect on what is distributed. Hardin argues that the world is
like a lifeboat unable to take all those who want to be saved. Some people are in
it and others are in the water wanting to get in. If access is not restricted every-
one will sink, and no one will benefit.9 This is a metaphor, but like all metaphors
may be misleading. What Hardin denies is the right of the poor to a share of the
resources of richer countries, and he casts doubt on the moral efficacy of char-
itable redistribution. What he assumes is that the benefit is fixed and if spread
too thinly will cease to be a benefit. Again, the time factor needs to be consid-
ered. The world does not have a fixed capacity, nor can we predict the effect of
redistribution on population growth, nor the effect of population growth on
economic sustainability. There is in fact much evidence to suggest that once a
society has developed sufficiently to provide adequate food, basic health care
and security in old age, increasing population trends level out or decline.10
Indeed, poverty may increase populations on the principle that one extra
mouth to feed equals two extra hands. In addition, if the benefit can be dimin-
ished by being spread too thin, it can also be increased by being spread wisely.
His argument is based on ‘the law of diminishing returns’ which states that
when there are small increases in a factor of production, other factors remain-
ing constant, say, adding labourers to a fixed acreage of land, the resulting
increases in output will after a certain point progressively get smaller. However,
this consideration has to be balanced against the law of marginal utility. The
additional amount of benefit I receive from each additional unit of value dimin-
ishes to the point where negative utility may be achieved. The amount of util-
ity I get from, say, each additional ice cream diminishes until I make myself sick.
What is of negative benefit to me will on someone else’s utility curve produce
positive benefits. For example, if I give my fifth ice cream in a relatively short
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period to someone who is starving the utility derived from it by the other person
is much greater than mine.
Hardin’s position denies the efficacy of both charity and duties of justice. The
distinction between duty and charity which was made by Peter Singer is applied
differently by Gordon Graham. Graham contends that the recognition that
everyone in the world has basic rights to the necessities of life can generate
nothing more than imperfect obligations, that is, claims upon everyone, but
upon no one in particular. The right to social justice requires and assumes a
government or state as the distributor, capable of enforcing contributions and
deterring free-riding, but at the international level no such authority exists.
Basic needs are best met out of a sense of charity rather than as a matter of
redistributive justice which stops at the borders of the state.11
Brian Barry extends Singer’s and Hardin’s distinction further in suggesting
that acting from considerations of justice is different from, but not incompatible
with acting out of a sense of humanity. Accepting Singer’s argument, Barry con-
tends that we have an obligation to give humanitarian aid to the poor, but on the
question of how much he suggests that no hard and fast rule can be determined.12
Humanitarian obligation is not derived from justice, but this does not mean
that it is an act of generosity or that it should be left to the discretion of the indi-
vidual. The principles relating to humanity are goal based in that they are con-
cerned with the well-being of individuals and have to do with questions of
welfare, freedom from poverty and disease, and provision for satisfying basic
needs. In Barry’s view, the duty of humanity is a matter of doing good. A
humanitarian tax may be levied and distributed through international agen-
cies to promote goal-orientated projects. Humanitarian redistribution would as
now be earmarked for specific use and its receipt would be conditional. The con-
trol of the resources would be in the hands of international bodies such as the
International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.
On considerations of justice, however, the ‘distribution of control of
resources would actually be shifted’.13 In other words, the transfer of resources
would not depend upon the use made of them. Humanitarian aid may justifi-
ably have strings attached in order to attain the desirable state of affairs it is
designed to bring about. By contrast, justice is not concerned with these things
at all. Justice relates to a set of wholly different principles which have to do with
power. It is partly about who is entitled to what. Barry’s point is effectively this:
it makes little sense to argue about what a state should do with its own
resources, for example, how it should distribute various benefits to the poor,
until it is determined what those resources are. In Barry’s argument, they
include a right to a share of the income from the world’s natural resources.14 If
we have a basically just international distribution, then the need for humani-
tarian aid is reduced to responding to extraordinary problems relating to
epidemics, famine, droughts, floods and earthquakes.
The principles of international justice have to do with resources in the broad-
est sense, including non-material resources which incorporate issues of rights
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– such as acting without interference from others, limiting the actions of oth-
ers and regulating changes to the non-human environment. Justice, then, has
to do with the distribution of control over material resources and the principles
governing how control ought to be allocated. At this level of abstraction the
principles of allocation are supplemented with the principle of equal liberty
which relates to control over non-material resources. The fortuitous allocation
of natural resources throughout the world is morally arbitrary, and the popu-
lations of the various countries can hardly be held responsible for their good or
bad fortune, and the benefits or miseries which ensue.15 The assumption is that
benefits from favourable natural resource allocation are ‘unearned’ and that
people have no exclusive right to the benefits they obtain from them.
The principle of the strong powers exploiting the weak by laying claim to
their resources has been somewhat weakened by various conventions and
United Nations resolutions to the effect that states have absolute sovereign con-
trol over their natural resources. This morality of the lottery is preferable to the
morality of control and exploitation. However, it is less acceptable to seeing the
world’s natural resources as the common possession of the world’s population
as a whole. International justice, Barry contends, is not a matter of charity. The
redistribution of resources raised through an international resources tax is a
matter of entitlement. Therefore, it must be transferred unconditionally to the
recipient countries. By contrast, Rawls dismisses out of hand the relevance of
the arbitrariness of resource distribution to international justice. A country’s
fortunes, he contends, are due more to its political culture and the virtues of its
people than to natural resources.16
Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge postulate a form of cosmopolitanism that
does not depend upon the idea of a universal political community of human-
kind. They are concerned to emphasise the interdependence of states, and the
effects that each has upon others, many of which have moral significance.
Given these effects can be both good and bad, there is a need for some form of
co-operation and regulation. They subscribe to the Kantian point that just
institutions must be established among all those whose actions can impact
upon each other. Beitz’s argument for applying the Rawlsian difference prin-
ciple to the international context is essentially that the extensive global system
of trade, or complex interdependence, which is part of the conventional wis-
dom of international relations, constitutes a worldwide co-operative scheme
in which every country is implicated.17 Rawls himself denies that the world
constitutes a common co-operative enterprise, sufficient to qualify for consid-
erations of distributive justice in the same way as bounded communities.
Because there is no global society engaged in a co-operative enterprise, there
is no co-operative surplus for which principles of distribution must be found.
Although, more recently, Rawls has conceded that there is a case for the just
distribution of basic liberties, and agrees with the aims of neo-Rawlsian cos-
mopolitans, such as Beitz and Pogge,18 of attaining liberal institutions, secur-
ing human rights and providing for basic needs in accordance with what he
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calls a ‘duty of assistance’, he does not agree with the principles they present
for redistributive justice.19
Beitz distinguishes between a resource distribution principle, which applies
when states are self-sufficient and where inequalities arise from uneven
resources, and a global distribution principle. The latter arises when there are
flows of goods and services from one country to another leading to co-operative
surpluses for which an international difference principle may be invoked.
Beyond the duty of assistance, which responds to gross injustices and inequal-
ities, Rawls cannot see the appeal of the global principle because it posits no
determinate target and is essentially open-ended. Its consequences, he sug-
gests, would be unwelcome because it would be unacceptable to subsidise
choices.20 If two liberal or decent countries of equal resources choose different
paths of development, the one industrialisation and increased real saving,
while the other prefers more traditional ways of living, why when vast inequal-
ities of wealth appear should the former subsidise the latter through taxation?
Rawls’s duty to assist does have a target and a cut off point. The target is bur-
dened societies that are too poor to develop their own just institutions and
equality of liberty, and the purpose of assistance to provide primary goods for
basic needs is to raise a people to the point of establishing such institutions and
to become capable of making their own choices. Such assistance need not take
the form of redistributive justice, and it should not be assumed that giving
money, although this is essential, will redress fundamental political and social
injustices. In this respect change, is more likely if assistance is tied to respect for
basic human rights. Rawls’s criticism of Beitz is equally applicable to Steiner’s
argument for international distributive justice. Steiner deduces two different
types of rights from the fundamental right to equal freedom. The first is the
right to self-ownership, and the second to an equal share of natural resource
values, the value being calculated by subtracting the value added by ‘labour
embodying improvements’. Steiner is elaborating upon the notoriously
ambiguous Lockean proviso to leave as much and as good for everyone when
appropriating land. Steiner contends that ‘the equality of each person’s land-
value entitlement is necessarily global in scope’.21 In his view, we not only have
a duty to desist from inflicting bodily harm on foreigners because of the princi-
ple of everyone’s self-ownership, but also have a duty to pay their land value
entitlement. The essential difference is this: Beitz, Pogge and Steiner wish to
establish principles for equality of liberties, but in addition to Rawls press for a
just distribution of resources.
2 Communitarianism/particularism
The later Rawls, because of his emphasis upon a political liberal conception of
justice, has increasingly been allied to a communitarian or particularist posi-
tion in which the elements of universalism derive from the principles which reg-
ulate communities or peoples. He can no longer be accused of having a view of
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the person as unencumbered or pre-social. For Rawls’s theory personality
depends upon both the formation and pursuit of a conception of the good, and
on being embedded in the political culture of liberal democracy, or at least a well
ordered hierarchical society that respects human rights, which are ‘a special
class of urgent rights’.22
He arrives at what these rights are by deploying the methods of ideal theory.
International relations, for Rawls, rest on a second contract between what he
calls ‘peoples’, or at least their representatives. Rawls is quite explicit about the
fact that his Law of Peoples is an extension of a liberal conception of justice for
domestic regimes. Rawls calls the result of his ideal theorising a realistic utopia,
in that it takes people as they are, but develops laws and institutions that are as
they may become. The resulting Law of Peoples applies not only to relations
among liberal well ordered regimes, but also to decent hierarchical well ordered
peoples, who, although not liberal, uphold human rights and respect basic lib-
erties. They are not liberal because they support a comprehensive doctrine,
whether it be political or religious, and those who do not adhere to it fail to enjoy
the full range of citizenship rights, but do enjoy a basic minimum, including the
security of acceptance of the rule of law.
A political conception of justice has recourse to those ideas which are imma-
nent, or latent, in a democratic society’s public political culture. The human
rights endorsed by Rawls’s political conception of justice operate on a different
plane from those that arise from and are supported by comprehensive doctrines.
This is something that Charles Taylor endorses in believing that there can be an
overlapping consensus on basic human rights, but the reasons for valuing them
may derive from very different comprehensive doctrines.23
Rawls specifies what these human rights are: they are not parochial or pecu-
liarly liberal, nor do they depend upon any comprehensive doctrine or philo-
sophical theory of human nature. His conception of human rights is very like
that put forward by the British Idealists over a century ago. They are those rights
that have come to be recognised as essential for social co-operation, and for pro-
moting the common good. In fact they are universal, subscribed to by decent peo-
ples all over the world, and ought to be by those who do not. Rawls places the
responsibility for sustaining human rights firmly in the hands of governments.
They are rights relating to basic needs such as the right to life, and to the means
of subsistence and security, including the protection of ethnic minorities against
genocide and ethnic cleansing, and to freedom from slavery. In addition, he advo-
cates basic political rights such as liberty of conscience, equality before the law,
and the right to personal property.24 Human rights fulfil three roles: they are the
necessary conditions of the decency of a society’s institutions and legal system;
upholding them averts any question of justifying foreign intervention in a peo-
ple’s domestic affairs, such as trade sanctions or military force; and, they
circumscribe the limits of reasonable pluralism among peoples.25
Others give even greater emphasis to the ethical significance of a particular
community or nation. It is quite common among those who deny the ethical
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significance of a cosmopolitan community to argue that much closer ties of
kinship or group solidarity generate the obligations we have to others. Both
Walzer and Miller, for example, argue that there is no consensus that the needs
of other humans, simply in their capacity as humans, impose any obligations
of justice upon us, indeed there is insufficient consensus on what counts as a
need. Typical of writers from the British Idealists to Walzer and Rorty, Miller
does not see compassion exhausted by an enhanced sense of justice towards
one’s compatriots, one’s family or co-religionists. On the contrary, it is equally
as likely that as long as conflicting demands are not imposed our caring for out-
siders will strengthen rather than diminish.26 Walzer makes a distinction
between maximal and minimal morality, the latter residing in the former. Min-
imal morality is universal only to the extent that it is widely endorsed, not
because it constitutes an objective reality. It is essentially the shared sum of
overlapping outcomes which different moral codes have in common, without
any suggestion that they have a common source. Maximal morality is embed-
ded deeply in communities and is relative to one’s cultural surroundings.
Walzer claims that distributive justice is inextricably tied to the shared mean-
ings of a community because it has to do with the allocation of social goods
such as food, wealth, education and health care provision, whose meanings dif-
fer considerably from one community to another. All discussion of social jus-
tice, Walzer claims, ‘will be idiomatic in its language, particularist in its cultural
reference . . . historically dependent and factually detailed’.27
Justice can be determined in a particular society by interpreting for its mem-
bers the shared meanings of the goods distributed among themselves. Once the
shared meaning of a good is ascertained, criteria for its distribution follow as a
matter of course. Barry calls Walzer’s theory conventionalism.28 If we were to
take the globe as our site of justice we would have to invent the shared mean-
ings for this imagined community.29 Ironically, this is the very accusation that
Dworkin levels at Walzer in relation to interpreting the meanings of American
Society. With regard to health care, for example, Walzer is accused of inventing
what Americans think. Far from the democratic socialism attributed by Walzer
to Americans, they favour only a basic minimum and emergency treatment as
a welfare provision.30 Furthermore, the absence of shared meanings at the
global level is just as much a feature of the domestic scene as it is of the inter-
national, and if justice were to hinge on such a consensus of meanings, then
there is no place for it inside or outside of state borders.
On the question of whether current resource distributions constitute interna-
tional injustice, Walzer wants to rely for the criterion upon culpable harm being
perpetrated by past interventions, rather than upon a universal principle of
redistributive justice. External responsibility for internal ills, arising from such
actions as political control of trade, imperial wars, and the like, constitute inter-
national injustices which may require large-scale redistribution of resources.
Where serious suffering and inequality exist, but which is not the consequence
of some form of intervention, similar redistributions may be necessary, but they
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would not be a matter of justice. Justice does not, in Walzer’s view and in
harmony with Gordon Graham, exhaust morality, and ordinary principles of
humane treatment and compassion may impel us to act out of charity rather
than justice.31
Walzer, does not, however, want to abandon completely the idea of minimum
universal standards of human rights based upon a thin universalism. In Spheres
of Justice Walzer clearly denies the existence of universal principles of justice.
Walzer refuses to ground our ordinary notions of justice in such fundamental
principles as equal treatment, desert or inalienable rights. By the time he wrote
‘Interpretation and Social Criticism’ (1988) and ‘Nation and Universe’ (1989),
Walzer appeared to have change his mind in suggesting that killing, torture and
deception were universally unacceptable, and evident universal consensus on
such issues constitutes a minimal code of justice.32 However, he had already
posited something like a minimum code of morality in Just and Unjust Wars
(1977) some years earlier when he claimed that part of what we mean by being
human is to have a right to life and liberty, whether natural or invented. They
are features of our moral landscape.33 He claims not to create a new morality
regarding just war, but to identify the shared meanings that are globally
acknowledged.
Walzer distinguishes between the covering law type of universalism, which
gives priority to a way of life as uniquely right, and which can be used as the
basis for imperialist arguments, and reiterative universalism, which accepts
that subject to minimal universal constraints there are many different and
valuable ways of life that have equal rights to flourish in their respective loca-
tions, and deserve equal respect to our own. These universal elements are learnt
through diverse experiences, but he denies that there is a common substance.
They are overlapping sets of values which have family resemblances, but which
are nevertheless products of the particularity of historical moral worlds. This is
the point that Walzer is making when he argues that maximal morality, the
type embedded in our societies and social practices, precedes universal minimal
morality, which is in fact abstracted from the former.34
This minimum international morality amounts to the principles of self-
determination (non-intervention), non-aggression and pluralism (the accom-
modation of tribalism within borders). Walzer’s fundamental point is that the
international community regards infringements of territorial and political sov-
ereignty as self-evidently wrong. Sovereign integrity is ensured by the interna-
tionally accepted right of non-intervention which is analogous to the moral
right of the individual to self-determination. Any infringements would there-
fore require extra-ordinary circumstances and special justifications. Given that
the rationale of a state in his view is the protection of individual rights, partic-
ularly human rights, only gross infringements on a significant scale, for exam-
ple genocide, would justify intervention if there are ‘reasonable expectations of
success’.35 In such circumstances, a state falls significantly below what the idea
of statehood requires, and breaches the trust endowed upon it by its citizens in
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some form of social contract. Walzer’s argument brings clearly into relief the
fundamental clash between the settled norms of sovereignty and those of
human rights: the first prioritise the state and its moral relevance, and the sec-
ond the individual whose moral status is often in conflict with that of the state.36
3 Overcoming universalism versus particularism – O’Neill
There are many arguments which link human rights with basic needs, and
affirm an obligation to help the poor based upon these rights. Onora O’Neill,
however, wants to move away from such associations posited by, among others,
Henry Shue and Alan Gerwith. She wants to maintain that helping those in
need is a matter of virtue and obligation but not of right or recht. She is critical
of communitarians because their particularism and norm-orientated practical
reason are relativistic and cannot provide the principles for international jus-
tice in an obviously interdependent world. Cosmopolitans or universalists are
defective because they begin by assuming idealised starting points ‘satisfied
only by hypothetical agents whose cognitive and volitional capacities human
beings lack’.37
O’Neill has argued that modern writers on ethics have tended to sever the tra-
ditional connection between justice and virtue. She associates cosmopolitans, or
universalists, with arguing the case for justice, and communitarians with pro-
pounding a constitutive and embedded view of the virtues. What is crucial for
her is the distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations. O’Neill’s dis-
tinction rests upon the idea that perfect obligations are those which have deter-
minate correlative rights and right-holders, whereas imperfect obligations differ
in structure in that they have no correlative rights attached to them. In her view,
this feature makes them no less obligatory. Those theories that make rights the
fundamental ethical category, and which therefore rely heavily upon the notion
of acts of recipience, find it difficult to justify as good or obligatory other act-
types which cannot be claimed as of right. Thus the virtue of charity is deemed
supererogatory, that is beyond what is regarded obligatory, and therefore in the
realm of discretion, because it has no correlative right attached to it. The virtue
of charity has, therefore, almost become a pejorative term in the vocabulary of
rights based ethical theorists. O’Neill argues that such theorists, including
Rawls, have tended to assume that all obligations have correlative rights.
O’Neill’s response to such views is to acknowledge that it is not feasible to rely
on the social virtues to discharge the functions of social justice. It is a justifiable
fear that unless rights to certain goods and services can be established then the
weak and vulnerable are thrown onto the mercy of the good will of others
which is all too often absent. She acknowledges that it is necessary to have insti-
tutions which establish rights and responsibilities in order to protect the vul-
nerable from systematic and gratuitous injury. To show that social virtues, such
as charitableness, compassion, pity and generosity of spirit, cannot in them-
selves adequately protect the vulnerable and cannot therefore take the place of
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social justice, does not make them redundant. There may still be a whole range
of required and necessary action that is not itself a matter of justice or
claimable as a right.38
Justice is a matter of perfect obligation. Its requirements fall upon everyone
and are matched by correlative rights. Virtues, by contrast, are a matter of
imperfect obligation. Their requirements fall upon everyone, but specify no one
as their recipients. Can principles of virtue, like principles of justice, also be
inclusive or are they always embedded in situations? As with justice there must
be certain principles of virtue which connect, or act as a manifold, for the dif-
ferent spheres of activity in which an agent moves in the world: ‘The spheres of
action must be linked not only by public institutions that co-ordinate or subor-
dinate them, but by continuities of character which support continuities of
activity, including feeling, relationships and community’.39 Without some con-
sistency of character in different situations, life would be erratic and unpre-
dictable, and the basis for trust and sustainable relationships would be eroded.
O’Neill’s point is that virtues are inextricably related to justice and must be
embodied not only in individuals but also in institutions, traditions and the
common culture of social groups. Institutions established on principles of jus-
tice cannot be sustained for long if they operate in a culture of corruption. The
virtues of justice such as fairness, reciprocal respect, truthfulness, probity and
fidelity are essential to the maintenance of just institutions both domestically
and internationally.
Conclusion
In conclusion, then, there is as great a variety of responses to the question of
international distributive justice from the perspective of special rights and obli-
gations generated by communal ties of patriotism or nationality, as there are
universalist claims. Where they differ, in general, is not in denying universal
claims, but in suggesting that these claims have their basis and source in the
thick morality, to use Walzer’s words, of embedded communities. The particu-
larist and the universalist is just as likely, however, to have the same goal of
expanding the moral community to encompass the whole world, without
resorting to an institutional cosmopolitanism. We are talking about differences
in degree, and not in kind, depending upon from which end of the continuum
one begins. For instance, Beitz, Barry and O’Neill are perfectly aware that our
sense of justice and obligation does not extend very far beyond the borders of
our states as things currently stand. They are concerned to show, on the basis
of universal principles, how we have such obligations to others beyond our bor-
ders, and how, given existing institutional arrangements, they may be modified
better to fulfil those obligations. What is particularly interesting about O’Neill’s
argument is that she readily acknowledges that the development of institutions
to eliminate as far as possible avoidable systematic and gratuitous injury can
very rarely come about de novo. Conceptions of reform and the will to make
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changes more often than not build upon current institutions and traditions.
It is a matter of modifying what is to hand, redesigning parts rather than
the whole, and re-establishing relations that have become disengaged. The
purpose is to shape institutions in such a way that they better embody abstract
principles of justice.40
The cosmopolitan who takes the individual as the subject of a universal
moral law, what Beitz calls moral or ethical cosmopolitanism, is not thereby
committed to an institutional cosmopolitanism.41 The key idea here as Pogge
suggests ‘is that every human being has a global stature as an ultimate unit of
moral concern’.42 The idea of a global moral community of humanity does not
logically preclude the division of the world into smaller administratively man-
ageable units, in whatever political form may be deemed most appropriate;
states, federations, empires. Typically in the modern era that unit has been the
sovereign state often coinciding with a desire on the part of a community for
national self-determination. The point that the Natural Law theorist and mod-
ern cosmopolitans such as Barry and Goodin, and cosmopolitan Marxists
would want to make is that the division is not absolute and that states are
merely more or less convenient administrative apparatuses to sustain the pur-
ported common good of the communities they serve. Together these states in
co-operation with each other serve the common good of humanity. In such a
view there is an overlaying of responsibilities, laws, rights and obligations, and
at some point a conflict of duties may arise between one’s obligations as a citi-
zen and as a person. Kant’s cosmopolitanism, for instance, is fully cognisant of
the existence of a primordial community of humankind and of the impracti-
cality of a world state. The best that could be hoped for was a peaceful federa-
tion of states. A modern Kantian ethical cosmopolitan, such as O’Neill,
acknowledges that nationality and other forms of community have an impor-
tance, and securing a national state may be instrumental in achieving justice
for some, as for example looks to be the case with the Kurds. Yet the achieve-
ment of a national state may be just as likely to be the instrument of injustice
to others, as the nationality problem in the former Soviet Union testifies.43
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Introduction
The idea of the just war is in danger of becoming one of the political clichés
of the new century. From an object of neglect and indifference it has been trans-
formed into the dominant image of war in the post-cold war age. Moral distaste
for war and things military, widely felt during an era of superpower rivalry and
nuclear confrontation, has given way (in some circles at least) to enthusiastic
moral approval of the use of force for an avowed humanitarian purpose. Even
a seasoned observer of war like the military historian John Keegan appears
infected with the new spirit: ‘The world community needs, more than it has
ever done, skilful and disciplined warriors who are ready to put themselves
at the service of its authority. Such warriors must properly be seen as the
protectors of civilisation not its enemies.’1 In the ‘New World Order’ the moral
rehabilitation of war gathers pace.
This development might be expected to meet with the enthusiastic approval
of just war theorists. After all, rescuing war from the clutches of realists, paci-
fists and assorted moral sceptics has been the primary aim of the just war
tradition throughout its long history. The idea of the moral determination of
war, once so hotly contested, now seems widely, if not universally, accepted. Yet
this transformation is not without its dangers. It poses a threat not just to the
theory of just war – compromising its critical force and utility – but also to the
practice that the theory seeks to shape or influence.
Classically and, it seems, authentically, just war theory is aimed more at the
restraint of war than it is at its justification. Upholding the moral primacy of
peace over war, it begins from a moral presumption against war. Now, not for
the first time in the tradition’s long history, that primacy and that presumption
are in danger of being reversed, with the idea of just war as moral restraint and
inhibition giving way to the idea of just war as moral justification and empow-
erment. In this more positive and bellicose form, the idea of just war threatens
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212 Just war
1 The ambiguity of the just war tradition
The phenomenon is neither new nor accidental. ‘For the past 3,000 years’,
writes F.H. Russell, ‘just war theories have had the dual purpose of restraining
and justifying violence, essentially a self-contradictory exercise.’2 Restraint or
justification? In its inherent ambiguity lies the central dilemma of just war
thinking. Without restraint war cannot be justified and yet, it seems, the more
war is justified the less restrained it becomes. As realists have frequently
observed, the attempt to subject war to moral regulation leads, all too easily, to
its escalation rather than its limitation. Paradoxically, the biggest threat to the
moral containment of war may come from morality itself. The more war is
informed with moral purpose, the less limited it becomes – the more eagerly
is it sought and the more intensely is it fought. In such a destructive enterprise
as war we may have more to fear from a surfeit of morality than we have from
any deficit.
Must we choose, therefore, between the restraint and the justification of war,
as Russell implies and realists argue? Is the restraint and justification of war
‘essentially a self-contradictory exercise’? Are we to conclude, with the realist,
that the surest way of limiting war is to eschew morality altogether? However
tempting it may be, such a conclusion is less than compelling, for the restraints
placed on war by the amoral pragmatism of the realist are themselves far from
secure. Those limits spring from realism’s understanding of the instrumental
nature of war, according to which a war fought as a means to the attainment
of finite, specific goals – as an instrument of policy – is likely to remain limited
in conception and execution. However this realist concept of limited war is
inherently unstable.
In the first place, the idea of limitation articulated here is quite distinct from
moral limitation. Ends and means may be ‘limited’ in the realist sense and yet
be at odds with moral principle. Second, policy goals may not remain limited, as
realists themselves readily admit. ‘If policy is grand and powerful’, wrote
Clausewitz, ‘so also will be the war, and this may be carried to the point at which
war attains to its absolute form.’3 Third, even if the goals of policy do remain
limited, there is no guarantee that they will be pursued by limited means. In
short, total war is alien neither to the theory nor to the practice of realism.
Realism, therefore, is no solution to the problem of the restraint of war. Nei-
ther is pacifism. By washing its hands of war, pacifism leaves the way open to
its unbridled prosecution. The solution lies not in a rejection of the very idea of
just war, but in a conception of just war that recognises its threat as well as its
promise.
2 Two concepts of just war
The real choice is between two radically different concepts of just war, with
opposing logical structures and divergent effects. It is not a choice between
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restraint and justification, but between two different forms of justification: one
‘negative’, restrictive and inhibiting, the other ‘positive’, expansive and empow-
ering. In the ‘negative’ concept restraint and justification work together. War is
justified in such a way as to strengthen moral inhibitions over the use of force
and to reinforce the moral containment of war. In the ‘positive’ concept justifi-
cation works against restraint, energising war and acting as a form of moral
empowerment. It is not, therefore, the justification of war, as such, that needs
to be rejected, but a form of justification that undermines the essential restrain-
ing role of just war theory. The ambiguity of just war thinking stems from this
struggle between the logic of restraint and the logic of empowerment.
The concept of just war as restraint is based on a moral presumption against
war. The claim that just war theory, in its classical and authentic form, starts
from such a presumption is contested by some just war thinkers. For example,
James Turner Johnson (the most prominent contemporary historian of the just
war tradition) argues that a negative presumption is part of a modern distor-
tion of just war theory.4 It is the result of a radical scepticism about war that has
more in common with pacifism than it has with just war theory. According to
Johnson, the classical view of war itself is a neutral one. It is the moral pre-
sumption in favour of justice that determines whether the response to war is a
negative or a positive one.
There is reason to be wary of regarding war with the kind of moral equa-
nimity that this neutral view of war seems to encourage. Of course, to question
the neutrality of war is not to regard war as an intrinsic moral evil. Johnson’s
concern to dissociate just war thinking from pacifism is understandable. To
retain any intellectual integrity the just war tradition must uphold the poten-
tial moral use of war, a use that pacifism is at pains to deny. However, uphold-
ing that instrumentality seems wholly consistent with the retention of a moral
presumption against war, a presumption that perhaps reveals the shared past
(and continuing, though limited, affinity) of the just war and pacifist traditions.
In the western world at least, the idea of just war as moral restraint appears
to have its source in the writings of medieval theologians and philosophers.
Though notions of the just war are discernible in Greek and Roman thought,
both ancient cultures were too indebted to war and military values to develop
the idea of just war as restraint. The Heraclitean view that ‘war is the father of
all things’ was as much a cultural principle as it was a philosophical one.5 As a
result, the justification of war came too easily to Greek (or Roman) thinkers.
The pacifist tendencies of early Christianity, however, established a moral pre-
sumption against war that survived the later renunciation of pacifism itself.
Unlike their pacifist predecessors, Christian thinkers like Augustine
(354–430) and Aquinas (1224–74) were prepared to defend the potential
moral instrumentality of war. At the same time, the fundamental orientation
of their thinking about war remained a negative one, as evidenced by the ques-
tion with which Aquinas begins his moral analysis of war: ‘Is warfare always
sinful?’6 This was, and remains, an ethical conception of war imbued with an
Anthony Coates 213
chap 17  23/1/03  7:51 am  Page 213
abiding moral scepticism. In this way of thinking there is always something
anomalous about war. Morally speaking, war is the exception rather than the
norm. The presumption is that war is not justified though, in certain extreme
(but none the less real) circumstances, that presumption (like any moral pre-
sumption) may be overcome.
To say that, in certain circumstances, the negative moral presumption may
be overcome is only partially true. In a fundamental sense, that presumption is
never overcome but continues to guide the course of the just war in its ‘nega-
tive’ form. The ‘positive’ concept, on the other hand, may admit a negative moral
presumption as a point of departure, but that initial phase is quickly trans-
formed into an affirmation of war. In this case the moral presumption against
war really is ‘overcome’. The initial moral struggle against war is resolved once
and for all; a negative presumption changes into a positive moral preference,
even, in extreme but not uncommon cases, into a real lust for war. By contrast,
the ‘negative’ idea of just war not only starts from a moral presumption against
war, it is grounded in such a presumption, and the structure and dynamics of
the theory are such as to keep that presumption to the fore at all times.
The restraining role of just war theory is not limited to the identification and
proscription of unjust wars. This ‘negative’ concept of the just war is as much
concerned with maintaining a moral hold on wars that are perceived to be just
as it is with the moral exclusion of manifestly unjust wars. Indeed, in this self-
critical form of just war reasoning, the dividing line between just and unjust
wars is not nearly as clear-cut as some, more positive, conceptions of just war
would have us believe. The danger of concentrating on the distinction between
just and unjust wars is that it may deflect moral attention away from those wars
that have been identified as ‘just’ with the result that the application of the idea
of just war comes to have an empowering rather than restraining effect. In such
instances the early (in fact, premature) delivery of a ‘just war’ verdict seems
designed to quell moral doubts about a war, to silence or forestall moral criticism,
to marshal support or to clear a path for war. Thereby, an instrument of moral
criticism is in danger of being transformed into a tool of political propaganda.
In the ‘negative’ concept of just war the persistence of a moral presumption
against war manifests itself in a keen, actively sustained, awareness of the phys-
ical evil of war. Both the just recourse to war (ius ad bellum) and the just conduct
of war (ius in bello) depend on it. Failure to realise the cost of war in human suf-
fering distorts moral judgement and undermines the moral response to war.
Addressing just belligerents, Augustine wrote, ‘Let every one, therefore, who
reflects with pain upon such great evils, upon such horror and cruelty, acknowl-
edge that this is misery.’7 That acknowledgement is often lacking in a belligerent
whose moral imagination has been fired by the justice or the moral grandeur of
his cause. In its ‘positive’ form the idea of just war can generate an ethic of hard-
ness that makes the ‘just warrior’ impervious to suffering, whether of himself or
of others. By contrast, maintaining a sympathetic awareness of the real horror
of war is a mark and a condition of the just war in its ‘negative’ sense.
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It is not just the physical evil of war that warrants a continuing moral pre-
sumption against it. From this ‘negative’ standpoint, no real war is free of moral
ambiguity. Assumptions of moral purity are both misplaced and dangerous. No
war, however ‘just’, is without moral deficiency and the potential for moral
catastrophe. As noted earlier, this approach stops short of regarding war as an
intrinsic moral evil, in which it is impossible to participate without committing
injustice. Such a view of war underpins pacifism, not just war theory. Rather, it
is a question of recognizing the real moral poverty of war and its potential
moral evil, of guarding against the moral pitfalls in which any war must
abound and the moral degradation that is the common, if not inevitable,
accompaniment of war.
Unlike its ‘positive’ rival, therefore, the concept of just war as restraint does
not ‘idealise’ war. On the contrary it keeps the physical and moral costs of war
clearly and constantly in view. In this regard it remains faithful to Augustine’s
counsel of moral realism: ‘Take off the cloak of vain opinion, and let such evil
deeds be examined naked. Let them be weighed naked and judged naked.’8
When war is viewed in this way, the adoption of a posture of moral neutrality
towards it seems misplaced. Given its brutal and brutalising nature, nothing
less than a moral presumption against war will do.
3 The structure of just war theory
The complex structure of just war theory, properly understood, embodies its
‘negative’ or restraining role. Ostensibly, the mechanisms of restraint in just
war theory are the various principles or criteria that the theory articulates and
upholds. Traditionally, two broad areas of ethical concern and ethical limita-
tion have been identified: one preceding the outbreak of war – the matter of
recourse to war – and one following the outbreak of war – the matter of the con-
duct of war. Though there is no absolute agreement among just war theorists
about their number, nature, or manner of application, the following criteria are
now commonly acknowledged: in respect of the recourse to war (ius ad bellum),
legitimate authority, just cause, right intention, proportionality, prospects of
success, and last resort; in respect of the conduct of war (ius in bello), propor-
tionality and discrimination (or noncombatant immunity).
The ambiguity of just war thinking is evident in the manner in which these
criteria are understood and deployed for, depending on their interpretation,
they can serve as instruments either of moral empowerment or of moral
restraint.
3(a) Just recourse
The role allotted to the criteria of just recourse is a matter of considerable import
and potential controversy. In some versions of just war theory (even more so in
instances of practice or application) their role seems, predominantly, one of
moral endorsement. Often, the individual criteria are understood and applied
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discretely or separately, in the manner of a checklist that, successfully com-
pleted, sets the moral seal of approval on the war in question. One theorist writes:
[T]hese principles have no more than a checklist status when it comes to theory
application. The leader who is thinking about going to war checks off whether
there is a just cause leading to war and then moves on to the other principles in the
of [ad bellum] portion of the theory . . . The necessary and sufficient condition [for
war] is achieved when a positive answer favoring war has been arrived at for each
and every one of the criteria.9
Conceived in this way, the application of the criteria appears more like a form of
moral therapy than one of moral criticism. It seems designed to resolve doubt and
assuage anxiety, to overcome moral resistance to war (as if a moral barrier to war
already existed). In such an understanding moral restraint and inhibition readily
give way to moral endorsement and empowerment. The negative moral pre-
sumption, which should remain a permanent feature of any authentic just war,
has been transformed in this justificatory version into a positive presumption in
favour of war. In this way, the criteria that ought to act as restraints on war
become, instead, the moral catalysts of war. A war that has passed these moral
tests is a war invested with a newfound (and dangerous) moral energy and vigour.
From the ‘negative’ standpoint, just war criteria are understood differently.
They are not fixed moral counters to be applied externally to the business of
war, but analytical concepts, formed as much in the light of the ‘facts’ as in the
light of abstract principles, designed to unearth moral complexities and to raise
moral issues that are unlikely to surface spontaneously. The more dogmatic the
criteria are in conception the less effective they are likely to be in this regard. Cri-
teria need to remain open, or receptive, to the complex realities they seek to
illuminate and regulate.
They need, too, to be seen in dynamic interaction. The deficiency of the
checklist approach is its failure to focus on the interrelation between the several
criteria. Instead it treats them singly and apart (mechanically not organically),
as if they were wholly discrete and independent of one another. The effect of
this approach is further to diminish the restraining power of the criteria, which
derives in large measure from their interactive force.
For example, the manner in which just cause is conceived will greatly affect
the application of last resort. In the Gulf war of 1990–91 the prospects of a
non-violent, diplomatic solution to the crisis always appeared dim, given the
historical parallel drawn from the outset by Prime Minister Thatcher and Pres-
ident Bush between Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler.10 A similar phenomenon
was evident in the moral posture adopted by western leaders towards Serbia in
the Kosovo war. The initial moral characterisation of the conflict left the parties
with little room for subsequent political and diplomatic manoeuvring.
The fact is that some concepts of just cause are more reconciliatory than oth-
ers, some are more confrontational than others – sometimes so confrontational
that an important criterion like last resort is rendered largely redundant or
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unworkable. Interaction works both ways but, whether towards restraint or
empowerment, the manner in which one criterion is understood will have a
powerful impact on the way in which other criteria are understood and applied.
In the ‘negative’ concept of just war the criteria are viewed, not as moral val-
idators, but as moral hurdles or obstacles, designed to inhibit recourse to war.11
The aim is to raise the moral threshold of war, to strengthen moral resistance
to war. The need for such strengthening is often acutely felt. The moral pre-
sumption against war that this concept of just war upholds owes much to the
perception that, far from there being any natural or spontaneous resistance to
war, a strong presumption in favour of war often exists. The last thing needed
is moral reinforcement or encouragement of that presumption. In this negative
tradition the idea of the moral abnormality of war goes hand in hand with the
recognition of a pervasive and widespread disposition to war.12
One of the commonest forms of moral empowerment (and causes of loss of
restraint) stems from a drastic reduction in the criteria of moral assessment,
involving either the simple omission, or the severe weakening, of important
criteria. More specifically, it is the tendency of just cause to monopolise the
moral assessment of war (to the extent that just recourse is often simply
equated with just cause) that undermines moral restraint. This can be seen to
apply regardless of the actual content of just cause. The distinction between
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ just war concepts should not be confused with the con-
ventional distinction between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ war. It cuts across that
distinction. The present argument runs counter to the common assumption
that a war of self-defence is inherently limited or that an offensive war is natu-
rally expansive. So-called ‘defensive’ wars can be conceived and fought ‘posi-
tively,’ just as ‘offensive’ wars (armed humanitarian intervention for example)
can be conceived and fought ‘negatively’.
In its ‘positive’ form just cause is understood in stark (even Manichaean)
terms. A clear moral divide – a moral chasm – is seen to exist between potential
or actual belligerents. The idea that adversaries inhabit the same moral uni-
verse – a key concept in the ‘negative’ theory of just war – is alien to this posi-
tive approach. Here absolute good is ranged against absolute evil. The
conception of the conflict veers towards the apocalyptic. Given what is thought
to be at stake, morally speaking, this is hardly surprising. The struggle with Evil
brooks no compromise and, in any case, such a demonic, or pathological, adver-
sary is thought to be beyond all rational-instrumental appeal.
This inflated moral characterisation of war is not uncommon; no doubt in
part a reflection of the high propaganda value attached to this moralistic form
of political rhetoric. For example, speaking of the conflict with Iraq in
1990–91, President Bush declared, ‘For me it boils down to a very moral case
of good versus evil, black versus white’.13 In the President’s view the Gulf war
was a ‘just war’ in that unequivocal sense. Justice belonged entirely to one side
and injustice to the other. In the mind of the President, it seems, this is what a
just war entails. Many would agree with him.
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In the current ‘war against terrorism’, President George W. Bush appears to
share his father’s (and, ironically, Osama bin Laden’s) absolutist view. This is a
war dubbed immodestly (but, as an indicator of underlying moral assumptions,
revealingly) ‘Operation Infinite Justice’ (a jihad, or holy war, in all but name).
According to the President, the war ‘will be a monumental struggle of good ver-
sus evil [in which] good will prevail’.14 The idea of the ‘just war’ articulated by
the President is without any sense of moral ambiguity, moral self-criticism, or
moral self-doubt. It is portrayed as a struggle, not between civilisations but,
much more grandiosely and exultantly, between Civilisation and Barbarism, a
struggle that embraces the global community, a struggle that knows only
friends or enemies. No neutral, no intermediate, no politically and morally
nuanced, positions are recognised. ‘Either you are with us or you are with the
terrorists’, insists the President (as if to be critical about aspects of American
foreign policy, or to voice concerns about some of the means employed in the
counter-terrorist war, is automatically to side with terrorism).15
The problem with the absolutist, or unilateralist, conception of just cause is
twofold. In the first place, it does scant justice to the ethical realities and com-
plexities of international politics. By contrast, in the ‘negative’ theory the crite-
rion of just cause is approached with a moral caution and a healthy scepticism
that flow from the recognition that the moral boundaries of international pol-
itics are always blurred. The idea of absolute or unilateral justice ill accords
with this more complex appraisal of the sources of international conflict. The
just war is not the struggle between Good and Evil that the ‘positive’ concept
takes it to be. Such an exclusive moral vision of the world flies in the face of a
moral reality where justice and injustice are, more often than not, shared. Con-
sequently, what the ‘negative’ concept of just war upholds is a bilateral or com-
parative understanding of just cause that makes explicit the shared, or mixed,
nature of justice and injustice among potential belligerents.
Second, and more urgent, the absolutist rendering of just cause threatens the
restraint of war. The permissive and perilous implications of an undue regard
for just cause are captured clearly, though unwittingly, in the advice given by
Bernard of Clairvaux to those about to embark on the Second Crusade: ‘O
mighty soldiers, O men of war, you have a cause for which you can fight with-
out danger to your souls.’ Here the sheer moral allure of the cause silences
moral doubt and releases moral inhibitions. The sense of the moral threat
inherent in war, on the preservation of which the moral restraint of war cru-
cially depends, is dulled. Moral defences are swept aside by the force of the
moral impulse itself. Nothing does more to undermine the just war (from
within) than this insidious idea of a war that can be fought ‘without danger to
the soul’. It is anathema to the ‘negative’ concept of just war. Despite common
and persistent assumptions to the contrary, no cause, however ‘just,’ carries
with it the power of moral absolution. A ‘just cause’ is no guarantee of the
justice of war. On the contrary, the more inflated the cause, the greater the
potential for the moral corruption of war.
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The magnification of just cause in the minds of potential belligerents under-
mines the restraining power of the other criteria of just recourse. In the case of
legitimate authority, for example, the right to war is readily assumed by those
who are convinced (or who claim to be convinced) of the moral, or historical,
importance of their cause. In the modern revolutionary tradition, or in the
practice of contemporary terrorism, for example, the perceived justice of the
cause is invariably seen as sufficient authorisation for the use of force by self-
appointed, often miniscule, minorities. In such cases, moral or ideological con-
viction is able to withstand the counter pressure of an adverse, even hostile,
public without apparent moral qualm or effort. The same can be seen to apply
to the assumption of the right to war by states (particularly in the case of wars
of intervention) without prior legal or institutional international sanction. In
both cases the principals claim to be acting on behalf of the very communities
that withhold their support or voice their opposition. The inflated moral claims
made for war help to overcome, or suppress, the problems (and the hurdles) that
are meant to be raised by the criterion of legitimate authority.
Traditionally, right intention is about the moral disposition that is brought to
war. Though relatively neglected in modern times, it was perhaps the key to a
just war for classical writers like Augustine and Aquinas. They realised that the
moral containment of war depended ultimately upon the moral habits and dis-
positions of the parties involved. The greatest obstacle to the moral contain-
ment of war is the ‘lust for war’ that commonly takes hold of belligerents, even
(perhaps especially) those engaged in the pursuit of ‘just’ wars. It would be
unsafe to assume, as exponents of the ‘positive’ concept of just war tend to
assume, that all that is required to fulfil the criterion of right intention are
strength of moral conviction and unity of moral purpose. A ‘moral’ disposition,
in itself, is no guarantee of right intention. A moral disposition that is vindic-
tive and triumphalist is a recipe for unjust war (and unjust peace). There is no
lust for war to compare with a moral lust for war.
The criterion of proportionality suffers just as badly. So elevated is the concep-
tion of just cause that no war, however destructive its potential impact, can appear
disproportionate and, therefore, unjust. ‘Better wipe out Ireland in one year’s civil
war’, wrote Patrick Pearse, the leader of the 1916 Easter Rising, ‘than let England
slowly bleed her to death’.16 The higher the goal of war, the more tolerant of war
prospective belligerents become. Indeed, the apparent disproportionality of war,
far from engendering doubt about the recourse to war, can strengthen moral
resolve. A war that is apocalyptic in its conception demands the symmetry of great
destructive force. ‘How close could we look into a bright future’, wrote Che
Guevara, ‘should two, three or many Vietnams flourish throughout the world
with their share of deaths and their immense tragedies.’17 As many apologists of
the First World War argued, there is no price that is too high to pay for ‘a war to
end all wars’.18 Indeed, the higher its price, the more just war seems.
As noted previously, this immoderate version of just cause has an equally
destructive impact on the criterion of last resort. The absolute and unilateral
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conception of just cause diminishes the prospects of (or, in more extreme cases,
rules out completely) nonviolent – political or diplomatic – means of resolving
conflict, the very means that the criterion of last resort is intended to advance.
The view, attributed to Hamas,19 that a negotiated settlement is ‘the path of
shame’ is widely shared by those who uphold such an uncompromising version
of just cause. A negotiated peace with the ‘Great Satan,’ or with any adversary
that is thought to be utterly beyond the moral pale, would constitute a betrayal
of the most fundamental kind (not least of those who have already sacrificed
their lives for the cause).
Moreover, as Aron observes, the more elevated the ends of war the more
war begins to acquire its own intrinsic, and not simply instrumental, value.20 In
the end, war may be invested with such creative, or redemptive, power that it
comes to be seen as a thing of first, rather than of last, resort, a unique source
of communal and personal fulfilment. Milovan Djilas wrote that
Wars and rebellions are a vital proving ground for leaders, ideas, and nations. Wars
and rebellions are an imperative: to renounce war when it is time for war means to
renounce one’s own inner nature. In opting for war, we came to understand who
we were. Only in armed conflict could we affirm ourselves and force the enemy to
understand us and grant us recognition. That affirmation, that self-realization – of
the self and of the nation – took place on July 13, 1941 [the day the partisan war
commenced].21
From this inflated, moral or ideological, perspective, there really is no substitute
for war. There is a good to be had in war that cannot be had in peace. In this way
the moral primacy of peace over war, which the criterion of last resort is meant
to uphold, is decisively reversed.
In the ‘negative’ concept of just war just cause is not allowed to silence the
other criteria of recourse. Far from making them redundant, the bilateral or
comparative understanding of just cause invokes and strengthens them. The
more complex and contested nature of the moral claim underlines the need to
establish – not assume – legitimate authority. The recognition that justice and
injustice are, to a degree, shared by potential belligerents cultivates right
intention and diminishes the triumphalism and the vindictiveness that flow
from a sense of moral certitude and moral exclusiveness. When war is stripped
of its false grandeur, its proportionality can no longer be taken for granted: the
more limited the end the more disproportionate a means war seems. The impe-
tus to war is checked, as moral divisions become more blurred and moral
enthusiasm wanes. The moderation of just cause strengthens the moral
imperative to seek, creatively and imaginatively, a solution to the conflict that
stops short of war. At the same time, the acknowledgement that justice and
injustice are not absolute or unilateral – that potential belligerents have
mutual rights, duties and interests – enhances the prospects of finding such a
solution.
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3(b) Just conduct
The interaction between the moral categories of just recourse and just conduct
underlines the need to conceive just war theory as a whole, and not as a set of
discrete principles that operate independently of one another. Though there are
criteria that apply specifically to the conduct of war (proportionality and dis-
crimination), the force of those criteria is greatly affected by the way in which
the prior criteria of just recourse are understood and applied. In war ends and
means work together: the ‘justice’ of the means will reflect the ‘justice’ of the
ends (and vice versa). Just as it did with the criteria of recourse, the ‘positive’
concept of just cause tends to undermine the criteria of just conduct. The more
inflated and one-sided the belligerents’ sense of the justice of their cause, the
more unjust their conduct of war seems likely to become.
The absolute, or unilateral, concept of just cause leads to the ‘demonisation’
of an adversary, and to the dehumanisation of both sides (an agent of Good
being just as inhuman, or unreal, as an agent of Evil). It suppresses that fun-
damental moral equality and moral solidarity between belligerents, on the
recognition of which the just conduct of war ultimately rests. As a result, pro-
portionality and discrimination are irreparably damaged. Both the economi-
cal and the discriminate use of force begin to lose their moral attraction in the
face of an enemy absolutely conceived. At the extreme, but not hypothetical,
end of the ‘positive’ spectrum of just war thinking, a war of annihilation may
seem an entirely appropriate moral response to the presence of an absolute
moral evil.
‘[O]ne has duties only towards one’s equals’, wrote Nietzsche.22 However
dubious this might seem as a general proposition (particularly, in its Niet-
zschean sense), its moral and psychological force in time of war often seems
compelling. Moral community among belligerents is the underlying principle of
the just conduct of war. The more inclined we are to distance ourselves from an
adversary, the less likely we are to treat him with the respect that just conduct
demands. The debilitating impact on the moral conduct of war of a sense of
fundamental difference and superiority and, conversely, the moderating effect
of a vestigial sense of community, have been frequently observed in the history
of warfare.
The contrast between the conduct of war on the Eastern and Western Fronts
in the Second World War is instructive in this regard. While the relatively
‘civilised’ conduct of war on the Western Front may indicate that some rudi-
mentary sense of community or solidarity among belligerents remained intact
despite hostilities, the ‘barbaric’ conduct of war in the East owed much to the
moral and ideological gulf that divided belligerents from the start. Given the
moral contempt that both sets of belligerents had for one another (a result of
the systematic suppression of any sense of common humanity), the inclination
to conduct the war proportionately and discriminately was bound to be lacking.
In this ‘battle of ideologies’ (or Weltanschauungkrieg) a quite contrary inclina-
tion was at work, to devastating effect.23
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The absolute understanding of just cause erodes the distinction between
combatant and non-combatant on which the principle of discrimination rests.
A war fought to vindicate a particular ‘civilisation’ or ‘way of life’ (let alone a
war fought on behalf of ‘Civilisation’ in some absolute and universal sense) is
not easily contained. Such ‘countervalue’ warfare seems unlimited in its pre-
vailing tendency. The threat that justifies the use of force is not simply the threat
posed by ‘combatants,’ in the conventional and limited sense of those directly
engaged in war-making, but the threat posed by an entire society, nation, race,
class, religion, or culture. From this perspective the status of ‘combatant’
extends to all those who belong to the category in question and, therefore, so
does the liability to attack. The ‘friend or foe’ mentality that so often accompa-
nies this grandiose approach to war is blind to the careful distinctions that any
serious application of the principle of discrimination demands. Such crude cat-
egorisation seems designed to evade the constraints on war imposed by that
principle. ‘Those who are not with us are against us.’ To be classed as the
‘enemy’ – to lose one’s right of immunity from attack – it is no longer necessary
to be party to some hostile act of war. The refusal to take sides may be consid-
ered offence enough.
The very disposition cultivated by this all too moral war jeopardises its just
conduct. In extreme cases an excess of zeal engenders the reckless and the ruth-
less conduct of war in equal measure. The readiness to sacrifice oneself and oth-
ers becomes the test of moral authenticity and commitment to the cause. An
inverse logic, whereby the sense of the justice or moral worth of a war increases
with its destructive force, strengthens the movement towards total war. ‘A lot of
killing’, Conquest notes, ‘seems to convince people of the seriousness, and thus
the justifiability, of a cause.’24 In this intensely, morbidly, moral world, the more
vicious and deadly its conduct the greater the moral aura attached to war.
Virtue and crime become indistinguishable. The readiness to violate basic
moral norms becomes the measure of moral worth. One commentator, strug-
gling to make sense of the thinking behind the attack on the World Trade Cen-
ter, surmised: ‘It rests on a perverted syllogism: only a great cause would justify
killing at random; I have killed at random, therefore my cause is great.’25
In contrast to the permissive tendencies of its ‘positive’ counterpart, the
‘negative’ concept of just war strengthens the criteria of just conduct. The lim-
itations inherent in the justification of recourse to war exert a restraining influ-
ence upon the conduct of war. The modest definition of just cause invites a
proportionate use of force that is also an economical use of force. The bilateral
or comparative understanding of justice, that recognises the moral equality
and the rights and interests of an adversary, encourages both the proportion-
ate and the discriminate use of force. No enemy is beyond the moral pale. There-
fore, no enemy is without rights (and no belligerent without reciprocal duties).
The moral preference for non-violent resolution of conflict, embodied in the ius
ad bellum criterion of last resort, continues to inform and guide the conduct of
war. As a result, war is fought in a restrained way with a view to peace and the
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ultimate reconciliation of adversaries. The idea of peace as victory, that ani-
mates the ‘positive’ concept of just war and that encourages belligerents to
prosecute total war, is here replaced by the idea of peace as community. Just
conduct rests on the recognition of a moral tie and a common good that unite
adversaries even in the midst of war. The aim is not to vanquish but to unite (or
reunite) in just order. That aim makes the limited conduct of war a political as
well as a moral necessity.
Conclusion
For practical as well as theoretical reasons, the argument has focused on the
ambiguity of the just war tradition. That ambiguity is of particular concern in
the new ‘cosmopolitan’ age, when war is being invested with a heightened
moral purpose. It would be dangerous to assume that such investment solves
the problem of war. Far from solving the problem, it may add to it. The just war
is a double-edged sword that can make things worse as well as better. Contem-
porary ‘just’ wars, fought for proclaimed humanitarian goals, are in danger of
veering towards the ‘positive’ end of the just war spectrum. In doing so, they
pose a substantial threat to the moral limitation of war. The moral restraint of
war requires that the moral impulse itself be kept very firmly in check. The ‘neg-
ative’ concept of just war seems better equipped to meet that requirement than
its ‘positive’ rival.
Notes
1 J. Keegan, A History of Warfare (London, Hutchinson, 1993), p. 391.
2 F.H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1975), p. 308.
3 C. von Clausewitz, On War (London, Penguin Books, 1982), p. 403.
4 J.T. Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare (New Haven, CT, and London, Yale
University Press, 1999).
5 M. Austin, ‘Attitudes to Warfare’, in S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds), The Oxford
Companion to Classical Civilization (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 773–4.
6 P.E. Sigmund (ed.), St Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics (New York, Norton,
1988), p. 64.
7 St Augustine, The City of God, ed. and tr. R.W. Dyson, XIX, 7 (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1998), p. 929.
8 St Augustine, The City of God, III, 14, p. 111.
9 N. Fotion, ‘Reactions to War: Pacifism, Realism, and Just War Theory’, in A. Valls
(ed.), Ethics in International Affairs (Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 2000),
p. 28.
10 See A. Coates, ‘Just War in the Persian Gulf?’, in A. Valls (ed.), Ethics in International
Affairs (Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 33–47.
11 Even ‘moral hurdles’ does not do justice to the concept of just war as restraint. The
problem is that, once surmounted, ‘hurdles’ are left behind. Here criteria are seen to
exercise a more enduring and dynamic influence.
Anthony Coates 223
chap 17  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 223
12 This theme is treated more extensively by A. Coates in The Ethics of War (Manches-
ter, Manchester University Press, 1997), see esp. ch. 2.
13 Quoted in S.J. Wayne, ‘President Bush Goes to War’, in S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Polit-
ical Psychology of War (Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), p. 40.
14 The Times, 13 September 2001, p. 1.
15 Speech to the Joint Session of Congress (20 September 2001), The Times, 22 Sep-
tember 2001, p. 16.
16 P.H. Pearse, Political Writings and Speeches (Dublin, Talbott Press, 1952), p. 188.
17 J. Gerassi (ed.), Venceremos! The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto Che Guevara (London,
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p. 423.
18 See A. Marrin, The Last Crusade (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1974).
19 A. Taheri, Holy Terror (London, Sphere, 1987), p. 8.
20 R. Aron, Peace and War (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. 593.
21 M. Djilas, Wartime (London, Secker and Warburg, 1980), p. 22.
22 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (London, Penguin Books, 1973), s. 260.
23 See the work of O. Bartov, for example, Hitler’s Army (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1991).
24 R. Conquest, The Great Terror (London, Macmillan, 1968), p. xiii.
25 M. Colvin, ‘Suicide Terrorists Find a New Way to Marry into Death’, Sunday Times,
16 September 2001, p. 21.
224 Just war
chap 17  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 224
Anderson, B., Imagined Communities (London, Verso, 1991).
Annas, J., An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981).
Appiah, K.A., ‘Multicultural Misunderstanding’, New York Review of Books, 44, 9 Octo-
ber (1997).
Arendt, H., The Human Condition (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958).
Arendt, H., The Origins of Totalitarianism (first published 1948) (London, Harvest, 1976).
Armstrong, C., ‘Philosophical Interpretation in the Work of Michael Walzer’, Politics,
20:2, May (2000).
Arneson, R., ‘Against Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity’, Philosophical Studies, 93
(1999).
Aron, R., Peace and War (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966).
Arrow, K., Social Choice and Individual Values (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press,
1963, 2nd edn).
Atkinson, A.B., Public Economics in Action: The Basic Income/Flat Tax Proposal (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1995).
Austin, J.L., Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1962).
Austin, M., ‘Attitudes to Warfare’, in S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds), The Oxford
Companion to Classical Civilization (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998).
Badhwar, N., ‘Moral Agency, Commitment and Impartiality’, Social Philosophy and Pol-
icy, 13 (1996).
Barrett M. and Phillips, A., (eds), Destablising Theory (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992).
Barry, B., ‘Equal Opportunity and Moral Arbitrariness’, in N. Bowie (ed.), Equal Oppor-
tunity (Boulder, CO, Westview, 1988).
Barry, B., Theories of Justice: A Treatise on Social Justice, Vol. I (Hemel Hempstead, Har-
vester Wheatsheaf, 1989).
Barry, B., ‘Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective’, in B. Barry, Liberty and Justice
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991).
Barry, B., ‘Spherical Justice and Global Injustice’, in D. Miller and M. Walzer (eds), Plu-
ralism, Justice and Equality, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995).
Barry, B., Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995).
Barry, J., Rethinking Green Politics (London, Sage 1999).
Barry, B., Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge,
Polity Press, 2001).
Bibliography
Biblio  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 225
226 Bibliography
Bartov, O., Hitler’s Army (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991).
Bauman, Z., Globalization: The Human Consequences (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998).
Baumann, G., The Multicultural Riddle (London, Routledge, 1999).
Beccaria, C., On Crime and Punishment and Other Writings, ed. R. Bellamy (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
Beitz, C., Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University
Press, 1979).
Beitz, C., ‘Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System’, in Chris Brown (ed.) Political
Restructuring in Europe (London, Routledge, 1994).
Bell, D., Communitarianism and its Critics (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993).
Bellamy, R. and Ross, A., A Textual Introduction to Social and Political Theory (Manchester,
Manchester University Press, 1996).
Benhabib, S., Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary
Ethics (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992).
Berlin, I., ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1969).
Blair, T., Preface, A New Contract for Welfare (CSS), Cm 3805 (London, Stationery Office,
1998).
Bobbio, N., ‘The Great Dichotomy: Public/Private’, in N. Bobbio, Democracy and Dictator-
ship (Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, 1989).
Bookchin, M., ‘Towards a Philosophy of Nature’, in M. Tobias (ed.), Deep Ecology (San
Diego, CA, Avant Books, 1985).
Boonin-Vail, D., Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1994).
Bottomley, G., de Lepervanche, M. and Martin, J. (eds), Gender/Class/Culture/
Ethnicity (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1991).
Brennan, A., Thinking About Nature (London, Routledge, 1988).
Breuer, M. Faist, T. and Jordan, B., ‘Collective Action, Migration and Welfare States’,
International Sociology, 10:4 (1995).
Brink, D., ‘The Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms and Moral Theory’, in
R. Frey and C. Morris (eds), Value, Welfare and Morality (Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1993).
Brink, D., ‘Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons’, in J. Dancy (ed.), Reading
Parfit (Oxford, Blackwell, 1997).
Brown, C., International Relations Theory (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).
Brown, C. (ed.), Political Restructuring in Europe (London, Routledge, 1994).
Brown, G., ‘Why Labour is still Loyal to the Poor’, Guardian, 2 August 1997.
Brueckner, J.K., ‘Property-Value Maximisation and Efficiency’, Joural of Urban Econom-
ics, 14 (1983).
Bubeck, D., Care, Gender and Justice (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995).
Buchanan, J. and Tullock, G., The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor, MI, University of
Michigan Press, 1962).
Buchanan, J.M., ‘An Economic Theory of Clubs’, Economica, 32 (1965).
Buchanan J.M. and Goetz, C.J., ‘Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the
Tiebout Model’, Journal of Public Economics, 1 (1972).
Butler, J., Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London, Routledge, 1990).
Campbell, B., Goliath: Britain’s Dangerous Places (London, Methuen, 1993).
Canovan, M., ‘Patriotism is not Enough’, British Journal of Political Science, 30:3 (2000).
Biblio  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 226
Carrigan, T., Connell, B. and Lee, J., ‘Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity’, in H. Brod
(ed.), The Making of Masculinities: The New Men’s Studies (Winchester, MA, and Hemel
Hempstead, Allen and Unwin, 1987).
Carter, I., A Measure of Freedom (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999).
Carver, T., ‘A Political Theory of Gender: Perspectives on the “universal subject”’, in V.
Randall and G. Waylen (eds), Gender, Politics and the State (London, Routledge, 1998).
Castel, R., ‘From Dangerous to Risk’, in G. Burchell, C. Cordon and P. Miller (eds), The
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (London, Harvester, 1991).
Checkland, S.G. and Checkland, E.O.A. (eds), The Poor Law Report of 1834 (Har-
mondsworth, Penguin, 1974).
Chodorow, N., The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender
(Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978).
Christman, J. (ed.), The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy (Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1989).
Christman, J., ‘Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom’, Ethics, 101 (1991).
Clausewitz, C. von, On War (London, Penguin Books, 1982).
Coates, A., The Ethics of War (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1997).
Coates, A., ‘Just War in the Persian Gulf?’, in A. Valls (ed.), Ethics in International Affairs
(Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
Cohen, G.A., ‘Capitalism, Freedom and the Proletariat’, in D. Miller (ed.), Liberty,
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991).
Cohen, G.A., Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1995).
Cohen, J., ‘Democracy and Liberty’, in J. Elster (ed.), Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Colvin, M., ‘Suicide Terrorists Find a New Way to Marry into Death’, Sunday Times, 16
September 2001.
Connell, R.W., Gender (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002).
Connolly, W.E., The Terms of Political Discourse (Oxford, Blackwell, 1974).
Conquest, R., The Great Terror (London, Macmillan, 1968).
Coole, D., Women in Political Theory: From Ancient Misogyny to Contemporary Feminism
(Brighton, Harvester Press/Wheatsheaf Books, 1992, 2nd edn).
Coole, D., ‘Cartographic Convulsions: Public and Private Reconsidered’, Political Theory,
28:3 (2000).
Costa, P., Il progetto giuridico (Milano, Giuffré, 1974).
Cox, R.H. ‘From Safety Nets to Trampolines: Labour-Market Activation in the Nether-
lands and Denmark’, Governance: An International Journal of Politics and Administration,
11:4 (1998).
Cox, R.H. The Consequences of Welfare Reform: How Conceptions of Social Rights are Chang-
ing (Norman, OK, Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma, 1999).
Cullis, J. and Jones, P., Public Finance and Public Choice: Analytical Perspectives (London,
McGraw Hill, 1994).
Dagger, R., ‘Membership, Fair Play, and Political Obligation’, Political Studies, 48 (2000).
Dahl, R., A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956).
Dahl, R., On Democracy (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1988).
Dahl, R., Democracy and its Critics (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1989).
De Giorgi, A., Zero Tolleranza. Strategie e pratiche della societaˇ di controllo (Roma, Derive
Approdi, 2000).
Bibliography 227
Biblio  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 227
Department of Social Security, A New Contract for Welfare, Cm.3805 (London, Stationery
Office, 1998).
Devall B., and G. Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Salt Lake City, UT,
Gibbs M. Smith Inc., 1985).
Devlin, P., The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965).
Djilas, M., Wartime (London, Secker and Warburg, 1980).
Dower, N., ‘World Poverty’, in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Oxford, Blackwell,
1993).
Dryzek, J., Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy (Oxford, Blackwell, 1987).
Dunn, J. (ed.), Democracy: The Unfinished Journey (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1992).
Dworkin, R., ‘Justice and Rights’ (first published 1973), reprinted in R. Dworkin’s Tak-
ing Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1978).
Dworkin, R., Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1986.
Eckersley, R., Environmentalism and Political Theory (London, UCL Press, 1992).
Eisenstein, Z., The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (New York, Longman, 1981).
Elshtain, J.B., Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Oxford,
Martin Robertson, 1981).
Erikson, E. and Weigärd, J., ‘The End of Citizenship? New Roles Challenging the Political
Order’, in C. McKinnon and I. Hampsher-Monk (eds), The Demands of Citizenship (Lon-
don, Continuum, 2000).
Esping-Andersen, G., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies
(London, Sage, 1996).
Esping-Andersen, G., ‘The Jobs-Equality Trade-Off ’, paper presented to the summer 
school on Welfare States in Transition, European University Institute, Florence, 8 July
1999.
Etzioni, A., The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communiarian Agenda
(London, Fontana, 1995).
Etzioni, A., The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society (London,
Profile Books, 1997).
Etzioni, A, The Limits of Privacy (New York, Basic Books, 1999).
Etzioni, A., The Third Way to a Good Society (London, Demos, 2000).
Evans, D.T., Sexual Citizenship: The Material Construction of Sexualities (London, Rout-
ledge, 1993).
Evason E. and Woods, R., ‘Poverty, Deregulation of Labour Markets and Benefit Fraud’,
Social Policy and Administration, 29:1 (1995).
Ewald, F., ‘Insurance and Risk’, in G. Burchell, C. Cordon and P. Miller (eds), The Foucault
Effect: Studies in Governmentality (London, Harvester, 1991).
Firestone, S., The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution (London, Cape, 1971).
Fishkin, J., Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family (New Haven, CT, Yale University
Press, 1983).
Flew, A., The Politics of Procrustes (London, Temple Smith, 1981).
Floud, J., ‘Report’, British Journal of Criminology, 22:3 (1982).
Floud, J. and Young, W., Dangerousness and Criminal Justice, Cambridge Studies in Crimi-
nology XLVII, ed. Sir L. Radzinowicz (London, Heinemann, 1981).
Foldvary, F., Public Goods and Private Communities: The Market Provision of Social Services
(Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1994).
Forst, R., Contexts of Justice (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 2002).
228 Bibliography
Biblio  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 228
Foster, H., ‘Postmodernism: A Preface’, in H. Foster (ed.), Postmodern Culture (London,
Pluto Press, 1985).
Fotion, N., ‘Reactions to War: Pacifism, Realism, and Just War Theory’, in A. Valls (ed.),
Ethics in International Affairs (Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
Foucault, M., Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison (Harmondsworth, Pen-
guin, 1977).
Fraser, N., ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually
Existing Democracy’, in C. Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, (Cambridge,
MA, MIT Press, 1992).
Frazer, E., The Problems of Communitarian Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1999).
Friedan, B., The Feminine Mystique (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1963).
Friedman, M. and Friedman, R., Free to Choose (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1980).
Frost, M., Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1996).
Galbraith, J.K., The Culture of Contentment (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1993).
Gallie, W.B., ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56
(1956).
Garland, D., ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State. Strategies of Crime Control in Contem-
porary Society’, British Journal of Criminology, 4 (1987).
Gatens, M., Feminism and Philosophy (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991).
Gellner, E., Culture, Identity,and Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987).
Gerassi, J. (ed.), Venceremos! The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto Che Guevara (London,
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968).
Giddens, A., The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge, Polity Press,
1998).
Gilbert, M., Living Together: Rationality, Sociality and Obligation (New York, Rowman and
Littlefield, 1996).
Gilligan, C., In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cam-
bridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1982).
Glacken, C., Traces on the Rhodian Shore (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press,
1967).
Gloz, P., Manifest für eine neue europäische Linke (Berlin, Wolf Jobst Siedler, 1985).
Goldsmith E. and Hildyard, N. (eds), Green Britain or Industrial Wasteland (Cambridge,
Polity Press, 1986).
Goodin, R., Green Political Theory (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992).
Goodin, R., Motivating Political Morality (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992).
Goodin R., Headley, B., Muffels, R. and Dirven, H.K., The Real Worlds of Welfare Capital-
ism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Graham, G., Ethics and International Relations (Oxford, Blackwell, 1997).
Graham, K., ‘Being Some Body’, in B. Brecher, J. Halliday and K. Kolinská (eds.), Nation-
alism and Racism in the Liberal Order (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998).
Graham, K., ‘Are all Preferences Nosy?’, Res Publica, 6 (2000).
Graham, K., ‘Collective Responsibility’, in T. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and
Ontology (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2000).
Graham, K., Practical Reasoning in a Social World: How We Act Together (Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002).
Grant, J., Fundamental Feminism (New York and London, Routledge, 1993).
Bibliography 229
Biblio  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 229
Gray, T., Freedom (London, Macmillan, 1991).
Green, K., The Woman of Reason. Feminism, Humanism and Political Thought (Cambridge,
Polity Press, 1995).
Grimshaw, J., Feminist Philosophers: Women’s Perspectives on Philosophical Traditions
(Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, 1986).
Habermas, J., The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One – Reason and the Rational-
isation of Society, tr. T. McCarthy (Boston, MA, Beacon Press, 1984).
Habermas, J., The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two – Lifeworld and System: A
Critique of Functionalist Reason, tr. T. McCarthy (Boston, MA, Beacon Press, 1987).
Habermas, J., The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, tr. T. Burger (Cambridge,
MA, MIT Press, 1989).
Habermas, J., ‘Citizenship and National Identity’, in J. Habermas, Between Facts and
Norms Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, tr. W. Rehg (first pub-
lished 1990) (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996).
Habermas, J., Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy, tr. W. Rehg (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996).
Hamowy, R., ‘Law and the Liberal Society’, Journal of Libertarian Studies, 2 (1987).
Haraway, D., Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (London, Free Asso-
ciation, 1991).
Hardin, G., ‘Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor’, Psychology Today, 8
(1974).
Hare, R.M., Essays on Political Morality (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989).
Harrington, J., The Commonwealth of Oceana (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1992).
Harrison R., Democracy (London, Routledge 1993).
Hart, H.L.A., Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1968).
Hart, H.L.A., ‘Rawls on Liberty and its Priority’, in N. Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1975).
Hart, H.L.A., ‘Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morals’ (first published 1968),
in H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1983).
Hayek, F. von, The Road to Serfdom (London, Routledge, 1944).
Hayek, F. von, The Constitution of Liberty (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960).
Hayek, F. von, The Political Order of a Free People (London, Routledge, 1979).
Hearn, J., The Gender of Oppression: Men, Masculinity and the Critique of Marxism
(Brighton, Wheatsheaf, 1987).
Held, D., Democracy and the Global Order (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995).
Held, D., Models of Democracy (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, 2nd edn).
Helly D. and Reverby, S. (eds), Gendered Domains: Rethinking Public and Private in Women’s
History (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1997).
Hemerijck, A., ‘Prospects for Effective Social Citizenship in an Age of Structural Inactiv-
ity’, in C. Crouch, K. Eder and D. Tambini (eds), Citizenship, Markets and the State
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000).
Herman, B., The Practice of Moral Judgement (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press,
1993).
Hirsch, F., The Social Limits to Growth (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977).
HM Treasury, Pre-Budget Report (London, Stationery Office, 2000).
230 Bibliography
Biblio  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 230
Hobbes, T., Leviathan, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Hobbes, T., On the Citizen, eds R. Tuck and M. Silverthrone (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1998).
Hobhouse, L.T., Elements of Social Justice (London, Allen and Unwin, 1922).
Hobsbawm, E., Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1990).
Home Office, Fairer, Faster and Firmer – A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum,
Cm 4018 (London, Stationery Office, 1998).
Honneth, A., The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflict (Cam-
bridge, Polity Press, 1995).
Horton, J., Political Obligation (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press International,
1992).
Hume, L.J., Bentham and Bureaucracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981).
Ignatieff, M., ‘Why “Community” Is a Dishonest Word’, Observer, 3 May 1992.
Ingram, A., ‘Constitutional Patriotism’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 22:6 (1996).
Isaac, J., ‘A New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Poli-
tics of Human Rights’, American Political Science Review, 90:1 (1996).
Iversen, T. and Wren, A., ‘Equality, Employment and Budgetary Restraint: The Trilemma
of the Service Economy’, World Politics, 50 (1998).
Jaggar, A., ‘Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology’, in S. Kemp and
J. Squires (eds), Feminisms (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997).
Johnson, J.T., Morality and Contemporary Warfare (New Haven, CT, and London, Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1999).
Jones, C., Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999).
Jordan, B., A Theory of Poverty and Social Exclusion (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996).
Jordan, B., The New Politics of Welfare: Social Justice in a Global Context (London, Sage,
1998).
Jordan, B. and Jordan, C., Social Work and the Third Way: Tough Love as Social Policy
(London, Sage, 2000).
Jordan, B. and Travers, A., ‘The Informal Economy – a Case Study in Unrestrained Com-
petition’, Social Policy and Administration, 32:3 (1998).
Jordan, B., Agulnik, P., Burbidge, D. and Duffin, S., Stumbling Towards Basic Income
(London, Citizens Income Study Centre, 2000).
Jordan, B., James, S., Kay, H. and Redley, M., Trapped in Poverty? Labour-Market Decisions
in Low-Income Households (London, Routledge, 1992).
Kant, I., Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (The Moral Law), tr. H.J. Paton (London,
Unwin Hyman, 1948).
Kant, I., ‘Perpetual Peace’, in Kant’s Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss (Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1970).
Kant, I., ‘The Metaphysics of Morals’, in Kant’s Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970).
Kearney, R., Postnationalist Ireland (London, Routledge, 1997).
Keegan, J., A History of Warfare (London, Hutchinson, 1993).
Kemshall, H., Reviewing Risk: A Review of Research on the Assessment and Management of
Risk and Dangerousness: Implications for Policy and Practice in the Probation Service (Croy-
don, Report for the Home Office, Research and Statistics Directorate, 1996).
Kennedy, E. and Mendus, S., Women in Western Political Philosophy (Brighton, Wheat-
sheaf Books, 1987).
Bibliography 231
Biblio  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 231
Kiss, E., ‘Democracy and the Politics of Recognition’, in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordón
(eds), Democracy’s Edges (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Kramer, M.H., The Quality of Freedom (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003).
Kristjánsson, K., Social Freedom: The Responsibility View (Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1996).
Kukathas, C., ‘Liberalism, Communitarianism and Political Community’, Social Philoso-
phy and Policy, 13 (1996).
Kymlicka, W., Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1989).
Kymlicka, W., Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1995).
Kymlicka, W., Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001,
2nd edn).
Kymlicka, W. and Norman, W., ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Cit-
izenship Theory’, Ethics, 104:2 (1994).
Landes, J., ‘The Public and the Private Sphere: A Feminist Reconsideration’, in J. Landes
(ed.), Feminism: The Public and the Private (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998).
Larmore, C., ‘The Idea of a Life Plan’, in E.F. Paul, F.D. Miller, F. Dycus and P. Jeffrey (eds),
Human Flourishing (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Leonard, M., ‘Informal Economic Activity: Strategies of Households and Communities’,
paper presented at 4th ESA Conference, ‘Will Europe Work?’, Amsterdam, 18–21
August 1999.
Lewis, T., ‘On Using the Concept of Hypothetical Consent’, Canadian Journal of Political
Science, 22 (1989).
Lister, R., Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997).
Lister, R., ‘From Equality to Social Inclusion: New Labour and the Welfare State’, Criti-
cal Social Policy, 18:55 (1998).
Lloyd, G., The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy (London, Methuen,
1984).
Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government (first published 1690), ed. P. Laslett (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1970, 2nd edn).
Locke, J., A Letter Concerning Toleration in Focus, eds J. Horton and S. Mendus (London,
Routledge, 1991).
Lorber, J., Paradoxes of Gender (New Haven, CT, and London, Yale University Press,
1994).
MacCallum, G.C. jr, ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’, Philosophical Review, 76 (1967),
reprinted in D. Miller (ed.), Liberty (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991).
MacIntyre, A., After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London, Duckworth, 1981).
MacKinnon, C., Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA, Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1989).
Malthus, T., An Essay in the Principle of Population as It Affects the Improvement of Society
(London, J. Johnson, 1798).
Markell, P., ‘Making Affect Safe for Democracy? – On “Constitutional Patriotism”’ Polit-
ical Theory, 28:1 (2000).
Marrin, A., The Last Crusade (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1974).
Marske, C.E., Communities of Fate: Readings in the Social Organization of Risk (Lanham,
VA, University Press of America, 1991).
Martin, R., A System of Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993).
232 Bibliography
Biblio  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 232
Martison, R., ‘What Works? – Questions and Answers about Prison Reform’, The Public
Interest, 35 (1974).
McKibben, B., The End of Nature (London, Penguin, 1990).
McMahon, C., Authority and Democracy (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1994).
Mead, L.M., Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship (New York, Free
Press, 1986).
Midgely, M., Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature (London, Routledge, 1995).
Miller, D., ‘Constraints on Freedom’, Ethics, 94 (1983).
Miller, D., The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought (Oxford, Blackwell, 1987).
Miller, D., ‘The Ethical Significance of Nationality’, Ethics, 98 (1988).
Miller, D., ‘Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice’, Political Studies, 40 (1992).
Miller, D., On Nationality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995).
Miller, D., Principles of Social Justice (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1999).
Miller, D. (ed.), Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000).
Mueller, D., Public Choice II (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).
Mulhall S., and Swift, A., Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford, Blackwell 1992).
Munoz-Darde, V., ‘Is the Family to be Abolished Then?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 72 (1998).
Myers, G.M., ‘Optimality, Free Mobility and the Regional Authority in a Federation’, Jour-
nal of Public Economics, 43 (1990).
Naess, A., ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-range Ecology Movement: A Summary’,
Inquiry, 16 (1973).
Naess, A., Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, tr. D. Rothenberg (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1990).
Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil (London, Penguin Books, 1973).
Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York, Basic Books, 1974).
Nye, A., Feminist Theory and the Philosophies of Men (New York, Routledge, 1989).
O’Brien, M., The Politics of Reproduction (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983).
O’Neill, O., ‘Abstraction, Idealization and Ideology in Ethics’, in J. Evans (ed.), Moral Phi-
losophy and Contemporary Problems (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987).
O’Neill, O., Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructivist Account of Practical Reasoning
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996).
O’Neill, O., ‘Women’s Rights: Whose Obligations?’, in Bounds of Justice (Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2000).
Oates, W.E., Fiscal Federalism (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972).
Oates, W.E., ‘Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study’, American Economic Review,
75 (1985).
Offe, C., Modernity and the State: East, West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
Okin, S.M., Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University
Press, 1979.
Okin, S.M., Gender, Justice and the Family (New York, Basic Books, 1989).
Okin, S.M., ‘Gender, the Public and the Private’, in A. Phillips (ed.), Feminism and Politics
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998).
Oppenheim, F., Dimensions of Freedom: An Analysis (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1961).
Oppenheim, F., Political Concepts: A Reconstruction (Oxford, Blackwell, 1981).
Outhwaite, W., Habermas – a Critical Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994).
P6, ‘Can the Obligations in Welfare-to-Work Schemes be Morally Justified?’ (Glasgow,
Department of Government, University of Strathclyde, 2000).
Bibliography 233
Biblio  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 233
Pappas, N., Plato and the Republic (New York, Routledge, 1995).
Parekh, B., Rethinking Multiculturalism (London, Macmillan, 2000).
Pateman, C., ‘Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy’, in S. Benn and
G. Gaus (eds), Public and Private in Social Life (London, Croom Helm, 1983).
Pateman, C., The Sexual Contract (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988).
Pateman, C., The Disorder of Women (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1989).
Pateman C., and Brennan, T., ‘Mere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealth: Women and the
Origins of Liberalism’, Political Studies, 27 (1979).
Pearse, P., Political Writings and Speeches (Dublin, Talbott Press, 1952).
Pettit, P., Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1997).
Pettit, P., ‘Contestatory Democracy’, in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordón (eds), Democ-
racy’s Value (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Pettit, P., Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1999, 2nd edn).
Phillips, A., ‘Universal Pretensions in Political Thought’, in A. Phillips and M. Barrett
(eds), Destablizing Theory (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992).
Phillips, A., Democracy and Difference (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993).
Plamenatz, J., ‘The Use of Political Theory’, Political Studies, 8 (1960).
Plato, Five Dialogues, tr. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, IN, Hackett, 1981).
Pogge, T., Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1989).
Pogge, T, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’, in C. Brown (ed.), Political Restructuring in
Europe, (London, Routledge, 1994).
Poole, R., ‘Liberalism, nationalism and identity’, in B. Brecher, J. Halliday and K. Kolin-
ská (eds), Nationalism and Racism in the Liberal Order (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998).
Prokhovnik, R., Rational Woman: A Feminist Critique of Dichotomy (London and New
York, Routledge, 1999).
Przeworski, A., ‘Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense’, in I. Shapiro and
C. Hacker-Cordón (eds), Democracy’s Value (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1999).
Rawls, J., ‘Two Concepts of Rules’, Philosophical Review, 54 (1955).
Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972).
Rawls, J., Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993).
Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1999).
Rawls, J., ‘Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice’ (first published 1963), in 
J. Rawls (S. Freeman (ed.)), Collected Papers (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press, 1999).
Rawls, J., The Law of Peoples (Cambridge MA and London, Harvard University Press,
1999).
Raz, J., The Authority of Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979).
Raz, J., ‘On The Nature of Rights’, Mind, 93 (1984).
Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986).
Raz, J., Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994).
Raz, J., ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, Dissent, Winter (1994).
Riker, W., Liberalism against Populism (San Francisco, CA, Freeman and Co., 1982).
Roche, B., ‘Migration in a Global Economy’, speech to the Institute for Public Policy
Research Conference, 8 September 2000.
Rodman, J., ‘The Liberation of Nature’, Inquiry, 20 (1977).
234 Bibliography
Biblio  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 234
Rousseau, J.-J., The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, tr. V. Gourevitch
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Rowlingson, K., Whyley, C., Newburn, T. and Berthoud, R., Social Security Fraud (Lon-
don, HMSO, 1997).
Ruddick, S., Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (Boston, MA, Beacon Press,
1989).
Rusche, G. and Kirchheimer, O., Punishment and Social Structure (New York, Russell and
Russell, 1968).
Russell, F.H., The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1975).
Sale, K., Dwellers in the Land: The Bioregional Vision (San Francisco, CA, Sierra Book Club,
1985).
Salt, J., ‘Labour-Market Recruitment to the UK’, paper given at a Home Office Confer-
ence, Bridging the Information Gaps: Research in Asylum and Immigration in the UK,
National Liberal Club, London, 21 March 2001.
Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1982).
Scanlon, T., ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, in B. Williams and A. Sen (eds), Utili-
tarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982).
Scanlon, T.M., What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 1998).
Scherer D., and Attig, T. (eds), Ethics and the Environment (New York, Prentice Hall,
1983).
Scott, A., ‘Globalization: Social Process or Political Rhetoric?’, in A. Scott (ed.), The Lim-
its of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1997).
Scott, J., Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, CT, Yale
University Press, 1985).
Scott, J., ‘Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist
Theory for Feminism’, in D.T. Meyers (ed.), Feminist Social Thought: A Reader (New York
and London, Routledge, 1997).
Searle, J.R., The Construction of Social Reality (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1995).
Seglow, J., ‘Universals and Particulars: The Case of Liberal Cultural Nationalism’, Politi-
cal Studies, 46 (1998).
Seglow, J., ‘Liberalism and the Politics of Recognition’, in M. Evans (ed.), The Edinburgh
Companion to Contemporary Liberalism (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press,
2001).
Sen, A., Inequality Reexamined (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992).
Shanley, M.L. and Narayan, U., Reconstructing Political Theory (Cambridge, Polity Press,
1997).
Shaw, C.D. and McKay, H.D., Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas (Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1942).
Sher, G., ‘Qualifications, Fairness, and Desert’, in N. Bowie (ed.). Equal Opportunity (Boul-
der, CO, Westview Press, 1988).
Shklar, J. ‘Political Theory and the Rule of Law’, in A.C. Hutchinson and P. Monahan
(eds), The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology? (Toronto, Carswell, 1987).
Shue, H., ‘Morality, Politics and Humanitarian Assistance’, in B. Nichols and G. Loescher
(eds), The Moral Nation: Humanitarianism and U.S. Foreign Policy Today (Notre Dame,
University of Notre Dame Press, 1989).
Sigmund, P.E. (ed), St Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics (New York, Norton, 1988).
Bibliography 235
Biblio  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 235
Simmons, A.J., Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1979).
Singer, P., ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1971).
Singer, P., ‘The Singer Solution to World Poverty’, New York Times, 5 September 1999.
Skinner, Q., Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Smith, A., Nationalism and Modernity (London, Routledge, 1998).
Spruyt, H., The Nation State and its Competitors (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University
Press, 1995).
Squires, J., ‘Feminist Visions of Political Citizenship’, in C. McKinnon and I. Hampsher-
Monk (eds), The Demands of Citizenship (London, Continuum, 2000).
St Augustine, The City of God, ed. and tr. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1998).
Stark, C., ‘Hypothetical Consent and Justification’, Journal of Philosophy, 97 (2000).
Starrett, D.A., Foundations of Public Economics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1988).
Steinberger, P., ‘Public and Private’, Political Studies, 42 (1999).
Steiner, H., An Essay on Rights (Oxford, Blackwell, 1994).
Steiner, H., ‘Territorial Justice’, in S. Caney, D. George and P. Jones (eds), National Rights,
International Obligations (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1996).
Steiner, H., ‘Freedom and Bivalence’, in I. Carter and M. Ricciardi (eds), Freedom, Power
and Political Morality: Essays for Felix Oppenheim (London, Palgrave, 2001).
Stone, C., Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects (Los Altos,
CA, Kaufman, 1974).
Sugden, R., ‘The Metric of Opportunity’, Economics and Philosophy, 14 (1998).
Sumner, L.W., ‘Positive Sexism’, Social Philosophy and Policy, 5 (1987).
Sutch, P., Ethics and International Justice (London, Routledge, 2001).
Sutherland, E.H., Criminology (Philadelphia, PA, Lippincott, 1924).
Sylvan, R., ‘A Critique of Deep Ecology’. Radical Philosophy, 40 and 41 (1984–85).
Synder, R.C., Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors: Military Service and Gender in the Civic
Republican Tradition (Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
Taheri, A., Holy Terror (London, Sphere, 1987).
Tamir, Y., Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993).
Taylor, C., Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1985).
Taylor, C., ‘Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’, in N. Rosenblum (ed.),
Liberalism and the Modern Life (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1989).
Taylor, C., Sources of Self (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).
Taylor, C., ‘What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty’, in A. Ryan (ed.), The Idea of Freedom
(London, Oxford University Press), reprinted in D. Miller (ed.), Liberty (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1991).
Taylor, C., ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in A. Gutman (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining
‘The Politics of Recognition’ (Princeton, NJ, University Press, 1994, 2nd edn).
Taylor, C., ‘Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights’, in J. Bauer and D.A.
Bell (eds), The East Asian Challenge For Human Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1999).
Thompson, E.P., The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth, Penguin,
1965).
Thompson, J., Justice and World Order (London, Routledge, 1992).
236 Bibliography
Biblio  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 236
Tiebout, C., ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’, Journal of Political Economy, 64
(1956).
Tomasi, J., ‘Kymlicka, Liberalism and Respect for Cultural Minorities’, Ethics, 105 (1995).
Tronto, J., Moral Boundaries: The Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York, Rout-
ledge, 1993).
Tully, J., Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1995).
Turner, T., ‘Anthropology and Multiculturalism: What Is Anthropology that Multicul-
turalism Should Be Mindful of It?’, Cultural Anthropology, 8 (1993).
Van Parijs, P., Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1995).
Vincent, A., ‘The Character of Ecology’, Environmental Politics, 2:2 (1993).
Vincent, A., Modern Political Ideologies (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, 2nd edn).
Vincent, A. and Plant, R., Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship: The Life and Thought of the
British Idealists (Oxford, Blackwell, 1984).
Viroli, M., For Love of Country – an Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism (Oxford, Claren-
don Press, 1995).
Voet, R., Feminism and Citizenship (London, Sage, 1998).
Wacquant, L., Les prisons de la misère (Paris, Raisons d’Agir, 1999).
Walby, S., Theorizing Patriarchy (Oxford, Blackwell, 1990).
Waldron, J., ‘Introduction’, in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights (Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1984).
Waldron, J., ‘A Right to Do Wrong’, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991 (Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Waldron, J., ‘Can Communal Goods be Human Rights?’, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers
1981–1991 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Waldron, J., ‘Liberal Rights: Two Sides of the Coin’, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers
1981–1991 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Waldron, J., ‘Rights in Conflict’, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991 (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Waldron, J., ‘Special Ties and Natural Duties’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22 (1993).
Walker, B., ‘Plural Cultures, Contested Territories: A Critique of Kymlicka’, Canadian
Journal of Political Science, 30 (1997).
Walzer, M., Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1983).
Walzer, M., ‘Interpretation and Social Criticism’, in S.M. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lec-
tures on Human Values (Salt Lake City, UT, University of Utah Press, 1988).
Walzer, M., ‘Nation and Universe’, in G.B. Petersen (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human
Values (Salt Lake City, UT, University of Utah Press, 1989).
Walzer, M., Just and Unjust Wars (first published 1977) (New York, Basic Books, 1992,
2nd edn).
Walzer, M., Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).
Walzer, M., ‘Response’, in D. Miller and M. Walzer (eds), Pluralism, Justice and Equality
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995).
Walzer, M. and Dworkin, R. (1983), ‘Spheres of Justice, an Exchange’, New York Review of
Books, 21 July 1983.
Wayne, S.J., ‘President Bush Goes To War’, in S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology
of War (Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).
Bibliography 237
Biblio  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 237
Weale, A., Democracy (London, Macmillan, 1999).
Weber, M., Economy and Society, eds G. Roth and C. Wittich (New York, Bedminster Press,
1968).
Weber, M., Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London,
Routledge, 1991).
Weeks, J., Sexuality and its Discontents: Meaning, Myths and Modern Sexualities (London,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985).
Weintraub, J., ‘The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction’, in J. Weintraub
and K. Kumar (eds), Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand
Dichotomy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1997).
Weldon, T.D., The Vocabulary of Politics (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1953).
Wildasin, D.E., Urban Public Finance (Chicago, Harcourt Press, 1986).
Williams, B., ‘The Idea of Equality’, in B. Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1973).
Willoughby, W., Social Justice (New York, Knopf, 1900).
Wilson J.Q., Thinking About Crime (New York, Vintage, l971).
Wilson, J.Q. and Kelling, G., ‘Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety’,
Atlantic Monthly, March (1982).
Wilson, W.J., The Truly Disadvantaged (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987).
Yeatman, A., Postmodern Revisionings of the Political (New York, Routledge, 1994).
Young, I.M., Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University
Press, 1990).
Young, I.M., ‘Impartiality and the Civic Public’, in J. Landes (ed.), Feminism: The Public
and the Private (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998).
238 Bibliography
Biblio  23/1/03  7:52 am  Page 238
Alexander the Great 95
Anderson, B. 57
Appiah, K.A. 159
Aquinas, St Thomas 213–14, 219
Arendt, H. 55–6
Aristotle
on legitimacy 95–6, 97–9 passim
The Politics 95–6





on just war 213–14, 219
Bacon, F. 188
Barry, B.
on green political theory 184, 187,
190–1
on international justice 200–1, 
204
on multiculturalism 161–4
on Rawls, J. 31
on Walzer, M. 204–5
Bauman, Z. 65–6 passim
Beccaria, C. 67, 71
Beitz, C. 201
Bentham, J. 80, 196
Berlin, I. 5–9 passim
Bookchin, M. 190
Brennan, A. 191
Brown, C. 196–7 passim
Buchanan, J. 110
Canovan, M. 58










and collective agency 146–9
defined 145–9
and the distinctness of persons 
151–3
identification and dissociation 
149–50
Kukathas, C. on 154n.2
McMahon, C. on 154n.2
Mulhall, S. and Swift, A. on 154n.2
Nozick, R. on 151–3 passim
Poole, R. on 149
Rawls, J. on 151
Raz, J. on 146
Sandel, M. on 146




and punishment 67–8, 71
Coole, D. 136, 140–1
cosmopolitanism see international justice
crime see punishment
Index
Index  23/1/03  7:53 am  Page 239
Dahl, R. 107–10, 112
democracy 105–16
Arrow, K. on 109
Buchanan, J. and Tullock, G. on 110
Cohen, J. on 111–12
contestory 114–15
Dahl, R. on 107–10, 112
deliberative model of 111–14
interest-aggregating model of 107–11
Miller, D. on 109, 113
minimal view of 105–7
Owen, D. on 130n.15
Pettit, P. on 114–15
Przeworski, A. on 105–6








Hobbes, T. on 97
imperfect 24
international 198
and rights 18, 21
see also obligations
Eckersely, R. 183, 186–7
ecology see green political theory
Eisenstein, Z. 135
Elshtain, J.B. 138–9
environment see green political theory
equality
and gender 32
of opportunity 28–38 passim
Rawls, J. on 28–38
Etzioni, A. 77, 84
families 31–2
feminism
Coole, D. on 136, 140–1
Eisenstein, Z. on 135
Elshtain, J.B. on 138–9
Friedan, B. on 138
Okin, S.M. on 135–8 passim
Pateman, C. on 136–40 passim
Phillips, A. on 141–2
Young, I.M. on 138–9




Cohen, G.A. on 15n.16
constraints on 11–14
deprivation of 68
Hayek, F. von on 12–13, 126–7
Herman, B. on 27n.13
Humbold, W. von 7–8
internal constraints on 12
and libertarianism 12–14
Locke, J. on 11
Mill, J.S. on 7–8
natural social obstacles to 11–12
negative and positive 5–9
Oppenheim, F. on 15n.7
Rawls, J. on 33–5
Raz, J. on 165
republican 8–9
right to equal 17
Rousseau, J.-J. on 5–6
socialists and 12
Steiner, H. on 12–14
Taylor, C. on 14n.4
triadic relation 9–11







behavioural theories of 175–6
equality and 32
family and 170
Hobbes, T. on 173
homosexuality and 173, 176
malestream and 170–80 passim
performative theories of 178–9
Plato on 170–1
power theories of 176–7
sexual behaviour and 172–3
sexual politics and 173–4
social science and 172–3
see also feminism
240 Index





Goodin, R.E. 53–4, 184–6, 191–2
Graham, G. 200
Green, T.H. 78
green political theory 182–93
and anthropocentrism 183–4
Barry, B. on 191
Barry, J. on 184, 187, 190–1
Bookchin, M. on 190
communitarian naturalism 190
concept of nature 187–9
critiques of 189–92
deep anthropocentrism 184
Devall, B. on 183
Dryzek, J. on 184–5
Eckersely, R. on 183, 186–7
ecocentrism on 183–4 passim
first and second nature 190
Fox, W. on 183
Gaia hypothesis 183
Galileo on nature 188–9
Goodin, R.E. on 184–6, 191–2
inclusive wholes 185
Naess, A. on 183, 185
pliant anthropocentrism 184








Hart, H.L.A. 67, 71
Hayek, F. von
on freedom 12–13, 126–7
on punishment 124
on rights 123
The Road to Serfdom 122–3
on the rule of law 121–7





on civil science 96, 173
on the Fool 97–103 passim
and law 120–1
and legitimacy 96–103 passim
and obligations 41–4, 97




Barry, B. on 200–1, 204
Beitz, C. on 201–2
Bentham, J. on 196
Brown, C. on 196–7 passim
cosmopolitanism/universalism
197–202
Frost, M. on 197
Gewirth, A. on 206
Graham, G. on 200
Hardin, G. on 199–200
Hare, R.M. on 199
Jones, C. on 196
Kant, I. on 196
Miller, D. on 204
O’Neill, O. on 197, 206–7
and particularlism 206
Pogge, T. on 201–2
Rawls, J. on 201–3, 206
Shue, H. on 206
Singer, P. on 197–200
Steiner, H. on 202
Sutch, P. on 196
Thompson, J. on 196




Aquinas, St Thomas on 213–14, 219
Aron, R. on 220
Augustine, St on 213–14, 219
defined 212–5
Djilas, M. on 220
Guevara, C. on 219
ius ad bellum 214
ius in bello 214
Johnson, J.T. on 213
Index 241
Index  23/1/03  7:53 am  Page 241
and just conduct 214, 221–3
and just recourse 214–20
Osama bin Laden and 218
Pearse, P. on 219
Russell, F.H. on 212
justice
Kantian duties of 17
social justice 28–38
theories of social justice 84–6
Kant, I.
on agency and autonomy 184
and the categorical imperative 17,
24–6
and duties of justice 17–26 passim









Liberalism, Community and Culture 
156
Multicultural Citizenship 158–60
on public and private 132
law
and law-making 120, 127–9
rule-like nature of 120–7
see law, rule of
law, rule of 118–29
arbitrary rule 119–20, 124–5
Hayek, F. von on 121–7
Hobbes, T. on 120–1








Shklar, J. on 118
Skinner, Q. and Pettit, P. on 127
versus rule of persons 119
legitimacy 93–103
Aristotle on 95–6, 97–9 passim
Augustine, St on 96
Hobbes, T. on 96–103 passim
Locke, J. on 99–101
Rawls, J. on 102–3
Rousseau J-J. on 100–1







and social contract 71
on legitimacy 99–101
on national sovereignty 54
on obligations 41–4







on public and private 138
on welfare 78
Miller, D. 58–9, 109, 113
on international justice 204
on multiculturalism 160–1
Mulhall, S. 154n.2
multiculturalism 53, 128–9, 156–66
Appiah, K.A. on 159
Barry, B. on 161–4
and immigration 161
Kymlicka, W. on 156, 158–60
Miller, D. on 160–1
Parekh, B. on 160–1
and the politics of recognition 160–6
and rights 157–8
Tamir, Y. on 160–1
Tully, J. on 160–1
Young, I.M. on 160–1, 162
Munoz-Dardé, V. 32
Naess, A. 183, 185
nationalism 52–62
242 Index
Index  23/1/03  7:53 am  Page 242
Anderson, B. on 57
Arendt, H. on 55–6
Canovan, M. on 58
civic 55
and economic sovereignty 79–81
ethnic nationalism 55–6
Habermas, J. on 60–1
Ingram, A. on 61
the Jacobin tradition 56





Viroli, M. on 60–1
nation-states see nationalism
New World Order 211
Nietzsche, F. 221
Nozick, R. 151–3 passim





and consent theory 41–4
Hobbes, T. on 41–4
Locke, J. on 41–4
moral versus general grounds for 
47
Rawls, J. on 50nn.4–5, 50n.6









Pateman, C. 136–40 passim
Pearse, P. 219










private sphere see public and private
Przeworski, A. 105–6
public and private 131–42
Aristotle on 132–3
Coole, D. on 136, 140–1
defined 131–3
Eisenstein, Z. on 135
Elshtain, J.B. on 138–9
feminist critiques of 132–42
four approaches to 136–7
Friedan, B. on 138
Habermas, J. on 139
Kymlicka, W. on 132
Mill, J.S. on 138
Okin, S. M. on 135–8 passim
Pateman, C. on 136–40 passim
Phillips, A. on 141–2
Young, I.M. on 138–9
public sphere see public and private
public–private split see public and private
punishment 65–75
and actuarial criminal policy 71–4
and social groups 71–4
Bauman, Z. on 65–6 passim
Beccaria, C. on 67
Castel, R. on 69
and character 68–9
and deprivation of liberty 68
disintegration theory 71
Foucault, M. on 68
Garland, D. on 65
Gloz, P. on 74
Hart, H.L.A. on 67
Hayek, F. von on 124
insurance strategy 72
Kelling, G. on 70–1
and libertarianism 71–4
and penitence 68
and poverty 65–7, 69
Rawls, J. on 67
and rehabilitation 68–70
and risk distribution 71–4
and social contract 67–8, 71
Index 243
Index  23/1/03  7:53 am  Page 243
and social control 65–9 passim
and Thatcher, M. 73
Wacquant, L. on 65
Weber, M. on 66
and welfare 69
Wilson, J.Q. on 70–1
and zero tolerance 70–1
Rawls, J.
A Theory of Justice 29–30, 38
on allegiance 53–4
on Barry, B. 31




individual and community 151
on international justice 201–3, 206
The Law of Peoples 203
on legitimacy 102–3
on obligations 50n.4–5, 50n.6
Political Liberalism 35, 38
principles of justice 29–30
on the priority of liberty 33–4
on punishment 67
on welfare 77–81 passim
Raz, J. 17, 20, 146, 165
rights 16–26
the basis/content distinction 18
content of 17–18
context sensitivity 19
and criminality 65, 67
and duties 18, 21
Hayek, F. von on 123
interest-based (IB) approach 16–26
and Kantian duties of justice 17–26
passim
multicultural 157–8
non-interference and 17–19 passim,
27n.13
O’Neill, O. on 18–24
prima facie 18–19
Raz, J. on 17, 20
Rechtsstaat 121
rights-respecting institutions 20
rule of law 129
Taylor, C. on 203
universal versus special 20







and national sovereignty 54
on political community 111






























United Nations Declaration of Human
Rights 21









Barry, B. on 204
and international justice 204–5
Just and Unjust Wars 205








communities of choice 77–81, 84–5
Etzioni, A. on 84
Green, T.H. on 78
Mill, J.S. on 78
neo-Hegelians on 78
Rawls, J. on 77–81 passim
and social exclusion 81–4
and socially reproductive work 87–8
Walzer, M. on 78
Wilson, J.Q. 70–1
Young, I.M. 138–9, 160–2
zero tolerance 70–1
Index 245
Index  23/1/03  7:53 am  Page 245
